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2ABSTRACT
This thesis explores how low-income women in Cairo respond to gender 
inequalities in their daily lives, both in the household and in the informal labour 
market. The aim is to generate knowledge about the diversity of gender relations 
and ideologies in the Egyptian context and to contribute to broader theoretical 
debates regarding gender and resistance, with a view to informing both policy 
and feminist activism. The thesis argues that a modified concept of “everyday 
forms of resistance” provides a way forward for a more nuanced and 
contextualized understanding of women's responses to their positions of relative 
subordination, than do either Marxist approaches to power and consciousness, 
or the a-historical usage of the notion of patriarchy.
The study is based on participant observation and in-depth interviews in 
four low-income neighbourhoods in Cairo over a period of 15 months. Within the 
household, research focused on four specific arrangements: pre-marital 
expectations, marriage negotiations, sexuality, and intra-household decision 
making. With the labour market, two types of women’s work were explored: 
home-based piece-work, and waged work in small-scale workshops. The links 
between women’s options in workplace and in the household were examined.
Results of this exploratory study show that women's perceptions and 
responses are varied, complex, contradictory and in continuous flux as they 
interact with broader socio-economic conjunctures. Women displayed both 
defiance and compliance, both a lack of articulated awareness of their self- 
interest, and high levels of awareness of some of the injustices against them as 
women. Sometimes, their actions were pragmatic seeking immediate relief. At 
other times, they sought more medium or longer-term gains. In some instances, 
they acted individually and covertly and at other times they acted collectively and 
articulated their discontent forcefully. Any single conclusion about women’s 
agency would thus be erroneous. Attempts to advance women’s interests are 
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9A Note on Transliteration
The system of transliteration used in this thesis is a modified version of 
that recommended by the International Journal of Middle East Studies. The 
modifications are due to my desire to be faithful to colloquial Egyptian 
pronunciations and local dialects, rather than classical Arabic pronunciations. 
Some modifications have also been necessary for ease of printing and to 
facilitate reading for the non-specialist.
All transliterated words are in italics throughout the thesis, except for 
those which are now part of the English vocabulary and found in standard 
English dictionaries, such as sheikh or Quran. Arabic names of persons and 
places are also not in Italics. Only Arabic singulars are used; plurals are 
denoted by the addition of an (s). The transliteration does not differentiate 
between emphatic and non-emphatic sounds.
All diacritical marks are deleted with the exception of the letter ayn and 
the glottal stop, the hamza, when it appears in the middle of a word. The ayn 
is denoted by the mark c  . The hamza is denoted by the mark => . The long 
high back vowel is denoted by uu. The long high front vowel is denoted by ii. 
The long low vowel is denoted by aa. The short high front vowel (kasra) is 
denoted by the letter i; the short low vowel (fat-ha) by the letter a; and the 
short high back vowel (dama) by the letter u. A dash is placed between two 
consonants, which are meant to be pronounced separately but could be 
confused for another sound if kept adjacent. For example, fat-ha, nas-ha.
The modifications made to accommodate the Egyptian dialect are 
noted below. Where there is more than one transliteration for a letter, this 
indicates a regional difference in dialect.
i l =  cJi
G= TL
DorZ = j c j i
T or S = r£u
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INTRODUCTION: A PERSONAL TRAJECTORY
How do iow-income women in Cairo experience, perceive, respond to, 
and negotiate gender relations and hierarchies in their daily lives, both in the 
household and at the workplace? This is the main question with which this 
thesis is concerned. The reasons why I felt compelled to seek answers to 
this question in the first place, however, may be a story worth telling, as it 
chronicles a personal and intellectual journey of discovery which started over 
13 years ago.
In 1985, I returned to Cairo, the city where I was born and bred, from 
the United States of America, where I had lived for two years to pursue a 
Masters degree in the Sociology of Development, eager to apply my recently 
acquired knowledge and skills. I was particularly interested in finding a job 
which would allow me to work on a daily basis in poor neighbourhoods 
around Cairo, which I only had glimpses of as I was growing up.
I would not have defined myself as a feminist then. Although I was 
immersed in the Women in Development (WID) literature as a graduate 
student, gender issues were not central to my concerns. Nor was I 
particularly aware of how gender structures poverty and how poverty, in turn, 
may influence and shape gender relations, gender interests, and gender 
hierarchies. In fact, my Master's thesis constituted an excellent example of a 
rather gender blind approach to the analysis of the social organisation of 
irrigation in an Egyptian village.
A few weeks after my return to Cairo, I was offered a unique 
opportunity to fulfil my desire to practice development and deepen my first­
hand knowledge and understanding of poverty. Between 1985-1987, I 
worked in one of Egypt's poorest and most marginalized communities, the 
traditional garbage collectors', zabbaiiin, settlement in Muqattam which lies
11
on the Eastern fringes of the city of Cairo.1 This is an experience I will 
always treasure as, much more than graduate studies, it has taught me what 
development is truly about, as well as what it could and should be about.2
I spent the first six months of my assignment participating in the daily 
lives of men and women in the zabbaiiin community. This constituted an 
unstructured and informal research process, in the course of which I sought 
to understand power relations within the community and different people's 
concerns, priorities and needs so as to initiate an appropriate programmatic 
response. The zabbaiiin had a strict and visible gender division of labour. 
Men were responsible for collecting household garbage from around the city 
and bringing it back to the settlement in their donkey carts. Women were 
responsible for hand sorting the garbage into organic and inorganic waste. 
Organic waste was then fed to the pigs which the zabbaiiin raise, and 
inorganic waste, such as plastic, glass, and tin, was recycled (EQI, 1987).
As my relations with the community deepened, however, I began to 
realise that the community was also differentiated in more subtle and less 
visible ways, and that gender was a central axis of this differentiation. Men 
and women within the same household often had divergent concerns, 
priorities and expenditure patterns, voiced different needs and interests, and 
expressed their grievances and concerns through disparate means. 
Moreover, men's and women's relationships and access to some of the 
central institutions and networks in the community, such as the church, the 
community development association, local offices of the Ministry of Social
1 This was in the context of an integrated community development program, 
implemented by Environmental Quality International (EQI), an Egyptian non­
governmental Consultancy Organisation. I remain indebted to EQl's director, Dr. 
Mounir Neamatalla, who encouraged my keen interest in learning about poverty 
and provided me with the intellectual support and flexibility to pursue my interests.
2 The concept of "development" has been the subject of increasing controversy and 
debate over the past decade. There has been an increasing recognition of the 
limitations of early conceptualisation of development as a linear process, as well 
as the overly technocratic, apolitical, top down, and fragmented approaches to 
improving human welfare through the vehicle of "development projects". For a 
critique of development discourse and practices, see Ferguson (1990); Hobart
(1993); Hancock, (1989).
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Affairs, informal employment and saving networks, and so forth, varied 
significantly.
My observations found confirmation in an emerging literature from a 
number of developing countries which suggested that women and men had 
differential access to, and control over social, economic and political 
resources within their households and communities. Cross cultural studies 
documenting how gender influences intra-household bargaining and access 
to resources has multiplied since the mid-eighties (Whitehead, 1981, Young 
et al, 1981; Jones, 1986; Hoodfar, 1990; Roldan, 1988; Bruce and Dwyer; 
1988, Guyer and peters, 1987; Haddad et al, 1995; Bryceson, 1995).
My attention soon focused on a particular category of zabbaiiin 
households, those for whom women were the main breadwinners. My 
discussions and observations suggested that these households had 
particularly pressing problems, and constituted some of the poorest and most 
vulnerable in the settlement. According to local estimates, about 30% of all 
households in the settlement were solely or mainly economically maintained 
by women. These were either widowed, married to disabled/sick men, 
deserted by their husbands, or married to husbands who were not fully 
providing for the family. Despite their numbers and relative disadvantage, 
women-headed households, however, were largely disregarded by the other 
development projects being implemented in the zabbaiiin community at the 
time. As elsewhere in the early eighties, women-headed households in Egypt 
remained an "ignored factor in development planning" (Buvinic and Youssef, 
1978).
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In an attempt to address this issue, I embarked on a participatory 
planning process3 in the zabbaiiin settlement that culminated in the design 
and implementation of a credit and technical assistance project for women- 
headed households.4 The aim of the project was to enable this particular 
category of women to both improve their earning capacity, as well as 
enhance their self-confidence and life options. To alleviate some of the 
gender specific constraints which poor women faced in accessing credit, the 
project required no collateral or guarantees, either in the form of the 
signature of a man, or the possession of an identity card, as was the case 
with practically all other credit programs in Egypt at that time.5
In the mid-eighties in Egypt, there were no national statistics or 
analyses of women who were financially supporting their households, and 
there was little public interest in the issue. In fact, I remember being met with 
scepticism by some researchers, activists and government officials when I 
tried to argue that women-headed households may indeed be an important 
issue to study and a potentially vulnerable group in Egyptian society at large. 
The major obstacle seemed to be a deeply entrenched view of the 
"traditional" Egyptian family casting the man as breadwinner, and a prevailing
3 Participation, now a central concept in development discourse, was introduced in 
the late 1970's partly in reaction to the failure of many large-scale, top down 
development projects. The emphasis on consultation with local community 
members, including women, throughout the design, implementation and monitoring 
of development programs constituted the backbone of this 'alternative' approach to 
development. However, several studies have shown the huge gap between the 
rhetoric and the practice of participation and the inherent tensions in such a 
concept. Participation is often used as a means to achieve project efficiency and 
pass on development costs to beneficiaries, rather than an end in itself aimed at 
empowering communities to set the agenda and take control over their own lives. 
For a critique of the concept, highlighting the benefits and misuses of participatory 
processes in development see Mayoux (1995) and Nelson and Wright (1994). 
For a discussion of the history of the concept, see Cohen and Uphoff (1980).
4 The potential and limitations of credit as a development tool for alleviating poverty 
and "empowering" women has been the subject of much debate. For a recent 
critique see Goetz and Gupta (1996).
5 The project also organised women into "solidarity groups", inspired by the 
internationally acclaimed Grameen Bank model in Bangladesh, and building on the 
traditional informal credit and saving associations, garrfiyya($), which were 
common among women in the community. The project was funded by the Ford 
Foundation and OXFAM. For details see EQI (1987).
14
gender ideology that closely linked maleness and masculinity with the ability 
to provide financial support (Rugh, 1984, Hoodfar, 1990; Nadim, 1985). The 
existence of large numbers of women-headed households challenged this 
ideology in a radical way, and put into question the range of state policies 
and laws—from social security, to personal status laws-, which are largely 
based on the ideology of the male breadwinner.
Moreover, the suggestion that these women were particularly 
vulnerable and not adequately supported by their wider kin group, threatened 
idealised images of the solidarity of the extended Egyptian family. This 
"public transcript" about the family is an item of national pride for many 
people, and a central feature assumed to distinguish Egyptians from the 
"West", whose weak familial relations are popularly invoked as the cause of 
its presumed moral decay. Surely this was an issue which may be of concern 
to black families in the United States I was told by several researchers, but it 
was not a development priority for us in Egypt. I quickly learnt, as Eickleman 
and Piscatori suggest in their discussion of the family in the Middle East, that 
"the idea of the family is so central that only with difficulties do societies alter 
its conventional images and public forms....Pressures to change the official 
and often legally endorsed view of family and familial roles is often regarded
with great suspicion The family provides a powerful idiom for expressing
core national and religious values" (1996:83-84).
I was too close to what was going on in the zabbaiiin community, 
however, to be swayed by the scepticism that I was encountering. Despite 
the lack of statistics documenting the phenomenon of female headship at the 
time, my fieldwork among the zabbaiiin and subsequently in other slum areas 
in Cairo, strengthened my conviction of the existence of a significant number 
of households supported by women. I also became more aware of how 
gender relations and family roles may be rapidly changing in response to 
broader societal transformations. Although ignored in Egypt, recognition of 
the phenomenon of female supported households was gradually increasing 
within the international development community in the light of research in a 
number of developing countries. This provided me with important
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ammunition, although I was not then aware of all the literature on the subject 
(see for example, Buvinic and Youssef, 1978; Bolak, 1990; Harris, 1993; 
Merrick and Schmink, 1983; Rosenhouse, 1989; Shanthi, 1996; Chant, 1991; 
1997).6
Not only were women breadwinners in the communities I was involved 
in particularly vulnerable and thus deserving of specific development 
assistance, but exposing their reality also seemed to me an excellent 
opportunity to challenge patriarchal legal structures in Egypt more broadly, by 
questioning the basic assumptions on which they are based. For instance, 
inheritance laws stipulating that a man has the right to inherit twice that 
allowed for a woman, on the basis that men are the main breadwinners, can 
be seriously put into question by a socio-economic reality where women may 
be increasingly becoming the main financial providers of their families.
The seeds of the central issues with which this thesis is concerned 
were sown during those early years of working with women-headed 
households at the zabbaiiin settlement, and have matured and evolved over 
the decade that followed. When I left the zabbaiiin community in 1987, I had 
become a self-defined feminist, had developed a keen appreciation of the 
extent to which poverty is gendered, and was sceptical about the 
conventional image of the Egyptian family that casts men as sole 
breadwinners. As a response, I became a founding member of the 
Association for the Development and Enhancement of Women (ADEW), an 
organisation whose aim is to support households in Cairo where women are 
the main breadwinners. Founding ADEW with a group of like-minded 
professional men and women in 1989, in many ways provided me with the
6 Several researchers in Egypt have recently addressed the issue of women-headed 
households, particularly as it relates to poverty. See for example, Fergany 
(1994b). Moreover, the issue has received some recent media attention (El Wafd 
Newspaper, 15 October (1997); Sabah el Khelr magazine, July (1997).
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necessary institutional base and intellectual support to pursue the issues I 
was interested in.7
As I continued my work as a professional involved in development 
programs with a number of international agencies in Egypt, I carried out 
extensive fieldwork and my experiences and knowledge of low-income 
neighbourhoods in both rural and urban areas increased. So did my 
understanding and awareness of gender issues. As a volunteer board 
member of ADEW, I became much more involved in the debates between 
various women's groups in Egypt, and joined, both as an individual and as a 
women's NGO representative, in the various organised activities and 
campaigns that aimed to challenge gender inequalities. These debates and 
campaigns had intensified significantly in the early 1990's partly in response 
to the International United Nations Conferences on Population and 
Development held in Cairo in 1994 and the United Nations conference on 
women held in China in 1995 (see Egyptian NGO platforms of action, 1994; 
1995).
As my involvement in the "women's movement" grew, so did my own 
awareness of broader issues and debates among feminists. This fuelled my 
willingness and ability to more radically challenge patriarchal structures and 
ideas both at a personal and public level. However, I also became 
increasingly uncomfortable with the, often significant, discrepancies, that I 
began to detect between the types of issues, priorities and visions that were 
shaping the most vocal feminist agendas in Egypt, and the concerns, 
struggles and priorities of the poorer women that I was working in a variety of 
development programs. The issue of "political participation" was a 
particularly nagging one for me.
Increasing women's "political participation" was identified as an 
important priority by feminists in Egypt (as elsewhere), and campaigns to
7 ADEW's activities are modelled after the zabbaiiin project mentioned earlier. 
ADEW was the first, and remains the only, private voluntary women's group whole 
sole concern is empowering women supporting their households, primarily through 
improving their access to financial and legal services. For a discussion of ADEW's 
Philosophy and activities, see Women-headed Households in Egypt: a Panel 
discussion (1994); El-Kholy (1996b).
17
raise less privileged women's awareness about the importance of 
participation in formal elections at the parliamentary and local government 
levels were launched in the 1990's. Registering women, and issuing voting 
cards for them was as an important feminist tactic and a special organisation, 
HODA, was set up for that purpose in 1994.
For the many poor women I worked with at the zabbaiiin community, as 
well as subsequently in other communities, however, politics was not about 
voting in the elections. Rather, it was partly about negotiating access to 
resources from a state bureaucracy that was biased against them both as 
women and as illiterates.8 The type of card many low-income women in the 
zabbaiiin and other communities were most in need of, and which many were 
unsuccessfully struggling to obtain due to a host of complicated bureaucratic 
regulations and ideological constraints, was not a voting registration card, but 
a more basic personal identity card, bitaqa shaksia. For many poor women, 
significantly more so than for poor men, possessing such a card was literally 
in the order of an unattainable dream.
Yet, identity cards have an important symbolic value for women as a 
way of asserting their citizenship and identity as responsible and independent 
human beings. Moreover, an identity card also has a direct practical value 
for poor women as it provides an important avenue for participation in the 
politics of survival. An identity card is essential to enable a woman to access 
state subsidies and pensions, to register her children in schools, or raise a
81 am not at all suggesting that political participation and attempts to register women 
for elections is not an important area of intervention and that the efforts in this 
regard are laudable. My point is only to suggest that it reflects the legitimate 
priorities of only a certain group of women.
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complaint at a police station, if beaten up by her husband.9 The possession 
of an identity card at its core thus appeared to me to be an issue of equal 
citizenship  between men and women, and represented both a political as 
well as a pragmatic concern. However, until recently, when ADEW took up 
the issue in its campaigns, the symbolic, strategic and practical importance of 
identity cards for low-income women had been completely ignored by 
activists. Voting cards were on the agenda, but identity cards were not This 
clearly pointed to divergent priorities among different categories of women in
Egypt-
The research interests behind this thesis thus partly stem from my 
dissatisfaction with our ability to formulate a feminist agenda broad and 
diverse enough to accommodate and reflect the interests and central 
concerns of women across class boundaries. I started to wonder whether 
our guiding agendas in the women's movement were perhaps circumscribed 
by our own class circumstances as middle and upper class educated women, 
and whether our strategies, visions and assumptions were dependent on our 
own social locations and lived realities, locations and realities quite different 
from those of the majority of women in the country.
I also became increasingly uncomfortable with the discourse and 
assumptions underlying the various policies and programs developed by 
governments, NGOs and international agencies to "empower" women. I 
began to realise that these were sometimes based on a-historical and de-
9 Boys are required by law to obtain an identity card at the age of 16. Girls, 
however, are not, and few are encouraged to do so. The underlying assumption is 
that women do not need a separate identity as theirs is tied to their fathers and 
later their husbands. Women face many obstacles in obtaining individual cards. 
The process, if successful, can take up to one year. To own an identity card, you 
need a birth certificate, which many women do not have and which is difficult to 
get. You also need access to two government officials who know you in person 
and who are willing to stamp your papers. You need to have access to a clinic to 
get a blood test. You need to have access to a police station. All of this requires 
time, energy, knowledge, and the ability to break through to the gatekeepers of 
these various bureaucracies, who are usually unsympathetic, and often 
intimidating male officials who uphold prevalent gender ideologies regarding 
women's roles and identities. The process also requires money, in some cases up 
to 200 Egyptian pounds. As a result, in the worst case scenario, and there are 
many women in this situation, an identity card remains an unattainable dream (see 
El-Kholy, 1996b).
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contextualized assumptions about women's and men's lives, devoid of a class 
perspective and thus often not reflecting the lived realities of poor families. 
Some aspects of my concern had to do specifically with the policy focus on 
an "ideal", and I would venture to say quite middle class, model of the 
household as one composed of a married couple with a male provider. My 
early experience in the zabbaiiin settlement discussed earlier had already 
suggested that this was often a fallacy.
Other aspects of my concerns had to do with the assumptions 
underlying some of the more academic work on gender relations in the 
Middle East. I was dissatisfied with what I saw as the two polarities in 
academic writing on gender relations and women's agency; some studies 
were depicting women as utterly oppressed and devoid of agency, (see 
Tapper,1979; Ahmed,1982); while others were celebrating their hidden or 
informal power, strength and solidarity (AITorki, 1986; Aswad,1978; Early, 
1993,a,b). As is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, these 
studies seemed to offer polarised theoretical assumptions regarding power, 
subordination and women's agency.
My years of experience at the grass roots suggested to me that women 
are often engaged in a complex process of negotiation at a micro-level in 
their daily lives. The low-income women I worked with seemed neither 
unqualifiably "passive" objects of oppression, nor were they powerful agents 
who exercised authority and agency, and who "have it all together" (Early, 
1993b), as they have been often depicted in those two extremes of the 
research spectrum. I thus felt compelled to find ways to manoeuvre between 
those two images of women. I wanted to contribute to a better understanding 
of what women's daily struggles and conflicts were about, what they were 
saying about their lives and priorities, how they were saying it, and how their 
concerns and responses varied based on their life cycles. This seemed to me 
a way to better understand how gendered forms of power operate at a micro­
level. My questions were multiple but interrelated: To what extent and in 
what ways were women trying to challenge aspects of their unequal 
relationships with men? Which aspects were they not contesting and why?
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I had a hunch, fuelled by my earlier observations, which suggested to 
me that women may indeed be discontented, speak about the desire for 
change, and challenge at least some aspects of gender relations and 
ideologies, but in a "coded" language. The only way to verify this hunch was 
to carry out in-depth and contextualized research using a methodology that 
would enable me to pay close attention to women's narratives, expressed 
both in public and in private, and to local expressions and idioms through 
which they may express daily forms of discontent.
Focusing only on women's narratives and experiences, however, 
carries the danger of "naturalising" the concept of experience or taking it at 
face value, assuming a one to one correspondence between words and 
things, and ignoring the constructed and discursive character of experience 
itself (Scott, 1992). Just as importantly as listening to women's narratives 
and experiences, I thus realised that I would need to examine closely the 
often conflicting realities and discourses which inform women's experiences 
and structures their visions and identities in specific physical, socio-economic 
and historical contexts. Moreover, since ideas about gender and power 
relations are best revealed through concrete daily interactions and specific 
activities (see Agarwal, 1994; Loizos and Papataxiarchis, 1991a), I would 
also need to carefully observe women and men's actual daily practices and 
social arrangements. This is precisely what I ended up doing over 15 months 
between July 1995 and October 1996 in several low-income communities in 
Cairo. The outcome of this endeavour constitutes the backbone of this 
thesis.
The impetus behind the thesis thus comes from a long journey of 
discovery about poverty, gender, power, and the possibilities of social 
change. My general aim is to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of 
the dynamics of gender relations (as reflected in the daily interactions and 
concrete social arrangements between men and women) and gender 
ideologies (beliefs and values about masculinity and femininity), in a low- 
income "community" in Cairo, Egypt. My focus, however, is primarily on 
women, and specifically on the ways in which low-income women at different
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points in their life course experience, cope with and respond to gender 
inequalities both in the family and at the workplace.
The specific objectives of the thesis are fourfold. The first is 
generating knowledge about the diversity of gender relations in the Egyptian 
family in the context of relative paucity of information. Despite some recent 
nuanced studies (Ghanem, 1996; Singerman, 1995), knowledge based on 
stereotypes inspired by orientalist notions of the family on the one hand, and 
a-historical feminist notions of patriarchy, on the other, remains widespread. 
In a recent book, Tucker (1993) emphasised the lack of ethnographic material 
on the family in the Arab world. "Although the importance of the family and 
the daily construction of gender roles and relations is not questioned, we 
actually know very little about the on-going evolution of the family in any 
specific context. There has been a tendency to assume the existence of a 
"traditional" family, a family defined and regulated by Islamic law that has 
remained unchanged" (Tucker, 1993: 12).
Moreover, urban ethnographies in general, and those related to 
gender in particular, are scarce in Middle Eastern anthropology, in 
comparison to those dealing with nomadic or rural populations. In Egypt for 
example, although 50% of the population now lives in cities, no more than a 
handful of urban ethnographies exist addressing gender issues over the past 
decade; the majority of those have been carried out by American and 
European anthropologists. In an annotated bibliography of urbanisation 
studies in Egypt produced by the National Centre for Sociological and 
Criminological Research in 1990, none of the 250 citations addressed gender 
issues. (Fergany, 1993). My study is thus set against a context of relative 
paucity of research.
The second objective is contributing to theoretical debates related to 
gender and resistance. More specifically my research aims to inform 
debates, in both the anthropological and the broader feminist literature, 
regarding the ways in which women’s gender interests are formed, and how 
their strategies for expressing discontent and negotiating gender-based 
power relations, are modified and inflected by their specific socio-economic
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locations. Despite the growing literature on power relations and resistance 
strategies, few have specifically addressed gender issues (Abu-Lughod, 
1990a; O'Hanlon, 1991; Agarwal, 1994). Moreover, although several studies 
have carefully documented the life cycle changes in women's lives, and how 
these affect their relative power positions (Rassam, 1980, Morsy, 1978, 
Taylor, 1984), unqualified and universal statements casting women as a 
group, as passive subjects unaware of their oppression, “continue to hold 
sway” (Agarwal, 1994:422; see also Mohanty, 1988).
The third objective is contributing to the formulation of a more 
comprehensive feminist agenda that is more sensitive to differences among 
women. This agenda should accommodate class differences and cultural 
diversity, without losing its basic philosophical commitment to human rights 
and social justice; an agenda that can "avoid the dual pitfalls of 
ethnocentrism and unprincipled relativism" (Kandiyoti, 1995:29). And, I would 
also add, one that can avoid the pitfall of elitism and class bias as well. 
Although feminist scholarship in other parts of the world has taken on the 
issue of class on board (Rowbotham, 1981; Ramazangiu, 1989;) attempting 
to look specifically at how poverty and patriarchy intersect (Greely, 1983) and 
examine the "crossroads of class and gender" (Beneria and Roldan, 1987), 
the relationships between poverty and gender concerns has not been central 
to the debates amongst women activists and researchers in Egypt. In the 
short run, the research thus aims at informing theoretical debates regarding 
women's rights, interests and demands in Egypt, as well as providing NGO 
and women's activists with insights into the perceptions, practices, priorities 
and organising mechanisms of low-income women.
The fourth objective is to generate policy relevant data which may be 
used to challenge prevailing, unexamined assumptions about gender 
relations which currently inform policy and programmatic interventions. In 
Egypt, many such policies appear to have been based either on stereotypical 
assumptions about women's and men’s roles, or on empirical realities 
uncritically transposed from very different regions or cultural contexts. In a 
recent review article on women, work and well-being in the Middle East,
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Papps (1992) concludes that: "we are very far from having sufficient
knowledge to implement effective policy or even to evaluate existing policies" 
(1992: 595).
The thesis is organised along topical themes. The first chapter 
discusses the theoretical framework that has guided the research. I critically 
review some of the debates on power, gender and resistance and argue that 
a modified and gendered concept of "every day forms of resistance" provides 
a way forward to a more nuanced and historically grounded analysis of 
gender relations. The second chapter provides an overview of some of the 
macro-level socio-economic and political influences that Egypt has witnessed 
over the past two decades. My purpose in doing so is to contextualize the 
results of the fieldwork and thus enable the reader to better interpret and 
understand the more micro-level processes in the chapters that follow. The 
third chapter provides the Cairo and community level contexts of my 
research. I provide an overview of the historical development of the city of 
Cairo, followed by a general description of the research setting and a profile 
of the study community and research sample. The fourth chapter provides a 
situated and reflective account of fieldwork encounters. I also justify my 
methodological approach and discuss the specific research tools adopted.
The following five chapters present the results of the fieldwork and 
analysis of my data. Each chapter deals with a particular set of social 
arrangements where gender relations and ideologies are explored; some 
chapters refer to women as members of their families and households, while 
others deal with work relations and with women as paid workers. Chapter 
five is concerned with pre-marital expectations and standards. It explores 
how girls are prepared to assume their central roles as wives, mothers and 
sexual partners, and how decisions regarding choice of spouse are 
negotiated. The chapter highlights several gendering processes such as 
female circumcision and menstruation.
Chapter six discusses marriage negotiations and transactions. The 
focus is on specific practices, such as accumulation of the gihaaz, marriage 
trousseau, and insisting on writing an ayma, marriage inventory, through
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which women attempt to gain more secure entitlements in marital property 
and to mitigate their perceived vulnerability in marriage. Chapter seven 
discusses the role of gender in structuring earnings, conditions of work and 
women's options in the informal labour market, focusing on two types of 
female employment: piece-work and waged work. The chapter highlights how 
the convergence of marital trajectories, the phase of a woman's life cycle, 
supply and demand factors, and the usage of kinship idioms, result in 
different forms of acquiescence, accommodation and overt protest in work 
relations.
Chapter eight concentrates on negotiations within the conjugal union, 
and highlights women's responses to their husbands' demand for sex. The 
chapter also illustrates how women voice their grievances and articulate their 
discontent, sometimes overtly, and sometimes covertly through the idiom of 
spirit possession. Chapter nine discusses intra-household decision making 
and analyses areas of dissent between husbands and wives, such as 
decisions related to the education of daughters, and how these are resolved. 
The chapter also discusses the role of extra-household networks in enabling 
women to gain more leverage within the conjugal union.
In their totality, the chapters of this thesis thus provide insights into the 
ways in which different groups of low-income Cairene women juggle the 
contradictions in their daily lives. Such insights aim at enriching theoretical 
debates regarding how gender inequalities are produced, reproduced and 
transformed. They also seek to expand the knowledge base regarding low- 
income women's priorities, practices, and strategies with a view to informing 
both activist and policy agendas in Egypt. Finally, the insights generated 
raise a number of questions about poverty, gender, power and social change 
that merit further investigation.
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CHAPTER ONE 
RETHINKING APPROACHES TO RESISTANCE, POWER AND GENDER 
RELATIONS: TOWARDS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
My interest in understanding how gender relations and inequalities are 
negotiated at a micro-level in the daily practices of low-income women and 
men in Cairo has necessitated that I explore the relationship between two key 
concepts, power and gender. Despite the centrality of both concepts to 
feminist scholarship, "the precise nature of this relationship remains 
shadowy" (Oldersma and Davis, 1991:1). I have ventured to examine the 
connections between power and gender by focusing on a third concept, that 
of resistance. I argue that a focus on how women negotiate unequal power 
relations both in the family and in the work place offers a promising avenue 
for better understanding how gender inequalities are produced, reproduced, 
and transformed.
The purpose of this chapter is thus to elaborate upon the various ways 
in which resistance has been conceptualised, and to discuss the two other 
central concepts which inform this thesis namely, gender and power. I 
specifically argue that a modified and gendered version of Scott's notion of 
'everyday forms of resistance' (Scott, 1985; 1986; 1990) is a particularly 
useful tool for analysing gender relations at the micro-level.
The concept of "everyday forms of resistance", coined by Scott in 
1985, captures a wide range of behaviour and actions of subordinate groups, 
ranging between open, collective revolt and passive consent. These include 
actions such as foot dragging, evasion, avoidance protest, sabotage, gossip, 
slander, and feigned ignorance. Such an approach to resistance, which 
focuses on the daily, often covert and non-co-ordinated practices of 
subordinate groups allows us to view resistance as a shifting continuum of 
practices, which must be empirically investigated in specific socio-economic 
and historical contexts. This approach also promises to significantly further
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our understanding of both the mechanisms of power as well as the potential 
agency of those in positions of relative disadvantage.
Women, particularly in the Middle East, have often been portrayed as 
either passive and unwary victims of oppression, or as strong and powerful 
actors. I term these two polarised depictions found in much of the 
anthropological literature on the Middle East, the "oppression" and "strength" 
strands. On the one hand, there is a large body of research influenced by 
orientalist stereotypes which largely depict women in the Middle East as 
submissive, oppressed victims (see Tapper, 1979; Ahmed, 1982). On the 
other hand- and partly in reaction to the former- there is a plethora of 
studies that present women as active, powerful and resourceful actors 
(AITorki, 1986, Aswad, 1978, Early, 1993a,b).
The problems with the former approach, and orientalism more 
generally, have been well rehearsed elsewhere (see for example, Ahmed, 
1982). The problem with the latter type of approach is the common confusion 
between women's activity and their power or authority (see Okely, 1991). 
Being active is not the same as being of equal value. Women may be 
economically active and outspoken, and at the same time subordinate, and 
bound by many constraints, which limit their choices. My concern is thus not 
to reveal women's informal power as some of these latter studies have done 
so well. Rather, my aim is to render more visible some of their daily acts of 
resistance against perceived injustices in specific contexts, as well as to 
achieve a better understanding of their lack of contestation in other contexts.
I argue that an approach to resistance based on covert and individual actions 
has the potential for providing a more complex and textured account of 
relations between men and women.
Focusing on women's every day acts of resistance promises to not 
only further our understanding of gendered forms of power, but is of potential 
value for developing policies and strategies for social change as well. An 
understanding of the potentially consequential acts of everyday resistance is 
an essential complement to the emerging scholarly focus on women's formal 
organisations as a major site of protest against gender inequalities. Low-
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income, largely illiterate women, who constitute the majority of women, have 
neither the time nor the skills to engage with formal women's organisations, 
and rarely do. Their voices of protest, their daily grievances, struggles and 
strategies, which should be the essential building blocks for the work of 
formal women's groups, are thus rarely noticed or taken into account by 
activists. Low-income women's voices even more rarely inform theories of 
power and resistance. Ethnographies guided by a theoretical approach that 
stresses the place of resistance in the construction of everyday gender 
relations would thus address an important theoretical and political gap.
Assumptions and Definitions:
I want to declare at the outset the basic presuppositions, intellectual, 
and political interests and value judgements that I hold and which underlie my 
interest in the concept of resistance. I start from a feminist perspective. 
Simply stated, this is both a recognition of the importance of gender in 
structuring social relations and thus "a concern with the political, economic, 
and cultural implications of systems of gender for women," (Abu-Lughod, 
1993:27), as well as a commitment to contribute to changing such systems.
I also start from the related claim that relations between men and 
women are characterised by institutionalised forms of inequality, with women, 
on the whole, occupying relatively disadvantaged positions. This claim is 
supported by the existence of a wide range of indicators of "gender gaps" 
(such as in education, nutritional status, income, and political participation) in 
many societies. As Oldersma and Davis (1991) argue: "despite the variety of 
forms gender inequality takes and has taken in the past, it remains something 
that can be perceived in various otherwise highly dissimilar settings and 
cultures" (1991:1).
In Egypt, national statistics reveal consistent gender asymmetries 
throughout women and men's life cycles. These are reflected in higher rates 
of malnutrition among girls than boys, higher rates of women illiteracy among 
women, higher rates of unemployment for women in some sectors, lower 
wages for women particularly in the "informal", unregulated economic sector,
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and a range of restrictions on women's mobility. In addition, both the
personal status laws derived from interpretations of SharFa law, and the
criminal law, derived from the French legal system, codify some crude forms
of discrimination (See Egypt Human Development Report, 1997; Bahie-EI
Din, 1993; Egypt NGO platform of action reports, 1994;1995).
Further, I maintain that these gender-based hierarchies are both unjust
and indefensible under any rubric of difference or cultural relativism. In doing
so, I am taking a universalist stance along the lines developed by
Nussbaum's notion of "human capabilities". Nussbaum (1995) argues that
some elements of human life are more fundamental than others for defining
what could constitute a "good" human life, despite differences between
classes, races, and cultures. She provides a tentative list of some of the
basic capabilities to function, which all societies should aim to achieve for
their citizens and against which the quality of life of a society should be
measured. These include capabilities such as the
"ability to live to have good health, to be adequately nourished; 
having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and choice in 
matters of reproduction;., being able to avoid unnecessary 
pain., and to have pleasurable experiences .being able to 
imagine, to think and to reason, and to do these things in a way 
informed and cultivated by an adequate education., being able 
to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life... 
being able to laugh, and to play, being able to have certain 
guarantees of non interference with certain choices., such as 
those regarding marriage, childbearing, sexual expression, 
speech and employment"(1995:83-85).
The author, however, develops this list in a consciously general and 
fluid way so as to allow for what she terms "plural specificities". These allow 
for multiple specifications of each of the components listed so as to take into 
account historical, class and cultural differences in specific contexts, as well 
as to allow for further negotiation.
In other words, like all other inequalities based on class, race or 
nationality, gender inequalities which result in women's unequal failure to 
achieve their capabilities for some of the most central human functions, is a 
basic issue of human injustice. Thus I argue that such gender-based
29
inequalities must be identified, acknowledged, confronted, and challenged. I 
also suggest, however, that to achieve success, such endeavours must be 
located within specific socio-economic and historical contexts, taking full 
cognisance of the priorities, perceptions and discourses of the specific 
groups of people involved, and with their full participation.
My interest in resistance as a guiding concept is thus not only a 
theoretical one, but also a political and pragmatic one. It is driven by the 
quest for potential sources of transformation and change, a search for "the 
access points, the winning coalitions, the pivots, the levers, the bastions, the 
weak links by which change can be brought about" (Lukes, 1986:15). My 
interest goes beyond an attempt to "romanticise" resistance, as is common in 
some of the literature (See O'Hanlon, 1988; Abu-lughod, 1990a for a critique 
of this approach). By "romanticising", I refer to interpretations of all forms of 
resistance as signs of the ineffectiveness of systems of power and a 
celebration of the resilience, creativity and free spirit of self-determining 
human beings in their refusal to accept oppression. Rather, mine is an 
interest in identifying what has been termed by Lukes (1986) as "branching 
points". These are the points at which alternative paths and arrangements 
could be envisaged and acted upon.
Some have argued that political and action oriented interests also 
underlie Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony, where he compares the 
state to a range of formidable structures that call for either a "war of position", 
or a "war of manoeuvre" (Lukes, 1986; Boggs, 1976; Holub, 1992). These 
pragmatic interests are also implicit in Foucault's much more diffuse 
conceptualisation of power, particularly where he stresses the importance of 
analysing the concrete mechanisms of power relations in their daily "effects", 
so as to accumulate "strategic knowledge" that can engender change 
(McNay, 1992; Lukes, 1986; Delsing, 1991). In my discussion of the ways in 
which power has been conceptualised later on in this chapter, I discuss both 
of these scholars in greater detail. Before doing so, however, I will first 
elaborate on the concept of gender and clarify how I use it throughout the 
thesis.
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The concept of gender has undergone various phases of 
conceptualisation, and is used differently by different scholars. Nicholson
(1994) provides a useful genealogy of the term. Gender was initially used, as 
distinct from the concept of sex, to represent differences between men and 
women that are not biological differences per se, but rather those that 
represented the cultural and social expectations related to biological 
differences. Thus it was argued that gender categories and attributes 
(behaviours, roles, personality traits, and attitudes embodied in the notions of 
masculinity and femininity) are primarily socially and culturally constructed 
categories. As socially constructed categories they are not fixed but can be 
changed and transformed.
A second shift in the usage of gender centred on an emphasis on the 
relational aspects of the concept of gender, that is, on the relationship 
between men and women, as well as between masculinity and femininity. 
This social relations approach is the one implicit in much of the gender and 
development literature. It remains committed to an analysis of how the 
female/male distinction reproduces inequality in access to, and control over, 
resources at every institutional level (Moser, 1993; Kandiyoti, 1998). Based 
on this conceptualisation, the primary task of gender analysis and feminist 
activism is thus to interrogate the institutionalised inequalities between men 
and women (Nicholson, 1994; Moore, 1988). This second shift also 
witnessed an increased attention to the relationships and differences within 
the categories of male and female. Its proponents argued that social 
categories such as men and women were not homogenous ones and pointed 
to the multiple, contested and contradictory meanings associated with 
male/female identities and distinctions. (See Moore, 1994,b).
The third, and most current, conceptualisation of gender is heavily 
influenced by the post structuralist turn in the social sciences. Gender is seen 
as referring "to any social construction having to do with male/female 
distinction, including those constructions that separate "female" bodies from 
"male" bodies" (Nicholson, 1994:79). The proponents of this approach argue 
that society not only shapes personality traits, behaviour and social roles, but
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it also influences how sexuality itself is conceptualised. Thus, sex and gender 
are not necessarily distinct categories. Rather, the concept of sex is 
subsumed under gender (Nicholson, 1994; Collier and Yanagisako, 1987). 
This usage is congruent with a larger debate amongst feminists and 
anthropologists as to whether the particular biological differences in 
reproduction that western culture defines as the basis of difference between 
men and women, and thus treats as the basis of their relationship, is the 
same basis upon which other cultures constitute the categories of males and 
females (Strathern, 1988; Moore, 1994).
Butler and Scott (1992), representing current post-structuralist thinking 
within feminist scholarship, push this third conceptualisation of gender even 
further. They argue that it is the gender division itself, which produces 
inequalities and oppression rather than the institutionalised power and 
privileges of men over women. The current gender distinction "marks out" 
and "naturalises" certain identities such as that of heterosexual, macho 
masculinity as dominant and others as subordinate. Maintaining that all 
power relations are gendered, Butler and Scott thus argue that to address 
gender oppression, we must refuse to take the gender division and binary 
oppositions, such as male/female, sex/gender, masculine/feminine, at face 
value. Rather, we must acknowledge that these are no more than the effects 
of a particular kind of discursive foundation. According to this 
conceptualisation of gender, the task of gender analysis and feminist 
scholarship is thus to move beyond a consideration of institutionalised 
inequality to an interrogation of these very distinctions (Butler and Scott, 
1992; Kandiyoti, 1998).
In my attempt to understand how women experience, articulate, and 
respond to their relative disadvantage in both the household and the 
workplace, I mainly utilise the first two conceptualisations of gender. Given 
my commitment to local understandings and priorities, and operating primarily 
within a gender and development approach, I adopt a relational approach to 
gender and gendering processes. This approach may not have the 
theoretically liberating potential of the postructuralist, de-constructionist
32
conceptualisation of gender, and may occasionally result in the slippage 
between the concept of women and that of gender. Despite its possible 
limitations, however, I concur with others who have argued that dealing with 
the world as it is constituted by the categories used by members of local 
communities themselves is more desirable than the analytical distortions and 
political impotence that could result from importing western conceptual 
frameworks that are dismissive of local articulations and understandings 
(Kandiyoti, 1998). This brief exposition of the genealogy of the concept of 
gender has clarified its different usages and specified how I will use it in the 
thesis. The next section discusses the relationship between the concept of 
gender and that of resistance and power, which were presented in the earlier 
part of the chapter.
The Emerging Concern: "Everyday forms of Resistance":
Studies of resistance have traditionally been dominated by accounts of 
open confrontations in the form of large scale rebellions and revolutions, and 
have largely focused on class conflict as the major cause of struggle (Wolf, 
1969; Paige, 1975 quoted in Abu-Lughod, 1991a). Influenced largely by a 
narrow Marxist paradigm, resistance has been conceptualised mainly as an 
organised struggle by subordinate groups informed by a coherent 
oppositional ideology, and focusing specifically on the working class. 
According to Marxist theory, such an ideology could only develop as a result 
of a certain level of consciousness which resulted in an apprehension of 
one's oppression and therefore to organised struggle and contestation, 
eventually leading to revolutionary confrontation.
A critical assumption in Marxist theory regarding resistance is the 
relationship between positionality and consciousness, a relationship which 
emphasises the split between "objective" conditions of oppression and 
"subjective" consciousness of this oppression, between ideology and 
behaviour, between the economic and the political spheres. Thus emerged 
the conceptual distinction between a "class in itself", defined in terms of its 
objective relations to the means of productions, but not necessarily conscious
33
of its exploitation, and a "class for itself", that is, unmystified, more politically 
and ideologically organised, and more willing to take up revolutionary 
struggle (McLellan, 1973). This approach to resistance and consciousness is 
also implicit in the strategies adopted by early feminists in the West. The 
emphasis on "consciousness raising" as an essential feminist strategy in the 
1960' and 1970's was partly based on the premise that a "collective" 
consciousness must precede agency.
However, I argue that such approaches are inadequate for a 
historically and culturally sensitive understanding of the dynamics of power 
underlying gender relations. The last decade has given way to a more 
nuanced usage of the concept of resistance largely as a reaction against the 
economistic, reductionist and gender blind versions, and interpretations, of 
Marxist theories of power. As Abu-Lughod argues, the current widespread 
concern in social studies with a range of unconventional, non confrontational 
acts of resistance is best captured by the increasing circulation of terms like 
"counter-hegemony", "counter-discourse", "subordinate discourse", 
"subversion", "bargaining", "voice" and so forth, reflect a rigorous rethinking 
of notions of power (Abu-Lughod, 1990a).
The opening up of new possibilities for understanding power and 
resistance has been influenced by feminist theory and practice as well as by 
the post structuralist/post modernist critique, with Foucault's work assuming 
particular importance1. The debate regarding false consciousness predates 
the post structuralist movement. However, with post-structuralism the margins 
between the objective and the subjective began to fade more rapidly and the 
concept of false consciousness lost much of its earlier force. Structures of 
dominance are no longer being viewed as independent and monolithic
1 There is an emerging debate about the extent to which Foucault's work does 
represent a typical example of Postmodernism. By focusing on his later works, 
particularly his work on the Self, McNay (1992) questions the extent to which 
Foucault's work does represent a clear break with Englightment thought. She 
argues that Foucault's notion of the acting self and his emphasis on exploration of 
identity, while a critique of essentialism, nonetheless is linked to a general political 
goal of enhancing individual autonomy, and thus keeps intact a crucial notion of 
agency on which one could build a politics of resistance and freedom.
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entities that are challenged only during dramatic instances of revolt, but
rather, as more commonly a web of contradictory processes that are
continuously being renegotiated and contested (Haynes and Prakash, 1991).
Scott’s notion of "everyday forms of resistance" captures this
conceptual shift. He uses the term to describe a wide range of contestary
actions of subordinate groups, in between open, collective revolt and passive
revolt. Scott traces his own interest in the concept of everyday resistance to
his disillusionment with the outcome of socialist revolutions (Scott, 1985). In
his work, Scott does not display a particular concern with gender relations or
gender inequalities, and in fact overlooks the gender dimension. Only a
limited number of scholars, such as Hart (1991) whose work I discuss in
chapter seven, have explicitly attempted to subject Scott's framework to
analysis through a gender perspective.
In his works, Scott is concerned primarily with the "peasantry" and
focuses mainly on class domination. Within such relations, Scott argued
forcefully for the inclusion of everyday resistance as an integral part of the
history of agrarian relations and peasant politics. He notes that:
"a history of the peasantry which only focused on uprisings 
would be much like a history of factory workers devoted entirely 
to major strikes and riots. Important and diagnostic though 
these exceptional events may be, they tell us little about the 
most durable arena of class conflict and resistance: the vital, 
day to day struggle on the factory floor over the pace of work, 
over leisure, wages, autonomy, privileges and respect. 
Resistance of this kind does not throw up the manifestos, 
demonstrations and pitched battles that normally compel 
attention, but vital territory is being won and lost here too"
(Scott, 1986:6).
While these "weapons of the weak" argued Scott, consisted largely of 
"routine resistance" and did not pose any major threats to agrarian 
inequalities, they nonetheless represented a continuous process of 
renegotiations and testing of social relations, and could have important, if 
unintended, consequences. Arguing along the same lines, Haynes and 
Prakash note that "the struggles of subordinated peoples need not be 
dramatic or informed by conscious ideologies of opposition to seriously affect
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relations of domination" (Haynes and Prakash, 1991:4). A broader definition 
of resistance, they argue, would allow a fuller understanding of the very 
processes through which subordinate groups test and undermine power and 
the ways in which daily struggles can be transformed into large-scale and 
conscious challenges to socio-political structures. The concept of everyday 
resistance has since triggered much debate. Some of the main points of the 
debate are covered in the proceedings of a seminal conference on the topic 
on South East Asian Peasant politics (see the special issue of the Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 1986). The main arguments within this debate are 
summarised in the following section.
What Constitutes Everyday Forms of Resistance?
Despite widespread agreement on the need to explore the diverse 
forms of non-conventional, non-violent acts of every-day resistance, a debate 
continues regarding how inclusive or exclusive such a concept should be. 
The debate seems to centre on two related issues. The first questions issues 
of intentions and motivations of the actors: are they "subjective", "self- 
indulgent" and "self-interested" or are they "objective", "selfless" and 
"principled"? The second related issue revolves around the consequences of 
these acts of resistance, with the central argument centring around an 
attempt to differentiate between acts of resistance and daily survival 
strategies. The key question seems to be: to what extent do acts of 
resistance challenge the forces of oppression? For example, could everyday 
survival strategies, often used interchangeably with "coping strategies", that 
seek to maximise life options and in fact result in perpetuating the system of 
domination be considered forms of resistance?
Some scholars, following a narrow Marxist framework, thus emphasise 
a distinction between "resistance" and real resistance (White, 1986). Real 
resistance is seen as organised and collective, with revolutionary 
consequences and embodying a form of consciousness that challenges the 
basis of domination. "Resistance" as elaborated by Scott and his followers, 
is seen by these scholars as no more than incidental acts that are
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individualistic, and opportunistic, with no revolutionary consequences and
embodying intentions to accommodate the structures of oppression, rather
than to challenge them. White argues that such acts of "resistance" are
actually dangerous over the longer run because they may simply act as a
safety valve for oppressed people making them unable to see their
oppression and thus contributes to the emergence of false consciousness.
I disagree with attempts to make such clear-cut differentiation because
I think they preclude an understanding of the diverse experiences and
perceptions of subordinate groups in a given situation of power, and privilege
an objectivist, apriori, interpretation. I also think that the term "coping
strategies", given the development and economic discourse in which it has
evolved, often does not capture the political nature of some of the acts
involved. In fact, the distinction between coping or survival strategies as
individualist, economic tactics, and "everyday forms of resistance", as more
political ones, may be misleading as it suggests too neat a separation
between the sphere of economic and political behaviour. Particularly in
contexts of poverty, scarcity and deprivation, tactics to ensure survival cannot
be easily dismissed as apolitical behaviour. As Scott elaborates when
discussing peasant politics:
"To require of lower-class resistance that it somehow be 
"principled" or "selfless" is not only utopian and a slander on the 
moral status of fundamental material needs; it is more 
fundamentally, a misconstruction of the basis of class struggle, 
which is first and foremost a struggle over the appropriates of 
work, production, property and taxes. "Bread and butter" issues 
are the essence of lower-class politics and resistance. 
Consumption from this perspective is both the goal and the 
result of resistance and counter resistance. It is precisely the 
fusion of self-interest and resistance that is the vital force 
animating the resistance of peasants and proletarians. When a 
peasant hides part of his crop to avoid paying taxes, he is both 
filling his stomach and depriving the state of grain" (Scott, 1985: 
295-96).
Another criticism of Scott's work is his overemphasis on the 
"individual" nature of every day resistance. By doing so, he seems to have 
favoured one extreme end and thus loses sight of the "middle ground", the
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various forms of resistance that social networks or informal groups may be 
involved in. Turton develops the concept of "patrolling the middle ground" to 
turn attention precisely to everyday forms of resistance that fall in the middle 
of the continuum between individual acts and organised collective actions 
(Turton, 1986). This criticism is I believe particularly pertinent when . 
attempting to "gender" the concept of everyday forms of resistance and use it 
to specifically explore power relations between men and women. There are a 
number of studies which demonstrate the crucial role that women's informal 
networks play in enabling them to gain power within their marriages and 
communities (see for example, March and Taqqu, 1986).
The main critique of Scott, however, and one with which I concur, is 
that he does not fully appreciate the cultural and ideological aspects of 
domination and the structural constraints which limit the actions of 
subordinate groups, and lay down distinct "rules of the game". These rules 
often determine what can be legitimately resisted and how effective such 
resistance can be. Scott's overemphasis on the ability of subordinate groups 
to always penetrate the hegemonic ideologies of the ruling classes, and to 
develop an unmystified discourse and consciousness, is most clearly 
captured in his concept of "the hidden transcripts". He defines the hidden 
transcript as the: "discourse that takes place offstage, beyond the direct 
observation of the dominant groups"(Scott, 1990). However, as Prakash and 
Haynes (1991) have correctly argued, the ability of subordinate groups to 
break through the walls of hegemony may be constrained by the very nature 
of existing power structures; every day acts of resistance take place in the 
field of power and thus are themselves affected by the nature of hegemony.
Timothy Mitchell (1990), in a detailed critique of Scott's work, takes 
particular issue with the "context free rationality" implicit in Scott's accounts, 
and in his narrow definition of hegemony which does not allow him to 
appreciate how various forms of domination operate. As a result, Scott re­
labels and disguises the hegemonic relations evident in the village he 
studies, by giving them titles such as "obstacles to resistance". However, 
Mitchell argues, "kinship is not something "given" that happens to work as an
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obstacle to resistance but another of those strategies of euphemization by 
means of which relations of dependence and exploitation disguise 
themselves, as they must, in this case in the form of family ties" (Mitchell, 
1990:557).
Mitchell is particularly critical of the dichotomy between the material
and the ideological, between a power that operates at the level of behaviour
and that which operates in the realm of consciousness, which permeates
Scott's work. Mitchell argues that this is a weakness of all contemporary
approaches to power and resistance as well. This dichotomy blinds us from
seeing power, not just as a coercive force that limits people's options and
behaviour, but also one that works on controlling the mind and
consciousness by creating certain "truths" and "subjects". Drawing on the
works of Bourdieu, which will be discussed later, Mitchell uses the example
of kinship idioms once more to demonstrate this point.
"Kinship strategies, for example, clearly belong to the "realms of 
both behaviour and belief; a mode of domination that operates 
by transforming relations of subordination into family ties works 
upon the physical body, determining how people eat, sleep, 
work for one another and reproduce and yet these practices are 
inseparable from the shaping of ideas, being the source of 
identity loyalty and emotion (1990: 558).
It is true that Scott's virtual dismissal of the structural and ideological 
dimension of domination, particularly in his earlier work, weakens his 
arguments. Nonetheless, I think that the concept of "everyday forms of 
resistance", properly re-conceptualised, still offers a way forward for a better 
understanding of the relationships between power and gender and between 
men and women. The concept needs to be adapted and given more nuance, 
by taking into account some of the critiques raised above, and by 
incorporating insights from a number of theories about both power and 
gender.
Resistance and Power:
A discussion of resistance is not possible without a discussion of 
power. This is no easy task, however, as power is one of the most
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contentious concepts in the social sciences.2 I focus my discussion here on 
notions of power as reflected specifically in the work of three theorists, 
Steven Lukes, the French post-structuralist scholar, Michael Foucault, and 
the Italian Marxist scholar Antonio Gramsci. This focus is partly due to their 
decisive influence in changing our understanding of the complexity and 
dynamics of power and domination, and partly because, as mentioned earlier, 
their interest in resistance appears to rest on a pragmatic desire for change 
and a commitment to social transformation. Despite differences among them, 
the works of these theorists also offer insights which are particularly relevant 
to an understanding of "everyday forms of resistance", particularly as they 
apply to gender relations, by focusing on the more subtle ways in which 
power shapes perceptions and actions.
Lukes' work on power (1974; 1986) represent one of the early classic 
attempts to grapple with the inadequacies of both purely structuralist or 
purely individual and intentional approaches to power. Lukes views power as 
both a structural phenomenon as well as a personal attribute and in both 
cases it need not be intentional. Reviewing various attempts to define power, 
Lukes proposes what he terms a "three dimensional" approach to power, 
through which a diverse range of power relations in various contexts can be 
identified. Each dimension incorporates the one before it, but also 
incorporates other layers of social phenomena.
In the "one dimensional" view of power, the interests of the various 
parties are regarded as equivalent to their preferences, which are articulated 
during an actual process of decision making. Thus "to exercise power is to 
prevail over the contrary preference of others with respect to key positions" 
(Lukes, 1986:9-10). To locate power, a researcher would need to identify the 
conflicts that occur during a decision making process and compare the 
outcomes of the process to the stated preference of the various parties.
2 For a discussion of attempts to define power, and how these reflect different 
people’s interest in both the outcomes and locations of power, see Lukes (1986). 
For one of the few attempts to link theories of power with gender, see Davis et 
al.(1991).
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Conflicts of interest, however, may not necessarily result in a decision­
making or negotiating process. The more powerful party may ensure that the 
conflict does not appear on the agenda in the first place. This is where a "two 
dimensional1' view of power, becomes necessary.
In the "two dimensional" view, power is seen to be exercised not only 
in the same manner as in the one dimensional view, but also by "controlling 
the agenda, mobilising the bias of the system, determining which issues are 
key issues, indeed which issues come up for decision and excluding those 
which threaten the interests of the powerful" (Lukes, 1986:9-10).3 To reveal 
this dimension, a researcher would thus need to identify areas of "non 
decision making" and to reveal the grievances and complaints of the less 
powerful party in the relationship that have not made it to the decision making 
agenda (Meyer, 1991)
The "three dimensional" view of power identified by Lukes incorporates 
both the one and two dimensions, but also incorporates another level of 
social phenomena. Lukes argues that the absence of grievances does not 
mean that power is not involved, for power can be "latent". This view of power 
recognises that power "may operate to shape and modify desires and beliefs 
in a manner contrary to people’s interests. In consequence, neither revealed 
preferences nor grievances and inchoate demands will always express them" 
(Lukes, 1986:10). Arguing for an appreciation of this three-dimensional view 
of power, Lukes poses the question:
"Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to 
prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances, by 
shaping their perceptions, cognition and preferences in such a 
way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, 
either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or 
because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because 
they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial?" (Lukes, 
1974:24).
All three dimensions are relevant for understanding different layers of 
gender relations, and Lukes theory has been applied to marital relations by
3 Lukes builds on the view advanced by peter Batrach and Morton Baratz (1970).
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several researchers (see for example, Kompter, 1991). I find the second and 
third dimensional views of power particularly helpful. Since power can be 
latent, then presumably so can conflicts and grievances. This proposition 
opens up space for probing more carefully into the non-conventional ways in 
which such latent conflicts between men and women may be expressed or 
articulated.
The two dimensional view of power is also highly relevant for
analysing questions about feminist practice more generally. In many
countries, feminist agendas are predominantly set by the most privileged and
powerful by virtue of either class position, race, or education. While this is
not problematic in and of itself, it does raise questions about power relations
within feminism, by asking who it is that sets the agenda for change, and
determines which issues are to be debated, and which are to be excluded?
Which feminist discourse is hegemonic and why? This in turn prompts the
rather uncomfortable suggestion that middle and upper class feminists may
themselves be implicated in perpetuating power inequalities, by privileging
their own concerns and priorities that are then reflected in feminist discourse.
This issue is discussed in greater detail in chapter Six.
Foucault's work also offers important insights for an understanding of
power, particularly its micro-mechanisms. Foucault has in fact fundamentally
challenged our thinking about power and its exercise by shifting the focus
away from an exclusive attention to power as exercised by the state and state
apparatuses. Instead, he highlights what he terms the "capillary" actions of
power, those diffuse mechanisms by which power circulates in society.
Foucault emphasises the importance of examining power at its "ultimate
destinations", that is power as reflected in its local and regional patterns and
structures. Power, according to Foucault did not emanate from one source,
but was incredibly diffuse, it was created and undermined all the time.
"Power must be analysed as something which circulates or 
rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain.
It is never localised here or there, never in anybody's hands, 
never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is 
employed and exercised through a net like organisation and not 
only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are 
always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and
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exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting 
target; they are always the elements of its articulation. In other 
words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of 
application" (Foucault, 1986:235).
Tracing how discourses about power have changed over the past
century, Foucault argues that by the 18th century, a new kind of power had
emerged. This was not power based on legal obligations to obey state laws
and sanctioned by a Judiciary discourse of public rights. Rather the new kind
of power that emerged in parallel to, and reinforcing, state power, was based
on "disciplinary mechanisms", and "disciplinary discourses" which invoked
'norms' or natural rules, not laws. Disciplinary discourse, argued Foucault-
apparent in institutions such as mental hospitals, the army, schools, families,
and factories-, aimed at shaping and influencing peoples minds and bodies.
Techniques of "surveillance", ceaseless observation, and persistent exposure
to the "gaze" of others, are the means of enforcing this type of power. These
techniques lead to internalised restraint, self-scrutiny and assimilation of
certain "truths". Such disciplinary mechanisms, Foucault argued, are such
powerful forms of domination in contemporary societies that:
"nothing in society will be changed if the mechanisms of power 
that function outside, below and alongside the state 
apparatuses on a much more minute and everyday level are 
not also changed" (Foucault, 1980:60).
Foucault's concepts of disciplinary discourses and regimes of truth 
provide useful analytical tools for analysing gender relations. Gender 
discourses can be conceptualised as one concrete example of such 
disciplinary discourses. Moreover, the concept of the "gaze" is particularly 
useful for understanding how some of the restrictions on women, such as on 
their physical mobility or sexual behaviour for example, as will be discussed 
in later chapters, are enforced. The challenge then becomes trying to 
understand how this discourse actually operates at the micro-level in 
everyday life in different contexts..
Gramsci's reflections on power and domination are equally 
illuminating. Although his conceptualisation of power is much less diffuse 
than that of Foucault's, he similarly highlights how power and resistance are
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intermeshed, and how power is reproduced and maintained not oniy through
force, but through a slow process in which consensus is forged between
dominant and subordinate groups. Gramsci's major contribution is the
development of the idea of ideological hegemony, a complex notion which he
uses to describe how relations of power unfold, not only during times of
change, but also in everyday life (Hoare and Nowell, 1971).
Because Gramsci uses the concept of hegemony in conflicting and
contradictory ways throughout his works, it has been subject to varied
interpretations. Some attempts in Marxist scholarship to explore the complex
forms of domination inherent in Gramsci’s concept of hegemony allow a
broad interpretation of the term, to inciude cultural, social and political
processes, and to emphasise the "interactional" meaning of the concept
(Williams, 1977). According to this interpretation, which is most relevant for
my purposes here, all power is seen as stemming from a relationship
between two parties, a "hegemonic interaction", in which both subordinate
and dominant actors have roles to play.
Hegemony, achieved through generating an acceptable "common
sense" view of the world and one's position in it, does not imply complete or
total control. Negotiation is an inherent part of hegemonic relationships.
This is because the common sense understandings of the world are not
consistent, but are fragmented, and often contradictory. The consciousness
of subordinate groups in such a relationship is a mix of contradictory views
and values, some of which reflect the values of the dominant groups, and
some of which emerge more directly from practical experience (Eagleton,
1991). "It is in the ambiguities and contradictions of common sense that the
differentiation in the values of dominant and subordinate groups becomes
visible" (Kompter, 1991: 59).
Macleod, in her attempt to use this interpretation of Gramsci's thought
to understand why middle class working women in Cairo are taking up the
"veil", explains hegemony as follows:
"Hegemony describes the process of the intellectual or moral 
leadership of dominants rather than the exercise of force, the 
framing of the ideas and vision of subordinates which ensures
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the acceptance of inequalities. But even this leadership, and the 
consent it creates, does not ensure a passive subordinate 
within the power relationship; it requires on-going struggle, an 
ongoing process of negotiation, concessions, and underlying 
threats (Macleod, 1992a:18)."
Lukes's notion of three dimensional power is actually quite similar to 
Gramsci's earlier concept of hegemony. Both allow us to better appreciate 
how power works in elusive ways to shape people's consciousness. 
However, Gramsci's notion also allows space for understanding why and how 
people contest power and domination, and points to the need for identifying 
the contradictions and inconsistencies in the beliefs of subordinate groups, 
and thus of possible sources of change as well.
The works influenced by Lukes, Gramsci and Foucault have 
highlighted the significance of ideological practices in power and resistance 
and have called for an appreciation of the interconnectedness of "symbolic 
and instrumental, behavioural and ideological, and cultural, social and 
political processes" (Abu-Lughod, 1990a:41). As a result, there is now 
greater understanding of the connections between physical coercion and 
violence and ideological instruments of domination, between legality and 
force and more subtle consensual norms.
Debates regarding what constitutes resistance have thus significantly 
shifted over the past decade. The importance of moving beyond a strictly 
economistic analysis of resistance that focuses on "material" struggles over 
wages, rent and land, is now acknowledged (Turton, 1986). Similarly, Haynes 
and Prakash (1991) argue for an expanded notion of resistance to 
incorporate the realm of culture and ideology and point to a relatively 
unexplored arena for studying every day resistance, namely, popular culture. 
"It is in such cultural forms as work, ritual, gossip, oral traditions, dress and 
entertainment that domination is constantly being forged and 
fissured"(1991:16). Along the same lines, they have argued that choice of 
lifestyle can be a form of resistance and that defending certain types of 
leisure may be seen as contestary behaviour.
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That power and resistance are not autonomous but are intermeshed 
and continuously shape each other is now well established. An unresolved 
methodological debate, however, has emerged. Does the researcher focus 
on studying power as a way of understanding resistance or does she/he 
alternately focus on acts of resistance as a way of illuminating power 
relations. Turton (1986), argues that speaking of resistance requires a prior 
attempt to "identify the specific social relations which support, constrain, 
threaten or exploit the resistor" (1986:39). This requires a careful 
examination and account of the relations, processes and structures of power, 
both formal and informal, and a fine conceptualisation of the extent of 
domination. "The finer our recognition and appreciation of agencies and 
instruments of domination, the better we may be able to assess whether they 
are being resisted, or in what ways they are perceived to be capable of being 
resisted or not, and the better we may recognise certain acts as being forms 
of resistance (Turton, 1986:41)."
Others, taking a cue from Foucault's line of thinking, argue for the 
reverse; they argue for the use of resistance as a "diagnostic of power", that 
is, identifying common forms of resistance and using these strategically to 
inform us about patterns of power and how people are enmeshed in them 
(Abu-Lughod, 1990a). Foucault notes that resistance can act as a "chemical 
catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, locate their position, find out 
their points of application and the methods used" (Foucault, 1983: 209). 
Abu-Lughod argues that this approach is more promising for ethnographic 
studies because it allows one to move from general and abstract theories of 
power, towards concrete methodological strategies for the study of power in 
specific contexts. Although clearly, the two positions are not mutually 
exclusive, the methodological implications and points of entry are different. It 
seems to me that using resistance as an entry point is a more pragmatic, and 
"bottom up" way of unpacking and revealing the complex mechanisms of 
historically changing structures of power.
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'Every Day Forms of Resistance' and Gender Relations:
Despite the current concern with everyday forms of resistance, studies 
of resistance dealing with gender relations are only just emerging. For the 
most part, contestation of gender relations has not been part of the on-going 
debates on every day resistance. The early influential plea by Kate Millet 
(1969) for a more encompassing theory of politics and power which has 
generated the powerful concept of "sexual politics", has not been paralleled 
by a plea for a more encompassing and inclusive theory of resistance. Part 
of the reason, I believe, may be found in the influence that the concept of 
"patriarchy", as elaborated in the feminist scholarship of the 1960's and early 
1970's, has had on shaping much of the writing and thinking about gender 
relations.4 This concept has been used as a blanket term to emphasise the 
existence of a universal system of domination and "failed to convey 
movement, the complexities of relations between men and women, or the 
extent of women's resistance to and transformation of male power" 
(Ramazanglu, 1989:38).
Patriarchy was viewed as a universal, static system and a formidable 
power structure, with little potential for change except through organised 
international "sisterhood" movements. This has meant that critical questions 
about the specific reasons and ways in which women and men reinforce, 
accommodate to or resist the specific and overlapping forms of oppression 
that they face in a particular historical and cultural setting were ignored. 
Instead, scholarship focused primarily on the search for more general 
answers to questions about the "causes" of women's universal oppression.5
Several scholars, however, have challenged this universal, essentialist 
and stagnant notion of patriarchy and its utility for identifying and 
understanding the specific forms of women's subordination cross-culturally
4 For an overview of how the concept of patriarchy developed and how it has been 
used by different strands of feminism, broadly, liberal feminists, Marxist feminists 
and socialist feminists, see Beechey (1979).
5 For an overview of the various attempts to provide social explanations for the 
universality of male dominance: (nature/culture, Public/Private dichotomies), see 
Moore (1988) and Rosaldo and Lamphere (1974).
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(see Rowbotham, 1981, Ramazanglu, 1989, Kandiyoti, 1988; Davis et a!, 
1991). It is now widely acknowledged that gender is constructed alongside a 
range of other positionalities, such as class, age and ethnicity, which modify, 
shape and affect both women's interests as well as their perceptions of 
particular social arrangements. Women perceive their "gender interests" 
differently depending on their own daily lived experience-which may involve 
struggle alongside and against men as well as against other women (see 
Beneria and Feldman, 1992, Ramazanglu, 1989)6, operate within different 
gender ideologies (Dwyer, 1978a), and develop different strategies for 
passive and active resistance in the face of oppression (Kandiyoti, 1988).
The possibilities of using resistance, or the lack of it, as a conceptual 
entry point for understanding gender relations has thus come about partly as 
a result of internal feminist critiques of the notion of patriarchy. It has also 
been inspired by the broader attempts to rethink notions of power and 
resistance as discussed earlier. Although more concerned with revealing 
women's 'private' power, than dealing with resistance per se, Nelson (1974), 
nonetheless provides one of the earlier attempts to question conventional 
notions of power as it relates to gender. She argues for recognising power 
as a kind of social relation in which men and women engage in "negotiating 
their social order", that is, "negotiating the rules that define and circumscribe 
that relationship", rather than as a quality institutionalised in particular social 
structures. She highlights the concept of "reciprocity of influence", whereby 
men and women control and influence each other with reference to specific 
spheres of activity and particular situations.
Okely (1991) provides one of the few attempts to apply the concept of
every day resistance to gender issues more explicitly. She argues that to
capture women's subordination, we need to redefine resistance to
encompass not just sustained collective action, but also the fragmented, less
visible, and often isolated "moments" of defiance and resistance located in
6 The often oppressive relationship between mother-in-law and daughter in law in 
extended households in some parts of the world is one of the more striking 
examples of the complexities and contradictions of gender relations.
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individuals at distinct moments of their life. She rightly notes that: "Putting up 
a fight, i.e. not being submissive could be interpreted as a momentary 
resistance to women's fundamental subordination" (1991:7).
Women's responses to practices like wage discrimination, sexual 
harassment, violence, restricted mobility, and lack of economic support, will 
clearly vary depending partly on their social locations, in terms of class, age, 
and family structure for example. I argue, however, that there are various 
reasons why much of women's protest, particularly within familial relations, is 
often likely to take the form of the uncoordinated, non-violent, non- 
confrontational types of actions that are embodied in Scott's notion of 
'everyday forms of resistance'.
One major reason is the powerful and mutually reinforcing relationship 
between gender and kinship, and between gender ideology and kinship 
ideology.7 Women and men are not just females and males, but they are also 
fathers and mothers, daughters and sons, wives and husbands, nephews, 
and cousins. This social web of relations, determined by both kinship and 
gender, means that the nature of relations between men and women are not 
firm and set, but are fluid and varied. Women are enmeshed in a complex 
web of not only exploitative relations, but also relations of solidarity and 
reciprocity, based on kinship (Joseph, 1993; White, 1994). These 
contradictory relationships exist both in the family and sometimes at the 
workplace as well. Women's paid employment often takes place in the 
"informal" economy where kinship plays a key role in mediating labour 
relations. In such a context, work relationships often adopt kinship idioms 
and values (White, 1994).
Closely related to the power of the kinship idiom, is the corporate 
orientation that is valued in many parts of the world, which results in fluid 
boundaries of personhood and a definition of the self that is highly relational.
Persons do not necessarily define themselves as individuals with separate 
rights independent of a larger group, but rather see themselves as part, and
7 For an excellent attempt at exploring the linkages between kinship and gender as 
two mutually reinforcing social categories, see Collier and Yanagisako (1987).
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extensions of significant others. In one of the few studies of the 
psychoanalytic dynamics of Arab families, Joseph (1993), takes issue with 
the Western concept of the "self" and argues, on the basis of her study of a 
lower-income community in Lebanon, that both men and women are 
"relationally oriented". She develops the term "connectivity" to describe the 
relationships she observed in her study area, relationships in which "persons 
expected intimate others to read each other's minds, anticipate each other's 
needs, and shape their likes and dislikes in accordance with others" (Joseph, 
1993:467). She argues that the pervasiveness of patriarchy coupled with 
connectivity "produced persons willing and capable of entering into gendered 
and aged hierarchical relations" (Joseph, 1993:469).
Another reason why women's resistance is likely to take covert, non- 
confrontational, and momentary forms is that women's power and status in 
the family in some parts of the world, is of a cyclical nature and varies 
significantly with a woman’s age and her structural position in the extended 
family. In such a system, older women, particularly mothers in-laws, have 
both more autonomy as well as more power over younger women in the 
household (Mernissi, 1975; Rassam, 1980; Morsy, 1978; Doan et al., 1990). 
Such a context creates conflict amongst women and results in a situation 
where women are subordinate to not just men, but to other women as well. 
Moreover, it creates a situation where women have a stake in existing 
patriarchal arrangements. The fact that younger women can anticipate and 
look forward to gaining more power and authority as they go through their life 
course, undermines their need to directly challenge existing power structures.
As Rassam (1980) argues, based on her field work in Morocco, "the 
inevitable competition for domestic power which takes place among women in 
the patriarchal extended household prevents the potential formation of any 
alliances among women and weakens their position vis a vis men" (1980:72). 
Women's stake in specific forms of hierarchical arrangements in the 
household, thus may not be a reflection of their false consciousness, nor of 
their conscious attempts to ally with such arrangements, but rather with their
LONDIK.
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actual stake in certain culturally available positions of power (Kandiyoti, 
1998).
In addition to the above mentioned factors, and partly as a result, the 
"enemy",— who women should resist--, is not always clear, and it is not 
always men. Women's unequal positions are also a result of their structural 
position in the household, their class location, state policies, as well as global 
inequalities. Thus, while women may be aware of the constraints under 
which they operate, "the origin of this force remains elusive" 
(Macleod,1986:18). The subtle, elusive, overlapping, and diffuse nature of 
the constraints on women, the intermeshing of exploitation and reciprocity, 
the fluctuations of their power due to life cycle changes, the lack of a clear 
person, group, or class to confront, would arguably lead to diffuse, subtle, 
non confrontational, and non-co-ordinated forms of resistance.
Several researchers have, implicitly or explicitly, accepted that 
women's resistance is often covert, subtle, and diffuse. Ethnographies 
dealing with gender relations within this framework fall broadly into two 
categories: those that focus on negotiation based on public and shared 
cultural ideas or representations (for example, Macleod,1992a,b, 
"accommodating", Rosen, 1984, "bargaining", and Dwyer, 1978b: "dialogue"), 
and, those that focus on the separate, rarely noticed subordinate discourses 
of women which are expressed through mediums and activities like special 
genres of women's poetry (Abu-Lughod,1986), dramatic games played by 
and for women (Safa-lsfahani,1980, quoted in Messcik, 1987) and carpet 
weaving (Messick, 1987). I briefly present an example of each genre.
In her study of a small community of Bedouins in Egypt's Western 
desert of Egypt, Abu-Lughod, provides insights into a particular form of 
women's discourse that complements the more formal and visible discourse 
on honour and shame in this community. This discourse is expressed 
through ghinniwas, short poems similar to "Japanese haiku in form but more 
like American blues in content and emotional tone", and sung largely by 
women and only amongst them. These poems express personal sentiments 
of love, loss, vulnerability and a wide range of other inter-personal relations
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that go against the prevalent code of honour. As such, ghinniwas represent 
not only a complementary discourse, but also a culturally legitimate and 
"honourable" way for women to communicate "immodest sentiments". Abu- 
Lughod concludes that "poetry as a discourse of defiance of the system 
symbolises freedom", and "provides a corrective to an obsession with 
morality and an overzealous adherence to the ideology of honour and maybe 
the vision is cherished because people sense that the costs of this system of 
honour ideology in the limits it places on human experience is just too high" 
(1986:258-59).
The second "genre" of research on gender and resistance can be 
illustrated by Rosen's study of how women and men negotiate and "bargain" 
over reality in a small town in Morocco. He suggests that men and women 
attempt to understand their relationships with each other through very 
different conceptual orientations and explanatory schemes; men stress the 
natural differences between the two sexes, while women emphasise the 
social aspects of their relationship (Eickleman, 1989). Thus, when 
conceptual disagreements occur, they are expressed in a manner which 
allows men and women to exercise their respective powers by engaging in a 
bargaining process regarding what is really true about the situation and what 
to do about it. "What is negotiable, however, is not their different views of 
reality, but its scope, its impact and its differential importance" (Rosen, 
1978:580). Through observing a number of conflicts and arguments 
surrounding marriage negotiations, Rosen concludes that although Moroccan 
men may present their definition of a given situation as the valid one, women 
possess sufficient means for hedging against the sheer impositions of this 
male fiat to grant them the capability of disputing the interpretation to be 
applied in the first place" (Rosen, 1978:581).
In a recent and influential book, Agarwal (1994) stresses the need to 
examine both the implicit and explicit forms of bargaining that occurs between 
people with access to different socio-economic and political power. She 
argues that:
"it is difficult to infer from people's overt behaviour whether they
are conforming because they fully accept the legitimacy of an
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unequal order, or partially accept it, or out of fear, or because 
they have (or believe they have) no other options. More clues 
are provided by examining the covert way in which 
disadvantaged groups resist authority and power” (1994:60).
The author presents many examples from South Asia which suggest 
that women's behaviour, such as diverting food and crops, or more symbolic 
forms of contestation through songs and dance, can be better understood in 
relation to their lack of options rather than their unquestioning acceptance of 
male dominance.
Insights about resistance and gender relations can also be indirectly 
gleaned from the work of other researchers who, grappling with both the 
inadequacy of the concept of patriarchy and ethnocentric notions of women's 
consciousness, have argued for a more refined analysis of women's 
strategies in dealing with the specific unequal relations that they face. 
Kandiyoti (1988) argues that an analysis of women's strategies can help to 
“capture the nature of patriarchal systems in their cultural, class-specific and 
temporal concreteness and reveal how men and women resist, 
accommodate, adapt, and conflict with each other over resources, rights and 
responsibilities” (1988:281). She elaborates the notion of "patriarchal 
bargains", which she defines as the specific constraints, emerging from class, 
race and gender inequalities, that significantly affect women's gendered 
identity, the nature of gender ideology and the potential for and concrete 
forms of women's active or passive resistance. "Patriarchal bargains” are 
historically situated and changing systems. In the process of their 
transformation they can open up new areas of struggle and bargaining 
between men and women, and lead to new notions of femininity and 
masculinity.
Along similar lines, Molyneux argues that "gender interests" are 
always socially and historically situated. The notion of "gender interests" was 
developed by Molyneux in the context of her analysis of the Sandinista 
government's policies towards women in the 1980's, where she distinguished 
between two ways in which interests could be derived which she termed
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"practical" and "strategic" gender interests.8 "Practical interests" are those 
based on the satisfaction of women's daily needs such as access to housing 
or water, which arise from women's position in the sexual division of labour, 
whereas strategic interests are those based on an analysis of women's 
subordination and thus aim at challenging the existing "gender order" and 
enhancing women's position.
Molyneux argues that although socio-economic location and material 
needs play an important role in inviting various forms of contestation, these 
factors are not enough. "The formulation of interests whether strategic or 
practical is to some degree reliant on discursive elements and is always 
linked to identity formation." Thus, arguing for a more situated understanding 
of women's interests, Molyneux concludes that, "claims about women's 
interests need to be framed within specific historical contexts since processes 
of interest formation and articulation are clearly subject to cultural, historical 
and political variance and cannot be known in advance" (1997:10).
Despite the obvious potential for a study of gender relations based on 
a framework of power relations and everyday forms of resistance, such a 
framework is not, however, without major theoretical and methodological 
difficulties. In fact, "gender power", is difficult to analyse through existing 
frameworks of power which have been largely developed for analysing class 
relations (Abu-Lughod, 1990; Sen, 1990; Meyer, 1991; Kandiyoti, 1998). The 
ties between men and women are of a specific type. Unlike other 
"subordinate" and "dominant" groups, whose universe may only occasionally 
overlap, men and women usually operate within the same universe, within the 
same socio-economic and cultural text. "A worker and a capitalist do not
8 This distinction was deployed in the development and planning field by Moser 
(1993) who replaced interests with needs. It has since been widely used, 
sometimes in a too fixed and hierarchical a fashion, in development discourse. 
This has fuelled a broader debate regarding the concepts of needs and interests. 
Molyneux (1998) argues for the need to keep a conceptual distinction between 
interests and needs as she sees the latter as less political and fluid constructs 
and, unlike interests, do not assume the same level of intentionality and agency. 
Fraser (1989) on the other hand, explicitly politicises the notion of needs arguing 
that both the satisfaction of needs and their interpretation are politically 
contestable issues. Questions regarding ‘Who interprets the needs in question, 
from what perspective and in light of which interests is crucial” (1989:164).
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typically live together under the same roof-sharing concerns and experiences 
and acting jointly. This aspect of "togetherness’' gives the gender conflict 
some very special characteristics" (Sen, 1990:47).
The constitution of the categories dominant and subordinate thus 
become complicated and the lines of demarcation are not as clear, 
permanent or stable as between other groups, say between "peasants" and 
"landlords", or "workers" and "capitalists". As Meyer cogently argues, theories 
of relationships between men and women must make room for love, for 
positive emotions, and avoid the dichotomy between power and love. "Power 
(and I may add resistance) in loving relationships is not comparable to power 
in other relationships, in that loving relationships are vehicles of both love 
and power at the same time" (Meyer, 1991:21).
In relations characterised by both love and power, the question of what 
constitutes domination, what "signifiers" should a researcher be on the look 
out for, and how this relates to women's own perceptions and articulation of 
their situation, become critical. Some forms of behaviour, like wearing the 
"veil", may for instance be taken up by women voluntarily and considered to 
be a source of self worth and pride and not a sign of domination. On the 
other hand such behaviour, could also be considered as a form of defiance.
In her study of "lower middle class" women in Cairo, Macleod 
(1992a,b) argues that veiling allows women to assert their respectability and 
adherence to prevalent gender ideologies at the same time as defying such 
ideologies by working in the government bureaucracy in response to 
economic pressures, a process which she terms "accommodating protest". 
This in turn raises the complicated issue of consent and consensus. The 
critical question here, it seems to me, becomes what constitutes consent, and 
the need to differentiate between consent based on belief in an existing 
system, as opposed to a compliance based on a perception of a lack of 
choice or alternatives. As Fierlbeck argues, consent may be a meaningless 
concept unless there is a clear context of options and choices (Fierlbeck, 
1997).
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The point that needs stressing, is that a framework for understanding 
women's resistance must be able to deal with power processes that operate 
from a basis of not only conflict, but also consensus and Cupertino. 
Risseeuw (1991) highlights this point in her study of gender transformations 
during the British Colonial era in Sri Lanka. Drawing on Bourdieu's notions of 
"habitus", she argues that "acquiescence1 rather than consensus my be a 
more accurate term to describe the lack of conflict that occurred in Sinhalese 
families as they encountered new forms of commercial land ownership and 
chances for social mobility, which had some adverse effects on women. 
Acquiescence refers to: "submission with apparent consent or a disposition to 
submit or yield. It includes (apparently) satisfied passivity or the lack of 
opposition; discontentment usually after previous opposition, uneasiness or 
dislike, but with ultimate compliance and submission" (McKechnie, 1971, 
quoted in Risseeuw, 1991: 163).
Clearly then, attempts to study gender relations guided by the notion 
of everyday forms of resistance, while potentially revealing and powerful, are 
also bound to be quite "messy" as they do not fit neatly in any one theory of 
power. However, the search for the perfect theory of power and resistance 
capable of analysing the multiple forms that gender relations take in different 
contexts, may itself be an unproductive undertaking. Rather, a more eclectic 
approach, based on the specific problems and issues which emerge in 
different contexts being explored, may be what is called for. As Davis (1991) 
suggests:
“We need theories to help us analyse asymmetrical relations 
involving power and gender in all areas and at all levels of 
social life. Considering the dazzling variety and complexity of 
social life, it seems highly improbable that any one theory 
regardless of whether its starting point is gender or power, can 
ever hope to explain it all (Davis, 1991:85)."
A gendered framework of everyday forms of power and resistance has 
yet to evolve. It will require more theoretical work, grounded in everyday 
lived realities of actors in various settings, to develop new concepts that can 
better capture how men and women attempt to reproduce as well as de­
stabilise gender relations and discourses. Foucault's stress on a non-
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universal, decentralised approach to theoretical endeavours is relevant in this
context. He argues that:
"The role for theory today seems to me to be just this: not to 
formulate the global systematic theory which holds everything in 
place...(but rather) to analyse the specificity of mechanisms of 
power, to locate the connections and extensions, to build, little 
by little, a strategic knowledge (1980:145)."
Methodologically, this means that it is essential for any study of
women's resistance to identify and be particularly sensitive to the categories,
interpretations, and the cultural idioms that women and men in a particular
setting are themselves using, to denote notions like resistance, domination,
subordination and agency. Such a grounded approach promises to
historicize the concept of resistance. It also allows us to view it as a
dynamic process of immediate, short, medium and long term strategies,
which may include both passive and active forms of protest, as well as
complicity and acquiescence, and various stages and types of
consciousness. For, as Strathern (1987b) emphasises, resistance and
consciousness do not simply emerge, but are created through individual and
political struggles that are often complex and contradictory. Thus, as
Kandiyoti argues:
"A better understanding of the short and medium term strategies 
of women in different social locations could provide a corrective 
influence to ethnocentric or class-bound definitions of what 
constitutes a feminist consciousness"(Kandiyoti, 1988:286).
And, I would add, a corrective influence of what constitutes women's 
resistance as well.
The purpose of this chapter was to present the theoretical framework 
guiding my research, discuss the central concepts informing it, and elaborate 
my main arguments. The next chapter will provide the contextual framework 
for the research. It will present an analytical description of some of the most 
salient macro-level forces affecting Egyptian society which have had, or are 
expected to have, a bearing on gender relations and ideologies.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE MACRO-CONTEXT: AN OVERVIEW OF SOCIO-POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS IN EGYPT
Om Samir, a 36 year old vendor of plastic kitchen utensils and a
mother of two boys and a girl, reflects on my question as to what the common
Arabic proverb, "a man is a man and a woman is a woman (// ragil ragil wi if
sitsit)"\ means to her:
"Frankly, in these times I no longer know... We live in confused 
times, zaman aghbar (from ghubar, ghabra, which literally 
means dusty and implies a fogginess and lack of clarity of 
vision). These are expensive times, zaman ghila, where one no 
longer knows what is a man and what is a woman... Look at me 
now, I work all day long, Just like a man, even better... My 
husband is a faa^il, unskilled day labourer. He works in the 
construction trade as a helper, carrying bricks and so on. He 
does his best, but he does not find work every day like before.
He went to work in Saudi Arabia 15 years ago. These were 
good times, he used to send us money regularly and we built 
this house and bought a television. But, since he.came back 
from Saudi Arabia 7 years ago, we now can no longer live on 
what he makes... Life has become so expensive... So I go to the 
market every two weeks, buy items wholesale and carry back 
them back on the bus. I spend the whole day, as you see me 
trying to attract and bargain with customers, selling, and 
haggling, atlaabit... I have no choice.. Three children are still at 
school and private lessons are so expensive.. My daughter will 
be getting married soon and I have not yet bought any of the 
items of her gihaaz, marriage trousseau. For five years now l 
have been working and getting money into the house, just like a
1 This common Arabic proverb is used in many contexts to explain or justify 
particular gender roles. Growing up in Egypt, I recall many instances where this 
saying was invoked by family and friends in discussions about a range of issues, 
from marriage to travelling to get an education, to working. It was used either at 
the beginning of a discussion, thus closing the door for further conversation on a 
topic, or at the end of a conversation, as a last resort at making a point. Although 
a seemingly obvious and self evident phrase, l remember being puzzled by it as it 
was often used to refer to different things by different people. This proverb 
remained at the back of my mind and I sometimes used it as a way to trigger 
discussions during my fieldwork.
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man.... At night, however, I become a woman again: can I 
say no if my husband wants to sleep with me, yp di 
maslahtu?
Om Samir's comments vividly captures some of the major 
transformations affecting Egyptian society over the past two decades, such 
as fluctuations in regional migration, increased inflation and unemployment. 
Her comments reveal the extent of the burden on poorer households in Cairo 
since the mid-eighties, due to a marked decrease in their standards of living. 
Om Samir's reflections also point to some of the adjustments people have 
had to make in their daily lives in order to survive in the face of major socio­
economic upheavals. These upheavals have clearly left their mark on gender 
roles and expectations, resulting in a state where, in Om Samir's evaluation, 
"a man was a man and a woman was a woman", to a situation where "one no 
longer knows what a man and what a woman is", and a context where "a 
woman may be both a man in the morning and a woman in the evening".
This chapter provides a brief overview of the conjuncture of a complex 
set of domestic, regional and international socio-economic, political and 
cultural forces that Egypt has been subjected to over the past two decades. In 
this overview, I have privileged a selected number of macro-level influences 
because of their better documented impact on local standards and 
articulations of gender. Four macro-level trends are discussed briefly below: 
regional migration, "open door" state policies, and their more recent 
manifestation in structural adjustment policies, the rise of an international 
Women In Development (WID) lobby, and the increasing influence of 
"Islamist" discourse.
These are clearly trends of a very different order, and their impact on 
Egyptian society in general and on gender relations and ideologies, in 
particular, vary a great deal. Some, such as regional migration to Gulf 
countries in the 1970's have had a direct impact on increasing consumerism, 
changing expectations about marriage, and altering the division of labour 
within households. Domestic economic policies, on the other hand, have had 
an impact on both increasing the cost of living as well as strengthening
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oppositional Islamist groups, resulting in contradictory pressures on families. 
On the one hand, economic pressures are forcing more women to engage in 
income earning activities and to contribute financially to their households, a 
conventionally "masculine" role. On the other hand, an increasingly 
conservative Islamic discourse is casting women as primarily mothers and 
wives and is posing ideological restrictions on their movements, rights and 
roles within society.
Contextualizing Gender Relations:
By providing a brief overview of such macro-level forces, the aim of the 
chapter is to contextualize micro-level practices and processes, both in the 
home and at the workplace, which form the focus of the thesis. As Om 
Samir's quote above suggests, national, regional and international forces, far 
removed from the boundaries of specific local communities, may nonetheless 
exert a powerful influence on shaping local understandings and articulations 
of gender, and inviting various forms of responses to gender inequalities. 
Household formations and gender relations take place in specific socio­
political contexts and are constrained and informed by broader circumstances 
beyond the control of individuals or local communities.
It is now widely acknowledged within anthropology that the discipline's 
conventional emphasis on bounded entities can no longer mean studying a 
community in isolation from national and international forces and structures, 
"which although invisible, influence the local economy and politics" (Wright, 
1994: 15). Developing ways of linking micro level ethnography to macro level 
processes and institutions and of contextualizing single locale 
anthropological research within wider contexts now constitutes a widely 
emphasised approach within anthropology (Wright, 1994; Fardon, 1995; 
Miller, 1995).
Situating gender relations within a broader socio-economic and 
political context also allows one to challenge the depiction of the "timeless" 
Arab family that emerges from much of the literature on the Arab world 
(Tucker, 1993; Auybi, 1995). One of the reasons why studies of the family in
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the Middle East have been generally frozen in time is because adequate 
connections between broader processes of societal change and micro-level 
behaviour are often not made. The idea! typical Arab family is thus often 
presented as a patrilocal, patrilineal extended family of several generations 
living in one physical and economic unit, and operating under the authority 
and control of a patriarch, the oldest male. An overriding assumption is that 
power in the family resides in the father: "who expects respect and 
unquestioning compliance with his instructions" (Barakat, 1993:10).
This stereotypical image of the "Arab" family, portrayed in much of the 
literature, is cast as a monolithic, unchanging entity, with certain 
characteristics that stand in stark opposition to the "Western" family. Tucker 
(1993) identifies four aspects of this "otherness" that are particularly relevant 
to power relations in the household: the prevalence of arranged marriages, 
the focus on women as bearers of family honour, c/rd, the preference for 
endogamous cousin marriages in particular the father's brother daughter 
preference, and women's relative lack of power due to the threat of divorce 
and the practice of polygyny.
However, more contextualized empirical and historical research that 
attempts to link household formations and family relations to broader societal 
transformations reveals that in reality there is a great deal of variability within 
this ideal model of the "Arab family". Several studies in Arab countries shed 
light on the complexity of power in the family, the dynamics of same sex 
power relations, such as that between the mother in law and the daughter in 
law (Morsy, 1978), and women's active roles in both the private and public 
spheres (Rassam, 1980; AITorki, 1986; Abu-Lughod, 1986). Moreover, 
Tucker (1993) rightly questions whether the ideal model of the Arab family 
was ever the reality or even the ideal of the majority of people in the Arab 
World. By comparing data from court records concerning marriage and 
property among upper class and lower class families in Nablus and Cairo in 
the 19th century, Tucker demonstrates major discrepancies within, as well as 
divergences from, this ideal family type. For instance, female codes of
61
modesty and the actual practice of associating family honour with female 
behaviour varied significantly across classes.
Some studies in contemporary Egypt have similarly shown that while 
some households may display characteristics of the ideal "Arab family", there 
is in fact a great deal of diversity in the types of family and living 
arrangements that exist. Such diversity reflects different responses and 
adjustments to various macro-level socio-economic and political 
transformations. The classic extended family arrangement is only one type of 
family/household configuration in Egypt. In fact, simple, nuclear households 
actually appear to be replacing extended arrangements in urban Egypt. In 
one of the neighbourhoods where I carried out my research in, 80% of all 
households were simple nuclear ones consisting of married couples with or 
without children or single parents with unmarried children (Shorter et al, 
1994). Moreover, households headed by women are now estimated to 
constitute at least 18% of ail households in Egypt (Fergany, 1994b; Egypt 
Human Development Report, 1997).
A recent anthropological study of gender and family power in a low- 
income neighbourhood in the North of Cairo, further challenges stereotypes 
of power as localised in a father figure and attempts to link local practices 
with broader socio-economic phenomena (Ghanem, 1996). Ghanem argues 
that men in this community selectively appropriated certain aspects of the 
"global" while simultaneously repudiating those aspects which may serve to 
contest their power in the family or disrupt the status quo. For example, a 
husband may install a telephone line, a symbol of modernity, but use it to 
more effectively monitor the movements of his wife. Another may purchase a 
coloured television to accommodate his wife's discontent at having to stay at 
home, but attempts to control when and how it is to be used (Ghanem, 1996). 
Her study is a perceptive portrayal of how in a context of globalisation, both 
men and women attempt to appropriate meanings and practices and to 
establish new "truths" to either naturalise or contest power relations between 
them.
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Gender relations and practices at a community level, are thus not 
static, but are in continuous flux as they interact with broader societal 
transformations. Understanding broad societal changes in Egypt is therefore 
essential for interpreting the micro-level interactions that the thesis focuses 
on. Before providing an overview of some of the macro level trends that are 
most relevant to the concerns of this thesis, however, a brief socio-economic 
profile of Egypt is provided below.
Egypt: A Socio-Economic Profile:
Egypt has an estimated population of 60,236,0002. (El-Zanaty et 
a!,1996). See map (1). It had a Gross National Product of $US 660 per 
capita in 1993 and is accordingly classified as a "low-income" country by the 
World Bank (World Bank, 1995). However, recent research (Fergany, 1997), 
suggests that the income levels of a sizeable percentage of population are 
below that average per capita estimate. This is an important finding which 
highlights the inherent inadequacies of GNP measures for capturing socio­
economic inequalities within a country, and suggests a greater degree of 
impoverishment for certain groups in Egyptian society than official estimates 
indicate (Fergany, 1997).
Estimates of the percentage of Egyptians whose income falls below 
the poverty line varies widely between 25-35 percent depending on the 
methodology adopted (World Bank, 1995; Egypt Human Development 
Report, 1997). In 1995, Egypt ranked number 107 out of the 174 countries 
on the Human Development Index. This low ranking is partly related to the 
high rate of female illiteracy, estimated at 66% of the total female population 
(UNDP Human Development Report, 1995).
Egypt's economy has traditionally been based on agriculture. In 1960, 
agriculture represented 40% of the Gross Domestic Product. By 1995, 
however, the share of agriculture had declined to only 20% whereas the 
industrial sector has expanded from 15% to 22 percent (World Bank, 1995). 
it is estimated that 43% of all industrial production in the private sector takes
2 This figure excludes Egyptians living abroad.
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place in small firms of less than 10 employees, many of which are "informal" 
in the sense that they are unregulated by law. These constitute part of 
Egypt's "informal economy" or "informal economic sector", which has only 
recently become the subject of research.3 Because most of my respondents 
were employed in the informal economy as will be discussed in later 
chapters, a brief description of sector is provided below.
Estimates of the size of the informal sector in Egypt vary widely. One 
estimate based on number of employees per firm, suggests that Egypt's 
informal economy has been on the rise over the past two decades. Census 
results show a significant increase in informal sector employment between 
1976 and 1986, indicating that it has been an important force for creating jobs 
during this period (Handousa, 1991). Assuming stable growth rates in the 
Egyptian Economy, informal sector employment is expected to reach 4.5 
million by the year 2000 (Rizk, 1991). In addition to its exact size, a related 
controversial issue4 with regards to the informal economy in Egypt has to do 
with wages and earnings, as compared to other sectors of the economy. 
Abdel Fadil shows that employees in the informal sector are engaged in low 
wage, low income and marginal activities that do not provide a minimum
3 The concept, measurement, and economic role of the "informal sector" have been 
a topic of debate internationally over the past 25 years. Early critiques of the 
concept, such as over stressing duality, ignoring linkages between sectors and 
assumptions of sectoral homogeneity, have now been addressed (Scott, 1991). 
Most current research on the informal sector assumes polarisation of economic 
activity, with a continuum between opposite poles, rather than dualism, and 
acknowledges both diversity within the sector, as well as connections between 
informal and formal economic activities. Some debate, however, still exists based 
on the differential emphasis given by different researchers to the role of certain 
causal factors such as technology, legislation and labour characteristics (Scott,
1991). Another important contested point also relates to whether the sector is seen 
as a manifestation of exploitation (Castells and Portes, 1989), or as the dynamo of 
future growth and employment (De Soto, 1986).
4 Acknowledging the debates and controversies regarding the definition, role and 
size of the informal sector in Egypt, Rizk nonetheless attempts to tease out several 
general characteristics of micro and small scale economic activities in Egypt by 
reviewing some of the main studies carried out on the topic. She shows that one 
of the primary characteristics is that the level of skills in such enterprises is 
relatively high; 43% of workers have specialised skills and 31% have medium 
skills. Rizk also finds that informal enterprises are characterised by low-capital 
intensity, high reliance on local raw materials, and a high degree of self and 
informal financing mechanisms (Rizk, 1991).
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standard of living (Abdel Fadil, 1983). On the other, hand, Rizk (1991) 
argues that concepts like "wages of the poor", "survival", "marginality", and so 
forth, go against the brighter picture provided by most research findings in 
Egypt A 1990 survey, the largest empirical one on the informal sector to 
date, shows that about 75% of workers in the informal sector make a salary 
above minimum wage level. Of those, 30 percent earn between 3-7LE a day, 
20% earn between 5-7LE a day, and 3% over 10LE a day5. As will be 
discussed in chapter seven, however, my research suggests that these salary 
levels may reflect only male employment and are a generally misleading 
depiction of female employment in the informal sector.
Regional and Internal Migration:
Egypt has experienced a number of important transformations over the 
past two decades which have had a direct influence on its economy, both the 
informal and the formal sectors. One of the most significant has been large 
scale migration. Part of this migration has been internal, from rural to urban 
areas6. In fact, Egypt has had one of the fastest rates of urbanisation in the 
world, which has resulted in the urban population doubling in 10 years. 
Population growth has been accompanied by a steady increase in the ratio of 
the population residing in urban areas, reaching 44% of the total population 
in 1986 (El-Zanaty et al, 1996). See table (1). Much of this growth has been 
uncontrolled and has resulted in the rise of a number of spontaneous urban 
settlements, as will be explained in the following chapter.
In addition to internal migration, Egypt has also witnessed 
unprecedented levels of regional migration over the course of the past 20 
years. Most of this migration has been to the oil rich Arab countries of the 
Gulf as well as to Jordan, Iraq and Libya. Successive waves of out-migration 
since the early 1970's were triggered by a number of national, regional and 
international developments. These included high levels of population growth
5 In 1997, one sterling was equivalent to 5.6 Egyptian pounds.
6 Rural urban migration, particularly to the capital city Cairo is discussed in more 
detail in the following chapter
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in Egypt, a deterioration in the conditions of life in rural areas, the adoption of 
liberal economic policies by the Egyptian government and the relaxing of 
controls over out-migration, the 1973 Arab war with Israel and the 
concomitant rise of a regional petrodollar economy, and the extended war 
between Iraq and Iran which has led to a dramatic increase in labour demand 
in Iraq (Taylor, 1984; Hatem, 1983; Amin and Taylor, 1984).
Since the 1960's Egypt had been exporting a labour force of 
professionals and administrators to a number of countries in the Middle East. 
This labour force was carefully regulated and controlled by the government 
and was in line with Egypt's own manpower needs (Taylor, 1984). In the 
1970's, however, the government sponsored labour migration was surpassed 
in size by a largely unregulated gush of labour at various skill levels. As a 
result, Egypt's share of total Arab migrant labour increased significantly 
reaching one-third by 1975 (Taylor, 1984).
By the mid 1980's, 11.5% of Egypt's total labour force was estimated to 
be working abroad, as compared to 5 percent in the mid 1970's (LaTowsky,
1984). However, professionals no longer constituted the majority of migrants. 
They were overtaken by skilled and unskilled labourers in the construction 
sector. The demand for construction workers was triggered by the 
construction and maintenance of huge infrastructure projects in the rich Arab 
countries in the Gulf during this period, in 1980, 44% of those who were 
issued residence permits for first time employment in Kuwait were employed 
in the construction sector. In Libya, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf countries, 
the same pattern of labour deployment has been observed (LaTowsky,1984).
Many men in the study community were part of this semi and unskilled 
construction labour force (Landor, 1994). They have thus been directly 
affected by the regional migration of the eighties as will be discussed later on 
when describing the study community.
It is estimated that only about 10% of the migrants between 1975-85 
were women (Taylor, 1984). It was thus predominantly Egyptian men who 
migrated leaving their families behind. Accordingly, much of the research on 
regional migration in Egypt has focused on the impact of men's absence on
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female autonomy and decision making within the household, particularly in 
rural areas.
Research results have pointed to conflicting tendencies. There is general 
consensus that male-out migration has increased women's workloads in rural 
areas and enabled them to assume new roles previously reserved for men, 
such as dealing with agricultural banks and co-operatives. Nonetheless, 
there is disagreement over the impact this has had on patterns of authority 
and power within the rural household. Some studies have concluded that 
male migration has led to women assuming greater leverage and control over 
resources and authority which are expected to continue even after husbands 
or fathers returned (Kattab and El-Daeif, 1982; Khafagy, 1984). Others, 
have, however, been more cautious in their conclusions, asserting that 
changes that did occur have been marginal, and have not fundamentally 
challenged or affected the existing character of relations between men and 
women, or significantly altered gender norms and expectations (Taylor, 1984; 
Hatem, 1983).
Taylor suggests that the impact of migration on the position of a 
migrant's wife is closely related to the type of family structure she is left to 
manage and on her stage in the reproductive cycle. Thus the position of 
younger women with children who live in extended households with their 
mothers-in-law may actually be negatively affected by male migration since 
they do not control the incoming remittances and their authority and 
independence is checked by their mother-in-laws. Taylor argues that even 
for migrant wives in nuclear independent households for whom migration has 
resulted in more control over their own lives, their power in the household is 
neither "total" nor "permanent": husbands remain the main decision makers 
(Taylor, 1984). Some studies have further suggested that the feminisation of 
agriculture that occurred with male migration has actually led to a societal 
devaluation of this entire sphere of activity. As more women engaged in 
farming and farm related tasks due to male out-migration, agricultural activity 
became devalued in comparison with the work that migrant workers assumed 
abroad (Abaza, 1987).
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Another important aspect of regional migration of more direct 
relevance to gender relations in the study community and which I observed 
clearly during my research has been its impact on increasing consumerism. 
Taylor (1984) documents the rise in demand on largely imported consumer 
durable goods, such as televisions, refrigerators and electric household 
equipment in the village she studied. She also vividly illustrates some of the 
changes in tastes in furniture and home items that have occurred with 
migration. The inflow of remittances appears to have been accompanied with 
an inflow of demand for novel "modern1' items, creating new popular tastes, 
such as for instance, a demand on blond and blue eyed plastic ornamental 
dolls. As will be discussed in chapter four, the rise of consumerism and 
changes in patterns of popular consumption that accompanied regional 
migration have significantly influenced marriage transactions in the study 
community. The increase in the costs of the marriage trousseau, gihaaz, has 
apparently forced an increasing number of unmarried women to seek 
employment as wage labourers in the informal sector. Amassing a large 
gihaaz has become an important mechanism through which women may 
increase their options and leverage in their future marriages as will be 
discussed in chapter six.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1992 and subsequent international 
events have led to the involuntary return of massive numbers of migrants to 
Egypt, estimated at over a million returnees by the early 1990's. This 
coincided with the decline of the construction boom in the Gulf countries 
which had attracted much of the regional migration of the 1970’s and 1980’s, 
thus inducing further involuntary returnees. The impact of this massive return 
migration has not been studied systematically. It is nonetheless 
acknowledged as one of the reasons for the current high rates of male 
unemployment in Egypt in general, and among semi-skilled and unskilled 
construction workers in particular, who, as mentioned earlier constituted a 
significant percentage of the male labour force in the study community. As 
Landor (1994) demonstrates, based on an anthropological study in 1980 of 
the labour processes underlying an urban peripheral area on the fringes of
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Cairo, there is a complex interplay between migration (external and internal) 
and the growth of unplanned urban settlements. Landor argues that the 
construction trade, in which most of the male labour force in his study 
community were engaged, is an unstable form of employment as “it creates 
an urban labour force only trained for construction work which will be laid off 
during periods of downturn in the industry”(Landor, 1994:449).
Economic Liberalisation and Structural Adjustment:
A second significant change in Egypt over the past two decades has 
been the gradual overhaul of the nationalist, socialist policies which marked 
president Nasser's regime in the 1950's and 1960's (Oncu et al, 1994). 
President Sadat's accession to power in 1970 marked the beginning of a new 
era in Egypt with the adoption of more liberal economic policies and closer 
ties to the west. Known as the "open door" polices, el infitaah, these resulted 
in a deeper integration of the country into the global political economy, a 
retreat of the state from economic regulation and welfare policies, and a 
degree of political liberalisation signalled by the emergence of multiple 
political parties (Oncu et al, 1994; Hatem, 1994). Accompanying this process 
of political and economic liberalisation has also been a steady decline in 
what has been termed "state feminism", (Hatem, 1992), that is, in the active 
social policies of the Nasser period which had resulted in many gains for 
women, particularly in education and employment. Women's labour force 
participation increased by 31.1% from 1961-1969, and throughout the 1960's 
women's unemployment was low. Increased liberalisation, however, 
coincided with a significant rise in women's unemployment in the formal 
sectors of the economy, from a low rate of 4.1 percent in 1966, to 29.8%. ten 
years later (Morcoss, 1988; Hatem, 1994).
The privatisation and structural adjustment policies that Egypt began 
implementing in 1990, under pressure from the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, are part and parcel of the liberal economic 
transformation which started in the mid 1970’s. The longer term impact of 
structural adjustment policies (SAPs) is yet to be evaluated. Such a task is
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also fraught with methodological problems. Nonetheless, emerging evidence 
strongly suggests that, at least in the short term, these policies result in 
increased poverty and widening disparities between the rich and the poor. 
Men and women are both negatively affected, but evidence suggests that the 
impact is differential, and that women often bear a disproportionate share of 
the burden (Sparr, 1994; UNICEF, 1989; Afshar and Dennis, 1992; Eison, 
1989; 1991; Vickers, 1991; Baden, 1993; Beneria and Feldman, 1992).
Cross-cultural evidence indicates that policies associated with 
economic liberalisation have affected many aspects of women’s lives, from 
educational attainments and employment to marital status, working 
conditions, family relationships, marriage decisions, self-concept, access to 
information and public services; and to their understanding of their role and 
possibilities in life. These different effects may sometimes either reinforce or 
contradict each other (Sparr, 1994). As a result of SAPs, more women than 
men may become unemployed, yet an increasing number of women may look 
for income generating work. Moreover, wage differentials between men and 
women grow, working conditions deteriorate, more women enter the informal 
sector, women's unpaid work increases, progress with girls’ education slows 
down, food consumption diminishes, girls’ health and mortality worsen, family 
structures change (Sparr, 1994; Vickers, 1991; UNICEF, 1989).
Some studies have even suggested a possible link between increased 
domestic violence against women and increased cost of living due to 
structural adjustment programs. Price increases affect women's ability to both 
generate and control resources. In her study of a low-income district in 
Ecuador over a ten-year period (1978-1988), Moser shows that 48% of her 
sub-sample of women reported an increase in domestic violence during this 
period. Her interviewees made an explicit link between increases in prices 
and their lack of access to cash, reporting being physically or emotionally 
abused by their husbands when forced to ask for more money (Moser, 1989).
Although such inferences are hard to make, a lot of marital conflicts in the 
study community similarly centred on monetary and budgetary disagreements 
and were.often the cause of verbal and physical abuse by a husband.
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There are few empirical studies in Egypt which have addressed the 
impact of SAPs in general or their differential impact on men and women in 
particular. The evidence that does exist, however, supports some of the 
international findings discussed above. Fergany, comparing national income 
and expenditures surveys between 1990 and 1995, shows that conditions of 
life have deteriorated at an alarming rate during this period. Real family 
incomes have fallen by 14% on average in urban areas and 20 percent in 
rural areas, prices have increased by 170% in rural areas and 160% in urban 
areas, and malnutrition among five year old children (as measured by stunted 
growth) has increased by 5% during this period (Fergany, 1997).
Existing research also suggests that the negative impact of structural 
adjustment policies varies depending on a woman's life cycle, class position 
and form of employment. The government's policies to contract the public 
sector has resulted in an unprecedented unemployment rate among women. 
By 1986, the overall rate of unemployment in Egypt doubled from 7.7% in 
1976 to 14.7%. It is noteworthy, however, that female unemployment was 
four times that of male unemployment; with 10% for men and 40.7% for 
women (Morcoss, 1988). This unemployment has mainly affected new 
university graduates. Hatem suggests that the inability of young female 
graduates to find jobs has had a regressive impact on the self-perceptions 
and consciousness of this new generation, increasing their financial 
dependence on their own families and encouraging many to adopt the 
traditional role of dependent housewife (Hatem, 1994).
In addition to increasing unemployment for certain categories of 
women, SAPs have also altered the terms of work in public sector 
manufacturing industries. Attempts to reduce the cost of labour have resulted 
in deteriorating conditions as reflected in practices related to hiring, 
promotions and child care facilities and maternal leaves (Hatem, 1994). In 
the private sector, unfavourable hiring practices have also been intensified. 
Private enterprises get around the legal requirement of providing day care 
centres for employees, by stopping short of hiring 100 female workers. Open 
discrimination against women can be detected from the many employment
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advertisements specifying that only men are eligible to apply. This is a 
blatant violation of labour laws, but is tolerated by the government as it is 
congruent with its laissez faire policies (Hatem, 1994).
Despite the lack of research in this area, structural adjustment policies 
are also believed to result in a deterioration of the conditions and terms of 
employment in some sectors of the informal economy, where much of the 
work of the less educated women and men is concentrated. This was clearly 
evident in the study community. As will be shown in chapter seven, an 
increasing number of women in the study community appear to be engaged in 
tedious and low paid work as piece-workers or as wage labourers in small 
workshops under precarious conditions. Moreover, the highly visible 
phenomenon of female street sweepers in Cairo illustrates how notions of 
what constitutes women's "proper" work may be eroding in the face of 
economic necessity. Public street cleaning, both poorly paid and socially 
stigmatised, has always been the domain of men. The relatively recent 
phenomenon of female street sweepers is also testimony to the increasingly 
precarious livelihoods that women may find themselves forced into in order to 
survive.7
In fact, the feminisation of poverty in Egypt may be on the increase 
(Egypt Human Development Report, 1997). Recent studies are pointing to a 
large number of households solely or mainly supported by women reaching 
18% nationally (Fergany, 1994b). Micro-level research suggests that the 
figure may be even higher, reaching 30% of all households in some low- 
income urban communities (EQI, 1987; El-Kholy, 1990; Fergany, 1994b). 
Moreover, the income levels of households headed by women are estimated 
to be 40% less than those of male headed households (Fergany, 1994b).
In the absence of longitudinal data, it is impossible to talk about trends 
over time. However, it is widely believed that the numbers of households 
which are de facto or de jure financially supported by women have increased
7 See El-Kholy, "The Feminisation of Poverty or Expanding Employment 
Opportunities for Women? A case Study of a Street Sweeper in Cairo" 
(Forthcoming 1998).
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during the past few years, partly as a result of male unemployment and 
underemployment This has obvious implications for the material basis of 
male authority in the family, and creates new arenas of negotiation and 
contestation within the household. These trends were clearly reflected in the 
study community. Although there were only 12 de jure women heads of 
household in my sample, there were many more women who were de facto 
the main or sole providers for their families. Only three women reported that 
they did not contribute any cash to the household.
Public sector cuts have also had a significant impact on the health and 
education sectors, both of which have specific implications for women in 
general, and had visible impacts on women in the study community in 
particular. State support to the public health care system declined 
significantly from 5 percent in the 1965 five year plan to 1 percent of total 
spending in 1988 five year plan (Kandil, 1989, quoted in Hatem, 1994). 
Similarly, in the educational sector, economic investment dropped, 
educational facilities deteriorated and salaries for teachers as a group 
dropped drastically over the past two decades. Throughout the 1980's the 
state encouraged entrepreneurs to open private schools, in an attempt to 
reduce the burden of providing more and higher quality government 
education. As a result, private entrepreneurs (some Islamist businessmen 
and some more secularly oriented entrepreneurs who attempted to emulate 
the western school system) began to invest in education (Hatem,1994). The 
increase in the costs of public education has resulted in a de facto move by 
both parents and teachers to the informal privatisation of a theoretically free 
educational system, partly through an emerging phenomenon of "private 
lessons". This phenomenon, discussed in some detail in chapter nine, 
emerged in my research as an area of disagreement between husband and 
wife vis a vis decisions concerning daughter's access to education.
The International Women in Development (W1D) Lobby:
A third influence on gender relations at the local level closely related 
to government policies discussed above, is the emergence of an International
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"Women in Development"(WID) lobby. This influence is clearly of a different 
order and scale than privatisation and structural adjustment policies and its 
influence is much more indirect. However, the role of this lobby in Egypt 
became significant, rather interestingly, at the very point at which the state 
welfare policies of the early 1960's, which gave women distinct advantages, 
started receding. The gradual retreat of the state over the past two decades 
has resulted in the creation of a political vacuum that was to be partly filled by 
international donors (and partly by Islamists as will be discussed below). As 
Kandiyoti argues: "the 'official' feminist rhetoric that had been the hallmark of 
the modernising post independence State has now been appropriated by 
supranational bodies with contradictory effects at the local level" (1995:25).
Partly as a result of the global WID lobby, increasing donor funds have 
been allocated to multitude of "women in development" projects over the past 
15 years. The overall impact of these projects is difficult to assess as there 
has been little systematic documentation or evaluation. Based on research in 
other countries, some have argued that many WID projects and programs 
have had no tangible impact on women's lives (Buvinic, 1989).
Nonetheless, the impact of the international WID monitoring lobby 
behind these projects, which gained strength as a result of the United Nations 
international conferences over the past few years, cannot be denied. For the 
first time in Egypt an informal Women in Development donor sub-group, 
made up of the representatives of international donor organisations in Egypt 
was created in Cairo in 1990. Its stated objective was to increase donor co­
ordination as well as to tighten donor leverage to influence the Egyptian 
government's policies regarding women. National and sub-national WID 
machineries, designed to keep women's issues on the agenda, have 
emerged partly in response to donor pressure. These include the National 
Commission for Women, set up in 1995 and chaired by the wife of the 
president.
A number of "gender units" have also been set up within several 
ministries, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, and within various public 
institutions, such as the Institute of National Planning. In addition, a new
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cadre of largely middle class female and male development professionals 
(project managers, extension workers, etc.), both in the government and in 
the private sector, has been created over the past decade. Through working 
on a range of "women in development" projects, they have been exposed to a 
WID rhetoric containing notions of equality and equity in gender relations 
sometimes quite alien to their own standards and expectations.
The highly visible national conferences on women organised by the 
government in 1994 and 1996 constitute further examples of Egypt's attempt 
to fulfil international demands to put women's issues on the agenda. These 
national conferences received high levels of publicity and media coverage 
and drew a large number of participants from national and local level 
government, as well as Non Governmental organisations (NGOs). The latter 
put a wide range of sensitive issues on the agenda which were discussed 
extensively, in these and other public forums over the past five years.8
Issues such as combating female circumcision, revising personal 
status laws and the adoption of a new marriage contract to better protect 
women's rights in marriage were debated nationally. Most of these 
discussions took place in the halls of five star hotels or universities in Cairo 
and Alexandria, Egypt's two largest cities. Attempts were made, however, 
particularly by NGOs, to extend these public debates to smaller towns and 
villages around the country. Attempts were also successfully made to engage 
some members of the media to cover many of these public events. As a 
result, "women's issues" were put on the national agenda in an 
unprecedented manner and became the topic of local television and 
newspaper coverage, and public debate. Since the International Population 
Conference in 1994, a full page was allocated on a weekly basis for coverage 
of women's issues by the leading government newspaper, Al Ahram. The 
actual content of the page varies a great deal reflecting, diverse, often 
contradictory, interpretations of gender and women's issues. However, as
8 For a description of some of the current women activist groups see Margo Badran 
(1993); Al-Aii (1997); llbaz (1997), For a more detailed discussion of the issues 
around which Egyptian NGOs mobilised and advocated during the United Nations 
conferences, see Egyptian NGOs platform of action (1994;1995).
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will be discussed below, while international pressures were pushing gender 
concerns in one direction, there were internal developments going in another 
direction.
The Rise of Islamist Discourses:
Finally, a fourth crucial development in Egypt over the past two 
decades, is a growing and increasingly militant and conservative Islamist 
movement. This movement is part of a broader Islamization discourse which 
has been gaining force as an oppositional movement in many Muslim 
countries since the 1970's (Kepel, 1992), and which has often been popularly 
termed "Islamic fundamentalism". Since the mid-eighties, however, a growing 
number of scholars have pointed to the inaccuracy of the term Islamic 
"fundamentalism", exposing it as an essentially western construct (Campo, 
1995; Haddad, 1987; Kepel, 1992). Terms such as "Islamist", or "political 
Islam" are now more commonly used to broadly describe these fairly new 
political movements. While scholars agree that there is a multiplicity of 
voices and practices within such Islamist discourses (Campo, 1995), Islamist 
movements, nonetheless appear to share some features which justify viewing 
them as part of a broader oppositional movement calling upon Islam as the 
source of legislation and moral capital.
One common feature in the new Islamist movements is that they 
commonly locate women, gender relations and family affairs at the centre of 
their discourse (Auybi, 1995; Kandiyoti, 1991; Mernissi, 1987; Sharabi,
1992). According to Islamist ideology, women's rightful place is the home 
and her first obligation is to her husband and the socialisation of Muslim 
children; women can work outside the home, only after fulfilling their primary 
obligations. Islamists insist on the imperative of modesty, protecting women 
from temptation and the separation of sexes in public places. "The "true" 
Muslim family that they wish to restore is one where "authority and protection 
flows from the male head of household down to females and the young. 
Respect and obedience flow in the opposite direction" (S. Ibrahim, 1985:498).
As Kandiyoti argues, in the attempts by Islamists to restore the "Islamic"
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community, umma, women represent the ’ultimate and inviolable repository of 
Muslim identity" (Kandiyoti, 1991:7).
It is generally agreed that the current Islamist trend in Egypt was 
activated and gained particular strength and popular appeal after the 
humiliation of the Arab defeat in 1967 by Israeli forces with support from the 
western world (S. Ibrahim, 1985; Shukralla, 1989; Auybi, 1995). The 
movement was nurtured under president Sadat (1970-1981) who attempted 
to use Islamist groups to counter leftist opposition particularly within the 
national universities. It gained impetus under president Mubarek's current 
regime. This is partly due to the inability of the successive governments of 
both Sadat and Mubarek to address the country’s severe social and 
economic problems, from housing and unemployment, to the increasingly 
conspicuous disparities between flagrant wealth on the one hand, and abject 
poverty on the other. Empirical evidence shows that the "highest percentage 
of members of the militant Islamic movement comes from the newly built and 
rapidly expanding periphery of the cities, especially Cairo, where social 
problems and moral issues reach critical levels" (Auybi, 1995: 91).
The liberal economic reforms begun under Sadat and continued under 
Mubarek resulted in short lived growth in the 1970’s. By the early 1980’s, 
however, they had culminated in a severe economic crisis and high rates of 
external debt. During the past two decades, prices soared, unemployment 
and inflation grew steadily, subsidies on most basic goods were cancelled, 
some public sector industries were dismantled and the public health and 
education sectors declined (Fergany, 1997; Hatem, 1994; Shukralla, 1994).
Finding affordable housing had also became an unattainable dream 
for the majority of low-income groups during this period. While rents 
remained quite low for older housing stock due to the rent control laws which 
prevailed during the Nasserite era, by the early eighties rents on newly 
constructed apartments had skyrocketed. The early years of the infitaah, 
witnessed a 10 to 15 fold increase in the price of land within the span of a few 
years (Flanna, 1985). Foreign and joint venture firms entered the 
construction sector, resulting in an oversupply of luxury apartments. At the
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same time, they drove up the price of land and rents (Hanna, 1985). As a 
result, one estimate suggests that by the early eighties, 30% of the income of 
couples within the lowest quartile of income distribution in Egypt went to pay 
for rent (Abt Associates et al, 1981). Moreover, the practice of charging so 
called "key money", whereby landlords ask new tenants for exorbitant 
amounts of money before renting out a flat, had become a rampant practice. 
One study shows that both the incidence and the amount of key money 
demands have increased at a rate of 30 percent annually (Abt Associates et 
al, 1981).
Unmatched by a parallel rise in incomes, the dramatic increase in the 
cost of housing has had a major impact on one of the fundamental institutions 
of Egyptian society, the family, by increasing the cost of marriage and 
contributing to raising the average age of marriage for both women and men. 
Both developments are sources of great anxiety and frustration particularly 
in low income neighbourhoods (Singerman, 1995; Auybi, 1995). These 
frustrations were evident in the study community as will be discussed in later 
chapters. In sum, as Shukralla argues, "the fruits of the promised growth (of 
infitaah policies) never reached the large masses of the population who were 
finding out that the new alliance with the West went to the benefit of the rich 
and powerful not the poor" (Shukralla, 1994:15). The current strength and 
popularity of the new Islamist discourse as an "alternative" must thus be 
understood in the context of the demise of existing state discourse, whether 
secular, nationalist or socialist (Kepel, 1992; Auybi, 1995). These discourses 
are now perceived by a large majority of Egyptians as linked to a political 
system that is "synonymous with defeat, humiliation and impoverishment" 
(Shukralla, 1994:16).
The privatisation policies discussed earlier also played an important, 
albeit unintended, role in paving the way for Islamists to gain power and 
strength at the local level. One consequence of the withdrawal of the State 
has been the creation of a social and political vacuum that was quickly filled 
by Islamist groups. These groups have, since the mid 1980's, stressed 
tactics "from below" which entailed the setting up of extensive networks in
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poor quarters and extending numerous social services (Kepel,1992). 
"Recognising the impasse that existed regarding the immediate capture of 
power, they fixed as their first objective to act on the level of the individual, in 
his daily life, so that he should break radically with the manners and customs 
of the surrounding "impious" society and comport himself strictly on the model 
of the prophet" (Kepel, 1992:158).
The reduction of government spending on the health sector referred to 
earlier, was partly compensated by the rise of alternative "Islamic clinics" in 
both villages and urban areas. Since the early 1980's clinics attached to 
mosques have played an increasingly important role in the provision of good 
quality affordable health care thus presenting Islamists as offering a viable 
alternative to the social services provided by the state (Sullivan, 1994; 
Hatem, 1994). Such services constitute one example of what can be termed 
the "islamization" of every day life, a phenomenon which was evident in the 
study community and which is discussed in greater detail in chapter eight.
This sketchy overview of the interaction of various macro-level forces 
in Egypt highlights the complex changes that the country has been 
undergoing over the past two decades. These set the broad parameters 
within which gender relations and practices in specific local contexts can be 
studied. Under the conditions of rapid change described above, it becomes 
inevitable to pose questions about socio-cultural reproduction and change. 
How do social groups, in particular families and communities, where early 
socialisation occurs, cope with these emerging realities as they attempt to 
reproduce themselves? (see Appadurai, 1990).
During such turmoil and confusion, in this era of ghubar, lack of clarity, 
as Om Samir put it, how do men and women negotiate gender roles and 
relations at a concrete level in their everyday lives? Given the cultural flux 
and shaky reference points, the increasing socio-economic stratification, and 
the decreasing standards of living—to what extent and in what ways are 
constructed standards of ideal behaviour--the various "traditional" roles, 
values, images, and discourses about gender-unsettled? How are women 
managing the contradictory pressures of seeking paid employment while
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adhering to increasingly conservative interpretations of their roles? To what 
extent is new space created through which women can gain advantage and 
challenge perceived injustices in their lives?
It is those types of questions that the thesis attempts to explore in 
some detail through fieldwork in specific low-income communities in Cairo. 
Following this brief exposition of the macro-level context of gender relations 
in Egypt, the next chapter presents an overview of the community context of 
the research by providing a description of the research setting, and a portrait 
of the "study community".
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE RESEARCH SETTING AND CHARACTERISTICS 
OF THE STUDY COMMUNITY
Doing urban anthropology, particularly in the context of not only a 
large but also a highly heterogeneous city like Cairo is a daunting task in 
view of the discipline's earlier emphasis on bounded communities. Cairo 
encompasses a mosaic of different lifestyles, social outlooks and standards. 
At the same time, communities within this huge metropolis are not isolated 
entities. They are linked to each other, as well as to their rural origins, and 
often to international cities and markets as well, in intricate and complex 
ways. The social and economic embedment of urban communities within 
larger structures and the diversity of values and lifestyles within one 
community make urban anthropology in general, and a "community" study in 
Cairo in particular, quite a complex undertaking. I became very aware of this 
issue during the early days of my fieldwork, which led me to revise my initial 
fieldwork plan.
My initial proposal, largely for practical reasons, was to carry out in- 
depth research in a single community. Given the size of urban communities, I 
had intended to focus even more closely on one haara1 within this 
community, a practice also adopted by other anthropologists (for example, 
Nadim, 1985). The community I had chosen was Manshiet Nasser, a 
settlement on the fringes of Cairo set up on government owned land in the 
1960's.
1 A haara now refers to the narrow unpaved alleyways typical of many lower 
income and traditional quarters of Cairo, in which various household activities, 
such as food preparation, takes place. As will be discussed later, however, 
historically a haara was not only a spatial division within the city, but more 
importantly, it constituted a distinct social and political division.
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I selected this settlement for various reasons. First, it is representative 
of the spontaneously formed low-income urban settlements in Cairo, 
cashwsr’iyyatf which have become established outside of formal zoning and 
building regulations. Like other cashwar>iyyat, Manshiet Nasser has been 
affected by the complex interplay of global and national forces of migration, 
population increase, structural adjustment, and religious extremism, which 
Egypt has witnessed over the past 15 years (see previous Chapter). 
Secondly, Manshiet Nasser has a large concentration of small enterprises, 
estimated at over 2000 in 1985, which engage in a wide range of activities: 
soap-making, leather goods, foundries, brass items, ready made clothes, 
rugs, toys, furniture, upholstery, mother of pearl items, and chalk making. 
Some of these workshops employ women as wage workers. Moreover, my 
previous exposure to this settlement suggested that industrial sub-contracting 
activities, carried out by women at home, may also be present.
Thirdly, a rich statistical, demographic and qualitative data base on the 
settlement, although now over a decade old, is nonetheless available, which 
is rarely the case for other informal settlements (see EQI, 1987; Shorter et al, 
1994). The availability of such macro-level material would allow me to better 
situate and interpret my own findings. The availability of such data also 
meant that I could spend most of my fieldwork time focusing on specific 
research issues rather than trying to get a broader understanding of the 
social history and demographic features of the community. Last, but not 
least, I was familiar with the neighbourhood and had easy access to it due to 
my previous involvement as a founding board member of an Egyptian Non 
Governmental Organisation that has been working with women-headed 
households in Manshiet Nasser for the past eight years.
After spending a few months in Manshiet Nasser, however, I decided 
to change my approach. Although I had based myself in one haara and had 
established strong relationships with various women there, I realised that
2 In 1992, there were an estimated 16 such settlements in greater Cairo, which were 
estimated to accommodate 30% of the city's inhabitants, many of whom are first 
generation migrants (El-Waly, 1993).
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confining myself physically to Manshiet Nasser, and to this haara would 
compromise my interest in understanding women's lives and extra-household 
networks. Women’s lives were closely intertwined and interconnected with 
activities in other locations and communities around Cairo. Many worked in 
neighbourhoods other than Manshiet Nasser where they had established 
long-lasting ties and networks, such as spirit possession networks, market 
networks, or rotating credit and saving association networks. (See the next 
chapter). I thus decided to abandon my initial pian of carrying a total census 
of women in all households in the haara and branched out instead into three 
other low-income communities where the women 1 interviewed led me. These 
are: Sayeda Aisha, Sayeda Zeinab and El Gamaliya. See map (2). In order 
to better locate Manshiet Nasser and the three other communities in the 
broader fabric of the city, the next section provides a brief social history of 
Cairo before moving on to provide more specific descriptions of the 
neighbourhoods in which I carried out my research.
Cairo: A Mosaic of lifestyles:
Cairo, with an estimated population of 14 million3, is currently the 
largest metropolis in the Middle East and North Africa region and one of the 
largest ten cities in the world. Only a hundred years ago, however, the city 
had only 905, 000 inhabitants (Shorter et al, 1994). The major spurt in 
Cairo's growth occurred in the present century, specifically during and after 
the Second World War. This was partly a result of large-scale migration from 
the countryside triggered by both external and indigenous factors. The 
disruptions in international trade, specifically the allied blockade of Europe, 
led to a sudden demand for local supplies to meet the needs of the urban 
populations and allied troops based in Egypt and the Levant. Employment 
opportunities in the cities emerged in response to this demand and attracted 
large numbers of migrants to Cairo (Issawi, 1982).
3 This figure refers to the greater Cairo region, which includes the governorates of 
Cairo and Giza, as well as part of the governorate of Qalubiya. See map (2).
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The demands of the war economy coincided with the Egyptian 
government's industrialisation and urbanisation policies, which resulted in 
disproportionate allocation of national investment in favour of cities. Poor 
living standards in rural areas, the neglect of agriculture in favour of 
industrialisation and population pressure (partly due to the rapid decline in 
death rates that occurred during this period) induced large scale rural urban 
migration throughout the 1950's and 1960's (Shorter et al, 1994; Abu-Lughod, 
1985). Most such migration was "first step migration", that is, migration 
favouring the largest cities and bypassing the smaller towns (S.Ibrahim,
1985). Cairo received the largest share of migrants, and as a result, the 
percentage of Egypt's population living in Cairo rose from 12 percent before 
the war to 20 percent in the 1970's (Shorter et al, 1994).4
To absorb its growing population, Cairo, which claimed a small 
physical area to begin with, could only expand by pushing out its boundaries 
through building on the agricultural and desert land surrounding it. 
Substantial plots of agricultural land were converted into housing projects 
during the present century, and large industrial plants established during 
Nasser's period were located in areas North and South of Cairo. Originally 
regarded as satellite areas, these have now become an integral part of 
greater metropolitan Cairo (Shorter, et al, 1994).
Over the past two decades, Cairo's growth has been absorbed through 
several means. Space was created by expanding existing structures through 
adding floors or using the roofs as temporary dwellings, and by shrinking the 
size of residential accommodation through subdividing dwellings (Shorter et 
al, 1994). This has resulted in the high density and overcrowding so 
characteristic of Cairo, estimated at 29,472 person per square kilometer
4 Numerically, migration is no longer a significant source of Cairo's growth and most 
Cairenes were born in the city. The changes in the regional economy triggered by 
the 1973 war with Israel, and more specifically the opening up of migration 
opportunities in oil rich states, has checked the flow of Egyptians from the rural 
areas to Cairo. Since the mid seventies Cairo's population has thus been 
increasing largely due to internal growth, and it is projected that by the year 2000, 
the percentage of Egyptians living in Cairo will actually decrease (Shorter, 1989).
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(Farah, 1996).5 Most significantly, urban space has also been expanded by 
setting up new settlements through building on surrounding agricultural 
lands, dessert areas or hillsides. While some of this expansion has been 
controlled and planned by the government, the great majority of 
developments have been spontaneous and unregulated, building on either 
agricultural private land, or uncontrolled squatting on publicly owned land 
(Oldham et al, 1987; El-Waly, 1993; Shorter et al, 1994). Map (2) shows a 
delineation of the original boundaries of the city of Cairo and the newly built 
planned and unplanned settlements.
"Informality" in the sense of lack of adherence to zoning regulations, 
building codes, or city plans, as well as the absence of government planned 
infrastructure, and often lack of title to the land as well, characterised much of 
this process of building in the new settlements. Despite their illegality, 
however, tacit permission from the authorities has generally been granted for 
these settlements (Shorter et al, 1994), which are referred to in Arabic as 
eashw^iyyat, which literally means unplanned or spontaneous.
The government has generally maintained a tacit acceptance of 
cashwa^iyyat, until the early 1990's, when the appalling conditions in many of 
the settlements were seen as the breeding ground for religious extremist 
activities.6 This association was triggered by the highly publicised 
confrontation that took place between massive police forces and so-called 
"terrorists", irhabiyyiin, in Imbaba, a crowded settlement, deprived of most 
basic services, which was built on agricultural land in the seventies. This 
area, with an estimated population of almost a million, was largely controlled 
by Islamic militant forces who provided the residents with a range of health
5 It is important to note that while Cairo overall is a crowded city, wide variations in 
density exist between neighbourhoods. For example, while Shubra, a working 
class area in the North of the city has a density of 100,000 per square kilometer, 
Heliopolis, a well to do district, has a density of only 13,505 (Farah, 1996).
6 The government’s attitude towards these settlements has gone through several 
phases over the past 20 years ranging from tacit acceptance, to relocation to 
eviction or threat of eviction.
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and other basic services over the past twenty years in the absence of any 
government presence (Kepel, 1992).
Since this confrontation, cashwaiyyat, which command an estimated 
30%, of Cairo's population, have been the target of much public debate and 
discussion (El-Waly, 1993). Significant government investment has now 
been allocated to the upgrading of many such settlements. There is general 
consensus, however, that budget allocations fall far short of actual needs and 
that the top down approach adopted by the government is not sustainable 
(El-Waly, 1993).
The phenomenal growth of Cairo in the present century has drastically
altered the historically distinctive features and the cohesiveness of urban
quarters of Cairo. Janet Abu-Lughod's classic study of Cairo remains the
best source for understanding the historical and administrative development
of the city from it's earliest beginnings during the Fatimide rule in the 10th
century to the 1960's. She notes the homogenous character and the spatial
boundaries of urban neighbourhoods which prevailed and were enhanced by
the guild system whereby each trade operated under a particular
organisational structure headed by a sheikh. The original plan of Fatimide
quarters was organised into distinct and bounded sub-sections referred to as
haaraat (singular haara).
"Socially the haara is a group of persons usually unified by 
ethnic and or occupational characteristics as well as by vicinal 
ties and segregated physically and socially from other 
subgroups in the city. Politically it is often a unit of 
administration and control. As the commercial life of Cairo (a/ 
Qahira) diversified, and as occupational groups came to 
dominate more and more of the essential loyalties and 
identification of the non military classes, the original haaraat . 
were adapted to the requirements of craftsmanship and trade. 
Whereas the nomenclature of the earlier haaraat showed a 
preoccupation with ethnic and tribal affiliations, the names of 
later haaraat sometimes revealed the dominant occupational or 
commercial functions of the areas" (Abu-Lughod, 1971:24-25).
This distinctive nature of urban quarters was noted by other studies as 
late as the early 1970's. In her study of a haara in one of Cairo's oldest and 
most densely populated quarters, Nadim (1985) suggested that the haara
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constitutes a complete social unit, with a discrete sub-culture within the larger 
culture of the city. She argues that members of a haara: "have strong 
identification..., share certain historical, ecological and socio-cultural 
experiences which point to an identifiable style of life .. (and) which generates 
a type of social behaviour which demarcates the haara people as distinct" 
(Nadim, 1985:107-108).
However, more recent research in several popular urban quarters 
suggests that over the past 20 years Cairo neighbourhoods may have lost 
much of their distinctive character and geographical boundedness, resulting 
in a city that is far more heterogeneous and less geographically defined 
(Singerman, 1995). Unable to expand easily because they are surrounded 
by other densely populated areas, residents of central districts in Cairo have 
moved to newly established settlements on the fringes of the city. As people 
were forced out of these older neighbourhoods in search of employment 
opportunities or new housing, they took the "haara culture" with them which, 
in time, integrated into the various sub-cultures of the new settlements. As 
Singerman argues: "a haara culture ... now defined more by socio-economic 
conditions and cultural preferences is less geographically distinct but 
increasingly pervasive throughout Cairo and other urban areas of Egypt" 
(Singerman, 1995:22).
Cairene culture is thus currently highly heterogeneous, and Cairo is 
often referred to as a "mosaic" of sub-cultures, reflecting the diverse lifestyles 
and values of the towns and villages of lower and upper Egypt from which 
migrants were drawn, as well as the lifestyles of the original city dwellers. 
One early attempt to categorise the various sub-cultures and lifestyles in 
Cairo is offered by S. Ibrahim (1985). Drawing on a variety of sources, he 
notes that Cairo, like other Arab cities which have undergone large scale 
internal migration, is characterised by three distinct types of population: 
"modern urbanites", "traditional urbanites", and "rural urbanites".
Modern urbanites are highly educated, well to do Cairenes who work 
in the city's modern economic sector and share similar values and outlooks 
with their counterparts in other major cities of the world. "Traditional
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urbanites" are descendants of the longstanding dwellers of the city, usually 
living in the older quarters, and who have remained "traditional" in their 
lifestyle. These include skilled craftsmen and traditional vendors. "Rural 
urbanites", or "urban villagers" are those who have recently migrated to urban 
centres but who still retain significant aspects of their life styles and value 
system and who tend to live in newly formed "ruralized" squatter areas and 
slums. It is these two latter "types" which constitute the majority of Cairo's 
population (S.lbrahim, 1985).
The liberal "open door" economic policies of the 1970's and 1980's, 
and more recently structural adjustment programs, have further diversified the 
socio-economic characteristics and lifestyles of residents of Cairo. Stark 
disparities in income, educational levels, access to basic services and 
lifestyles are now firmly established as major features of the city. 
Conspicuous wealth and consumerism coexists with severe poverty and 
deprivation; luxury apartment buildings and five star hotels rub shoulders with 
run down structures and crumbling buildings, and donkey carts carrying 
garbage or selling fruit cross paths with the latest model Mercedes on the 
crowded streets of the city. It is now estimated that about 30% of the city's 
residents are below the officially established national poverty line (Farah, 
1996), and that while rural poverty may have slightly decreased over the past 
two years, urban poverty has been on the rise (Egypt Human Development 
Report, 1997).
The Neighbourhoods: An Overview:
According to the typology referred to earlier, Manshiet Nasser 
residents could be categorised as representative of "rural urbanites" whereas 
the residents of the three other neighbourhoods I worked in would be more 
typical of "traditional urbanites". All four areas could be considered sha^bi, 
popular, (see Singerman, 1995), or baladi (see Early, 1993a) quarters, as 
distinguished from the more westernised, and more affluent quarters of the 
city. While these typologies may be useful as broad descriptive categories, 
they are unable to capture the subtler features of differentiation within
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neighbourhoods. An attempt at more detailed description of the specific 
neighbourhoods I worked in is thus provided in this section.
The overview that follows focuses on Manshiet Nasser because it was 
the main site of my research; about 70% of my respondents resided in this 
neighbourhood. It is based largely on secondary data obtained through a 
major survey of the community carried out in the mid 1980's (Shorter, 1994), 
an anthropological study carried out in 1980 (Landor, 1994), as well as on my 
own observations. Since I did not carry out a geographically focused study 
that aimed to get a total picture of a particular community, the descriptions 
that follow are necessarily sketchy.
Manshiet Nasser is located on quarry land on the slopes of the 
Muqattam hills, east of the city of Cairo. Spread over an area of about 1.5 
kilometres long and one kilometre wide, the community is bounded by hills on 
the one side and a huge cemetery on the other. On the hills themselves, lies 
a small community of about seven thousand, mainly Christian, traditional 
garbage collectors, known as the zabbaliin. The zabbaliin and Manshiet 
Nasser communities are socially and historically distinct, and until the mid 
1980's were also physically segregated. The rapid pace of expansion of 
Manshiet Nasser, however, has resulted in the physical merging of the two 
communities, and a certain degree of social merging as well.
From the west, Manshiet Nasser faces the Northern sections of a huge 
cemetery dating to Mamluk times, known as Qayet Bey cemeteries, in which 
a significant number of people now also reside. Two kilometres away from 
Manshiet Nasser, beyond the cemeteries, lies the district of il Gamaliya, one 
of the oldest and most densely populated commercial neighbourhoods of 
Cairo, dating to medieval times. The famous il-Azhar mosque and the 
traditional bazaars of Khan il Khalili and il Ghouriyya are located this 
neighbourhood (EQI, 1987; shorter el al, 1994). Gamaliya is also one of the 
four neighbourhoods where I carried out my research. (See map (2) for a 
location of the settlement in relation to other areas in Cairo).
When I first returned to Manshiet Nasser in July of 1995 through it's 
main unpaved, steep road and crossed the rail tracks which run parallel to
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the settlement's main paved street, my first impression was one of familiarity. 
Although I had not been to the settlement for a few years, the sight and smell 
of leaking sewerage flooding the two main roads of the settlement was a 
deeply familiar one, and a testimony of the inadequate infrastructure of the 
community.7 The bustling, densely populated dirt roads characterised by the 
mixed use of space, with buzzing small commercial and industrial 
establishments interlaced with the community's multi-storied houses, made 
mostly of unpainted brick and concrete, were also familiar sights.
Despite this familiarity, there were also some noticeable changes. The 
most significant was a more visible physical presence of both the ruling party 
and non-governmental religious/ welfare activities. Two huge black and white 
signs, hanging side by side now meet the eye as soon as one enters the 
community through its main entrance: one signals the office of the national 
democratic party, and the other points to the premises of the il cAshira il 
Muhammadiyya, one of the two largest Islamic private voluntary 
organisations operating in this settlement.8
A small local mosque, built by the community through local 
contributions about 15 years ago and located on the main street parallel to 
the railway tracks, had also become a more elaborate building, with two new 
floors, a freshly painted exterior and a large new sign advertising its services. 
These services included an orphans support program, kafaalit il yatilm, 
through which a monthly allocation for the children of widows and divorcees
7 The local network of sewers and pipes set up under a World Bank upgrading 
project in the 1970's was never fully completed or up to engineering standards. 
Many residents connected pit latrines illegally to the main lines without expert 
supervision, and the hilly topography of Manshiet Nasser, exacerbated the poorly 
installed connections. As a result, breakage of sewerage pipes are frequent and 
leakage and flooding of sewerage a distinctive feature of the physical 
environment.
8 The visible presence of the ruling party increased during my fieldwork and was 
seen through such actions as operating a dental clinic, clearly marked as NDP 
affiliated, and the building of a brick stairway at the entrance of the settlement. 
This was probably related to the parliamentary elections which took place in 
November of 1996, and in which the ruling party, the Nasserite party and the 
Islamic leaning labour party were all competing for the votes. The ruling party 
won the elections. A few months after elections, the dental clinic was shut down.
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are administered by two fully covered, munaqqabaat, women from outside the 
settlement, religious classes for women, and literacy classes. I later found out 
that the activities of the mosque are now being overseen by il Ganfiyya il 
ShaFiyya, one of the oldest Islamic private voluntary organisation (PVO) 
which operates nationally and has branches in most governorates and in 
many neighbourhoods in Cairo.9 The mosque in Manshiet Nasser was being 
managed through the PVO's branch located in the nearby quarter of Sayeda 
Aisha, one of the other communities where I carried out some of my fieldwork. 
The PVO branch in Sayeda Aisha provided other services, such as a 
polyclinic and illiteracy classes for both men and women.
Manshiet Nasser’s population, estimated at 64,000 inhabitants in 
1984, is now estimated to be over one million. The community has six 
primary and preparatory government schools, private and public health 
clinics, local offices of the Ministry of Social Affairs, the ruling party (NDP), 
and a number of Muslim, Christian, secular, and regionally based private 
voluntary associations which are providing a range of charity and community 
development services. Observing this crowded and bustling community, it is 
difficult to imagine that only thirty years ago, it consisted of no more than a 
handful of families squatting on inhospitable government-owned land. A brief 
history of how the community developed speaks to the resourcefulness of its 
inhabitants.
Manshiet Nasser was established in the early 1960's by a number of 
low-income migrants from Upper Egypt who were evicted from another area 
of the city (EQI,1987). These migrants had moved to Cairo during the Second 
World War and had set up a small community near the historic bazaar in the 
core of the medieval city and established a specialised business of recycling 
low grade steel recovered from used oil drums. The community became 
known to the government and its neighbouring community as cizbet il safih, 
the hamlet of steel, and was left undisturbed for a decade (Landor, 1994; 
Shorter et al, 1994).
9 See LaTowsky (1995) for a profile of this organisation.
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In the 1960's, however, the Egyptian government announced that it 
needed the land on which the cizba was set up to build a school and a 
hospital and asked cizba residents to vacate the land. After many months of 
negotiations between community leaders10 and government representatives, 
a deal was struck whereby tacit agreement was given by the government for 
cizba residents to occupy public land on the slopes of the Muqattam hills. As 
they were not granted official title to the land, residents worried about 
security, and elder members recall that the new settlement was named 
Manshiet Nasser, in honour of Egypt's president at that time, so as to 
increase their chances of tenure (Shorter, et al, 1994).
The main occupation of recovering and trading in recycled metal 
sheets continued in Manshiet Nasser. Gradually, families and relatives of the 
early migrants from upper Egypt joined them attracted by the availability of 
housing and new job opportunities, largely in the construction sector. As the 
community grew in size and the threat of eviction receded, skilled craftsmen 
working in nearby bazaar areas, taking advantage of the availability of land in 
Manshiet Nasser and the lack of government regulation, also started to move 
into the settlement to set up their own enterprises (Landor, 1994). The 
previous links with the traditional bazaar area in Gamaliya,enabled Manshiet 
Nasser residents to capitalise upon the existing production infrastructure 
there, while availing themselves of more affordable and larger spaces for 
individual workshops (Shorter et al, 1994; Landor, 1994). As more people 
moved into the settlement, demand for new building grew and the community 
attracted large numbers of construction workers such as reinforced concrete 
workers, masons, painters, electricians and plumbers, to service Manshiet
10 See Shorter et al (1994) for a discussion of the informal leadership structure in 
the community based on the tribal Arab council. The authors argue that the council 
played a crucial role in negotiations with the government in the 1960's and in 
arbitrating conflicts as the settlement expanded. By the mid 1980's, however, the 
death of the chief of the council and the integration of Manshiet Nasser into more 
formal institutional webs had significantly weakened the power and influence of 
the council. During my own research, the influence of the council in arbitrating 
conflicts was insignificant.
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Nasser as well as neighbouring communities.(Shorter et al, 1994). The 
demand on construction workers grew significantly due to the boom in large 
infrastructure and housing projects which was taking place during this period 
in the Gulf countries. Many settlers from Manshiet Nasser migrated to the 
Gulf in search of employment opportunities and much of the building in 
Manshiet Nasser is said to have been built from “gulf money”, that is from the 
remittances that these migrants sent back (Landor, 1994).
The pressure from municipal authorities on densely populated quarters 
like Gamaliya to relocate their foundries further away triggered the setting up 
of small foundries and aluminium enterprises elsewhere. Manshiet Nasser 
was an obvious alternative location for these enterprises given its closeness 
to the markets, the availability of empty tracts of land and the fact that it 
received little official attention11 (Shorter et al, 1994).
Economically, Manshiet Nasser is thus not dependent on public sector 
employment, but is much more closely tied to the informal economy. Small 
industrial and commercial establishments, and a range of jobs in the private 
construction trade, form the main occupations of Manshiet Nasser residents 
(Landor, 1994). In 1984, it was estimated that the community had over 2000 
small enterprises. Although a significant percentage of. the labour force 
comes from outside the settlement, at least 20% of the male labour force 
works in Manshiet Nasser (Shorter et al, 1994)12.
According to a 1984 community survey, Manshiet Nasser can be safely 
characterised overall as a "low income" community in the socio-economic 
hierarchy of Cairene communities. In 1984, the average monthly household
11 Initial settlers did not pay for the land. Gradually, however, an intricate market in 
land and property slowly developed. In the mid 1980's, 54% of dwellings were 
occupied by renters, with landowners living in the same dwelling or near by.
12 For a detailed description of the construction labour force and the range of 
economic activities which exist in Manshiet Nasser, based on a anthropological 
study focusing on the male labour force which was carried out in 1980, see Landor 
(1994).
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income was LE 130, while the average monthly household income at the 
poverty line for urban Egypt as a whole was estimated at LE183 (Korayem, 
1987). The proportion of households falling below the official poverty line in 
1984 was thus 64%. Another indication of the poverty of the community can 
be gleaned from data on dwelling units. In 1984, almost 50% of the dwelling 
units in the community had only one room, and only 30% had their own toilet. 
The settlement was connected to main water lines and had several public 
taps. However, only about 50% of households had private water connections, 
and carrying water from main taps was an important task that consumed the 
time and energy of women, mostly the younger ones. Access to electricity 
was more universal. Most households had electricity connections in their 
homes, often through illegally tapping the main lines (Shorter, et al, 1994).
My observations 10 years after this survey was conducted, indicates 
that although there are some members of the community with significant 
resources, the area is still fairly impoverished. About half of the households I 
visited had no toilet, and families of seven or eight members lived in one or 
two rooms. Population pressure had far outstripped the capacity of the 
limited sewerage facilities in the settlement posing a serious health and 
environmental hazard for the entire community. Moreover, disposal of 
wastewater continues to be an onerous and time consuming task for women. 
There is no income data which would make a comparison between income 
levels in 1984, when the survey was conducted, and the present time.
However, given the decline in the construction boom of the 1970's and 
1980's, both in Cairo and the Gulf countries as discussed in the previous 
chapter, it would be safe to assume that the income of a large number of 
Manshiet Nasser residents, which was directly tied to the construction trades, 
has also experienced a decline. Moreover, as will be discussed in chapter 
four, the apparent increase in the numbers of women employed in informal
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sector workshops and as piece workers further suggests that certain 
segments of the community are economically and socially disadvantaged.13
The three other areas I conducted interviews in are located within a 
distance of two to three kilometres from Manshiet Nasser. These are Sayeda 
Aisha, Sayeda Zeinab and Gamaliya. They are all part of what has been 
termed medieval quarters of Cairo whose history can be easily detected 
through the distinctive forms of architecture of buildings and mosques. Apart 
from their history, a main difference between these three neighbourhoods 
and Manshiet Nasser is that they are less geographically bounded or 
physically segregated from other neighbourhoods. Although, like Manshiet 
Nasser, they can also be broadly defined as sha^bi communities, casual 
observation indicates that they are better off from an income and educational 
perspective. Similar to Manshiet Nasser, however, they are generally more 
dependent on informal sector workshops and enterprises than on formal 
sector government employment, and display the same forms of mixed use of 
space for housing and workplaces. Singerman (1995) provides a lively visual 
description of some of these older quarters of Cairo. For a description of 
Gamaliya, see also Stauth (1991).
The "Study Community": Poverty, Gender, Religion and Regional 
Identities
As indicated earlier, my research was not confined to a single 
neighbourhood; about 70% of my interviews were carried out in Manshiet 
Nasser and about 30% were spread out in the three other neighbourhoods 
mentioned. In total, I carried out repeated visits to 46 households, and 17 
workshops in those four neighbourhoods. I conducted in-depth interviews
13 Although legally Manshiet Nasser residents are still squatters on public land and 
have no official land tenure, the community is now recognised by the municipal 
administration, it has been integrated into a newly formed administrative district, 
qism, which has a police station and which incorporates not only Manshiet Nasser 
but also seven other sub-districts, including Qayet Bey and the zabbaliin 
community. When referring to Manshiet Nasser in this thesis, however, I am 
referring to the community as defined by its residents, and not the broader 
administrative definition adopted recently by the government.
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with 88 women and 12 men. (See appendix (1) for a detailed description of 
the study population).
An explanatory note regarding my use of the term "study community" 
or "sample" in future chapters is necessary. When I refer to the study 
community or sample (which I use interchangeably throughout), I am referring 
to the entire population I interviewed, in all four neighbourhoods. I refer to 
this group of people as a "community" because they are practically all linked 
through different networks. I refer to them as a "sample", to indicate that the 
group was purposefully arrived at through a "snow ball" approach to 
encompass certain age groups and occupations.
I also chose to refer to the group of people I interviewed as a "low- 
income" group throughout the thesis. My aim is not to homogenise this group, 
as I am well aware that there are variations in lifestyle, beliefs, and socio­
economic standing between and within the various neighbourhoods I visited. 
There were also some variations along the above lines in my sample. 
However, there were also many shared characteristics, such as being mostly 
rural migrants, lacking formal education,14 employed in the informal sector of 
the economy, deprived of access to some basic services, and with low levels 
of income, thus lending some justification to my use of the term "low-income 
community". Moreover, the nature of the study community, consisting largely 
of women who are working either as sub-contractors or as wage labourers, 
meant that there was also a certain degree of uniformity in the socio­
economic characteristics of the particular people I interviewed. Because I 
was specifically interested in working women, I may have missed out on the 
more affluent members of the community, who did not need to involve 
themselves in such work.
14 A large percentage of my sample consisted of illiterates, although a few of the 
younger women and men had also received some degree of education and 
several had high school diplomas. Variations in education were thus not significant 
enough amongst my sample. Nonetheless, as will be discussed in chapter nine, 
education, particularly for women, emerged as a marker of status in the 
community.
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Nonetheless there were also articulations of multiple identities and 
local perceptions of differences within the study community. Respondents 
sometimes emphasised these differences in my interactions with them, as will 
be illustrated below. During my fieldwork I thus grappled with the difficulties 
inherent in the use of a term such as "low-income", which implies a uniformity 
of identity and may not be sensitive to other attributions of difference by 
interviewees themselves, who may otherwise share similar socio-economic 
characteristics. A further problem with concepts such as "low-income 
groups" or the "urban poor" is that they have conventionally been defined 
narrowly in economistic terms and thus do not allow for an understanding of 
rankings people invoke, based on prestige or social status, rather than on 
wealth and income alone. One of my tasks throughout the fieldwork was thus 
to problematize and contextualize, rather than discard, the concept of a low- 
income group. As the following section illustrates, I tried to do so through 
working out a local ranking system based on the definitions used by my 
interviewees.
In attempting to do so, the challenge was to link material or observable 
aspects or descriptions of poverty, such as levels of education, levels of 
incomes, types of jobs, housing conditions, and access to basic services with 
more personal, "subjective" aspects that draw on different people's self 
perceptions.15 I attempted to probe into the gender specific aspects of 
poverty and to understand the links between poverty, regional identities, and 
religion as expressed by my study community. As in the rest of my research, 
my concern was to carefully capture the specific idioms that people used to 
describe poverty, and probe into what these meant for them.
15 Attempts by both international organisations and governments to assess poverty 
has been conventionally based on trans-cultural "objective" criteria. There is an 
increasing awareness amongst researchers and policy makers, however, that 
while objective measures are important for certain purposes, subjective 
assessments are just as crucial, and recommendations for carrying out more 
qualitative, participatory assessments of poverty that take into account culturally 
specific perspectives are now being forcefully made. See El-Kholy (1996b).
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Five culturally specific categories of poverty and wealth were invoked 
in my discussions in the various communities. These are not mutually 
exclusive categories, and some are occupational categories, but they 
nonetheless form one local ranking system. The categories which emerged 
are: aytaam, literally orphans, ghalaaba (sing, ghalbaan), a complex term 
commonly used for the working poor, urzipi, referring to those working as 
casual workers or in irregular jobs, mastuur, which literally means "covered" 
and connotes a minimum level of security, and, finally mabsuut, literally 
happy but referring to those who have money in excess of their needs.
Aytaam, are considered the poorest segments of the community.16 It is 
interesting to note, however, that the definition of the term orphan in this 
context is restricted to those households without a father. This is different 
from the standard dictionary definition of an orphan as an individual both of 
whose parents have died. The more restricted definition used in this 
community reveals a gender bias as it is based on conventional local 
understandings and constructions of gender roles, whereby men are 
expected to be the main economic providers. Thus a father's death, but not a 
mother's, signals economic distress and need. In fact, it is noteworthy that 
the death of a mother does not qualify a child as an orphan, and thus does 
not entitle him/her to either the Ministry of Social Affairs orphans' pension, 
nor to the orphans sponsorship program, kafaalit il yatiim, run by an Islamic 
Private Voluntary Organisation in several of the neighbourhoods.
The term orphans, aytaam, is commonly used to refer not only to the 
children themselves, but also to their mothers. Widows are thus considered 
a particularly disadvantaged group by community standards and are the 
target of local charity networks and support systems. Widows also are often 
given priority in some forms of employment such as piece-work, as will be 
discussed in chapter six.
16 The inability to purchase meat during the religious feast for Muslims, ciid il adha, 
was commonly used by my respondents as a clear, and publicly known, marker of 
a family's poverty.
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Ghalaaba, comes from the Arabic term ghulb, which connotes fatigue 
as a result of daily struggles for survival as well as endurance despite difficult 
circumstances. As used by community members, ghalbaan implies two 
important characteristics. On the one hand, it denotes toiling to make ends 
meet due to lack of security, and on the other, it implies certain favourable 
moral qualities such as kindness, lack of greed, and lack of deviousness and 
corruption. This double meaning of the term is significant and suggests a 
belief that, despite their poverty, il naas il ghalaaba are still honest, and that 
deprivation has not driven them to cheating or stealing. I often heard people 
use the term ghalbaan with pride. II ghalaaba was often used to denote the 
working poor, that is those who may have steady jobs but whose incomes are 
meagre and/or whose job conditions are difficult. Some of those who were 
considered ghalaaba, also worked as casual irregular labourers, urziPi. 
Derived from the Arabic work r/20, "god given livelihood", the term connotes 
lack of security, precariousness of livelihoods and a certain degree of 
fatalism. UrziPi refers to a wide range of jobs in which employment is of a 
casual nature with no assurance of a regular or sustained income.
Mastuur, literally means "covered" in Arabic, and suggests a higher 
degree of security than that of an urziPi or a ghalbaan. Mastuur implies that 
what comes in as income, goes out in expenditures, and there is little extra to 
put into substantial savings or to give away to others as charity, which is an 
important symbol of status and prestige in the community. cA/a aduhum, 
"have enough for themselves only", was another way of describing the bottom 
end of this category. The terms ghalbaan and mastuur contrasts sharply with 
mabsuut, literally happy, a revealing term which suggests that perceptions of 
happiness are closely tied to material security and well-being. Mabsuut is 
used to refer to those who are financially well off, often skilled craftsmen, 
sana^iyya, or wholesalers/merchants, tuggar. In addition to wealth, the term 
also implies security due to a regular income and lack of vulnerability. 
Existence of substantial savings or investments, often in the form of real 
estate, and public displays of charity such as slaughtering and distributing a
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sheep in the Muslim feast, ^iid il adha, are important distinguishing features of 
this category of people in the community.
If one were to use this local classification system to categorise my 
respondents, a limited number of my sample would describe themselves, or 
would be described by others, as mabsutiin. The latter would be mainly men 
who run or own the workshops and a few of the female grocers, middle 
women and door to door saleswomen). Some respondents would also fall 
into the category of mastuuriin and some would be considered aytaam. The 
overwhelming majority would describe themselves as ghalaaba, working hard 
to generate a steady income and make ends meet, yet honest, kind and 
uncorrupted. Within this group some would define their occupational 
category as urziPi, unskilled casual labourers.
My respondents generally identified collectively as naas ghalaaba, 
which I translate as the working poor. However, regional origin was 
sometimes evoked as an additional marker of difference.17 While Manshiet 
Nasser is still identified with its original Upper Egyptian sa^iidi, regional sub­
culture, generally considered the most socially conservative of sub-cultures in 
Egypt, it now has a significant number of residents of various regional origins. 
Within the three other neighbourhoods, strong opinions about regional 
identities were also voiced in certain contexts. Women sometimes made a 
point of identifying themselves to me as either sa^ayyda, rural migrants from 
upper Egypt, fallahiin, rural migrants originally from lower Egypt, or 
masriyyiin1S, which literally means Egyptian, and in this specific context 
implies longer term residence in Cairo. Unlike the masriyyiin, who had no 
links with rural areas, village networks still played an important role in the
17 See Taher (1986) for one of the earliest and most sensitive discussions of the 
relationship between class and ethnic identities in a low-income Cairo 
neighbourhood. Her analysis shows that members of the community she studied 
identified much more along the lines of regional origin, than along the lines of 
class.
18 Cairo is commonly referred to by Egyptians as Masr, the same term for Egypt, 
and denotes the importance of the city.
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survival strategies of both the sa^ayda and the fallahiin. inter-marriage 
between groups of different regional origin did occur, but was uncommon.
Each group harboured stereotypical views of the other, which usually 
surfaced in specific conversations or during particular events such as fights 
or discussions about marriage arrangements. The moral qualities and 
behaviour of women was one of the important qualities that both the fallahiin 
and the sa^ayda evoked to distinguish themselves from the masriyyiin, whose 
women were considered loose, sitat sa faa . I was continuously struck by 
how married men accused of having affairs always alleged to be having them 
with masarwa, from popular areas in Cairo such as il Hussein or Bab el 
Sheriyya.
Original dwellers of Cairo, il masriyiin or masarwa on the other hand,
sometimes referred to sa^ayda as unfriendly, rimam, and ugly, suud (literally
black referring to their relatively darker complexion). They also distinguished
themselves from the fallahiin women, who did not know how to dress properly.
Nawai born in and bred in Cairo, stressed that she is masriyya in her
discussions with me. She recalls how beautiful she was when her husband
first saw her in. front of her father's house twenty years ago:
"I was 13 and wearing pyjamas with small flowers. I had 
beautiful straight hair, styled in very long braids. Mind you, I 
always had my braids in the front, not in the back like the 
fallahiin do.
Similarly, during a discussion with some women about a certain Om 
Hamid, I asked if they meant the one who lived near the public water tap. 
"On no," replied one of the women, "the one we are talking about is white, not 
black like those people." I later understood that to mean she was a masriyya, 
not a sa^idiyya.
Regional identities were mobilised most dramatically during periods of 
crisis, such as a death, and there are numerous regionally based PVOs in the 
community whose role is to generate resources for family members of the 
deceased, and to cover the funeral and burial costs of their members. 
During some of the violent fights which took place between different families 
during my fieldwork (one of which necessitated the intervention of the police),
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community members also often automatically took sides in the fight according 
to their regional origin. Regional identities sometimes also affected women's 
access to networks in the community, particularly employment networks. 
Some of the workshop owners, for example, stressed that they gave priority 
to women from their own original region or village. Others, however, gave 
preference to women from the physical neighbourhood regardless of their 
regional origin.
in addition to regional identities, religious affiliation also formed 
another layer of identity amongst my research sample. I had various 
discussions about Christian/Muslim relations in the study community and 
observed the interaction between the two groups in their daily lives. Inter­
faith marriages were unheard of, but there was otherwise a range of everyday 
networks and relationships that closely linked Muslims and Copts. Religious 
identification did not appear to play the same role in access to networks as 
did regional origin.
Stereotypes of the members of the different religions, however, were 
rife and often projected contradictory attributes. Copts were regarded by 
some Muslim women as much friendlier, cishariyiin, and more capable of 
keeping a secret than Muslims. Copts were also generally perceived as 
better off financially than Muslims as a group, and their women were 
regarded as more beautiful. Om Gamal, a Muslim, explains the reasons for 
this difference in wealth and beauty by relaying the following story. Her 
comments are interesting because they reveal how historical myths are 
created and serve as powerful tools for justifying and maintaining differences 
in status amongst people.
“It is true, they are more beautiful, but it was our choice. You 
see, with the advent of Islam in Arabia, the prophet made 
people choose, khayyarna, between wealth, beauty and 
religion. We, the Muslims chose religion. They (meaning 
Christians) chose wealth and beauty. That is why they are 
better off than us, halhum ahsan, and most are pretty.”
Notions of superior physical beauty, however, were marred by 
unpleasant bodily odours that were referred to as one of the distinguishing
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characteristics of Copts. "Rihithum zifra", they smell of grease, "lihum riiha 
khaasa", they have a special smell, and "although we eat with them and 
everything, there is something in my body that cannot stand them because 
they smell like fish,”, were some of the expressions used to convey this 
characteristic. It was commonly believed among my Muslim respondents that 
Christian women, unlike Muslims, do not have a proper bath after they have 
sex with their husbands, which partly explained their unpleasant smell.
On the other hand, members of one of the Coptic families that I 
became close to repeatedly told me how astonished they were that I am a 
Muslim, because I do not look or talk or walk "like them". I am polite, they 
told me, and do not shout or use vulgar language as Muslims do. They also 
felt that I visited them because I really cared for them and liked them, unlike 
Muslims, who always have a hidden agenda, ulterior motives, and are only 
concerned about their own self interest, maslaha.
My research sample thus consisted mainly of women in four different 
low-income neighbourhoods of Cairo who collectively identified as poor 
people, naas ghalaaba, and who shared many socio-economic attributes. 
Certain characteristics, however, such as religion and regional origin, also 
served as important markers of identities. It is amongst this group of low- 
income people with multiple identities that I carried out my research. The 
next chapter will discuss my research approach and methods. It will also 
provide a reflective account of the fieldwork process.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ETHNOGRAPHY IN ONE'S NATIVE CITY: RESEARCH APPROACH, 
METHODS, AND FIELDWORK ENCOUNTERS
"What we (anthropologists) find depends on the questions 
which we ask and on the angle of vision from which we 
approach our material. If we ask different questions at different 
points in time, we may well get different answers" Caplan, 1988:
10, 12).
Ethnography, the basis of anthropological knowledge and theory, has 
been the subject of increasing debate over the past two decades. Central to 
such debate has been a recognition of the problems of language and 
translation (Assad, 1986). There has been an increased awareness that the 
absence of the ethnographer from standard anthropological accounts (as well 
as the political and cultural baggage he carried with him), has resulted in both 
lack of self scrutiny (Dwyer, 1982), as well as in essentialist and monolithic 
representations of the "other" (Marcus and Cushman, 1982). The 
conventional image of the anthropologist as a neutral and objective observer 
has thus been seriously challenged. It is now well recognised that 
observation is always mediated by the presence of the researcher and his/her 
interactions with the study community (Rabinow, 1977).
Acknowledging positionality in research, that continuously shifting 
context which shapes our realities and "from which values are interpreted and 
constructed" (Alcoff,1988, quoted in Geiger:171, 1990), has constituted a 
significant development in anthropology which gained impetus with the 
feminist movement. This move towards reflexivity has served to increase our 
awareness of both standpoint and the power dynamics of self and other, and 
to debunk the myth of the "neutral" researcher (see Caplan, 1988; Abu- 
Lughod,1993; Mohanty, 1988). As Abu-Lughod argues in her criticism of 
Bourdieu's notion of the "other": "The outside self never simply stands
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outside, he or she always stands in a definite relation with the "other of the 
study....he/she is always in a position within a larger political and historical 
complex" (1993:41).
Acknowledging such positionality, however, has raised complex 
problems for (feminist) researchers with regards to how they can write about 
the "other" without either essentalizing or overlooking the implications of the 
position from which they speak (Moore, 1994b). Feminists have also 
specifically challenged the androcentric bias of much mainstream 
anthropological scholarship, and have further problematized the relationship 
between knowledge and power, arguing for the impossibility of separating 
epistemology from power relations (Harding; 1987; Caplan, 1988; Strathern, 
1987a,b),
While raising similar concerns, recent critiques by Postmodernist 
anthropologists have specifically questioned the way in which interpretative 
authority is constituted in ethnographic texts. This has resulted in a call for 
researchers to experiment with new forms of ethnographic writing which is not 
"homological, plagiaristic, positivist, essentialist or analogical." 
(Caplan, 1988:9; Clifford and Marcus, 1986; Marcus and Fischer, 1986).
This chapter is written in light of these debates. It provides an account 
of my fieldwork, the methodological approaches informing it, and the 
limitations and pitfalls of my approach. My aim is to present the "angle of 
vision" which has influenced my choice of specific research questions, as well 
as to show how I grappled with the complex issues of positionality, location 
and representation. The chapter is divided into four sections: the first offers 
reflections upon my own positioning as an upper/middle class, Egyptian, 
feminist woman carrying out research among Egyptian men and women in 
low-income communities in Cairo, the city where I was born and bred; the 
second lays out my methodological approach and main research questions; 
the third delineates methods and tools of inquiry, and the fourth discusses 
issues of interpretation and ethnographic representation.
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Insider/Outsider: Fieldwork Encounters:1
“What one sees or experiences depends upon who one is, both
individually, socially and historically" (Caplan, 1988:10).
As mentioned in my introductory chapter, the motivation for my 
research stemmed from my work experience in Egypt over the past 13 years 
as a women's rights activist, a professional in the social development field, 
and a founding member of a women's association supporting female-headed 
households in deprived neighbourhoods of Cairo. Working closely with 
women through various development programmes, I had become 
increasingly aware of the tensions and discrepancies between the agendas 
and priorities that we—largely educated upper/middle class women rights 
activists-were putting forth, and the concerns and priorities of many women 
in the communities I worked in. I began to wonder about the extent to which 
the issues we were voicing may have been circumscribed by our own class 
position and to entertain the possibility that our assumptions, strategies, and 
visions are largely a function of our specific social locations and lived 
realities, locations and realities often radically divorced from the majority of 
Egyptian women. My research was thus fuelled by a desire to develop a more 
situated understanding of gender relations and women's interests from the 
perspectives of "the poor" in Egypt. My ultimate aim was to contribute to the 
formulation of more nuanced and textured feminist analysis, practice and 
policies which are sensitive to class and other differences amongst women.
I thus began my fieldwork with a keen awareness of my complicated 
relationship to the study community. I was uncertain as to how that defined 
me in terms of my relationship to the community. A "native"? a "marginal 
native?" (see Freilich,1977 quoted in AITorki and EI-Solh,1988), an 
"insider?", a "halfie?" (see Abu-Lughod, 1991), an "outsider?", due to the 
social distance created by my educational background and class position?
Anxious to locate myself early on in the fieldwork, I consciously chose 
to define myself as an insider, an indigenous researcher. However, as I
1 For a more detailed reflection on identities during fieldwork, see El-Kholy and Al- 
Ali (Forthcoming, 1998).
106
spent more time in the various low-income neighbourhoods, the difficulties 
and ambiguities of finding one identity or "location" became vividly apparent 
(Geiger, 1990). I was continuously shifting positions, and roles, from one 
context and set of discussions to the next (the good Muslim, the westernised 
Egyptian, the women's right's activist, the conservative Egyptian mother, the 
well-connected upper class Egyptian, etc.). Moreover, there were also 
sometimes discrepancies between how I wished and imagined that I would be 
perceived and how my interviewees actually perceived or positioned me. In 
the following section, I provide an account of how attempts at self­
presentation and perceptions of my identities were played out during the 
fieldwork.
Multiple Roles, Multiple Identities:
l began my wanderings in Manshiet Nasser on my own, 
unaccompanied by local informants or research assistants. These unfocused 
wanderings aimed at achieving a better feel for a community I had previous 
contacts with, but which had changed significantly. I was also interested in 
finding out the extent to which I would be recognised as an affiliate of the 
Association for the Development and Enhancement of Women (ADEW), 
which is active in this, and other communities, and of which, as mentioned in 
the introduction, I was a founding member. As I walked around, I shopped for 
tea, soap, and matches at the many small local groceries in the community. 
This gave me a legitimate and relaxed context to start chatting with the 
owner, often a woman, or other women who also happened to be shopping 
there. Gradually I was invited to tea and lunch in some of the houses, and 
my circle of acquaintances started to expand. I felt a strange mixture of 
familiarity and strangeness during the first weeks, and was surprised at the 
extent to which my identity as an ADEW board member seemed irrelevant. 
Very few people identified me with the association, and to those few who 
inquired about my current involvement in it, I explained that I had temporarily 
left the organisation to pursue my studies.
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I was forthright as to the reasons for my presence in the 
neighbourhood, explaining that I was carrying out research (the topic of which 
I found myself defining differently depending on who I talked to), for my 
Ph.D., duktuura, in a University in England. Some did not quite understand 
what this meant or entailed, and their main concern was what type of job such 
an undertaking would enable me to get. Others likened me to the Ministry of 
Health and Ministry of Social Affairs personnel who had just been in the 
community collecting survey data for some development program. Yet others 
assumed I was training to be a physician (also duktuura in Arabic), and some 
asked if I could examine their children. It was often younger men and women 
with some education who came to my rescue, explaining that I was preparing 
to get a job as a professor in the university, just like the daughter of Om 
Sanaa in a popular Arabic soap opera2.
While I took time to explain to everyone who expressed curiosity about 
me, that I was a researcher, baahitha, I never used the work anthropologist, 
or ethnographer which do not even have Arabic translations; sociology, c//m 
il igtimaac, was the closest I could use. I found myself changing the way I 
defined my topic depending on my mood and who I was talking to. 
Sometimes I was so tired, I did not want to engage in any lengthy discussions 
so I selected more banal and concrete topics like "small scale industries". 
Other times, when I did want to provoke or engage a person, I used more 
hazy or controversial titles, such as the relationships between men and 
women. To those whom I interviewed in greater depth, I explained my 
research interests in detail.
In general, however, I explained that I was trying to understand how 
women were coping with their lives in this and other low-income communities 
in Cairo, both in terms of their family situation and their job conditions. "How 
is this going to help us", was a common reaction, to which I must admit I 
found my own attempts at explanation rather lame. I generally articulated the
2 Television soap operas are very popular in Egypt. They are watched regularly 
and are often a subject of discussions and debates. For a discussion of the role of 
Soap Operas in Egyptian society see Abu-Lughod (1995).
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position, suggested by Geiger (1990) that as a researcher, I will probably not 
be able to help them change their conditions in any major way, but that what I 
hoped I could do is make their voices, experiences, and priorities more 
visible, and thus perhaps influence the way their livelihoods are interpreted 
and understood by those who may be in positions to support them.
After a few months of observation and exploration, I began conducting 
in-depth interviews with several women with whom I had established good 
rapport and who resided in different parts of the community. These were not 
women whom I selected, but rather they had selected me in the sense that 
they were the ones who first invited me to their homes and expressed their 
willingness to be part of my research. After a few interviews, I subsequently 
decided to focus my investigations on one haara, alley. Although the data I 
was getting from the interviews was rich, the fact that my interviewees did not 
know each other, made me unable to get a feel for the networks and mutual 
relationships in the community. The haara I selected is one which I 
happened to come across during my walks through the community, and for 
several reasons, it seemed like a particularly good place to start.
First, as an unpaved, narrow alley off the main paved road, it seemed 
physically representative of the smaller alleys and streets of Manshiet 
Nasser. Second, I was attracted by a charming woman in her 60's, Om 
Azouz, who later on become one of my key informants, and with whom I have 
developed a special relationship. When I first met Om Azouz on a hot 
summer day in July, 1995, she was squatting on the mud floor in front of her 
house hammering away upholstery tacks, which I subsequently discovered 
was a widespread type of sub-contracting job, performed solely by women, 
and sometimes children as well (see chapter seven). Squatting beside her, I 
started chatting informally, and when I left after a couple of hours I knew I had 
established one of my most important contacts.
During my repeated visits to this haara, Om Azouz embraced me with 
incredible generosity and warmth, despite her obviously meagre resources. 
When I explained to her my interest in women's employment, she introduced 
me to several other women in the haara who worked both as sub-contractors
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like herself, as well as wage labourers in workshops. The fact that this haara 
included women engaged in the two different types of employment that I was 
interested in made it even more appealing for me as a research site.
Third, the haara was relatively compact, comprising probably around 
150 households. While i knew I would not be able to visit them all, I had 
hoped to be able to visit a significant number and thus assure a reasonable 
coverage of the entire population of the haara. Fourth, the haara had at least 
two Christian households, and I thought it would be interesting to look at 
Christian/Muslim relationships, particularly with regards to female networks, 
in this predominantly Muslim community.
I spent much of my first few months in this haara and conducted many 
in-depth interviews with haara residents. While I was convinced that this 
grounding in a particular geographical location was extremely useful, it also 
presented problems that I had not anticipated. There appeared to be much 
jealousy and friction amongst households, and more specifically competition 
over me (who I visit first, how long I spend with each person, etc.). I had 
expected that the more people I got to know in the alley, the more 
comfortable they, and I, would be but I had the opposite experience. As long 
as I was visiting Om Azouz only, people in the street seemed friendlier and 
less curious. Once I started developing relations with other people and 
visiting other households, I began to feel less at ease in my dealings, as 
everyone seemed to have something terrible to say about the others. I had to 
make an effort not to be drawn into haara conflicts, gossip and politics, began 
to be more self-conscious about who l visit first every day, and tried to ensure 
that I was not seen to be affiliated with one particular household. This was 
not easy to do because there were some women who I enjoyed spending time 
with more than others. When I began visiting one of the Christian 
households, speculation about my religion surfaced visibly for the first time, 
and as will be discussed later, religious identification became an important 
marker of my identity in the field.
My early experiences in the haara probably reflected how I think I was 
perceived by its residents. I initially thought that I had clearly articulated my
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purpose as a researcher, during the first few months. However, it became 
increasingly clear that community members had their own agenda and 
consciously cast me in a specific role, that of a resource person, someone 
who could help solve the many problems they faced. The role and agenda I 
adopted were in effect being negotiated to accommodate the different 
agendas of the women I talked to. This attempt to treat me as a resource 
clearly had something to do with my being an educated, upper-middle class 
Egyptian, who was assumed to be knowledgeable about the mysterious 
workings of the bureaucracy in Egypt (which in fact was an accurate 
perception because of my previous work experience). It was also assumed 
that I had a network of influential family and friends in Egypt, a network of 
wasta{s), connections, that I could activate to mediate on behalf of the 
women I spent time with. I was continuously asked questions such as: Can 
your husband find my son a job in the textile industry (after I had mentioned 
that my husband works in textiles?); Does he know anybody well connected 
at the Saudi embassy, to get my brother a visa to Saudi Arabia? Do you 
know anyone in the police station who can help me issue an identity card?".
The perception of my being a possible resource affected my initial 
contacts and the information I was getting in critical ways. One of my 
research interests was extra-household, female networks. Although I was 
aware of such networks, both through previous fieldwork as well as the 
literature, and was prepared to explore extra-household forms of Co­
operation and linkages, my early discussions with women on these topics 
was met with persistent frustrations. Women often abruptly put an end to my 
questions, responding that relationships of Co-operation simply did not exist, 
that the community was fragmented, that there were no forms of mutual help 
and that people were greedy and selfish. The Arabic saying, "no one wipes 
your tears but your own hand", was often evoked to emphasise the lack of 
mutual support systems. As I spent more time in the community, observing 
the range of networks of mutual help that did actually exist and, more 
specifically, as I witnessed how the community activated them in response to
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specific tragedies such as a fire or a death, I realised that I may have been 
purposefully misled3.
It was only upon reflection about the community's possible perception 
of me as a resource, both economically, but more importantly socially and 
politically, that I began to understand why I had become the object of intense 
competition. Individual women were probably purposefully projecting 
themselves to me as struggling on their own, so as maximise the individual 
attention they may command. Given my previous links with the community, as 
well as my social position, I should have been aware of the possibility of my 
being perceived as someone with power. I think I probably unconsciously 
blocked this possibility because of my desire to negate or diminish the social 
and economic distance between "me" and "them", and to establish a more 
egalitarian relationship with my interviewees.
This experience, moreover, made me reflect more critically on the 
findings of one of the earliest studies of poverty in Cairo. In her ethnography 
of 17 poor families in a Cairo neighbourhood in the early 1970's, Wikan 
(1980) finds that most social relations in that community were characterised 
by divisiveness, jealousy, suspicion and infighting, with little sustained Co­
operation. Wikan concludes that:
"The poor urban neighbourhood reproduces its characteristic 
social organisation: small divisive coalitions, and enmities in a 
sea of strangers; unstable scattered circles of acquaintances in 
spite of limited geographical mobility; a low level of 
integration..(p. 147)."
It would be interesting to consider Wikan’s conclusions in the light of 
whether she may have similarly been perceived as a resource (she mentions 
several times how she used to regularly distribute gifts of clothes and food in 
the community, donations which she collected from embassies and well to do 
people in Cairo), and the extent to which this may have influenced her 
findings and impressions of the community she studied.
3 It is of course also possible that community women were not constructing the 
arrangements I observed as forms of mutual help but as part of their daily realities. 
In other words, the definition of mutual help may not have been a shared one 
between my interviewees and I.
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Once I became aware of possible perceptions concerning my roles, I 
began to both discuss the limitations of what I could offer, and to 
simultaneously act as a resource, openly, when I could. I was generally not 
approached directly for financial assistance, (I was never asked to lend or 
give money for example), but more for acting as a wasta, connecting and 
mediating, largely with the local bureaucracies.4 I also went to great length 
explaining to community members that in fact they were of more use to me 
than I could ever be to them, since my research depended on my ability to get 
to know them, interview them, understand their lives and livelihoods, and 
record it. After a few more months, when the limitations of what I could, in 
fact, do became evident and my novelty wore off ,! think people realised that I 
was genuinely there for a specific purpose, and that while I was prepared to 
act as a wasta for anybody to the best of my abilities, there was often little 
that I could do.
Later on, I was also asked to join several rotating saving associations, 
garrfiyya(s), (see the discussion on garrfiyya(s) in chapter nine) with the 
provision that I be the last to withdraw my contribution. Thus, in effect I 
provided economic resources by contributing to the capital of these 
associations. I was pleased to offer this service, as my main opportunity for 
reciprocity with people who were so hospitable and generous with their time 
and energy. I was also aware that this signalled a qualitative shift in my 
relationships in the community and that I had become more accepted and 
trusted. However, I must admit, that I was also pleased to be asked to join 
these associations for purely selfish reasons: being a participant in these 
networks gave me insights about their dynamics, which I would never have 
been able to have access to otherwise.
Managing my role as a potential resource was not always easy. In 
general, I was able to maintain the balance between making myself useful-- 
providing advice, health information, connecting people, mediating through 
the bureaucracy on behalf of women who wanted to receive an identity card
4 This highlights the crucial links between poverty, helplessness, and lack of access 
to power, thus challenging simplistic, economistic definitions of poverty.
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or to register a child in school—without feeling overwhelmed or overloaded. 
There were instances, however, where I failed to manage this balance and 
where I faced the limitations of my role as an individual researcher in a 
neighbourhood deprived of access to many basic services.
I remain haunted by the various situations where I was unable to 
provide badly needed services for women and their families, and where I 
stood helpless in the face of a dying infant, a badly beaten wife, or the 
eviction by the police of various families from their homes. These were 
situations were I was vividly reminded of the limitations of an academic 
researcher in terms of changing systems of inequalities. It is these same 
situations that have made me sceptical of the common claims that feminist 
methodology, which purports to abolish the object/subject dichotomy, is 
inherently "empowering", or "liberating" for those being studied (see 
Reinharz, 1992). These claims, must be seriously questioned, particularly 
when research is conducted in situations of extreme poverty and social 
inequality and where "empowerment" requires much stronger links between 
research and the commitment and ability to change material conditions and 
challenge power relations.
Another role that I found myself unconsciously assuming in the course 
of the field research was that of mediator. The pressure to take sides in 
fights and quarrels-which were sometimes a daily occurrence--, and to be 
part of the grapevine of gossip among women was quite strong, particularly at 
the beginning of my fieldwork. I think in some ways I was being tested, to 
determine who I would ally myself with. I listened intently to the gossip 
realising its power as a form of communication that transmits information 
about customs, change, and ideas as well as opinions about ideas (Harding, 
1975, quoted in Cornwall, 1996). With some of the women I had become 
closest to, I took a clear stance and sided with them against other women 
(and sometimes men) who had wronged them. Most of the time, however, 
rather than taking sides with one party or the other (because even after 14 
months, I rarely felt secure enough in my interpretations to really evaluate 
many situations), or at the other extreme, being neutral and refusing to get
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involved in the fights and quarrels, I found myself adopting the role of the 
mediator.
This role drained me emotionally and was a source of constant stress, 
although it gave me important insight into community relationships. Unlike 
my role as a resource person where I felt I was being useful and I generally 
enjoyed, I often did not enjoy my role as a mediator. That I was encouraged 
to play this role by many women, even towards the end of my fieldwork, 
however, indicates my precarious "insider'V'outsider" status in the community, 
despite my intimacy with many women. Perhaps I could never be a real 
"insider". I was considered close enough to be trusted with details of fights 
and to understand their dynamics, but without immediate vested interest, 
which thus allowed me to be perceived as fair in my arbitration.
Familiarity and Distance:
While my nationality, history and fluency in Arabic granted me a 
degree of instant "insider" status and were significant markers of identity for 
my interviewees, my religious affiliation- which is not clear from my name as 
is sometimes the case with Arabic names-, caused initial confusion. 
Although I was working in predominantly Muslim communities, there was a 
significant minority of Coptic families. Relations between the groups were 
complex. Modes of Co-operation, a common identity as Egyptians (the main 
distinction being that of regional origin, i.e.: Lower Egypt, Upper Egypt, or 
Cairo as was discussed in chapter three), and alliances predominated, there 
were also tensions and frictions, reflecting increasing tensions along religious 
lines in the country at large.
In retrospect, it is clear to me that I may not have had the same access 
and intimacy with women if I had not been identified as a Muslim. While 
some women asked me directly whether I was a Muslim or a Copt, others did 
not, but tried to find out indirectly, through probing into the names of my 
husband, son, or mother. For example, several women asked me why I 
called my son Seif (a name used by both Muslims and Christians), and not 
Muhammad (a name solely used by Muslims). I think that, at least for some
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women, I was only accepted as a real "insider" when they found out, 
sometimes through subtle means that my husband's name was, Amr, a clearly 
Muslim name. This established my religious identity, and thus "located" me 
more neatly and clearly for women and increased my closeness with most of 
them. It also enabled me to discuss religious issues and participate in 
religious lessons in the local mosques in a way that may have been difficult 
had it not been possible to establish my religious identity.
My research encounters clearly challenge the binary categories of 
insider/outsider and shows that, contra to conventional usage, these terms 
are not synonymous with "native" versus "western" anthropologist. Although 
a Cairene and an Egyptian, I was sometimes perceived as an "outsider" by 
the research community and experienced a sense of distance and difference 
due partly to my class location. The complexity of these categories became 
even more apparent to me when comparing field experiences with Nadje El 
Ali, a colleague who was carrying out research among upper middle class 
secular feminists in Egypt at the same time.. Nadje is partly German and was 
neither born nor bred in Egypt or the Arab world. Despite her more "western" 
background, I was struck by how she was actually sometimes more of an 
"insider" than I was, due to the similarities in class and educational levels 
between her and her interviewees.
Throughout my fieldwork, I repeatedly confronted these issues of 
"familiarity" and "distance", long standing concerns within anthropology. 
Some scholars have argued for maintaining a "respectful distance" from 
interviewees to counter the fear of "turning native", or creating "over rapport" 
(see Reinharz, 1992). For anthropologists who are studying their own 
society, this is assumed to be a particular danger (See AITorki and El-Solh 
(1988) for a discussion of the presumed advantages and disadvantages of 
"indigenous" versus "non indigenous" research.) In a similar vein, the issue 
of "hybridity" has been addressed by questioning the effects of prolonged 
exposure to a specific culture. "While culturally enriching, hybridity perhaps 
induces a half-conscious adoption of the research community's ethos; and
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this, while enhancing rapport, may block off certain questions and inquiries"
(Sayigh, 1996:2-3).
Although born and bred in Cairo, there were several situations where I
felt a "stranger", an "outsider". This was most apparent when I encountered
cases of spirit possession in the course of my research. Not only were
practices related to it new and unfamiliar to me, but I was also unable to
easily decipher the very heavily coded language and symbolism of the spirit
possession discourse. This was a totally different communication system,
embedded in a sub-culture that I was unfamiliar with. I was an outsider to the
extent that 1 had initial difficulties believing some of what was going on,
particularly when spirits manifested themselves during an interview and
started talking to me and to other women in an altered voice. It was not only
that I did not believe that this manifestation was genuine-which would have
been fine--, it was more that 1 even had doubts whether anybody could
believe this, including the women involved. I had to nudge myself to let go of
my reality and live in the reality of the women I was studying, if I was to
proceed any further with my research. (See chapter eight for a discussion of
spirit possession).
Another instance where I was also clearly identified, and felt, as an
"outsider", was during my extensive discussions of the ayma5, discussed in
detail in chapter four. The ayma, a written inventory of all the furniture,
equipment and jewellery brought to the marriage by both the groom and bride
with a stipulation that they are to be the sole property of the wife, is not a
common practice among upper class Egyptians. My admission that I did not
have an ayma drawn up when I married initially provoked reactions of
disbelief, pity, shock, and strangeness. These sentiments are summed up
well in Om Soad's remarks:
"But how is this possible, is there a house without an ayma in 
this country? How can you protect your rights? If you do not 
have an ayma, you must not be really Egyptian then, you must 
be a khawagaaya (foreign woman), or maybe you are married to 
a khawaagaT
5 The word ayma is colloquial, derived from the classical Arabic word for inventory or 
list, qaa i^ma.
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There were many other instances, however, where I was clearly 
appropriated as an insider (although I did not necessarily feel like one in 
particular situations). One striking episode took place during a heated 
discussion in a local mosque during a "religious lesson". Some of my 
questions apparently aggravated the woman who was giving the lesson and 
she began questioning my identity and rationale for attending. Two of the 
women whom I had accompanied to the lesson surprised me by immediately 
standing up to "protect" me, and talk on my behalf. "She is one of us", they 
said, “an Egyptian and a Muslim, and had a right to pray in the mosque and 
attend classes if she wanted to". She is not a khawagaaya," they explained, 
"or a voyeur, gaya titfarrag, but a "real Muslim." One of the other women, 
whom I had accompanied to the mosque, also volunteered spontaneously to 
say that I was a distant relative who had been working in Libya for many 
years and was here on a visit. In sum, throughout my fieldwork, I was 
constantly moving between an "insider/outsider status; experiencing a 
constant sense of "shuttling between two or more worlds" (Visweswaran, 
1994:119).
Such movement had many unsettling moments. One of the most 
problematic for me, particularly given my commitment to a feminist 
methodology, which at its best requires honesty and openness, was the issue 
of reciprocity and self-disclosure. I was continuously struck by the various 
ways in which I felt compelled to dissimulate many aspects of my identity and 
conceal some of my beliefs. This was sometimes because I felt that certain 
attitudes were expected of me as an Egyptian, and at other times because I 
was unwilling to reveal the social gulf that separated me from the women I 
was conducting research amongst. As a result, I found myself less engaged 
in self-disclosure and reciprocal exchange of ideas, experiences and 
information than I had hoped for or expected.
For instance, I often concealed some of my beliefs, particularly when 
talking about issues related to sexuality, which formed an important part of 
my research. It was hard to be truly transparent with personal information,
118
because I assumed that it may have seriously jeopardised my relationship 
with the women I interviewed. As an Egyptian, my liberal attitudes on these 
issues may not have been tolerated and I feared being dismissed as a loose, 
wayward woman. I had purposefully tried to project myself as a "respectable" 
Egyptian woman, through dressing conservatively, wearing a head scarf 
occasionally, and "flaunting" my married status and my motherhood (See 
Morsy's (1988) reflections on a similar strategy).
My five-year old son sometimes accompanied me to the field (which I 
think opened many doors and increased my rapport tremendously with 
women), and I often talked about my husband. Except on a few occasions on 
bus rides when I accompanied women to their workplaces, I generally 
experienced no forms of sexual harassment, and I never felt I was considered 
a sexual threat. I exchanged my views on many marital issues, gave 
examples from my own marriage, and engaged in arguments about what was 
a right thing for a woman to do or be (many women expressed sorrow, shock, 
or surprise that I did not have an ayma for example, that I was not 
circumcised, or that I had only one child and did not plan to have any more), 
i was much more careful in volunteering and exchanging information about 
my beliefs concerning sexuality, except in the context of my own marriage 
and marital relationship. This type of self-censorship may have also resulted 
in excluding some sensitive issues from the discussion, which women may 
have responded to had I been more forthright on my views of some issues, 
such as homosexuality for example.
I think my gender, my marital status and the fact that I was a mother 
played an extremely important role, not just in having access to women, but in 
being able to engage with them in intimate discussions about the perils and 
joys of marriage and motherhood. I am convinced that reaching this level of 
intimacy would have been less possible had I been a man, or an unmarried 
woman with no children. Being a woman, particularly a married educated 
woman, enabled me to gain easy access to men as well, although I doubt if I 
could have had the same type of intimate discussions that I was able to have 
with women. Because many interviews focused on marital conflicts where
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women shared personal, and often embarrassing and troubling details of their 
relationship, at a certain point, my intimacy with women could be maintained 
only at the expense of engaging in the same level of interaction with men. 
Given that I often found myself in the role of a "confidante", I felt I had to, was 
expected to, "take sides" and unambiguously "declare my loyalty", which I 
did, to the women (see Abu-Lughod, 1988 for a similar experience).
The result is that I interviewed much fewer men than I had initially 
intended. Much of the data and analysis in the chapters to follow is thus 
primarily based on women's perspectives and experiences. Although this 
may have resulted in a less complete perspective than I had aimed for, I think 
the trade-off of being able to establish deep relationships with many of the 
women I interviewed and thus generating data and insights on sensitive 
topics, many of which have not been previously explored in the Egyptian 
context, was worthwhile.
I also often felt uncomfortable when women started grilling me about 
my husband's or sister's salaries, the cost of my son's nursery, or the value of 
my apartment. I dissembled throughout. Of course, women knew that I was 
more affluent than them, but it became increasingly clear to me that most had 
no idea of how large the gap was. Although cognisant that it may have been 
more "empowering" to make them more aware of the steep class divisions 
and discrepancies of lifestyles that exist in Egypt, I did not volunteer the 
necessary information.
As a non-practising Muslim, I also felt disingenuous at times. From the 
moment that I declared that I was a Muslim, women automatically presumed 
that I was a practising Muslim who shared their religious framework and 
beliefs. As mentioned earlier, I was questioned many times about my religion, 
usually subtly, and sometimes not so subtly. I sensed that saying I was a 
Muslim gave me more immediate and intimate access to the overwhelming 
majority of households. I exploited this and never dared to admit that I am a 
non-practising Muslim. I often joined in Friday prayers, particularly in 
Ramadan. I sometimes felt that this was indeed part of my own self-identity
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that I could call upon when necessary. At other times, however, I felt I was 
performing the part of being a Muslim.
It is against this backdrop of multiple identities, perceptions, and roles 
and in light of this baggage of personal values and convictions that the 
following chapters analysing my findings must be read. I am aware that what 
follows represents only one perspective on gender relations and women's 
strategies in the study community. This is a perspective arrived at through 
both who I am and was (during and after the fieldwork), and who my 
interviewees were (given their multiple positionalities as well) in their 
discussions and interviews with me.
Analytical Approach and Research questions:
The aim of my research was to explore the complexity and dynamics of
gender relations and gender ideologies in low-income Cairo, with a view to
understanding women's daily strategies for responding to what they
perceived to be gender inequities. My research, however, focused largely on
one specific category of relations between men and women within the
household: relations between husbands and wives. I am aware that gender
relations are broader than this dyadic relation. However, my choice was
partly based on the need to narrow down the field of investigation, and partly
influenced by ethnographic research in Egypt, which highlights husband-wife
relations as primary ones for the manifestation of male and female identities
and roles. For example, in her study of economic and power relations among
poor families in a haara, in Cairo, Nadim (1985) consciously focused on the
husband-wife relationship because she found that within this sub-culture,
"intra-familial relationships could be categorised more 
meaningfully in terms of males and females. Differences in role 
playing among members of the same sex is one of degree, 
rather than one of kind. The son’s relationship in the family and 
his relationship with his mother and sisters is an extension of 
his father's role. Similarly, the daughter's role is an extension of 
her mother's" (ibid:221-222).
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Given the importance of the mother-in law complex in extended 
families described in earlier chapters, I had initially planned to investigate the 
relationships between mothers and daughters-in-law. I was unable to do so 
thoroughly due to time constraints. I also did not look at parent child 
relations, or at sibling relations in as much depth as I would have liked to.
Several general questions, corresponding to the specific and concrete 
aspects of gender ideologies and gender relations that I chose to focus on, 
guided my research. Gender ideologies are complex, and often 
contradictory, composites of beliefs relating to many aspects of masculinities 
and femininities. To narrow such a broad domain, I focused specifically on 
local understandings and meanings as they relate to three main arenas: 
conjugality, breadwinner status and sexuality, all of which are directly related 
to the various social arrangements that I discuss below.
Gender relations are also extremely broad and are not negotiated in 
the abstract, but in relation to particular social arrangements. I focused on 
women's negotiation practices as manifested in two specific, and closely 
related arenas or “spheres of activities”: the "conjugal contract" (see 
Whitehead, 1981; also Roldan, 1988), and women's paid work.6 Within 
marriage and the conjugal contract, three areas took precedence: pre-marital 
standards and marriage negotiations; conjugal relations and sexuality; and, 
intra-household decision making and resource allocation. I also focused on 
two specific types of women's paid work: waged work in small "informal" 
sector workshops, and home-based subcontracting.
The decision to focus on these particular arrangements was not 
arbitrary, but was guided by suggestions from previous research on intra­
household power relations, both globally and regionally. For example, 
several earlier studies showed that power and conflict within households are 
most clearly manifested in the arena of budgetary allocations and decisions
6 There is cross-cultural evidence of the dovetailing of marital arrangements and 
women's paid work. Marriage and domestic chores greatly influence the specific 
forms of paid work that women enter into and the extent and type of women's 
resistance to perceived inequalities at work. For example, married women may 
tolerate much lower wages than men in workplaces which provide childcare 
facilities for their children (see for example, Afshar, 1993).
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regarding spending, savings and investments, and that the control of cash­
flows within the household is closely related to reinforcing or undermining 
male dominance (Pahl, 1989; Bruce, 1989; Roldan, 1988; Nadim, 1985; 
Hoodfar, 1990; 1997)
Moreover, existing research suggests that provider status and 
sexuality are two aspects of gender ideologies most directly related to beliefs 
and expectations about maleness and femaleness, with important 
consequences for power relations in the family. In her study of the self- 
images of bint H Balad, the traditional low-income urbanite woman, AI-Messiri 
(1978) shows how women's notions of masculinity centre mainly on the ability 
of the husband to earn money and provide for his family. The close link 
between notions of masculinity and provider status has also been noted in 
other ethnographies in Cairo (Rugh, 1984; Hoodfar, 1997). I was also 
particularly interested in exploring this link given my experience, as 
discussed earlier, working with women-headed households.
Three broad sets of issues or questions guided my research. (See 
annex 2). Some of these were formulated prior to my fieldwork and others 
emerged or were refined during the process of fieldwork itself, taking cues 
from the women and following my own intuition and awareness of the issues 
on which there was a dearth of data. As a result, the balance of questions 
changed and some received more in-depth investigation than others. I 
engaged in more discussions related to sex, sexuality, marriage negotiations 
and sub-contracting arrangements, for example, and less than I had intended 
to in relation to budgetary control and intra-household resource allocation.
My starting point, as discussed previously, was to focus on 
households, both as units of analysis, but just as importantly as springboards 
for identifying other locations such as the workplace and larger kin and non­
kin social networks. While I remain sensitive to the important distinctions 
between the concept of household and that of family (see Netting et al, 1984, 
Yanagisako, 1979, Bruce and Dwyer, 1988),7 1 nonetheless use the two terms
7 Egyptians actually distinguish in Arabic between the family, ceela, and the 
household, maskan or beet.
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interchangeably. My interest was in units of co-residence, which in urban 
Egypt are primarily composed of kin (Zurayek and Shorter, 1988). In this 
context, the concept of the family, although more encompassing, can thus be 
approximated to that of household, which lends itself more easily to empirical 
observation.
Several scholars have highlighted the value of using the household as 
a site for examining gender relations. Households are the main arena for the 
expression of gendered roles and expectations and provide a primary 
material context for the formulation and internalisation of gender ideologies 
(Beneria, 1987). Moreover, as Netting et al argue, focusing our attention at 
the household level is particularly useful during times of rapid change as the 
family/household institution is a sensitive mirror for how people adjust to the 
shifts in constraints and opportunities that confront them as a result of socio­
economic and political change (Netting et a!., 1984). Households studies 
provide a practical approach to "understanding how global forces are in 
actuality--rather than by deduction from grand theory-played out in different 
local contexts, or in the same locality at different times" (Middletown, 
1992:32).
My approach to the study of households, however, was not a static one 
that concentrates on demographic features and so called household 
strategies which presuppose a unitary model of the household. While not 
negating the existence of various types of intra-family Co-operation, my 
approach was influenced by feminist critiques that have challenged the 
idealised, normative view of households as undifferentiated, income pooling 
units in pursuit of a common strategy (Whitehead, 1981; Bruce and Dwyer, 
1988, Folbre, 1986; Wolf, 1990). Therefore, I focused more specifically on 
processes of negotiation within household units, which may take conflictual 
forms and may perpetuate domination and hierarchy along gender lines, or 
may invite resistance.
Feminist research on the family has also highlighted the problems of 
viewing households in isolation from one other and from the broader context 
in which they are embedded (Harris, 1981; Caplan and Bujra, 1982). I thus
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also examined the ways in which women within different households are 
linked to each other through broader social relations of Co-operation, 
exchange or conflict, and on the interrelations between women's patterns of 
negotiation within the household, as unpaid family workers, and outside the 
household as paid workers. With regards to women's paid work, I focused 
specifically on two types of working women: women who do piece-work (sub­
contracting) at home, and women who receive wages in workshops (largely 
small, generally unregistered, enterprises employing up to 10 workers.
I focused on these two types of work for a variety of reasons. They 
appeared to be widespread in the study community, they have not been 
studied in-depth before, and they provide two interesting extremes of 
women's paid work options in terms of flexibility of arrangements, pay levels, 
skills required, and community acceptance as "proper" women's work. As will 
be discussed in detail in chapter seven, whereas sub-contracting is carried 
out inside the home and is considered acceptable work for women, wage 
labour, while more lucrative, is considered shameful and inappropriate. 
Moreover, as the women engaged in these two activities represented different 
age groups-single girls predominated in wage labour and married women 
with children in sub-contracting-, they appeared most relevant with respect to 
my interest in examining life-cycle changes in gender inequalities and 
patterns of resistance.
Within the specific arenas of gender relations and ideologies 
mentioned above, I was particularly interested in understanding two types of 
variations in gender relations: life-cycle changes and generational differences 
resulting from transformations in gender norms and expectations. To better 
capture these changes, I focused my investigations on two sorts of families: 
newly married couples with young children, and families with older children 
and grandchildren. To analyse changes in marriage practices and forms of 
paid employment, I adopted a time perspective which enabled me to seek 
explanations for such changes in terms of broader changes in the socio­
economic and political environment which had taken place concurrently. 
Such an approach also entailed trying to understand current practices and
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ideologies "by asking how their connection with the past constrains and 
shapes their dynamics in the present" (Collier and Yanagisako, 1987:45).
Tools and Methods:
During my fieldwork, I lived with my husband and son in my family 
home in a suburb south of Cairo, about 15-30 minutes drive to the 
communities I studied. I did not live in any of the communities, as it would 
have been culturally unacceptable for a married Egyptian woman with her 
own residence in Cairo, and would have appeared inappropriate and risked 
jeopardising my access to the community. I visited the neighbourhoods I was 
interested in, however, on a daily basis throughout these months and spent 
many of my evenings there.
I used an array of methods of investigations which included: dardasha- 
-a common local means of exploration based on informal discussions, chats 
and conversations-, participation in a range of regular livelihood activities 
(such as peeling garlic and cleaning rice, assembling upholstery tacks and 
washing pegs, joining rotating credit and saving societies, attending 
weddings, religious lessons, prayers, funerals, celebration of births, and spirit 
possession ceremonies), observation of daily activities, and in-depth, open- 
ended interviews and oral narratives. Only a few of my oral narratives could 
be described as oral histories, in the sense of comprehensive accounts of a 
woman's life story following a life history format (See Geiger, 1990). 
Towards the end of my research I also relied more heavily on focused 
interviews to probe into specific issues.
My choice of methods stems directly from the nature of my theoretical 
and methodological concerns outlined earlier. The emphasis on observation 
and participation in a range of livelihood activities was related to my 
conviction that theory and interpretations must be grounded in an 
understanding of the daily material realities and lived practices of men and 
women, as well as the importance of verifying and identifying the 
contradictions between beliefs articulated in narratives and actual practices. 
My use of oral narratives and in-depth, open ended interviews reflected an
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interest in "giving voice to women" I was interested in describing and 
analysing women’s experiences from their perspectives as related to me in 
specific interactions, and making sense of their place in the world in a way 
that "is not challenged or outright rejected by the very people whose lives it 
tries to explain" (Reinharz, 1992:33). And, I might add, often tries to change 
as well.
Oral narratives and open-ended interviews are invaluable technique
for providing insights about people's experiences of themselves, in their own
worlds, and in their own words (Gluck and Patai, 1991). Moreover, open-
ended interviews are particularly useful for capturing interaction and
interconnections between people and events, they allow both the narrator
and the researcher maximum flexibility for clarification, and reduce the control
and direction of interviewer over interviewee, all of which are qualities which
have particular appeal for feminist researchers. Open ended, in-depth
interviews are particularly well suited for an exploratory study such as this
one, in which one does not know in advance what types of specific questions
to ask. As Anderson and Jack (1991) argue, in-depth interviews represent an
important shift from:
"information gathering, where the focus is on the right 
questions, to interaction where the focus is on process, on the 
dynamic unfolding of the subject's viewpoints. It is the 
interactive nature of the interview that allows us to ask for 
clarification, to notice what questions the subject formulates 
about her own life, to go beyond conventional expected 
answers to the women's personal construction of her own 
experience" (1991:23).
All types of interviews, including open-ended interviews and oral 
narratives, however, are not without their limitations involving, as they do, two 
subjectivities, that of the interviewer and that of the narrator. Issues of 
motives and memory of the narrator, her desire to present herself in a certain 
way to the interviewer, cannot be ignored. There is a vast literature on 
biases in interviews (see for example, Acker et al, 1983, see Reinharz, 1992 
for an extended bibliography). It is well recognised that oral narratives 
always contain a self serving component and are often shaped according to
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the narrator's own sense of direction, in other words, they are neither a 
transparent representation of experience nor a reproduction of reality, but 
only offer glimpses of different subject positions in specific interactions with 
the interviewer.
Moreover, discrepancies in power, status, and privilege between 
narrator and interviewer also pose important challenges to the presumed 
interactive and non-hierarchical qualities of oral narratives so prized by 
feminists. While narrators do have some control over the interview process, 
they are rarely full partners. Their control recedes significantly during the 
actual transformation of the oral texts into accessible formats for reading, a 
process which inevitably involves decisions of selection, framing, editing, and 
discarding of passages (Borland, 1991). As a result, the content of oral 
narratives may not "contribute to a respectful and non stereotypical view of 
those studied, as a social fact, it typically helps recreate a hierarchy of 
privilege" (Olson and Shopes, 1991:198).
I tried to do minimal editing of the transcribed interviews. Nonetheless,
I made constant choices about how to translate and present various women's 
narratives into the context of a written thesis, what to include and what to 
leave out, and what to use to support particular arguments, a process in 
which the women I interviewed had no say. I am aware thus that "their voices" 
are clearly mediated through this process. I take refuge in the conviction that 
should the women I interviewed read this thesis many would recognise their 
own particular voices in it. I am also aware that the voices that do emerge 
from my interviews are not static ones that reflect the "real voices" of the 
women I spoke with. Like myself, my interviewees have multiple and shifting 
identities and what my interviews captured can be no more than specific 
subject positions reflecting specific interactions with me at a particular 
moment in time.
As mentioned earlier, I started my interviews with women at the 
household level and then traced my way to their work places, and to the 
locations of the various networks they participate in, which were often in 
different communities. I also interviewed a limited number of men. These
128
were mainly workshop owners—so as to capture how decisions about pay, 
hiring, and specific work arrangements are negotiated-, male lawyers to get 
insight into the legal aspects of marriage negotiations, as well as others who 
were doctors, religious healers or relatives of the women I interviewed. About 
50 % of my interviews where taped, with the full agreement of the 
interviewee, and I later transcribed and translated them into English with the 
help of an assistant.
Alongside my observations, participation in livelihood activities, and 
interviews, I also recorded Arabic proverbs pertaining to gender and family 
relations. However, I only recorded those that emerged spontaneously in the 
course of an interview or conversation, and I was careful to record, and later 
analyse, these proverbs in their "discursive" context, that is, in the context of 
who used them, when, for what purposes, and for which audience. The 
importance of such local idioms is not that they provide an accurate 
description of reality. In fact, the ideas and depictions provided by proverbs 
may often be contradictory, fragmented, and inconsistent in their ethical 
judgements or at variance with other cultural beliefs (Webster, 1982). 
However, they nonetheless map out a field of meaning based on local 
categories, and give people a language to talk about differences, as well as 
providing local definitions and understandings of concepts like value, status, 
power, equity, injustice, and domination.
My interest in proverbs and colloquialisms on gender used in a specific 
context, was thus part of my broader conviction of the importance of paying 
attention to local idioms, forms of expression and usages. As Dwyer notes 
in her study of gender ideologies in Morocco as conveyed through proverbs 
and everyday conversations, it is critical for researchers to look at possible 
conflicts between male and female views of the world as such differences 
provide insights into possibilities of change (Dwyer, 1978a). Since 
understanding gender ideologies was related to my interest in strategies of 
resistance and identifying potential sources of change, I was particularly 
sensitive to variations in beliefs about gender between men and women; 
proverbs sometimes provided a stark way of articulating such variations.
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My main research “sample” on which I based most of the analysis in 
the chapters to follow, consisted of 88 women and 12 men. (See appendix (1) 
for a more detailed description, in terms of age, marital status, education and 
occupation). I also had less in-depth conversations and discussions with 
many other members in the communities. My sample was a purposefully 
composed one, a theoretical sample, which was not aimed at ensuring 
statistical representation of women or men in those communities. It was 
rather intended to select specific categories of individuals using life cycle and 
employment criteria.
My approach had some inherent limitations. I did not talk to as many 
men as I had initially planned (see fieldwork encounters). The limited number 
of people I talked to and the fact that this was not a comprehensive study of 
particular communities mean that issues of comparability and generalisation 
are compromised. However, the advantages of the methods used in this 
exploratory study, whose purpose was essentially heuristic, is that they 
enable the generation of the sorts of information that generate both 
theoretical insights as well as inform policy formulation.
Qualitative methods enable the generation of rich and new information, 
from the perspectives of people whose voices are rarely heard, and the 
unearthing of a range of previously unexplored (or unsuspected) 
relationships on sensitive issues, from which a number of important 
hypotheses can be derived and more systematically explored. For example, 
my suggestion in this study that it is mothers who insist on educating their 
daughters, often despite their husband's disapproval, runs counter to the 
conventional wisdom in Egypt and elsewhere about the obstacles for girls' 
education and has important theoretical and policy implications. (See Chapter 
nine for an extensive discussion of this issue). Moreover, since my aim was 
to evaluate, critique, complement and contribute to existing feminist and 
social theories, my methods allowed me to take a "grounded theory 
perspective" which uses an inductive approach to interpreting data (see 
Reinharz, 1992), thus enabling me to identify new conceptual relationships 
grounded.in actual practices and daily material realities.
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interpretation and Ethnographic Representation:
Analysis and presentation of information generated through 
ethnographic techniques often poses specific challenge of interpretation, and 
as several scholars have argued, the relationship between ethnography and 
feminism is an "awkward" one (Strathern, 1987b). Issues of representation 
and the inevitable problem of "speaking about", without "speaking for" (Moore 
1994b) occupied me during both the fieldwork and writing up process. I 
recognised early on that some of the questions I had set out to investigate, 
particularly those related to a concept such as resistance, are interpretative 
in nature since it is an analytical construct, and is thus less observable than 
issues such as the division of labour and actual daily practices. In addition to 
direct observation of conflicts and processes of negotiation, I thus also made 
inferences about what constituted resistance. However, I attempted to ground 
these inferences as far as possible as they related to specific events, such 
as a street argument, a marriage negotiation, or a marital conflict.
I also attempted to resist imposing my own interpretations by engaging 
in a serious dialogue about meaning with my informants throughout my 
fieldwork. Borland (1991) giving an example of her experience interviewing 
her grandmother, cautions us of the possible "interpretative conflicts" that 
emerge in the process of recording oral narratives. Influenced by feminist 
concepts of patriarchy and oppression, she had framed her grandmother's 
racetrack narrative-in which her grandmother had recalled how she insisted 
on betting on a certain horse despite her father's disapproval-,as a "female 
struggle for autonomy within a male hostile environment". This interpretation, 
however, elicited strong disagreement from her grandmother, who accused 
Borland of projecting her own biases into the narrative and insisting that she 
herself has never been concerned with female struggles and has never 
considered herself a feminist. This experience has led Borland to seek ways 
to "more sensitively negotiate issues of interpretative authority in our 
research". She suggests that one way to do so is "by extending the
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conversations we initiate while collecting oral narratives to the later stage of 
interpretation (Borland, 1991:73).
I have attempted to adopt a similar approach. I shared parts of my 
analysis and interpretation with some of my respondents, and where there 
were sharp divergences, i attempted to probe further. My fluency in Arabic 
and my intimate knowledge of the culture presented me with a distinct 
advantage to engage in this type of shared interpretation during fieldwork. 
My repeated visits to the field during the writing up process also helped to 
reduce, or at least made me more aware of the amount of "interpretative 
conflict" in data analysis.8 To the extent possible, I have tried to present an 
analysis that both reflects respondents1 perspectives on events and issues, 
but that is also able to take account of broader socio-economic phenomena 
that the women I talked to may not have been aware of.
As the chapters that follow will show in greater detail--by juxtaposing 
my own interpretations against extensive quotes from my interviewees-, 
there are certain areas where the interpretation is clearly a shared one. This 
is most obvious in my analysis of the practice of the marriage inventory, 
ayma, which women deployed as a damage control mechanism in the face of 
a range of potential abuses by their husbands (see chapter six). The 
analysis is also largely shared with regards to the relationship between public 
defloration ceremonies and waged work, where respondents also explicitly 
argued that public defloration ceremonies are more common and more 
elaborate for women who were known to be working as waged labourers prior 
to their marriage (see chapter seven).
There were other areas, however, where interpretations are mine 
alone, interpretations that I found convincing and compelling in light of other 
information and theoretical frameworks that I had access to. Some of these 
interpretations were either contested by the women or were deemed 
incomprehensible or irrelevant. Examples of such differences were most 
striking in my discussions of female circumcision (see chapter 5). My 
interpretation of spirit possession as a "discourse of protest" that enabled
8 For a discussion of a comparable approach, see Marjorie Mbilinyi, (1989).
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women to voice their concerns about issues, such as forced sex, which in 
every day discourse would be difficult to articulate, also found little local 
resonance (see chapter eight). My arguments about the "euphemization" of 
piece-work, or the connections between the exploitative relations underlying 
this pattern of work and international processes of the feminisation of labour, 
were also ones that my respondents could not relate to, for obvious reasons 
as such interpretation either radically challenges their "doxa", or draws upon 
information that they have no access to (see chapter seven). While I 
discussed as much as possible my interpretations with many interviewees, it 
is important to note, however, that there are also parts of my analysis that I 
did not share with my interviewees at all. For example, I did not discuss my 
interpretations regarding the apparent increase in Christian spirits (see 
chapter eight), nor the role of religious myths in perpetuating power relations 
and gender hierarchies (see chapter five).
In their conclusion, the Personal Narratives Group (1989) argue that 
the context and experiences of the women they researched "must be 
considered from the standpoint of the subject of the personal narrative as well 
as from the standpoint of the interpreter's analysis of a particular cultural and 
social system (1989:12). Similarly, Gorelick (1991) argues that the 
"experiential-inductive" perspective has serious limitations for fully 
understanding "underlying causes of oppression". Cognisant of these 
limitations, and aware that "giving voice" to women, while absolutely crucial, 
may not be enough, I have attempted to follow an approach suggested by 
Acker et al (1983). What this entailed is constructing an account of the lives 
of the women I researched which highlights and reflects their active voices, 
perspectives and experiences, accommodates my own analysis and, very 
importantly, shows the relationship and the gaps between the two.
This chapter has attempted to provide an account of my fieldwork, the 
methodological approaches informing it, the "angle of vision" which has 
influenced my choice of research questions and the specific methods of 
inquiry I adopted. I have also discussed how I grappled with the complex 
issues of positionality, location, representation and interpretation. The
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following five chapters will present the results of my fieldwork and analysis, 
each exploring a specific set of gender relations and ideologies. The next 
chapter deals with pre-marital standards and expectations.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PRE-MARITAL STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS 
"Choose a spouse more carefully for a daughter than for a son"1
Om Gamal and Om Youssef, neighbours for the past 20 years, are 
shouting at each from their respective windows and gesturing with their 
hands wildly. In a few minutes, their exchange had escalated from verbal 
accusations and insults across windows, to a physical fight between the two 
women in the middle of the alley. Although a large crowd, including myself, 
quickly gathered around the two women and tried to intervene and stop the 
fight, physical damage had already taken place. Om Gamal had struck Om 
Youssef with a thick wooden plank. In a few seconds Om Youssef’s forehead 
was bleeding profusely. The sight of blood abruptly stopped the fight, and 
accompanied by a dozen or so women and men, Om Youssef was rushed off 
to a nearby public hospital to have her forehead stitched, and to issue a 
complaint at the police station against Om Gamal.
The fight, I later found out through piecing together bits of information 
from neighbours, was sparked by Om Gamal's remark, to another neighbour, 
that she saw Om Youssef s 18-year old daughter helping her brother put his 
shoes on, just like a spinster. She thanked god that her own daughter was 
married at the age of 16, and now looks after the needs of her own husband, 
not her brother, as some of the less fortunate girls in the community were 
forced to do.2 The neighbour reported this conversation to Om Youssef, who
1 Ista^dil 11 bintak, wa la tistacdil H ibnak. This popular local idiom, which will be 
discussed later in the chapter, was invoked by several of my respondents in the 
context of discussions about choice of spouse.
2 It is interesting to note in this context how gender roles and expectations vary by 
age, even within the span of a few years. While serving a brother's needs (such 
as fetching things for him, making him tea, washing his clothes and putting his 
shoes on), is an acceptable and expected role for young girls, it no longer reflects 
standard behaviour at a slightly older age, as it is expected to be superseded by 
another role, that of a wife serving her husband.
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took it as a serious insult against her daughter, and started insulting Om 
Gamal. The fight was the topic of conversation among some of the families in 
my sample for a few days, and everybody, including myself, was expected to 
take sides.3
This chapter discusses pre-marital standards and preparation for 
gender roles in adulthood, particularly preparations for marriage. As the 
incident above shows, marriage is a central aim in the community. 
Spinsterhood remains one of the worst nightmares for girls and their families, 
and charges of Spinsterhood were often the cause of similar dramatic public, 
verbal quarrels, rah, and sometimes physical fights amongst women in the 
community. The chapter discusses how girls are prepared to assume their 
roles as future wives, mothers and sexual providers. Within a broader 
discussion of pre-martial standards and expectations, the chapter focuses 
specifically on two pre-marital "rites of passage" and gendering practices 
which mark the journey of a girl's transition into womanhood, that of 
menstruation and female circumcision. The chapter also discusses selection 
of spouses and how girls attempt to expand their choices in this regard. The 
chapter aims to set the stage for the chapter following it, which will focus 
more specifically on marriage negotiations and transactions.
When "good", il kheir; enters a girl's body: Menstruation
Entering a world, dakhalit dunya, an Arabic idiom commonly used to 
mean getting married nicely captures how marriage is conceptualised in the 
study community. Marriage is seen as much more than a partnership, bond 
or alliance between two people, or even two families. For both men and 
women, but particularly for women, marriage signifies a qualitative change in 
their lives. It is the point at which they enter into the "real" world, dunya, and 
experience the true meaning of womanhood, becoming a sit, hurma or mara— 
implying becoming both sexually active as well as bearing children--, as
3 As discussed in chapter four, the issue of "taking sides" was a constant source of 
anxiety throughout my fieldwork.
136
opposed to remaining in the marginal world of that of a girl, bint Marriage is 
also the only way for unmarried women to have sex, and bear children.4
Once married, women, particularly those who did not engage in paid 
work outside the house as adolescents, usually enjoy greater freedom of 
movement. With the birth of their first child, generally expected during the 
first year of marriage, women move into what is considered their central role, 
that of motherhood, which enhances their status in their families and the 
community. Remaining single is a highly undesirable state of affairs, and in 
the community studied, girls between the ages of 20-25 who were neither 
engaged nor married, approached the community's definition of spinsterhood, 
cawaanis, and were under increasing pressure to get married.5
Although women acquire gendered roles and attributes early in 
childhood, many of those I interviewed recalled a keener awareness of the 
social consequences of being female at around the ages of 8-13.6 The 
onset of menarche was sometimes referred to by some of my interviewees, 
very tellingly, as the point at which "good enters a girls body," il kheir dakhaf 
gismaha. This was most often signalled as the point at which girls begin 
recognising the full social and community consequences of their identity as 
female.
It is noteworthy in this context that the Arabic term for femininity, 
untha/unuutha, however, was never used to discuss these changes. Rather
4 Pre-marital relations existed in the community, but they were neither common nor 
socially endorsed. Attempts were made to conceal such affairs, through for 
example, hymen repair operations before marriage as will be discussed in chapter 
seven. Extra-marital affairs were more common. Women normally blamed 
women, not men for such affairs. As one interviewee put it: "It is the woman who 
is shamed/blamed in such affairs, because nothing can shame a man". "A man is 
like a dog, if you give him a bone, he will come running to you, but if you ignore 
him, he will find a bone elsewhere", ventured another woman.
5 Economic pressures, the phenomenal rise in the cost of marriage and the increase 
in girls' education, have resulted in raising the age at marriage for females over the 
past decade (see Nawar et al, 1995). This is merely seen as a delay, however, 
but almost never as a permanent state of affairs.
6 1 am referring here to awareness of the social implications of their gender, not 
their own personal identity or awareness of being female, which probably comes 
much earlier, but it is not an area that I explored. The onset of menstruation, not 
circumcision, was identified as the critical turning point.
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women used more generic terms like, "grown up" and physically "ready" for 
marriage, and more specifically for motherhood. In fact, unlike the concept of 
masculinity, ruguula, which was conceptualised and articulated in a concrete 
manner in various contexts, the Arabic term for femininity, unuutha, was 
never articulated to describe female attributes or roles. Unlike the concept of 
masculinity, there was no local idiom for the concept of femininity different 
than that of girl or woman. The concept of femininity was much more diffuse 
and related to a number of attributes such as physical strength and 
endurance.
With the onset of menstruation, and the bodily changes associated 
with it, particularly the development of breasts, girls become much more 
aware of their own bodies as well as of their gendered attributes, 
expectations and responsibilities. In her pioneering study on women's 
perceptions of sexuality in a village in Giza, Khattab similarly finds that: 
"menstruation is "the first "rite de passage" which is perceived by most 
women as directly related to fertility and procreation and consequently to 
sexuality. Once girls menstruate, they are considered ready for marriage and 
for intercourse" (Khattab, 1996:6).
Many women reported that these physical changes resulted in 
significant changes in how they dressed, in their freedom of movement, in 
their interactions with outsiders, in the types of housework they engaged in— 
with a more conscious focus on learning specific skills, such as cooking,—and 
sometimes also in their allocation of wages if they were working. Ihsan, who 
sells tea at a street corner, is 26 years old, born and bred in Cairo, did not go 
to school, got married when she was 16 and now has four children. She 
comments:
"j think I was about 11 years old when I got my period. From 
that day I felt, and was treated differently by everyone around 
me. My mother talked to me and said that you are now a grown 
up girl and have to take care of yourself, and your card, honour.
My father told me to wear a tarha (head cover) and stop playing 
outside the house with other children like I was used to. My 
father also asked my brother, who is one year younger, to 
monitor my movements. This is what upset me the most, but my 
parents said we do not have girls who play in the street, it is
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ceeb, shameful, you are no longer a child. I would let my 
brother go out and I would escape and go play in the street.
When I saw my brother returning, I would run up to our room 
again, which is on the fourth floor. One day my brother caught 
me and hit me very hard.... I also could no longer go and get 
the fresh produce from the market near the railroads. The only 
errands my mother now sent me on was to buy soap and rice 
from the grocery in front of our house. She would watch me 
carefully, however, and if she saw me talking to any man, she 
would tell my brother and he would hit me."
This comment reveals how both girls and boys acquire gendered
identities and become aware of male and female role expectations with the
onset of menstruation, which in turn influences their behaviour. Ihsan's
movements were now more restricted and the spaces to which she had
access had also changed: the market place became defined as inappropriate
for an unmarried7 girl of her age, whereas a close by grocery shop was not.
Just as significantly, however, Ihsan's brother also acquired a new sense of
gender identity in this process. His adolescence "manhood" was in effect to
be judged by his ability to monitor and "discipline" his sister. The above
example further reveals how power works in subtle ways, through introducing,
as Foucault suggests albeit in a different context, "disciplinary mechanisms"
which require, not just force (Ihsan's brother hitting her), but just as
importantly constant "surveillance" (Ihsan's mother's watching her carefully).
Fatma, a vegetable vendor married to a baker, talks about her
daughter Ibtisam, who is 15 years old, engaged, and is currently working in a
small pastry workshop. Fatma reports that last year Ibtisam has "grown up",
and is no longer a child, cayy//a. (When probing what she meant by grownup,
she explicitly said that she got her period). Fatma's comments reveal the
implications of "growing up" as well as how girls are prepared for domestic
work with more care if they are expected to live with their mother-in laws.
"I am telling Ibtisam she has to be more careful in her 
interactions with people in the workshop and she now covers 
her head with a scarf when she goes to work. She is working to
7 A woman's access to certain public spaces thus clearly depends on not just 
gender, but also her age and marital status. Married women with children have 
much freer access to a marketplace, for example than unmarried girls who have 
reached puberty.
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complete her gihaaz, and she is no longer putting her earnings 
into household expenses as she used to when she was 
younger. But I am thinking she also needs to learn how to cook 
and take care of the house, and bake bread. She will be 
married to her cousin in the village and will live with her mother- 
in-law, dakhla cala beet cee/a. If she does not learn these 
things, and also get used to staying at home, she will not be 
able to take it, to adapt to her marital life, hatiFab. On Sundays, 
which is her day off, I now teach now her how to cook properly, 
not just clean the rice and peel the potatoes like she used to".
Once girls begin to be defined as sexual beings, attempts to control 
that sexuality takes on an increasing importance. Within this context female 
circumcision emerged as another important pre-marital practice closely 
related to constructions of womanhood and manhood. Circumcision is 
obviously of a different order than menstruation, with different short and long­
term implications. While the bodily changes associated with menstruation 
are part of a natural process, circumcision is a change that is consciously 
inflicted on female bodies. Nonetheless, circumcision, as Khattab (1996) 
argues, emerges as the second most central gendered rite of passage” for 
girls. Like other "rites of passage" that signal a girl's transition from 
childhood to womanhood, it is essentially based on constructions of women 
as wives and mothers (Khattab, 1996).
The history and prevalence of female circumcision has been the 
subject of an increasing number of studies both in Egypt and internationally 
(Dorkenoo, 1994; Assad, 1980, El-Saadawy, 1980, Toubia 1995, Khattab, 
1996). My purpose is not to rehearse the many important points raised by 
these studies, nor to single out female circumcision as an instance of 
women's oppression, but rather to elucidate specific theoretical points central 
to my broader arguments regarding the complexities of power and resistance. 
Using the example of female circumcision as a gendering practice, I aim to 
partly highlight how one's apprehension and awareness of certain injustices-- 
and thus one's ability or willingness to contest some aspects of social reality— 
is very much linked to one's particular social location. Female circumcision is 
also highlighted because it can further our understanding of how bodies
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themselves are gendered and how power operates to produce a specific 
discourse on sex and pleasure.
The reasons for my focus on circumcision as a premarital practice are 
fourfold. First, is the universality of the practice among the women in my 
sample, both Muslims and Copts: 100% of women were circumcised, and 
100% had either already circumcised their daughters or were planning to 
circumcise their younger ones when they were a little older. Second, is the 
stark contrast between how circumcision is perceived by the women studied 
(they referred to as a purification ritual, tahaara) and how it is perceived by 
feminist activists who now refer to it as "genital mutilation"8. In fact, 
circumcision (purification or mutilation depending on who you talk to) has 
been recently defined by middle and upper class feminists in Egypt, and 
much earlier on by western feminists, as one of the most critical violations of 
women's human rights in Egypt.9 The campaign launched against it is 
considered by some as one of the best examples of organised feminist 
activism in Egypt (see FGM Task Force position paper, 1979).10
However, unlike other areas of women's oppression both within 
marriage, and the labour market, as will be discussed in iater chapters, where 
women often articulated their discontent and evolved strategies to check 
male power, there was no resistance at all to the practice of circumcision by 
the women I interviewed. Rather there was emphatic compliance and
8 One of the arguments for the use of this term rather than female circumcision is 
that the latter incorrectly connotes that male and female circumcision have similar 
health implications, ignoring the significantly more adverse effects of female 
circumcision. See FGM Task Force Position Paper, 1997.
9 The concerted and vocal campaign against female circumcision by Egyptian 
activists is a recent phenomenon which gained impetus with the United Nations 
ICPD conference in 1994.
10 Objections to the practice are based on the grounds of personal dignity and 
control over one's body, as well as on medical grounds. The possible immediate 
and long term complications of circumcision, from the most severe such as death 
from uncontrollable bleeding, to infections resulting in infertility, to long term 
effects such as child birth difficulties, urinary disturbances, and inability to fully 
enjoy sex, have been the subject of much debate, discussion, supported by some 
research.
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complicity11 with the enforcement of this practice. Circumcision thus provided 
me with an opportunity for better understanding how power mechanisms 
could work from a basis of consensus and Cupertino rather than conflict.
Fourth and finally, circumcision is highlighted because of the 
connections that my interviewees made between the practice and women's 
sexual appeal and appetite, which relates to my discussions on sexuality in 
chapter eight. As will be seen later, women's obligations to render sexual 
services emerged as one of the important arenas for marital disputes and 
conflicts. Women's discontent with their sexual relations was sometimes 
vividly articulated through their spirit possession narratives. Some women 
also manipulated their role as sexual partners in their financial negotiations 
with their husbands.
"Purification", "Genital Mutilation" or "Gendering the Body"?: Female 
Circumcision
Circumcision, referred to in classical Arabic as khafed (literally 
decreasing), and known popularly as tahaara, purification, denotes the partial 
or complete removal of the external female genitalia. Excision varies from the 
removal of the prepuce of the clitoris only to the full excision of the clitoris, 
the labia minora and the labia majora (Assad, 1980). The most commonly 
practised type in Egypt is what is known as the first degree where the labia 
minora are removed and sometimes also the tip of the clitoris (Khattab, 
1996)12.
"Agarwal (1994) makes the important distinction between compliance and 
complicity. In the case of circumcision there was both compliance and complicity 
to the practice, unlike other practices as will be discussed later, where there was 
compliance, but varying degree of complicity, and sometimes none at all.
12 Circumcision is practised in a large number of mainly African countries, amongst 
both Muslims and non-Muslims. Tracing its origin in Egypt is fraught with 
speculation. The practice was either introduced from Africa, or is a pharonic 
practice that has survived and was more recently diffused to other parts of Africa. 
There is no historical evidence, however, that female circumcision originated or 
was even practised by Muslims in Arabia, from where Islam spread to other parts 
of the world. Female circumcision was also never, and is not practised today, in 
many Arab Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, 
Palestine, or any North African country other than Egypt (see Toubia, 1995).
142
All the women in my sample reported that they are circumcised, had
their daughters circumcised, or would be doing so in the future. Women's
ages at circumcision ranged between 8-14. Most of the older women in the
sample reported performing it at home by a traditional mid-wife, a daaya,
whereas most of the younger women in the sample were operated on by a
private physician in a clinic. Most women, remembered the operation vividly,
and were usually willing to talk about their experiences and feelings once I
got to know them well.
Om Yehia is a self-employed grocer originally from Sohag in Upper
Egypt, but came to Cairo when she was 13 to get married to her cousin. She
recalls being circumcised, at the age of 10, in her village together with two of
her relatives of the same age. They knew they would be circumcised and
although they were not quite clear what that meant, they realised it was a
significant event. Om Yehia recalls how the three of them walked in the
village the day the operation was scheduled happily announcing the
impending event. A midwife, whom she remembers was a hefty woman,
performed it, while her paternal aunt helped her by spreading her legs apart.
Three pieces were cut, two on the side and one in the middle, she
emphasised, noting that if all three pieces are not removed, the operation
would not be considered complete. Om Yehia recalls screaming from the
pain and does not remember that anaesthesia was used. To avoid infection
and stop the bleeding, referred to as ironing the wound, tikwi il garh, the
daaya put rolled henna and lemon juice on the injury. Om Yehia fainted
afterwards, and the next thing she recalls is being propped up in bed and
being fed soup and rabbit, a special treat.
Om Yehia felt very strongly about the importance of the operation. It
made a woman hadya, sexually calm, but, she emphasised not frigid, barda,
towards her husband.
"Also, suppose a woman does not get married until she is older.
If she was not circumcised she would be itching down there and 
wanting to play with her self all the time. Although the operation 
makes a woman colder sexually, bitbarrad il sit, a woman can 
still enjoy sex with her husband, as sexual pleasure is not based 
on whether a woman is circumcised or not, but rather on her 
nature, whether she is flirtatious, shsFiyya or not. I myself used
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to enjoy sex with my husband very much until he stopped 
providing for the house 11 years ago, ever since my 6th 
daughter was born. That is when problems started. He still 
wants to have sex, but I am no longer interested in it and I 
refuse." (Chapter eight will deal in more detail with women's 
perceptions of sex and how they negotiate sexual services).
Om Yehia confirmed that she has circumcised all her daughters, who
are all in school, except the youngest who will undergo the operation when
she is old enough. Unlike herself, however, all her daughters, were
circumcised by a private doctor not a daaya. It cost her about LE15 four
years ago; now the cost has risen to LE50. Her daughters did not object;
could not object, she insisted, it was taken for granted, and her husband had
nothing to do with the decision. This was a decision within the domain of
women, not men, unlike decisions regarding choice of husbands where the
opinion of their father is more important.
Interestingly, Om Yehia said that she realised that the operation was
not an Islamic practice, was not mentioned in the Quran, and was not
practised during the Prophet's time. She emphasised, however, that even
during the prophet’s time, people were nonetheless aware of the problem of
women's excessive sexual appetite. She then recounted an interesting story
(best described as a community myth, since it has no factual religious or
historical basis) about Fatma, the daughter of the Prophet who, according to
the story, was sexually aroused, hayga, because she was not circumcised.
"She (Fatma) used to sleep with her husband two or three times 
a day. One day the prophet came to visit and found them 
fighting. He asked what was wrong and Fatma complained that 
her husband does not want to sleep with her. The prophet then 
looked at the washing jug, abriP, that her husband uses to wash 
with after intercourse and asked it how many times her husband 
has used it today.13 The abriP, which suddenly started talking, 
said that her husband has washed himself seven times today 
(that is, he has had sex with Fatma seven times today). So the 
Prophet looked disapprovingly at his daughter, patted her and 
told her: Fatma, be cold, calm down, kuunni buruud.
13 The issue of bathing after intercourse is heavily emphasised by women, and the 
term bathing, istahamet, is often used in conversations to mean that a woman or a 
man has had sex.
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This myth was circulating in the community as a religious fact and is an
interesting example of how religious precedents and credentials are creatively
invented to grant legitimacy to certain actions.
Another story, regarding circumcision that was also recounted to me
more than once, was that of a woman named Reda. Reda's parents died at the
age of 12 and she was taken in and raised by one of the well known families in
a neighbouring community, who were also distant relatives. When she was
having a bath once at the age of 17, another female member of the family saw
her naked and was shocked to find that she was not circumcised and "had an
ugly piece of thick skin protruding from her genitals, just like a man's penis".
Realising that her parents must not have circumcised her before they died, but
not wanting to publicise this fact fearing that it could jeopardise her reputation
and affect her marriageability, her adoptive family decided not to have her
circumcised by a daaya or a doctor (which would have been a more public
event). Instead they tied the "extra piece" protruding from Reda tightly with a
piece of thread and left it like that for three months, until it "died", and fell off.
Ragabeya, newly married and now five months pregnant, notes that
she was 10 years old when she was circumcised by a daaya. Details of the
event and the pain it entailed remain alive in her mind to this day.
"We went to our neighbours’ apartment and there were three 
other girls waiting to be circumcised. I was the last and it was 
hard for me to hear the other girls screaming in the next room, 
but my mother told me they were exaggerating and that it is a 
very simple operation. The daaya made me smell something, 
but it still hurt very much. It turned out not to be a simple 
operation after all. I bled heavily, the cut was too deep, so they 
called the doctor and he stitched me-two stitches in the 
apartment. I did not go to a hospital or a clinic and was not 
given any anaesthesia. I know now that circumcision is 
important so that a woman can sleep with her husbands with no 
problems, and so that he can find her appealing. I will also 
circumcise my daughter when she is about 10, but I will have a 
doctor do it, in the clinic, to avoid the bleeding and stitching that 
I underwent. I want to spare her the pain."
Om Sayed, originally from Upper Egypt, is married, has five children 
and a co-wife who lives near by. She reports that she is circumcised and has 
circumcised all her daughters (aged 12-21). Her comments stress how this
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tradition is ingrained in the community's value system and is closely tied to
conceptions and constructions of female and male bodies.
"The biggest ceeb, shame, is for a woman not to get 
circumcised. If a woman is not, she is not really a woman.
She will have a piece sticking out of her like a man (referring to 
the penis). Uncircumcised, she would run after men in the 
street, timsik // rigalla fil shaarF, and if 50 men slept with her in 
one day, she will not be satisfied, layikfiiha... You are not 
circumcised, so what do you do??... You better not tell anyone 
here that you are not circumcised" (A strong tone of contempt 
reverberated that last remark).
All women reacted with surprise, to the fact that I was not circumcised, 
a clear example of my "otherness", despite many shared values, and a 
common nationality and language. Some tried to casualty find excuses for 
me, "you are not like us, you are really like a foreigner", or used it to explain 
what they perceived as my frail, unwomanly body, gismik ta^baan, gismik 
da^iif. Om Sayed, however, was the only one who questioned my sexual 
behaviour, and who also clearly perceived me as a possible threat to her 
family. The intimacy we had established in previous encounters cooled off 
significantly after our discussion of circumcision and my interactions with 
other household members became more restricted and formal.
While all women reported being circumcised only once as young girls, 
one woman, Mona who has finished six years of school, told me that even 
though she was circumcised by a daaya when she was eight, she had to 
undergo another operation a month before her wedding last month. This was 
because she discovered that the earlier operation was not done properly and 
there was still a piece of skin dangling from her. Her husband, a semi-skilled 
carpenter would have found that repulsive and it would have got in the way of 
him enjoying sex, she emphasised, so she had no qualms about removing 
it.14
141 wanted to follow up on this conversation with her husband to get his perspective 
on it, but I felt uncomfortable doing so. This was one instance where I feel my 
gender did inhibit me from following up on some issues with men. A study on male 
perceptions on circumcision, and sexuality more generally, would be an area well 
worth pursuing.
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The universality of circumcision in my sample and women's attitudes 
towards the practice is confirmed by a recent national study, the results of 
which were only recently released by the government and were met with 
much surprise on the part of researchers and activists. The 1995 Egyptian 
Demographic and Health survey (EDHS), carried out by the Ministry of 
Health, with technical and financial support from USAID, was the first 
nationally representative survey to measure circumcision among women of 
reproductive age. The results of the survey of ever married women between 
the ages of 15 and 49, revealed that 97% reported being circumcised.15 The 
majority of respondents, 58%, mentioned "good tradition" as the reason for 
this practice. Thirty six percent cited "cleanliness" as the reasons, and 30% 
said it was required by religion. Nine percent mentioned "better marriage 
prospects", 9% cited "the preservation of virginity"; 6% said that it prevents 
adultery, and 4% gave the possibility of greater sexual pleasure as a reason 
(El Zanaty et al, 1996).
Female circumcision emerges in my study as a universal pre-marital 
practice that cut across differences in regional origin, religion or form of 
employment. It is a rite of passage that signals a girl child's transition into her 
socially ordained roles of future wife, whose role is partly to ensure the sexual
15 Given the importance of these findings, the Egyptian Fertility society, an Egyptian 
non governmental association (NGO), in collaboration with the Population Council, 
an international NGO carried out a follow up clinic-based study of FGM to 
investigate the types practised in Egypt as well as assess the accuracy of the self- 
reporting. A total of 1,339 women selected at the out patient services of eleven 
clinics providing gynaecological or family planning services were interviewed. 
Following the interviews, gynaecological examinations by specially trained 
physicians were conducted to collect data on the prevalence and range of severity 
of FGM. The findings of the study, which was funded by USAID, show that there 
was agreement between self-reporting and examination findings in 94% of the 
cases. In all, 93% of those examined were found to have some type of FGM. 
Unlike the 1995 sample, the population of the clinic-based survey was not a 
nationally representative sample. Care must thus be taken when interpreting its 
results. See Population Council (1996).
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pleasure of her husband.16 The practice results in marked changes in how 
girls view themselves, but more importantly in how they are viewed and 
treated by others. Although all my interviewees remembered the pain 
involved, none voiced any protest and there was no questioning, let alone 
discernible resistance to the practice. The compliance with this practice, 
contrasts sharply with the organised and vocal protest by more middle and 
upper class feminists (See FGM task force position paper, 1997).
This contrast can only be comprehended within the context of what are 
two very different cultural settings and socio-economic locations. Such 
different locations produce, using Bourdieu's term, two very different 
"habitus", a commonsensical and unquestioned "system of dispositions", 
which "engender products, thoughts, expressions, actions, whose limits are 
set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its production 
(1977:73). For the women and men in my study community, circumcision was 
part of their "doxa", that "practical faith.., undisputed and pre-reflexive 
compliance with fundamental presuppositions" (Bourdieu, 1992:68).
Circumcision touches upon deeply ingrained constructions of 
womanhood and manhood and is closely tied to gendered identities and 
perceptions of women’s and men’s value and worth. Female circumcision 
can also be understood with reference to community notions of physical 
beauty and images of the body. Circumcision illustrates how images of the 
sexed body are themselves cultural constructs. Ideas about what a female 
body should look like to men do not include a “piece sticking out” , as one of 
my interviewees put it. A woman’s body must be docile and controlled, one 
that is not too demanding for a man, a body, as one of my interviewees 
expressed it, that “causes no problems for a man when he sleeps with if ,  a
16 Male circumcision was also a universal practice in the community and was 
similarly referred to as tahaara. While I did not talk to people about it in as much 
length, it is obvious from my limited discussions that no connection was made 
between the practice and sexual pleasure, or being more appealing to the 
opposite sex, as was the case with female circumcision. Although both forms of 
circumcision are referred to as purification ritual by community members, the 
meanings and the power relations underlying male and female circumcision are 
thus clearly quite different.
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body that is “calm, hadya, but not frigid, barda, as another interviewee put it. 
Female circumcision is thus both a "rite of passage" for women, and a 
gendering practice that partly serves to accentuate the difference between 
both masculine and feminine bodies, and to create certain "truths" about sex, 
sexual differences, and pleasure.17
Foucault's approach to power discussed in chapter one, particularly 
the links he makes between sex, power and the body offers useful insights for 
understanding the practice of female circumcision in the study community, 
including women's complicity with it. Although Foucault has been criticised 
by feminists for not paying particular attention to the gendered nature of the 
"disciplinary techniques on the body", the relationship that he highlights 
between sex and power is nonetheless of relevance. Foucault argues that 
the body is invested directly with relations of domination. The body is 
"sexed", that is, it becomes a female or a male body, within a discourse of sex 
that aims at reproducing a specific type of sex, based on heterosexuality as 
the "norm", the "reality" and the "truth". This type of sex, argues Foucault is 
itself an effect of a historically specific organisation of power, which produces 
a specific discourse on bodies and pleasure (Foucault, 1981). It is not 
because we have a body that we have a particular sex, but rather we have a 
particular kind of the notion of sex so that we have a certain type of body 
(Foucault, 1981; Pun, 1996: 17). Foucault's analysis provides insights for 
understanding how circumcision serves to assign masculine and feminine 
qualities to the body to fit specific power relations.
17 If the categories of "sex" or "body" are themselves gendered, and not a biological 
given, as the above analysis suggests, then this raises the complicated issue of 
the relationship between gender and sex. A critique of the binary categorisation of 
sex/gender, has been the focus of recent anthropological work, which has shown 
that in some societies, gender differences are not necessarily linked to binary 
sexed bodies. It is thus no longer as widely accepted that gender is determined by 
the obvious facts of biological sex differences, or that there is a one to one 
correspondence between sex and gender. As Moore argues: "We cannot afford 
to assume that binary exclusivity modelled on external genitals necessarily 
provides an appropriate model for understanding sexual difference and gender 
identity around the world" (Moore, 1994b:45-46). See chapter one for a discussion 
of the genealogy of the concept of gender.
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Situated within this cultural and analytical context of power relations 
and social identity it becomes easier to understand why the practice of 
circumcision is so entrenched. It also allows one to appreciate the fact that 
addressing the practice of female circumcision requires a major shift in 
women's self and community identity and a shift of both men and women's 
images of female and male bodies. What is required clearly goes beyond 
legal measures.18
Choice of Marriage Partner: "Choose a Spouse More Carefully for a 
Daughter than for a Son"
Following these two "gendering processes", menstruation and
circumcision, girls begin to be more carefully prepared for wifehood and
motherhood, considered as their central roles and identities. In this context,
the search for an appropriate spouse becomes a family affair in which much
energy and care is invested, particularly by women. This care reflects the
fact that an impending marriage affects the social and material position of the
family as well as its relationships in the community. The centrality of marriage
in low-income neighbourhoods of Cairo has been noted by several other
studies (see Rugh, 1984; Hoodfar, 1997; Hoodfar and Singerman, 1996). As
Singerman (1995), based on her research in popular quarters of Cairo
argues:
"impending marriages affect career choices, education, 
employment, investment, migration, savings and consumption 
patterns of both men and women... Parents must consider how 
a marriage will influence their future financial security and
18 I personally do not approve of the practice. However, I am trying to link it more 
explicitly to power relations so as to better understand women’s unquestioned 
acceptance of the practice and thus perhaps to address it more effectively, and in 
ways that go beyond legal measures. During my fieldwork, the success of the 
organised campaign by Egyptian feminists against female circumcision indirectly 
prompted the Minister of Health to issue a decree banning the performance of the 
operation in government hospitals. While I am not dismissing this as a major 
achievement in some respects, it is noteworthy the women in my sample 
completely dismissed and disregarded it. To them, it was not an achievement in 
any sense of the word. Most women currently perform the operation in private 
clinics. Very few still resort to traditional midwives. The unintended consequences 
such a law could have in terms of making women less willing to go to doctors, and 
thus increasing their dependence on traditional midwives, with the higher 
associated risks of infection, must be seriously considered as a possible backlash.
150
material needs. The familial ethos not only emphasises that 
parents provide for their children but also that children support 
them when they get old (1995:84).
Data from the mid 1980's indicate that in Cairo, 32% of marriages took 
place between relatives (Zurayek and Shorter, 1988). An anthropological 
study in a low-income area in Cairo in the early 1980's similarly shows that 
55% of marriages in that community were between relatives19 (Rugh, 1985). 
More recent surveys, indicate that the preference for marriages among 
relatives is still a common national trend. A 1991 survey reveals that 29% of 
currently married women are married to relatives, often first cousins (Nawar 
el. al, 1995). In my sample of married women, the majority also reported 
being married to relatives, araayib, but only a few to their first cousins.
The majority of married or engaged women in the study community did 
not choose, ikhtaaru, their spouse. Most marriages were "arranged", with 
family members initiating suggestions for a potential groom or bride. This is 
consistent with national level data. In a 1991 survey, the majority of currently 
married women reported not being primarily responsible for selecting their 
spouse (Nawar et al, 1995). It is important, however, to clarify that arranged 
marriages in the community studied are not synonymous with "coerced 
marriages", as is sometimes implied in the literature.
Women's attitude towards arranged marriages was a generally 
favourable one. While some may object to a particular prospective groom as 
will be discussed below, there was no objection to having their parents, 
particularly their mothers, closely involved in weighing and assessing various 
possible spouses, and negotiating with him and his parents on their behalf. 
Each marriage invariably involves its own specific dynamics, and 
suggestions of candidates are discussed at length informally by the entire 
family. A suitors economic ability, level of education, blood relations, looks, 
demonstrated sense of responsibility (does he gamble, does he drink, was he
19 The Egyptian concept of relatives, araayib, and family, cee/a, is a broad and fluid 
one, making it difficult to define what family or relatives are and leaving room for 
various individual meanings. The terms are expandable to include both nuclear 
and extended kin, and sometimes to non- kin as well with whom one is bound 
through relations of mutual obligations (See Rugh, 1984).
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financially responsible with his natal family), and place of residence, were the 
most salient characteristics discussed.
Hoodfar's study of several low-income neighbourhoods in Cairo in the 
mid-eighties suggests similar findings regarding women's attitudes towards 
"arranged marriages" and the involvement of their parents in the choice of 
spouse. She finds that women put much emphasis on having their parents 
participate in their marriage negotiations, including the choice of a spouse. 
She argues that because women are "aware of the legal and ideological 
inequality that rendered them more vulnerable both within marriage and 
within society, women increasingly favoured the involvement and consent of 
their parents, often despite their fascination with love marriages" (Hoodfar, 
1997:266).
Very few of the marriages I witnessed or was told about took place 
without this long process of informal discussions and consultations with a 
prospective bride or actually involved physical coercion. Particularly if a 
bride explicitly voices her objection to a prospective groom, persuasion and 
negotiation to seek consent commonly takes place. Physical violence, 
however, was sometimes used as a last resort. Two women in my sample 
reported being physically beaten several times by their fathers, and in one 
case a brother, in order to succumb to a marring someone to whom they were 
objecting. In both cases, the groom was a relative. In the parallel cases of a 
groom not wanting a chosen bride, some pressure is similarly put on him, but 
I did not witness and was never told of any instances where a man was 
subjected to physical violence to coerce him into a marriage.
In this context, a girl's level of education emerged as one of the most 
important variables that significantly increases her ability to choose a spouse. 
Education allows a girl to be more selective, gives her more legitimate power 
to say no to a prospective husband, particularly if his educational level is 
below hers, and enables her, and her family, to delay marriage until she 
finishes education. For most families "finishing education", meant completing 
preparatory or high school. Decisions regarding the education of girls will be
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discussed in more detail in chapter nine in the context of intra-marital 
negotiations.
The views of men--fathers, older brothers and uncles-often carry more 
weight in the final official discussions and negotiations regarding choice of a 
groom than does the opinion of their wives, or their daughters. However, 
mothers play an active role in influencing the opinions of their husbands, by 
thoroughly investigating, and reporting on, the reputation, employment 
situation, and the financial and moral qualities of any prospective groom. 
Although the choice of a prospective husband was a complicated affair, 
influenced by a variety of factors, a man's financial capabilities, yPdar yikaffi 
beetu, his ability to supply a room, or apartment, and to provide for his 
household after marriage, was often a quality that took precedence in 
negotiations.
Om Nasra, a 45 year old woman whose husband left to work in Libya 
10 years ago and rarely sends her money, emphasised the view, voiced by 
other women, that a mother must take greater care when choosing a spouse 
for her daughter, than when she is choosing a spouse for her son, istacdil li 
bintak, la tista^dil li ibnak. The essence of this popular idiom is that parents 
should never rush the marriage of a daughter, but should take time to 
meticulously investigate the credentials of the prospective spouse, and to 
carefully negotiate the terms of the marriage. For a son, this is less important 
because if a man marries and his wife turns out to be no good, mish 
kiwayyisa, explained Om Nasra, he can take another wife or divorce her.
If a man turns out to be no good, however, a woman's choices are 
much more limited. If she asks for a divorce, she may not get it as it is the 
prerogative of the husband, even though the ayma may help in enabling a 
woman to get a divorce as will be discussed later. Divorced women are also 
generally stigmatised, their reputations are often questioned, and it is more 
difficult for them to access community networks and support systems. As a 
result, Om Nasra notes bitterly, women, like herself, whose husbands are not 
"real men", mafiish marggalla, often have to tolerate their miserable 
circumstances, rather than seek a divorce:
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"I work as a dallafa, I go from house to house selling clothes 
and material which I buy at the whole sale markets in other 
communities. This is how I make a living. If I got divorced, it 
will be much more difficult for me to move in and out of the 
community or to go freely into people's houses as I do now. 
Women here fear for their husbands from divorcees".
Despite the popular advice of taking extra care in selecting a
daughter's spouse, for fear of her divorce given the well acknowledged social
and legal inequalities within marriage, this is not always adhered to. I
encountered two cases, when marriages to men not well known to the family
was rushed in a few months, with practically no protest by the bride or her
family. In both cases it was because the groom was financially ready, gaahiz,
which meant he had secured an apartment, and the required gold wedding
present, the shabka.
Within the context of these arranged marriages, however, women do
attempt to exercise some individual preference. When a prospective bride
objects to a marriage proposal, she sometimes articulates her protest overtly
to her parents. She is more likely, however, to resort to covert tactics. One
such common ploy is that of tatfiish, driving the prospective groom away.
Tatfiish, in this context, rests on the assumption that if you, as the weaker
party in the negotiations cannot say no, you get the more powerful partner to
refuse the match. Nawal, now 42, comments on her attempts at 13 to drive
away a prospective groom.
"My mother told me that they have committed me a certain man 
whom I had seen once before in my cousin's wedding, and that 
we will get engaged in a few months. I cried and said I did not 
want to get married. My parents insisted and my father beat me 
up. The man used to visit us a lot and get me presents-- 
perfume, fruit, and once a dress--, but I still felt he was a 
stranger and I did not want to marry him. I decided to try and 
drive him away, ataffisho. Before he came to visit, I would not 
take a bath and I would intentionally work in the kitchen and 
peel garlic so that I did not smell good. Every time he came to 
the house, I would wear the same dirty and smelly galabiyya, 
and would not braid my hair, but would tie it in a messy bun. 
Eventually he told my parents that he did not want to go ahead 
with the engagement, because he feels that I am not yet ready 
for.marriage, that I am too young, am still a child."
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Neamat, a 25 year old unmarried government employee, is also 
planning to use this tactic as a last resort. Her attempts over the past two 
years to convince her parents that she is uninterested in marrying a distant 
relative who has proposed to her, despite the fact that he had secured an 
apartment, have been futile. This tactic is used carefully, however, because 
it can have repercussions on a girl’s reputation in the community, as well as 
on that of her siblings and entire family. Nonetheless, my discussions 
suggest that it was considered more acceptable for a prospective groom to 
withdraw a marriage proposal, than for a prospective bride to continue 
objecting to a particular man.
Sometimes, parents themselves used tatfiish, as a diplomatic way of 
turning away a prospective husband. Om Samira, explained how her family 
drove away Samira's fiance, who is a not a relative, and to whom she was 
informally engaged for two years. Unable to afford an apartment or a 
separate room in Cairo, he had wanted Samira to move to the countryside to 
live with his family. This was an offer that neither Samira nor her mother 
found attractive as they recognise the heavy labour that a young bride living 
in a rural extended household would have to endure. Moreover, proximity to 
the parental home was a strong preference amongst both mothers and 
daughters in my sample, and was an important concern during marriage 
negotiations. Rather than saying no outright, however, Samira's parents did 
so in a way that would not offend the groom and would not imply that it is 
Samira herself who is objecting. In their negotiations, they insisted on an 
engagement present worth 70 grams of gold, which they knew the man would 
not be able to afford.
When I later discussed this account with one of Samira's neighbours, 
Magda, who is a little older and not yet married, she mentioned that Samira 
was in fact lucky. She was a pretty girl with fair skin20, and thus could afford to 
be more selective about who she marries and where she wants to live. 
Moreover, she added, Samira had finished the preparatory stage of education 
and was thus more "in demand", calleeha il ceen, by many prospective
20 This reference to skin colour is a euphemism for beauty.
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grooms. As will be discussed in chapter nine, a girl’s education is an avenue 
for a family’s social mobility and status in the community, and increases a 
girl's marriageability. Women's options to resort to an action such as tatfiish 
is thus partly shaped by other personal resources and qualities, that a bride 
may possess, such as beauty or education.
This chapter has focused on pre-marital expectations and preparations 
for marriage in the study community. Menstruation and circumcision were 
discussed as "rites of passages" as well gendering practices which serve to 
define male and female roles and bodies. The chapter has also discussed 
choice of spouse, highlighting some of the negotiations that go into that 
process. Tatfiish, was presented as one covert way in which women may 
ward off a prospective spouse in whom they are not interested. The 
discussion in this chapter has set the stage for the next chapter, which will be 
focusing on marriage transactions and negotiations in more detail.
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CHAPTER SIX 
MARRIAGE TRANSACTIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS 
"A man is to be trusted as much as a sieve is to be trusted with water"1
I was sitting on a plastic mat in the largest room of a two-story house, 
sharing a meal of lentils, molasses, dry bread and green onions with Om 
Sayed and some members of her extended family, her daughter, Om 
Mahmoud, and her grand daughter Karima. As we casually talk about 
Karima's marriage, consummated four weeks ago, Om Mahmoud proudly 
recounts, for the third time, the particulars of the fight that took place over the 
value of Karima's marriage inventory, her ayma. Om Mahmoud explains how 
she insisted that the ayma be valued at 4000 Egyptian pounds2, listing in 
great detail the various items involved, whereas the groom's family, in 
particular his older sister, protested, insisting that the maximum value her 
brother would agree to sign to was 2000 pounds.
Om Mahmoud stood firm on her demand, however. After weeks of 
negotiations-during which the threat of cancelling the wedding loomed™, the 
groom succumbed and both he and his uncle, as guarantor, signed a 4000 
pound ayma. The groom's sister, however, Om Mahmoud ends the story in a 
victorious, self-congratulatory tone, was so angry she did not even come to 
the wedding. Although I had heard this story for the third time, its importance 
to my research had not yet quite sunk in. I had heard about the ayma before, 
but had largely dismissed it as a formality, and did not realise its centrality to 
marriage transactions. Munching on a piece of dry bread dipped in 
molasses, I casually asked the women whether the ayma was an important
1 This is an Egyptian proverb invoked during my discussions of marriage 
negotiations in the community.
2 One sterling pound in 1997 was equivalent to 5.6 Egyptian pounds.
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component of marriage negotiations in this community in general, or whether
it assumed a significance in Karima's case for specific reasons. As I did not
write an ayma myself when I got married eight years ago, I continued, I did
not quite understand why Om Mahmoud made such a fuss about it, and I
wondered if they could provide an explanation. The mixture of shock, pity
and disbelief that my harmless question elicited from the three generations of
women sitting around me, was a turning point in my research. Om
Mahmoud's reaction was the most severe:
"What! You did not have an ayma? How is this possible? Are 
you living in another world? ... Do you not know your rights as a 
woman? The ayma is the only way to protect a woman from 
men and from time, (il ayma tidman ha3 il sit min il riggalla wiz- 
zamari). When you get old, who will feed you? Your husband 
will find himself a pretty, fair new bride and kick you out of the 
house, yiz^utik. Is there a house without an ayma? You were a
fool. They sold you cheap  If a woman does not have an
ayma she is considered married for free, and people would 
belittle/humiliate her, yicayruuha... It is not your fault, maybe 
you were young and naive. (Om Sayed was clearly desperately 
groping for explanations for my disgraceful behaviour, as in fact 
she knew from a previous discussion that I was married at 28, 
quite old by community standards). But what about your 
parents, what is their excuse to throw you out like that, (nasik 
mish haraam caleehom yirmuuki}? You must go and make an 
ayma immediately. Give your husband some drugs, birsham (I 
presumed she meant to make him drowsy), and let him sign an 
ayma... You must protect yourself by an ayma, an ayma 
secures a woman's rights, il ayma bitsuun haP il hurma. Men 
are not to be trusted. A man is to be trusted as much as a 
sieve is to be trusted with water, (ya nfaamin HI riggal, ya 
nfaamin lil mayya fii ghurbaal).
As I engaged in discussions in the community about marriage 
negotiations, probing more specifically into the issue of the ayma, this 
proverb was invoked by women many more times. It vividly illustrates the 
mistrust and suspicions that characterise gender relations specifically as they 
relate to marriage, which is the focus of this chapter. My aim is not to provide 
a comprehensive account of marriage negotiations in the community studied, 
capturing all the subtleties and complex dynamics that such relations entail.
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Rather, my aim is to focus on specific practices directly related to the main 
theoretical concerns of this thesis.
More general accounts of marriage in low-income communities in 
Cairo, have been provided in several other studies (see for example 
Singerman, 1995; Rugh, 1984; Hoodfar, 1997). The role of marriage in the 
Middle East as an arena for negotiating political and economic conflicts and 
the expression of competition in the wider society has also been well 
illustrated by several studies (Rugh, 1984; Tapper, 1991; Eickleman and 
Piscatori, 1996). Much of the ethnographic data presented in this chapter, 
however, focuses specifically on some important practices through which 
women attempt to negotiate their impending conjugal contracts3 in a context 
of poverty and high rates of male unemployment. I have chosen to focus 
specifically on two related practices which emerged as most salient in 
providing women in the study community with bargaining power in their 
marriages: the marriage inventory, the ayma, and the trousseau, the gihaaz.
Personal status laws in Egypt grant men a range of rights over women 
in marriage which expose wives to various sorts of vulnerabilities. These 
include men's rights to unilateral divorce, the right to marry up to four wives, 
and the right to forcefully return a wife to a marital home, the "house of 
obedience" law, beet il taa^a (See Minces, 1982; Zulficar, 1993). As the 
chapter will demonstrate, however, these rights gain specific meanings and 
are contested differently in different socio-economic and historical contexts. 
An elucidation of the practices of the ayma and gihaaz as objects of 
negotiation as well as women's perspectives on them, illustrates how women 
consciously seek to expand their options and protect themselves, and their 
children, from the publicly acknowledged perils of men, as husbands. They 
further illustrate how wives seek to increase their security financially in a 
context where men are either unwilling or unable to provide for them. The 
ayma and gihaaz are closely related to women's options in the informal
3 The term conjugal contract was first used by Whitehead (1981) to highlight the 
duties, roles and responsibilities that structures the relations between husband 
and wife.
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labour market. As will be discussed in the chapter to follow, accumulating a 
sizeable gihaaz is one of the most important reasons why women seek paid 
employment.
An Overview of Marriage Protocols:4
Marriage conventions and protocols in the community varied largely 
along religious lines. Among Muslims, who constituted the overwhelming 
majority, marriage negotiations typically underwent four stages, once an 
appropriate spouse was selected. The first stage, the formal declaration of 
intent, is signalled by both families getting together and reading the opening 
verse of the Quran, iraayit il fat-ha. This is considered an informal 
engagement, and is usually referred to as khutuuba, engagement. The 
reading of the fat-ha, which usually takes place at the bride's residence, is 
often preceded by many negotiations, regarding the timing of the following 
three stages: the formal engagement, shabka, the official religious ceremony, 
katb il kitaab, and the consummation of the marriage, il dukhla.5 The financial 
commitments of both families are worked out, and agreed upon, at this stage, 
although they may remain the subjects of disagreements and renegotiations 
for many months afterwards.
The formal signature of the marriage contract and the religious 
ceremony, katb il kitaab, sometimes takes place at the same time as the 
shabka, the formal engagement party, and sometimes at the time of the 
consummation of the wedding, leilit il dukhla.6 In situations, where an 
engagement is expected to be long, there is a preference for signing the 
marriage contract at the time of the shabka, as this enables couples to
4 Marriage conventions, negotiations, and prestations have long occupied a central 
place in anthropology. Discussions about the meanings of marriage payments, 
and the exchange functions of marriage, have been the subject of much debate 
and research. Some of the seminal works include Goody and Tambiah (1973) and 
Comaroff (1980). Because my research is not on marriage transactions and 
conventions per se, but rather more specifically on women's options and strategies 
within marriage arrangements, I do not review this literature here.
5 Sometimes these stages are condensed into three, with the shabka merged with 
either the fat-ha, or with the katb il kitaab.
6 The dukhla will be discussed in some detail in the following chapter.
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associate more freely. Long engagements are becoming increasingly 
common, as families need time to amass the necessary "marriage capital", or 
want to wait for a girl to complete her education (see also Singerman, 1995). 
The engagement party is usually paid for by the bride's family, and the 
wedding party by the groom's family, although families sometimes share the 
expenses of both events.
Discussions between families take on the tone of financial 
transactions, from the very first stage of marriage negotiations, with the 
usage of commercial terms like buying a bride, bayFha, or selling a bride, 
.shariiha, to express degrees of a prospective spouse's commitment to a 
marriage. The term "selling a bride" indicates that a groom and his family are 
not really committed to the marriage, whereas the term "buying a bride" 
suggests seriousness and willingness to invest financially in the marriage. 
Typically a groom must provide the marital home, and a present of gold, also 
referred to as a shabka, and the bedroom furnishings. The average 
acceptable shabka in the community studied ranged between 500-1500 
pounds, and typically consisted of one or two 21-carat gold bracelets and a 
gold wedding band.
A particularly expensive type of shabka, the unattainable dream of all 
the women I talked to, was known as shabka shabah, literally "ghost shabka", 
and consisted of two thick and elaborately decorated golden bracelets 
costing about 1,200LE each. The name ghost, "shabah" is particularly 
interesting to note. It refers to the nickname given by Egyptians to the top of 
the line Mercedes car in Egypt, which costs over LE 600,000. A "ghost" 
Mercedes car, so named because of its speed, is the ultimate status, prestige 
and wealth symbol of the nouveau riche in Egypt. While acquiring a "ghost" 
Mercedes may be a sign of social mobility and a status marker for Egypt’s 
upper classes, acquiring a "ghost" shabka is a sign of social mobility and a 
status symbol for the less privileged classes.
In addition to the shabka, the groom is typically expected to provide an 
apartment, or more commonly a room or two, as well as the bedroom 
furnishings, and the cotton filling for upholstery of sofas and chairs, if there is
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a parlour or living room. The actual material for the upholstery, is usually the 
responsibility of the bride. Securing a room or an apartment is not always 
possible, however, given the high cost of housing in Cairo, and new couples 
sometimes start the first years of their married lives in the parental household 
of the groom, or less commonly, in the parental household of the bride. The 
furniture for the rooms other than the bedroom and kitchen equipment is open 
to negotiation, but, as will be discussed later, is increasingly becoming the 
responsibility of the bride as part of her trousseau, gihaaz.
The dower, mahr, the payment of the groom's family of an agreed upon 
sum of money, is part of marriage negotiations among Muslims in other 
communities in Egypt (see Rugh, 1984; Singerman, 1995). The mahr is an 
Islamic convention with a fixed meaning according to shariFa laws which 
stipulate that a groom's father give the bride a cash payment. The mahr has 
accordingly been rigidly conceptualised as a "dower" in anthropological 
accounts. However, the mahr was not prevalent in the community I studied, 
suggesting that in practice it is a much more fluid and historically specific 
institution than is commonly portrayed7.
Marriage transactions, of which the mahr is a part, appear to have 
been adapted in response to broader socio-economic changes, as will be 
discussed later. Only a few women, usually older ones who got married in 
rural areas, reported receiving a cash mahr. Many women explained that the 
mahr was part of the marriage negotiations of financially better off people, il 
naas il mabsuuta, but it was not part of the practices of the very poor, il naas il 
ghalaaba, like themselves. The more common arrangement in the study 
community, already referred to, was that the groom (and/or his family), would 
directly purchase some of the furnishings and durable equipment for the 
marital home.
Financial arrangements varied, however, depending partly on the 
characteristics of a bride and groom, and the relationships between the
7 See Moors (1991) for a comparison of the changing meanings of marriage and the 
mahr in a village in Palestine in the 1930's and the 1980's. Her study similarly 
points to the variability in the meaning of the mahr.
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families. In one instance, a very poor man agreed to marry the daughter of a 
merchant who was known to be slightly mentally retarded, on the condition 
that he does not pay anything and that the bride's family covers all marriage 
expenses. In another case, an illiterate man in his fourties who had 
nonetheless amassed reasonable wealth as a construction worker in Saudi 
Arabia proposed to a 19 year old who had just obtained a high school 
diploma. Although both she and her family initially refused, they eventually 
agreed when the man suggested that he assume all the engagement and 
marriage costs.
For Copts, who constituted about 7% of my research sample, marriage 
negotiations typically undergo two stages: the formal engagement, nus ikliil, 
also referred to as khutuuba, and the signature of the marriage contract, ikliil. 
Both are religious contracts and ceremonies, and take place in church. For 
the nus ikliil, a formal contract is signed by the bride and groom, two 
witnesses and the priest. Breaking an engagement is thus more difficult for 
Copts than it is for Muslims, and requires formal procedures, including the 
signatures of the same two witnesses who signed the engagement contract 
and of the priest on a new document. The formal engagement contract is the 
basis on which the church issues the permission for marriage.
The marriage contract, ikliil, is also signed by a witnesses and a priest 
and normally kept in the church. Unlike, Muslims, divorce is extremely difficult 
for Copts, and requires the written approval of the church. The only two 
acceptable grounds for a divorce are adultery, and conversion to another sect 
or religion. Because of the difficulty of divorce among Copts, several women 
told me that the church is now insisting that couples undergo blood tests to 
ensure freedom from major health problems, before granting permission for a 
marriage.
There were many similarities in the financial arrangements of marriage 
transactions among Muslims and Copts. As with Muslims, a shabka is an 
essential component of the Coptic engagement. The value of the shabka, 
however, is written into the engagement contract, and gets automatically 
transferred to the marriage contract, unless the engagement is broken.
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Because a certain percentage of the value of the shabka goes to the church 
when it issues authorisation for the marriage, most people do not declare its 
real value. As with Muslims, a Coptic husband is generally expected to 
provide the apartment, the difference being that women are expected to 
provide bedroom furnishings. Provision of other furniture and kitchen 
equipment is open to more flexible negotiation. Once formally engaged, 
shabka or nus ikliil, both Muslims and Copts are expected to present their 
fiancee and her family with occasional gifts of fruit, meat, and clothes.
The above accounts of marriage transactions, however, refer only to 
first time marriages. Re-marriage of divorcees challenges some of the ideal 
marriage conventions described above. Marriage negotiations for a divorced 
woman deviate significantly from those of first time "virgin" marriages. There 
were four divorcees in my sample of 59 once married women. Two had 
remarried, and two were single. Of the single divorcees, one had gone back 
to live in her parent’s home, which was in the same community. This was the 
most accepted practice particularly if a woman has younger children. The 
other divorcee lived on her own with her teenage son and daughter after 
physically dividing a two room flat with her ex-husband, who remarried. She 
was an older woman in her fifties and her parents were still living in Upper 
Egypt. All four male divorcees had remarried.
When a divorced woman remarries, she is generally expected to do so 
without any financial demands from the groom; normally a groom is neither 
expected to provide a shabka, an apartment nor furniture. This was the case 
with the two divorcees in my sample who re-married. Community attitudes 
regarding divorcees and the expressed fear of divorce discussed in the 
previous chapter, thus partly reflect material concerns. They are fears based 
on both loss of "honour" or bringing "shame" to a family as well as on 
economic calculations. Parents realise that in case of remarriage, a divorcee
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has very little power in future financial negotiations. No longer a virgin8, a 
woman loses an essential symbolic resource, virginity, which reduces her 
claims on her prospective husband. One of my interviewees explained why 
she does not want her daughter to marry a particular man who was known to 
be on drugs: "I cannot trust him, I am afraid he will take her a virgin and 
throw her out a non-virgin, yitgawwizha bint, wa yirmiiha mara."
Moreover, divorced women and their children are expected to return 
and live in their natal home. This constitutes a financial burden on a woman's 
natal family leading to possible downward social mobility. Although 
husbands may continue to provide some financial support, all my accounts 
and observations suggest that a divorced women must supplement such 
support, through either drawing on her own natal family's resources, or 
working to generate an income herself.
The attitude of married and single women towards divorcees was often 
that of suspicion and caution, as Om Nasra's comments quoted earlier 
illustrate.9 These attitudes, however, are I think less related to concerns 
about their reputations, and more to the fact that divorcees have little 
financial claims over prospective husbands. Divorced women are thus 
attractive candidates to take on as co-wives, particularly given the high cost 
of marriages.10 One man, an impoverished 30 year old construction worker, 
told me that he would actually prefer to marry a divorced woman, particularly
8 The rhetoric of female virginity occupies a central place in Egyptian culture in 
general. The hymen is sometimes referred to as wish il bint, the "face of the girl". 
This analogy with the face, which a identifies a girl vividly denotes the importance 
of female virginity. A girl without a face has no identity or place in the community 
(Khattab, 1996). Issues surrounding proof of virginity in the study community will 
be discussed in the following chapter.
9 Unlike divorcees, widows are generally not expected by community standards to 
remarry, and thus are less feared by other women.
10 The costs of marriages have skyrocketed over the past two decades, as a result 
of the dramatic increase in the cost of housing, as well as the cost of living 
generally as discussed in chapter two. Noting the large capital investments that 
marriages now require, Singerman concludes that: "the struggle to marry off 
children... is the single most concerted financial and social effort that every family 
with children confronted" (Singerman, 1995:109). Although Singerman's 
meticulous economic data suggests that her respondents were economically much 
better off than my sample, many of her observations are nonetheless relevant.
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if she has everything on her ayma from a previous marriage, as there is no 
way he could amass the necessary capital for marrying a virgin.
Frictions in Marriage Negotiations: The "Materiality of Reputation"
Singerman (1995) highlights the importance of marriage in popular 
neighbourhoods of Cairo, revealing the extent of financial and emotional 
capital that is committed to this process. She argues that the family in 
popular quarters of Cairo is a central institution that not only guarantees 
social security, and access to resources, but that it fills a political vacuum as 
well. In the context of an authoritarian state which provides little opportunity 
for political participation in formal politics, the family provides an important 
avenues of participation in the public sphere. Her study provides a detailed 
description of the role that familial and informal networks play in advancing 
people's individual and collective interests, ranging from securing a good 
education, finding a job, to gaining access to subsidised goods, or migrating.
Marriage was similarly a central concern in my study community, and 
negotiations, particularly over finances, extended over many months and 
were often fraught with tensions. Unresolved tensions sometimes caused 
conflicts and struggles between families that were remembered for years 
afterwards. Marriage negotiations are not individual matters, since what is at 
stake is the status, prestige and reputations of the two families concerned. 
When conflicts take place, disagreements quickly become public, with 
community members either taking sides or attempting to arbitrate. Such 
public disagreements are carefully orchestrated, however, as the reputation 
of both families are on the line. The following example of the frictions during 
a marriage negotiation illustrates the types of issues that arise during such 
conflicts. It also illustrates a more general theoretical point regarding 
reputation as a material resource among low-income groups, or what may be 
termed the "materiality of reputation".
Hoda, 25 years old, has been engaged to her neighbour for the past 
five years. Because they have not yet secured an apartment or any furniture, 
setting a date for the katb il kitaab, has been delayed, much to the
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disappointment of Hoda and her parents. Hoda's father is a labourer in a 
local bakery and her mother works as a piece-worker sewing leather shoes 
for a nearby workshop. Hoda's parents were getting particularly anxious 
about the delay in marriage because her fiancee' visits regularly and they 
feared that people would start gossiping. Even though Hoda, pressured by 
her fiancee', had quit her job as a wage labourer in a jewellery workshop 
three years ago, she still had a problematic work history. She had to go out 
of the community to work on a daily basis since she was 13 years old and 
thus her reputation was particularly fragile.
On one of my many visits to Hoda's family, I found the entire extended 
family in terrible distress due to a fight that broke out in the street the 
previous night between Hoda's mother and her prospective mother-in-law. 
The fight was apparently triggered by a discussion between the two women, 
during which Hoda's mother-in-law announced, in a purposefully loud voice 
overheard by neighbours, that her son will be unable to provide Hoda with a 
separate apartment. If she wanted to go ahead with the marriage, Hoda 
would thus have to live in one of the rooms in their apartment. Moreover, she 
continued, in the same loud voice, they also could not afford to get the fancy, 
makhsuus, bedroom suite (which consists of three pieces and costs almost 
4000 pounds) and so Hoda would have to settle for the ordinary one (which 
costs about 1,500-2000 Egyptian pounds).
Hoda's mother could not contain her anger as this offer, announced 
publicly, was "below their standard or status", mish imitna; it was insulting and 
offensive. Soon the two women engaged in a screaming match in the street. 
Hoda's mother-in-law started smearing Hoda's reputation, insinuated that 
Hoda was not a virgin; she was "soiled merchandise", and her mother should 
have her checked out by a physician. Other members of both families, as 
well as neighbours, were soon dragged into the fight. Hoda's two unmarried 
sisters insisted that she break off the engagement immediately, as not doing 
so would mean that she accepted their accusations of not being a virgin, thus 
bringing shame to the entire family. Although enraged herself, Om Hoda, 
however, was not willing to break the engagement so easily:
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"They are saying these things, so that we get angry and break 
off the engagement first, nikrah, and thus we have to return 
Hoda's shabka. I refuse to give them back the shabka. if they 
want to break the engagement, then they do it, because then 
they will have no claim over the shabka. I had an engagement 
party that cost 800 pounds and I paid for it from my own work. I 
insisted on having a big engagement party so that people know 
that my daughter is valuable, imit-ha calya. I made a detailed 
list of all the expenses incurred in the party, however in case a 
day like this may come. If they want the shabka, then they have 
to pay me back every piaster I paid on the engagement 
celebration."
Accusations and arbitration continued over two months, during which 
Hoda's marriage negotiations were the subject of much speculation and 
gossip. Eventually Om Hoda's family sent word that they no longer wanted 
the engagement, but that they were nonetheless keeping the shabka. This 
was not contested by Hoda's in-laws, a critical fact that Om Hoda made sure 
that everyone knew about, as it constituted a type of public apology. By 
keeping the shabka, even though they were the ones who broke the 
engagement, and by making this public, Om Hoda explained to me, she had 
ensured that her daughter's reputation, and thus her marriageability, had not 
been compromised by this nasty incident. Ten months later, the two families 
were still not on talking terms. Hoda had sold the shabka and bought two 
rings and a golden pendant-which she conspicuously displayed to her 
neighbours--, and had gone back to her job in the jewellery workshop.
The centrality and more specifically, the materiality of reputation in 
the lives of the poor is well illustrated by this incident. "Poor people have 
nothing but their reputation", their surrfa, was a term I heard often during my 
fieldwork. Reputation in this community, however, is much more than a moral 
issue, as it may be in more middle or upper class communities. Protecting a 
family's reputation--in Hoda's case, publicly affirming her virginity and thus 
the honour of the family-, is not only an individual issue or one of morality, 
but an issue of economic survival. Reputation is an essential symbolic 
resource that determines one's entire livelihood: getting a job, getting
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married, and being part of the community's networks that are critical for 
ensuring a decent livelihood.
A wide range of economic exchanges, such as getting a loan, buying 
on credit, finding a job, making a "good" marriage, accessing scarce food 
commodities from the black market, obtaining a ration or identity card, or 
registering a child in school, depends on reputation. For poor households, 
survival is based not just on the income of different members of the 
household, but on a much wider network of durable relationships of sharing, 
exchange and mutual help. "Survival in our world", explained one of my 
interviewees, "is based on reciprocal relations of lending and borrowing, id- 
dunya salaf wi deen". The notion of "mutual indebtedness" as a concept 
underlying social relations in this community comes through clearly in this 
idiom. (See White, 1994, for a discussion of a similar concept in urban 
working class communities in Turkey). Reputation is of particular relevance 
to women who actively seek to engage in informal networks of mutual 
assistance so as to secure their livelihoods and increase their ability to 
negotiate in the marital union, as will be discussed in chapter nine.
The strength of a household does not only depend on the economic 
capital its members possess, but on its "symbolic" capital as well (Bourdieu. 
1990). In a context of material deprivation, and in a situation where 
patronage ties mediate access to resources, and where dealings with the 
state bureaucracy requires not only skill and money, but more importantly 
mediation through personal relations, wasta, the only possible form of 
accumulation becomes that of accumulating "symbolic capital"11. Bourdieu 
defines "symbolic capital", as material capital "misrecognized", i.e.: assets 
like public acknowledgement, recognition honour, and so fourth. He argues 
that in many societies, "the interests at stake in the conducts of honour is one 
for which economism has no name and which has to be called symbolic, 
although it is such as to inspire actions that are very directly material...
11 See Singerman (1995) for a detailed exposition of the role that informal networks 
and patronage play in Cairo's popular neighbourhoods. The roles of some 
informal female networks will also be discussed in chapter nine.
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Conducts of honour, no longer seem as the product of obedience to rules of 
submission to values (which they also are since they are experienced as 
such, but as the product of a more or less conscious pursuit of the 
accumulation of symbolic capital" (1990:121). An appreciation of the 
“materiality of reputation” allows one to better understand the negotiations 
surrounding marriages in the study community.
The Marriage Inventory: "The Ayma Handcuffs a Man"
Within the context of marriage transactions and protocols described 
above, the ayma, marriage inventory, emerged as a critical component. As 
the anecdote at the beginning of this chapter reveals, the ayma is a practice 
that I stumbled upon in my discussions and I was unprepared to deal with 
how strongly women felt about its value. Indeed, the ayma has remained 
largely unexplored in anthropological accounts of the Egyptian family, 
including recent studies addressing marriage arrangements in Cairo in great 
detail (such as the Singerman study referred to earlier).
The ayma, which literally means inventory or list in Arabic, is used 
specifically to refer to a written document on which all items of furniture and 
equipment belonging to the new home are recorded and itemised, stipulating 
that these are the sole property of the bride. These items include the goods 
contributed by the bride, those contributed by the groom, and the items they 
receive jointly as gifts. The ayma is thus an inventory of marital property, 
which sometimes also includes the shabka.
Mutually agreed upon in advance, often after tough negotiations, the 
ayma is signed by the groom, before or on the day of the katb il kitaab, as 
well as by two witnesses who act as guarantors, in case he defaults on any 
commitments. The negotiations centre on deciding on the monetary value of 
the ayma, with the bride's family usually attempting to inflate its value. By 
signing on the ayma, a husband officially declares that he has received all 
these items for safe keeping. However, they remain the property of his wife, 
which she can claim back anytime she wants during the marriage or in the 
event of a conflict, of widowhood or of divorce. This stipulation is enforceable
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both legally and through informal community arbitration. Once singed, the 
ayma is carefully guarded by women, and is in safekeeping with the bride's 
family, usually the mother, to ensure that the husband does not have access 
to it.
There is some variation in how an ayma is formalised and the types of 
items that are included in it. Variations appeared to be based on both socio­
economic standing and regional origin. Most of the women in the community 
studied, tended to include equipment and furniture as well as the value of the 
gold of the shabka. Some women, particularly those who were relatively less 
well to do, also included breakable and exhaustible items like glasses, china 
sets, and bed linen, whereas others confined their ayma to durable items and 
furniture. Several women in the sample, who identified themselves as 
masriyyiin, not fallahiin or Sa^ayda of recent rural origin, emphasised that 
they would never include the value of the shabka into the ayma and that it 
was only the fallahiin who did that.
In most ayma(s), each item is detailed separately and is assigned a 
monetary value, which is often inflated. The value of all the items are then 
added up to make up the total value of the ayma. A few families preferred not 
to assign a monetary value to each item, but simply described the item in 
detail, noting such things as the type of wood used and the brand of the 
implement, explaining that this protected them against inflation. Once the 
ayma is acted upon in case of a marital dispute, a monetary value can be 
assigned to the items, based on current market prices.
The value of ayma(s) in the community varied tremendously, from a 
modest 50 Egyptian pounds, to 8,000 pounds. Some of this variation is, of 
course, a reflection of the date of marriage, since I interviewed women who 
were married within a span of 40 years. However, it is also important to note 
that the value of the ayma is not necessarily a good indicator of socio­
economic status, as in many cases, some of the items included have not 
actually been provided, or their value has intentionally been inflated. For 
marriages which took place within the past two years, a typical ayma, which 
included a gold shabka of 40 grams of gold, was about 4000 pounds.
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The ayma is usually formally negotiated by men, generally fathers,
uncles or older brothers of the bride, but informally it is the women, generally
mothers, aunts or older sisters of the bride who decide on the items to be
included and on their value. As Om Nasra put it:
"When it comes to negotiations over an ayma, it is the women 
who needle and prompt, and the men who do the formal talking, 
ilsitat bit wiz wil riggaala bititkaflim.”
The ayma is not a stipulation of Islamic law, and although it has legal 
standing as will be seen later, it has no explicit basis in state legislation, but 
is based on customary law, curf. The history of the ayma, when and how it 
was actually introduced is difficult to trace. Although women were not aware 
of the origin of the ayma, many, but not all, of the older women I interviewed 
(in their 60's) recalled having an ayma in their marriages, but were not sure 
whether their own mothers also had one.
Although the importance of the ayma was uncontested among the 
women I interviewed, it appears to have taken on a new significance in more 
recent marriages in the community. As a central component of marriage 
negotiations, the ayma operates within the framework of specific rights and 
obligations enshrined by prevalent gender ideologies. Moore (1994) terms 
these local customary and standard understandings of the rights and needs 
of different types of people, local theories of entitlement. She argues that 
they are fluid, always subject to contestation, as well as "resources which are 
drawn up on in the process of negotiation" (Moore, 1994:104). Discussions 
with several generations of women in the study community suggest that "local 
theories of entitlement" may be changing, giving greater centrality to the 
ayma, partly in response to broader societal changes. Some of these 
changes, such as the dramatic increase in the cost of living which has been 
unmatched by increases in male wages and employment opportunities, are 
altering women and men's relationship to, and expectations of, marriage.
The strong words that women used to convey why and how the ayma 
works to control and check male power, reveals that the ayma articulates a
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local discourse about female vulnerability in marriage. Amal who is newly
married, talks with great pride about her ayma.
"My ayma was large, it was for 7000 pounds. I have hand 
cuffed/tied up by husband with it, katiftu biiha. We put things in 
it that were not even there, like the television and a video. And 
he signed for them. This way he is
restricted/controlled/condemned, mahkuum, he cannot play 
with his tail, yifab bideelu. (This is an Arabic idiom generally 
implying illicit extra-marital affairs), or get married and get co­
wife to live with me."
Karima, 32 years old and married and with three pre-school children explains
why her ayma is important:
"It is important so that he does not throw me out to my father's 
house after he takes what he wants from me, ghiyyitu (meaning 
sexual pleasure). I have a hold on him with an ayma, but 
without an ayma there is no rope with which I can tie him, mafiih 
habl rabtaah biih. Any time he can tell me to go out with my 
galabiyya (traditional dress for women in low-income areas). An 
ayma protects a woman’s rights, bitihfaz haP il sit Otherwise 
how can a woman ensure her rights, tidman ha^aha izzaay?
Men, as a kind, cannot be trusted, sanf el riggaala maluush 
aman.
Shocked that I could even ask whether she had an ayma, Laila, whose
parents migrated to Cairo from lower Egypt when she was a few months old,
confirmed that she wrote an ayma, emphasised its role in protecting women's
rights in marriage, and detailed some of its items:
"How can a girl marry without an ayma, if she does, she can be 
kicked out of the house any second. Her husband would have 
no incentive to try and get her back from her parent’s house 
when there is a conflict and she is upset. The ayma is even 
more important than the deferred dower, Muakhkhar12, for 
safeguarding/ensuring a woman’s rights, damaan ha3 il sit, to 
restrict/control a man, aalashan il ragil y itfa  mahkuum. On my 
ayma, which was for 3500 pounds, I wrote all the things that 
both he and I got, from the bedroom, to the aluminium sets to 
the spice rack."
12 The late payment is a sum of money that is written into the Muslim marriage 
contract and which the bride is entitled to in case of divorce.
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Laila then told me the story of her neighbour, Om Muhammed, whose 
husband divorced her without informing her, ghiyaabi, when she was in the 
village visiting her family. When she came back, she found that he had sold 
most of the furniture, had married someone else, and was now living with her 
in another community. She issued a complaint at the police station and her 
husband was eventually arrested. He returned some of the furniture, but was 
not able to provide the rest or to pay the remaining value of the LE4000 
ayma. He received a three- month prison term. While this only partly helped 
Om Mohamed, Laila continued emphatically, it nonetheless sent a strong 
message to other men in the community about how they should treat their 
wives.
The ayma appears to be used in various ways and gains different 
meanings in different marriage negotiations. It was sometimes used to screen 
potential grooms, or to improve a family's social status by showing off a 
daughter's value. The greater the value of the ayma, which is always public 
knowledge, the greater the status that the bride and her family acquire. 
Negotiations and transactions regarding the ayma thus seem to partly serve 
as a means for creating or reinforcing social ranking and distinctions amongst 
families. The possible role of the ayma as a form of insurance against 
women's vulnerability in marriage, however, is what is most relevant to my 
interests here. The next section will elaborate upon this argument.
The Ayma in Practice: A Damage Control Mechanism?
The ayma is a local practice, which women appear to be using to 
safeguard their entitlement and rights within marriage, as understood by 
them, in a specific context of urban poverty where women's breadwinner 
status is becoming a fact of life. Realising that they are disadvantaged in the 
marital union, women are taking explicit measures to "up the stakes" of being 
abandoned or mistreated. Some of the prerogatives of men that an ayma 
aims at restricting are the threat of divorce, the threat of being thrown out of 
the house, and the threat of being forced to accept a co-wife. The ayma was 
also used to force a husband to take marital conflicts more seriously and
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attempt to resolve them, as well as to force a husband to divorce a woman, if 
she asks for it.
Reducing the husband's options in terms of taking on a second co- 
habitating wife was mentioned several times as one of the situations where 
an ayma can be invoked. Ostensibly, this was singled out as the main source 
of resentment: not that a husband could take another wife, but that the co­
wife could be made to share the house. Om Samir explains:
"I do not care if he married someone else as long as she does 
not bring her here to use my gihaaz, the things on my ayma, 
and as long as my husband is making my life comfortable 
(meaning largely financially). With an ayma, it is more difficult 
for a man to remarry, because he can find himself penniless, 
ca/a HI balata, if he has to get the furniture and equipment for 
another house."
On probing further, however, it became clear that in fact, the ayma is
used as a means to support women's desire to deter a husband from taking a
second wife, co-habitating or otherwise. Women realise that finding another
apartment or room and furnishing it is so expensive that a man can rarely
marry a second wife unless his first wife accepts co-habitation. Women
clearly believed the ayma serves as an important deterrent against polygyny.
Although polygyny is legally allowed, in practice its rate is lower than 2% in
Egypt. In my sample, there was only one polygynous marriage. Could these
strategies be working after all?
The significance of the ayma, however, goes beyond ensuring a fair
deal if divorce occurs, providing economic security for the future, or warding
off the threat of a divorce or a co-wife. Perhaps just as importantly, it is used
as a bargaining device, throughout the marriage. It enables women to monitor
their husband's behaviour and help ensure that they do not default on their
main responsibilities as economic providers. Mayada's grandmother, a
woman in her seventies, explains:
"the ayma is important not just to ensure a woman's rights if 
there is a divorce or a dispute, but it is also important to correct 
a man if he becomes deviant, ifawag (literally bent), or mish 
maashycalatuul, not walking straight.
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On probing what itcawag meant, it appeared to centre on the man's 
responsibility to provide for his household. Mayada's husband's behaviour 
was pointed out as an example of inappropriate behaviour that reference to 
the ayma was able to address. Even though Mayada is newly married and 
pregnant with her first child, her husband, Ragab, has stopped providing for 
her and spends a lot of his time gambling and drinking. Mayada and her 
husband had a fight last month, during which he told her that if she did not 
like his behaviour she could leave.
In response, Mayada's entire extended family intervened, insisting that 
she should divorce, because her husband's behaviour was unacceptable, 
and demanding that he pay them the value of the ayma, estimated at 
LE10,000, almost double the real value of the furniture and equipment listed. 
After a few days of negotiations and discussions, Mayada's husband came to 
his senses, cPil. He now gives Mayada money regularly and no longer 
spends all his wages on drinking. The family knew that Ragab had a 
reputation as a gambler, which is one of the reasons they had insisted on a 
large ayma. It is noteworthy however, that part of the reason why the ayma 
was effective in this case is because Mayada and her husband were living 
with her extended family of 14 people, and that the entire family was united in 
its decision.
Reda, a piece-worker originally from Tanta in Lower Egypt, expressed 
deep sorrow for me because I did not have an ayma, since this implied that I 
had no security in my marriage. I was living barakawi (from baraka, meaning 
as a fatalist relying on good luck, with no strategies or plans for the future). 
This is the worst situation for a woman to be in, she emphasised. Reda views 
the ayma as a way to wear a man out, make his throat dry (tinashif rip il 
raagil), so that divorce is not that easy for him. She was married two years 
ago and her ayma was valued at LE 6000. Although she has had no conflicts 
with her husband so far, so that the question of the ayma never arose 
between them, she explained that it was important to her sister Somaya who 
got married 6 years ago, and whose husband divorced her last year because
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she was unable to conceive. She got back all the furniture and equipment,
some of which he had provided.
Stressing how the ayma may protect some women, Mohsen, one of the
few men I conducted in-depth interviews with and a relative of Mayada's,
confirmed its importance as both a deterrent against a husband's
misbehaviour, as well as a negotiating tool in disagreements between
spouses. He recounted the story of a woman who lives near by and who
wanted a divorce on the grounds that her husband was asking her for
"improper" sexual acts, and was forcing her to have anal sex. Her husband
denied it, but she was adamant that a doctor examine her to confirm her
complaints. After much arbitration by the elders of both families, an informal
process of negotiations termed taraadi, her husband agreed to divorce her.
They divided the items on the ayma between them, and she kept the shabka.
Amal, 27 years old, and divorced last year, also recounts how the
ayma enabled her to pressure her husband into divorcing her. She had
signed her marriage contract 2 years ago, but the actual consummation of the
marriage was scheduled for a year later. Her husband, however, had
accepted a large ayma, detailed in table (2), when they signed the marriage
contract, although they had not yet provided most of the items listed. Amal
explained that her mother insisted on an inflated ayma so as to secure Amal's
future because her husband, who was from a different neighbourhood, did not
have a secure job and was of a lower socio-economic standard.
Six months after signing the marriage contract, Amal's husband began
going out with another woman in public, no longer gave Amal any presents,
and began maltreating and hitting her. The family insisted that he divorce
Amal, but he refused unless he was paid 1000 pounds in return, it was at this
point that Amal and her mother went to a lawyer and issued a complaint in
court, presented a copy of Amal's original ayma, and accused her husband of
selling the items on it, a criminal offence known in the legal system as
squandering movables, tabdiid manqulaat Om Amal recalls:
"When he was unable to produce the items on the ayma, the 
judge sentenced him to 6 months imprisonment. He then 
entered into negotiations with us and we struck a deal, whereby 
we agreed to give up our rights, nitnaazil, if he divorces Amal
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immediately. This process took about six months and we paid 
200 pounds for the lawyer. If it was not for the ayma, we would 
have never been able to make him divorce Amal, and she would 
have remained at his mercy and miserable, miscFiiha H dabaab.
As I talked to more women and witnessed discussions about marriage 
arrangements, I began to realise that the ayma offered more than a local 
idiom for expressing women's views about power relations within marriage. It 
was also an important tool for women to secure their marriage, ward off the 
looming threat of divorce, and provide them with financial stability.
Nonetheless, a woman has to choose her battles carefully so as to 
decide strategically at which point the ayma may be invoked or used. Once 
the ayma is presented in court, the original document must be submitted (as 
will be discussed later). Once a settlement takes place, a woman loses 
recourse to her ayma for use in future marital negotiations, should she decide 
to continue with the marriage. Some women thus prefer to settle out of court. 
As an insurance policy for securing women's rights in the conjugal union -- 
clearly perceived as an essential part of life, but nonetheless as a high risk 
proposition-, the ayma thus has some inherent limitations.
There are also other possible limitations to the ayma as a deterrent or 
damage control mechanism. These are partly related to the possible 
breakdown and fragmentation of the normative pressures and moral 
community needed for the enforcement of the ayma. Although set in an urban 
context, most of my sample consisted of first generation migrants to the city, 
who still maintained close knit relationships with relatives and had brought 
with them to Cairo many of their customary forms of conflict resolution. With 
the dispersion of the community over the years, however, some of these 
relationships and structures may become more fragmented and forms of 
customary pressure by family elders may break down. The possible 
challenges by emerging conservative forces of the legal standing of the 
ayma, as will be seen later in the chapter, may pose a further limitation to its 
effectiveness.
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The ayma was only practised among my Muslim respondents. Copts 
did not have an ayma, partly perhaps because divorce is generally not 
allowed by the Coptic church and marriage is a sacrament, rather than a 
contractual arrangement as is the case in Islam. Another reason may be that 
the underlying property regime in Coptic marriages is that of joint property of 
spouses, whereas in Muslim marriages, separation of property/goods, known 
as zimma maaliyya munfasila, is the underlying principle. This difference 
adds another layer of complexity to understanding women's options. It 
reveals how, even within similar socio-economic locations, there is significant 
variation in men's and women's negotiating options due to variations in the 
marriage practices of different religious communities. Since the ayma's 
value, however, goes far beyond deterring easy divorce and is used more 
generally to contest unacceptable actions by husbands throughout a 
marriage, more research is needed to investigate more carefully Coptic 
women's corresponding marital strategies. The stipulations of the ayma are 
enforceable through both informal and formal mechanisms. In order to better 
understand how the ayma is enforced legally, I conducted interviews with two 
lawyers from the community, who had personally been involved in several 
cases related to the ayma.
Enforcing the Stipulations of the Ayma: A Legal Debate
Interestingly, my interviews indicated that legally the ayma falls under
commercial transactions and contracts and is part of criminal law, rather than
the personal status law which regulates marriage and divorce. Mr. Mahmoud,
one of the lawyers explains:
"Ayma cases fall under the same category as defaulting on a 
commercial transaction such as writing invalid cheques. Thus it 
is treated as both a criminal offence, which can result in 
imprisonment, as well as a civil offence which results in a fine.
This is unlike the deferred dower, mu^akhkhar, which is only a 
civil offence and thus does not entail imprisonment. Women 
can raise a complaint through two mechanisms: either issuing a 
written complaint at the police station, or a direct appeal in 
court. It is considered a misdemeanour, gunha, or squandering, 
tabdiid amaana. As a legal document, the ayma falls under 
safekeeping contracts, cuPuud il amaana, stipulated under
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clauses 340 and 341, in the criminal laws, and is thus 
considered a direct misdemeanour, gunha mubashra.
The second lawyer confirmed the legality of the ayma, as a
commercial transaction, and, interestingly, expressed his sympathy for men,
arguing that the ayma was a sword, seif, which married women dangle over
their husbands' necks:
"I encounter many court cases related to ayma complaints. If 
problems occur in a marriage, it is common for a wife to say that 
her husband has squandered, baddid, the furniture, and a lot of 
times, what is written on the ayma is not actually there. Usually 
the courts respond by issuing a sentence for imprisonment 
(from 6 months to three years) if the husband does not produce 
the furniture or its value. The legal procedures are usually 
quick, and do not take more than two to three months. I usually 
sympathise with the men, however. If I was asked, I would 
say, ban the ayma, it is not a good cu/f. I usually 
sympathise with the men, because I know that many of the 
complaints raised by women are not real, they are fictitious, 
driven by ulterior motives and vengeance, kaydiyya.
This view was echoed, in more subtle terms and couched in academic 
language, in the November 1996 issue of a widely read middle class 
magazine published in Arabic, Nus il Dunya. In an article titled: "The ayma 
is a useless piece of paper and the iaw is clear", the writer, a male lawyer, 
probes into the legality of the ayma, from an Islamic perspective, and from a 
legal point of view, using sophisticated legal language and resorting to 
examples from Islamic history and the Quran. After his extensive review, the 
writer concludes that the ayma has no basis in either Islamic fiqh or in civil or 
criminal codes, and calls upon the courts to rethink its legality as it creates a 
lot of problems in marriages and is a burden on the court system. Although 
he does not articulate it outright, the writer was clearly arguing for a rejection 
of the ayma's legal enforceability. His conclusions and recommendations are 
quite dangerous from the point of view of the women I talked to, for whom the 
ayma was indispensable both as an insurance policy and as a negotiating 
device in marital negotiations.
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It is interesting to note, however, that this article did not elicit any 
reaction from women's rights activists in Egypt. This lack of response 
contrasts sharply with, another recent newspaper article questioning the right 
of female professors to supervise academic dissertations by male students, 
on the presumed grounds that in Islam women have no right of supervision or 
guardianship, wilayya, over men. This latter article was the subject of several 
published responses by feminists, and the source of public debates amongst 
women's groups, some of whose members are academics or are in 
supervisory positions themselves, so that they were also directly threatened 
by the article. The article on the ayma, however, which is potentially more 
threatening to lower-class women, went unnoticed, possibly because this 
practice is more limited among the middle and upper classes. Since it is not 
part of their daily reality, the issues surrounding it were invisible to them.13
In fact, had I read the article on the ayma two years ago, before my 
fieldwork, I suspect it would not have attracted my attention either. This type 
of myopia is self-defeating and limiting. The possible erosion of the social 
and legal basis of the ayma actually offers a concrete issue, affecting the 
perceived interests of a broad segment of Egyptian women, around which 
participatory politics and mobilisation of women can take place.
In summary, although ignored by both researchers and activists, the 
ayma is a central component of marriage negotiations, possibly in many low- 
income communities, which protects women's self-defined entitlements in the 
marital union. Women's presentation of the rationale for the ayma using the 
same, seemingly unambiguous, term for rights, hsP, which is the same term 
used by women activists in Egypt and internationally, is significant. It 
illustrates how conceptions of rights and interests are socially and historically 
situated and are linked to both discursive elements as well as to 
constructions of meanings and identities (Fraser, 1989; Moore, 1994;
13 Another study is needed to determine the prevalence of the ayma among the 
more middle and upper classes in Egypt. However, none of the women from this 
background whom I know, had written an ayma. The six main feminist activists 
and researches who were involved in the campaign did not have an ayma 
themselves. (Personal communication with Hoda Ei-Sadda and I man Bibars, June, 
1997).
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Molyneux, 1998). The use of the same terminology for rights and interests 
among different groups of women does not imply the same content and 
understandings of such interests. To elaborate this point further, it is 
necessary to make a small digression to illustrate the contrasting agendas 
and tactics of different constituencies of women in Egypt.
A Tale of Two Contracts: Towards a Situated Understanding of 
Women's Interests
"The ayma is like a contract, it regulates/has a hold on a groom" (// 
ayma zay iIca3d, bitimsik il^ariis) was a phrase I heard repeatedly. The ayma 
was clearly seen and presented by women as a "contract", whose aim is to 
safeguard and ensure "woman's rights", ha3 il mara (including the right to 
request a divorce, ward off the threat of an unwanted divorce or ensure that a 
man does not default on his responsibilities). It is thus interesting to 
juxtapose it against the "new marriage contract" campaign, initiated by a 
prominent feminist lawyer in the early 1990's and which gained impetus 
during the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) 
in 1994. An example of concerted action by several women's groups in 
Egypt, the campaign aimed at increasing women's leverage within their 
marriages, by promoting the concept of marriage as a contractual 
arrangement, and emphasising that as a contract between two parties, its 
terms, conditions, rights and obligations should thus be specified and agreed 
upon in advance.
The draft of an "ideal" marriage contract was drawn up and was 
discussed extensively in public fora, with a view to making it acceptable to the 
Ministry of Justice as the basis of future marriage legislation for Muslims. 
The terms of the "new contract" reflected the legitimate priorities and 
anxieties of middle and upper class Muslim women in Egypt. It included new 
issues such as: the right for married women to travel out of the country 
without the husband's approval (which currently is not allowed by law), the 
right for women-initiated divorce, the right to work and the right to continue 
higher education after marriage. The contract stipulations may also be used
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to limit a husband's rights, in shariFa laws. For example one may stipulate 
that the marriage will be monogamous as one of the conditions.
The new contract was eventually rejected by the government, critiqued 
by the religious establishment, and failed to receive much support from the 
public, both men and women. The reasons varied, from charges that it 
"legitimises the forbidden and forbids the legitimate", and is contrary to 
shariFa, to arguments that some of its stipulations, such as women's rights to 
work or travel abroad are harmful for the family, while others, such as the 
right to education, were not necessary since they are not questioned (Karam,
1996). Other reasons, voiced in public seminars I attended were that such a 
contract has overly materialistic undertones, threatening the harmony and 
symbolic meaning of marriage.
What is critical for my purposes here is that despite some obvious 
links between the marriage contract and the ayma, there was no reference to, 
or discussion of, the ayma at all during the campaign. Attempts to justify the 
"new marriage contract" to the public were largely based on excellent 
historical research. The research demonstrated that the idea of a contract 
with stipulations of rights and duties of husband and wife was not an alien 
concept and that it had historical precedent in the practices of Islamic 
dynasties in Turkey and Egypt. There was no attempt, however, to link it with 
current practices and marriage arrangements among the majority of women in 
Egypt, which have a clearly contractual basis as was described earlier in this 
chapter. In retrospect, I can now recognise that this made our campaign 
much weaker and prevented us from recognising both similarities and 
differences across class boundaries, which could have strengthened the 
campaign by mobilising a broader constituency of women.
A survey was conducted among low-income women to elicit their 
responses to the suggested contract, hoping to increase the campaigns' base 
of support. However, none of the survey questions addressed lower income 
women's actual concerns nor what their marriage negotiations actually 
entailed, so as to build on them and take them into account. The campaign 
had laudable aims and was a worthwhile effort. Nonetheless, its approach
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was a top down and myopic one that did not allow for an understanding or
appreciation of the diversity of women's perceptions of their interests and
rights within marriage, their own idioms of articulating these interests, or their
strategies for promoting their perceived interests.
This suggests, among other things, that the national identity of a
researcher (or activist) is not automatically linked to the production of more
"authentic" or "indigenous" knowledge. As Morsy et al (1991) argue,
emphasising the impact of colonial domination and intellectual dependency,
the production of knowledge,
"is the output of people whose thought patterns reflect the 
"truths" of their social milieux. To the extent that indigenous 
anthropologists (and I would add women's rights' activists) 
social milieu’s are not simply or purely, "indigenous", neither are 
their thought patterns nor the "truths" of their scientific 
productions" (1991:92).
As mentioned earlier, the language used in marriage negotiations in 
the study community was openly contractual and based on explicit material 
calculations and terms such as selling and buying. This language is 
considered quite "improper" among more upper class Egyptians. In fact, in 
one of the many public discussions of the new marriage contract at a luxury 
hotel in the centre of Cairo at which I was present, one of the major criticisms 
voiced was that the contract was based on "western", "materialistic" notions, 
and that it took out ail the "love" and "emotion" out of marriage, relegating it 
instead to the domain of cold calculation and market transactions. This is not 
at all what marriage is about in traditional Egyptian culture, argued the 
speaker, an upper class man in his mid 50's.14
An effective response, but one which was not voiced, would have been 
to point out the class bias inherent in this particular view of Egyptian 
marriage, by highlighting the largely material considerations and dispositions 
which characterise the marriage negotiations of a large proportion of families
14 This particular view of marriage in itself raises interesting questions about the 
middle class "domestication" of women and about the dependency of middle class 
women on men and the naturalisation or "euphemization" of that dependency as 
"romantic love".
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in Egypt. It would have been worth noting that the ayma is such an overtly 
financial arrangement, that its stipulations fall under commercial laws. 
Clearly marriage acquires different meanings amongst different classes.
Azza Karam (1996) in her recent study of middle and upper class 
women activists in Egypt notes how the new marriage campaign was 
discredited. She argues that this was partly due to the lack of dialogue and 
alliance building between different groups of "feminists" (which she 
categorises as "secularist", "Islamists", and "Muslim feminists") to safeguard 
women's rights. While I agree with Karam's call for horizontal coalition 
building, my data suggests, that it may not be enough. Given the class and 
educational disparities in Egyptian society, which generate different, but 
possibly overlapping perceptions of gender needs, rights and interests, it 
would seem crucial to strengthen campaigns not only through cultivating 
horizontal links, but also through forging more vertical coalitions, alliances 
and linkages, across class and educational lines.15
Such efforts would significantly enrich the current debates about 
priorities for change. It may also increase the chances for the success of 
some campaigns, by rallying more public support. Moreover, it could result in 
the politicisation and mobilisation of a broader and more diverse constituency 
of women and men, and carries the promise of encouraging the emergence of 
local leadership in different low-income communities, who can begin to 
articulate their own concerns more vocally and publicly. It seems to me that 
seeking actively to establish such shared platforms may be the only way to 
move from the largely individual "gender activisms"16 of today, to a social 
movement that is strong enough to challenge the many forces contributing to 
both gender and social inequality more generally in Egyptian society.
Bourdieu's stinging analysis of the possibilities of social change and 
his cynical view of the potential of organised resistance, while uncomfortable 
for many feminists, myself included, is nonetheless relevant in this context.
151 am not underestimating the difficulty of such an effort since low-income women 
may not always have their own organisations and representatives to facilitate such 
linkages-
16 The term "gender activisms" comes from Margo Badran's work (1993,1995).
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Bourdieu "stresses the struggle among the privileged themselves and the 
relative inability of the oppressed even to enter into the "dialogue" among 
more privileged groups" (Risseeuw, 1991:177). This was clearly the case 
with the marriage contract that we were promoting presumably on behalf of all 
Egyptian women.
What this suggests, is that as middle/upper class feminists in Egypt 
with privileges of class and education, we need to seriously consider the 
possibility that we may ourselves be perpetuating power inequalities. The 
unequal power relationship that we, as activists trying to challenge gender 
inequalities, have over other women on whose behalf we often speak, can 
perhaps be captured by Lukes' two dimensional view of power discussed in 
chapter one. This is a form of power that operates and is exercised by 
"controlling the agenda, mobilising the bias of the system, determining which 
issues are key issues, indeed which issues come up for decision and 
excluding those which threaten the interests of the powerful" (Lukes, 1986:9).
It seems to me that without necessarily intending it, we may be 
implicated in reproducing inequalities between women by privileging our own 
voices and discourses. By so doing, we may be not just marginalizing the 
priorities and discourses of other groups of women in Egypt, but we may also 
be blinded to understanding what shapes these alternative discourses. In the 
case of the ayma, what accounts for its importance is partly a context of 
general impoverishment for both men and women, in which women have few 
opportunities for financial security and ownership of economic assets. For 
most of the women in the study community, the items on the ayma, were the 
only property or economic asset that they owned, or could ever hope to own 
in the future. Incorporating these broader issues of poverty and economic 
vulnerability into our feminist theories and practice points the way forward to 
making social theory more relevant and addresses one of the identified 
sources of the "crisis" of social science in the Arab world, that is, "the missing 
link between societal problems and intellectual production" (Morsy et al, 
1991:85).
186
Closely related to the ayma, another important aspect of marriage 
negotiations in the study community centred on the marriage trousseau, 
gihaaz. Like the ayma, negotiations around the gihaaz reveal various ways in 
which women attempt to secure themselves financially in the face of declining 
male support, as well as increase their options of who to marry, where to live, 
and whether or not to work after marriage. It is with these issues that the next 
section is concerned.
The Trousseau: "A Decent "Gihaaz” Increases a Woman's status, 
ma^amha17
On visiting Om Youssef, one day, I found her carefully unpacking 
several large dusty cartons which had been piled on top of each other all the 
way to the ceiling of one of her two-room apartment. She was displaying, 
with great pride, some of their contents: 2 sets of glasses (eight pieces each), 
plates, cutlery, kitchen utensils, and a china tea set richly decorated with pink 
roses, an electrical blender, pots and pans, a rug, and four sets of bed 
sheets. Her audience was Om Sanna, a cheerful woman, well known in the 
community for organising, gamFyya(s) (informal rotating saving and credit 
societies). Om Youssef warmly called me to join in, explaining that her 
greatest items of pride were not in any of these cartons, but were located at 
the other corner of the room, covered with a red and white table cloth. With a 
dramatic gesture, she removed the cloth to reveal a brand new washing 
machine and stove. These items are all part of her daughter's trousseau, 
which the family has been amassing for years, she proudly announced, 
detailing the cost and provenance of each item.
17 Although I use the terms interchangeably, the gihaaz is not exactly equivalent to 
the trousseau, which is defined in the dictionary as: "linen and clothes that a 
mother gives her daughter when she gets married" (See Fine, 1992). The gihaaz 
in Egypt in the study community, however, consists of not just the above items, but 
also includes furniture and equipment. Moreover, unmarried girls often work to 
provide some of these items themselves as will be discussed in the following 
chapter..
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Later on, when we were alone, Om Youssef explained that she was 
intentionally showing off her daughter's amassed gihaaz so as to impress Om 
Sanna, and prod her into bragging about it to prospective families who are 
searching for brides for their sons. Om Sanaa, she elaborated, was not just 
known for organising gamciyya(s), but also for arranging marriages. A large 
gihaaz was an excellent way of finding a good husband these days and 
expanding a daughter's marriage options. Moreover, she added, a woman 
who goes into a marriage with a small gihaaz, risks degradation and loss of 
status both in her husband's family, as well as in the community at large, 
whereas a proper gihaaz increases a woman's status, worth and bargaining 
power with her husband.
In this section, I illustrate the use of the gihaaz, which includes all the 
material goods that the bride and her family provide to the new home, as 
another important element in marriage negotiations. Accumulating a gihaaz is 
a major financial undertaking, and young girls, and their mothers work hard at 
this task as their daughters approach puberty. Although fathers contribute to 
the gihaaz, it is significantly higher on women's expenditure and saving 
priority lists than on men's. The desire to accumulate a gihaaz is one of the 
main reasons why many women, particularly unmarried ones, defy community 
standards and seek paid work in workshops, a decision which will be 
discussed more fully in the following chapter.
The function of a gihaaz, goes beyond its economic utility. It is much 
more than a material contribution by the bride, but has important symbolic 
value as well. The gihaaz, depending on its value and composition, is a 
public sign of either, social status and success, or of failure and loss of 
prestige. The poorer a girl and her family is, the greater the social importance 
of her gihaaz. For a new bride, a large gihaaz is critical resource for future 
marital negotiations, and is not a private affair, but an explicitly public one, as 
it is closely related to social mobility. Like other forms of consumption, it is a 
means through which families reaffirm their status in the community (See 
Warde, 1994; Fine, 1992). A "proper" gihaaz in the community studied was 
valued at a minimum of 1500 Egyptian pounds, a major investment given the
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levels of income and women's wages in the community. Women, often with
some assistance from men, put themselves out on a limb to amass the
necessary capital.
Sabah, married last year, has been working for the past 6 years in an
electronics assembly workshop to save for her gihaaz. She explains why
amassing a large gihaaz was a high priority. Her reasons, centring on the
gihaaz as a deterrent to possible abuse by her husband or mother-in-law,
were echoed by many other women:
"a gihaaz enhances a girl’s value and enables her to negotiate 
with her future husband and stand firm in front of him and her 
mother in law. It makes a woman able to answer back if they 
humiliate or insult her, tekhali il sit ceenha awiyya amam hamat- 
ha wi guzha, tPdar tirud ^ aleehum". In addition to linen, towels 
and 10 galabiyya(s), my gihaaz also included electric 
equipment, such as a blender, a washing machine, and a 
television."
Similarly, Gamalat, in her early thirties explains how entering a
marriage with a "proper" gihaaz is a sign of prestige and status and a
deterrent against potential spousal abuse. Her comments show how family
honour, sharaf, is dependent in this case not on a woman's sexual behaviour
as is generally emphasised in the literature on "honour and shame", but also
on a woman's ability to accumulate a large gihaaz.
"a proper gihaaz is an honour to the family, il gihaaz il hilw 
yisharaf il ahL A woman who does not have a proper gihaaz is 
considered a maid, khaddaama, who has no family , ahi, and 
she can be abused by her husband, yibahdilha. If he gets 
angry, he can tell her go back to your parents, you did not bring 
anything valuable into this marriage."
There is an obvious link between the gihaaz and the ayma discussed 
earlier, since a large gihaaz will increase the overall monetary value of the 
ayma. Although both practices are part of the same cultural repertoire, they 
have different trajectories and may have evolved separately. However, I am 
arguing that in the spatial and temporal context of my research, there is a link 
between both as cultural resources that are drawn upon to improve a 
woman's bargaining power in her marriage. Om Ashraf's comments:
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"Before, gold was security enough for a woman but now the 
gold of the shabka is not enough, so a woman has to secure 
herself, iPamin nafsaha, with other items such as a fridge or a 
washing machine. All these (durable) items go into a woman's 
ayma. This embarrasses a man and forces him to provide a 
decent apartment and also to get more and better furniture, and 
to write this furniture into the ayma as well. A good gihaaz now 
would not cost less than 4000 pounds".
I was told that more unmarried girls in the community were currently
engaged in the labour force than in the past. Discussions with older men and
women, who confirmed that this trend has escalated since the early eighties,
indicate that the main reasons are to enable a girl to acquire a respectable
marriage trousseau. Hag Youssef, an older man who works as a guard in a
community school, reflects:
"Girls have to pay a lot more now for marriage than in the past.
A large gihaaz is critical as the items in the trousseau elevate a 
girl's status, maPamit-ha, improves her standing with her in­
laws, and increases her marriage proposals in the community, il 
haga bitaa i^t il gihaaz bitshahiiha. If her parents cannot afford to 
purchase all the items of a gihaaz, then a girl must work for it".
One of the reasons a woman with a large gihaaz has a stronger 
standing with her husband and his family is that she shows him, and 
everyone else in the community, how she has reduced the financial burden 
on him. This creates a sense of indebtedness, and obligation is built into the 
relationship from the start. Moreover, as the gihaaz serves as a marker of 
status, a woman with a sizeable one increases the status of her husband and 
his family as well. This not only deepens their sense of indebtedness towards 
her, but also enables a bride to be more demanding in terms of choice of 
residence, such as refusing to live with her in-laws, or insisting on living close 
to her own mother.
The phenomenon of a brides' substantial contribution to her gihaaz, 
appears to be relatively new. interviews with older women reveal that 
expectations about the gihaaz and negotiations over it have changed 
dramatically over the past several decades. Whereas before, the groom was 
expected to provide everything, either through a mahr, or indirectly, a gradual
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change from a "dower system” to a "dowry" system appears to have occurred.
Om Mustafa reflects on these changes. She emphasises the critical point that
in the past it was not only unusual, but actually shameful for a bride to
contribute significantly to her gihaaz. A major contribution would imply that a
girl's reputation was suspect, and that her family was thus eager to bribe a
prospective husband so as to marry her off quickly:
"Now, a gihaaz has to be complete, and so if the man cannot 
afford to get everything, the girl must get it herself. This way 
she can have some power, ^een, with her husband and his 
family, and can talk to them eye to eye with her head raised. In 
the old days, however, the groom used to get everything, and a 
bride was not expected to bring anything into her marriage. In 
fact it was shameful for a woman to contribute to her 
gihaaz, other than her personal things and clothes. If a 
family provided more than that people would suspect that they 
are trying to bribe the groom to marry their daughter because 
there is something wrong with her, yiballasuu ^aleeha calashan 
yi^utuuha".
Om Mohamed, 70 years old and married in upper Egypt when she was
11 recalls how the financial arrangements of her marriage were so different
from that of her daughter’s, who got married two years ago. Although a
woman was expected to get a gihaaz in the "old days", both its composition,
and symbolic meaning were very different.
"My ma/ir was only 75 pounds. The only thing I provided was a 
wooden box sandiF, with some clothes, soap, and a copper 
washing basin. It was so much simpler then. The groom would 
pay a mahr of a maximum of 200-300 pounds and the father's 
bride would get everything with that money. People were not so 
materialistic then and things were much cheaper. The 
maximum that a woman got in terms of furniture was a bed. No 
fancy furniture, equipment or anything like that. Now, a girl 
cannot get married without these things. She would not be able 
to find a proper husband, caleeh il iima... For the past five 
years, I have been cutting down on daily expenses, joining 
several saving societies, and working in assembling washing 
pegs so as to get some of these things for my daughter. Her 
husband did not pay a mahr, but he built two separate rooms, 
with a bathroom for her on top of his father's house, and got a 
special bedroom... My daughter has also been working in a 
clothing factory for the past four years to complete her 
trousseau. We did not get everything we wanted, but we still
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managed to get a fridge, and a modern (meaning western style,) 
set of chairs and sofa made of wood."
Om Hussein, a 60 year old widow who runs a grocery shop similarly
comments on how marriage related financial arrangements have changed:
"Now, among the poor, the mahr is not very common, because 
things are so expensive. If a man pays a mahr, it wilt probably 
be too low to get all that is expected now and the woman will 
have to pay as much to get a proper gihaaz. So it is more 
common to ask the groom to provide some furniture instead.
But women still have to provide much of the furniture 
themselves, not like in the old days, where they went into a 
marriage just with their galabiyya(s). In the old days, gold was 
more important than furniture. A groom had to get a lot of gold 
and the furniture was limited to a mattress, and, maybe, a 
cupboard. In our days, if a girl’s family got her what people are 
now getting for their daughters, her reputation would be 
suspect, as it would be as if they are helping the groom 
because they want to marry her off quickly to hide something."
Naema recounted how her sister's gihaaz was publicly displayed last
year.18 Her comments reveal an important relational concept, that of
"miFaayarat', inaccurately translatable as belittle or humiliate, which
underlies the emphasis on a large gihaaz. Her views found resonance in my
discussions with many other women. When Naema's sister was married,
referred to as kharagit (literally went out of her parents’ house), or dakhaiit
(literally entered, meaning entered her husband's house), she did so with five
large cartons of clothes, kitchen utensils, in addition to a washing machine
and a stove, not a local one, she emphasised, but an imported one. Two
days before her dukhia all these things were transported by truck from her
father's to her husband's house in a public display.
"If we had not shown everybody what she is bringing to her 
marriage, people would have belittled/scorned her, and she 
would have started her marriage in a weak position vis a vis her 
husband".
18 The ritual of a bride's trousseau publicly transported and shown off is also a 
common practice in rural areas of Egypt.
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Om Shaymaa, married in rural Assuit, upper Egypt, 40 years ago, also
highlights the concept of muifayara and elaborates on a specific expectation
that is no longer adhered to.
"If a woman does not have a complete gihaaz, people would 
scorn her and she becomes the subject of gossip. This is so 
different than before... In the past, the man used to get, not just 
a golden shabka and everything else, but also special china 
bracelets engraved with enamel from Assuit city, 6 of them, and 
the bride would wear them on the wedding night. When people 
came to visit them the next morning, they looked at the 
bracelets to ensure that they are broken. If a few are broken, 
that means that they did not have sex all the way, makamiltuush 
Hi aakhir, but only flirted a little... My own bracelets were 
broken to pieces.”
The Evolving Meaning of Marriage Practices:
Understanding changes in marriage transactions requires a broader 
understanding of socio-economic transformations. Two important inter-related 
changes have taken place in marriage negotiations over the past 30 years or 
so which require an explanation. The first is the change in the forms of 
exchange of marriage prestations, where women are now expected to 
contribute substantially to the setting up of a marital home. The second is the 
change in the composition of the specific commodities which are the subject 
of exchange, that is, changes in the composition of the gihaaz, moving 
increasingly in the direction of consumer durables, with less emphasis on 
items such as gold and copper, as was previously the case.
The first change may be related to the tremendous increase in the 
costs of marriage over the past 30 years, particularly in urban areas due 
primarily to an acute housing shortage,-but also to the increased demand for 
more expensive furniture and equipment- which has not been matched by an 
increase in incomes. Securing a separate room or an apartment is a major 
financial undertaking in Cairo, and at the same time it has become an 
important expectation, tied to the normative preference for an independent 
conjugal home, a preference that was clear in the study community.
Changes in family structure, normative expectations of marriage, 
residence patterns and material realities have made it imperative for both
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bride and groom to contribute to preparing the marital home. A man can no 
longer afford to provide both the physical dwelling as well as the furnishings 
and equipment that are now expected. For a woman, however, an 
independent conjugal home while valued, nonetheless carries its own risks, 
as it may increase a woman's dependence on the residence the husband 
provides (which would be invariably registered in his name), and thus her "fall 
back" position in case of marital conflicts may be weaker. Moreover, male 
under and unemployment has meant that the ideal of the man providing for 
his family is seriously in question. Through the gihaaz and the ayma, women 
thus attempt to guarantee their material well-being over the long term.
The consumer durables that are part of the gihaaz are not simply 
consumption items. They also represent an important form of accumulating 
savings and assets. The high rate of inflation in Egypt, and the inaccessibility 
of banks, means that such savings actually make economic sense. Women 
can sell a television or a washing machine a few years after it is bought and 
not lose any money. In fact this form of buying consumer durables when 
money became available and selling the items when there was a financial 
crisis constituted a common survival strategy through which women in the 
study community managed their precarious living conditions (See also 
Hoodfar, 1997).
The second type of change in the composition of the gihaaz, must be 
understood within a broader context of the changing symbolic value of 
commodities as markers of social status, the politics of popular demand and 
consumption, and the cultural construction of value. As discussed in chapter 
two, Egypt's economic "open door policy" of the 1980's and the boom of 
labour migration to the Gulf countries, have ushered in a wave of 
consumerism with accompanying changes in systems of status and prestige. 
The demand for consumer durables, including imported items, has increased 
significantly, even among the less well to do. Consumer durables have 
acquired a new symbolic value as symbols of "modernity" and progress, 
tattawur, and as markers of social differentiation. They have in essence 
replaced the importance of traditional markers such as gold jewellery.
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Acquiring modern appliances and furniture has become an avenue of social 
mobility and prestige.
Appadurai's perspective on the circulation of commodities-which he 
defines as anything intended for exchange--is of relevance in this context for 
understanding changes in demand and consumer tastes. Arguing that things 
have a social life, he suggest that to understand changes in consumption 
patterns, we need to analytically focus on the "things" themselves that are the 
subject of demand, rather than on their forms of exchange. "The meaning of 
things are inscribed in their trajectories, uses and forms,...things in motion 
illuminate their human and social context" (Appadurai,1986:5).
Such a focus argues Appadurai provides us with a better 
understanding of the changing nature of demand, and hence consumption, as 
constitutive of relations of privilege and prestige and closely linked to the 
overall political economy of societies. He suggests that we regard 
consumption as social and relational, not as individual or private; 
consumption, and the demand it creates is neither "bottomless" nor "culture 
free", but is rather an effective mechanism for both sending as well as 
receiving social messages. Demand on consumer durables in particular, 
"emerges as a function of a variety of social practices and classifications, 
rather than a mysterious emanation of human needs, a mechanical response 
to social manipulation or the narrowing down of a universal and voracious 
desire for objects or whatever happens to be available" (Appadurai, 1986:29; 
see also Warde, 1994). It is within this analytical framework that changes in 
the composition of the gihaaz in the community studied, and its use by 
women in marital negotiations are best comprehended.
The data presented in this chapter has demonstrated how women 
attempt to gain advantage and security in their marriages and limit the control 
and arbitrary exercise of power that they are aware that men, as husbands, 
may exert over them. The ayma and the gihaaz were presented as two 
practices that may be turned to such uses. The chapter presented a detailed 
examination of the ayma and gihaaz as the subject of transactions utilised by 
women to. gain advantage, paying particular attention to the specific idioms
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underlying them, through which women express ideas like resentment,
discontent, male disempowerment, and rightful entitlement. The arguments
and idioms women used to make claims over men reveals a striking
awareness amongst women of certain aspects of gender-based oppression.
The literature on gender relations in Egypt is still heavily influenced by the
image of the "corporate" family, where "male dominance is matched by
female accommodation, male authority by female obedience"
(Rugh,1984:75), and undifferentiated family strategies (see B. Ibrahim, 1985).
Discovering a local, historically specific, and class-bound discourse about
women's rights, entitlements, and perceived self-interest thus constitutes a
significant finding.
The chapter has also illustrated how women's and men's interests are
culturally and historically constituted, partly reflecting their specific social
locations. Within the same national "culture", women and men do not have a
single "indigenous" view of marriage and marriage transactions, but several.
Arguing for a more nuanced and situated understanding of women's interests,
this chapter showed how, although women in the community studied used the
same terms for women's rights, har3 il mara, that more upper class and
intellectually inclined feminists use, they often attached very different
meanings to this term. A common gender thus does not imply common
interests, even when similar terms for expressing these interests are used by
different groups of women. Any claims about women's interests in Egypt thus
need to be conceptualised very carefully. As Molyneux argues, women's
interests are historically and culturally constituted, as well as related to
specific socio-economic locations.
"Claims about women's interests need to be framed within 
specific historical contexts since processes of interest formation 
and articulation are clearly subject to cultural, historical and 
political variance and cannot be known in advance" (Molyneux, 
1997:10).
A more situated understanding of women's negotiation strategies in marriage 
through micro-level, and context specific research can thus significantly 
enrich both feminist debates and activism.
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The following chapter will shift the discussion from marriage 
negotiations to the conditions and consequences of women's participation in 
the informal labour market. The chapter will focus on two specific forms of 
employment, sub-contracting and wage labour. The linkages between 
women's options and practices in their households and their choices and 
experiences in the market and workplace will be highlighted.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DEFIANCE AND ACQUIESCENCE IN THE LABOUR MARKET 
"A man has one gall bladder, a woman has 24"
Om Azouz, a widow in her fifties, is squatting on the mud floor in her
two room rented flat staring at a low, round, wooden table normally used for
eating, a tabliyya. Piled on the tabliyya are hundreds of aspirin-sized tin
circles with a hole in the middle, a pile of two centimeter long pins, a short
hammer like instrument, and a round thick iron object the size of a saucer.
Also sitting around the tabliyya is Om Azouz's daughter, a pretty but frail
woman in her mid-twenties breast-feeding her youngest, and seventh, child.
Om Azouz and Om Muhammed are about to start hammering the pins into the
holes of the tin circles, a process called, talbiis shamaasi. They will keep at
this repetitive and tedious task for about 10 hours, interspersing it with
various household chores. This task is the second of a six-step process for
the production of upholstery tacks. All other operations are carried out by
men, on machines, in small-scale workshops in the community. Om Azouz
describes her work as follows:
"I get 25 piasters per kilo (4 pence), but this is so little, irshu 
daciif, and my eye-sight is not good, so I am slow. We get the 
unassembled tacks from Om Assem, who takes it from various 
workshops who want to help the poor, yisa^du il ghalaaba. It is 
hard work, ta^ ab, it breaks the back and results in finger 
injuries. The hammer often "bites", bifud, your finger. Look at 
my hands. But this is life. Women's work, shughl il niswaan, is 
like that, it causes heart aches and is tiring. My son, the one 
married to Om Muhammed does not work, he is often drunk. He 
always fights with his wife and she gets angry and stays for
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months at her parents' house, leaving all the children to me.1 
How can I feed them? Sometimes they work with me, but it is 
dangerous. Samir stepped on a pin yesterday and his foot is 
now full of pus. The pharmacy prescribed a medicine but it cost 
LE 7. How can I afford it? My son does not help with this job.
He cannot. This is a job that requires sitting down for so long.
It involves no haraka, movement, it is not a job a man can do.
Men have no patience, khuP, for this kind of work. You see, a 
man has one gall bladder, maraara, a woman has 24."2
This chapter is concerned primarily with women's experiences in the 
"informal" labour market, and how these inform relations in both the 
household and the workplace. The inter-linkages and reciprocal influences 
between marriage negotiations and contestation in the labour market are 
highlighted. The chapter discusses the role of gender in structuring skills, job 
opportunities, conditions of work and patterns of negotiation in the informal 
economy, focusing specifically on two forms of female employment, home- 
based piece-work (sub-contracting) and waged labour in small workshops.
Other forms of female employment exist in the community I studied, 
such as public sector work and self-employment (particularly, in retail). My 
focus on piece-work and wage work, however, was intentional. First, both 
have been apparently on the increase over the past ten years. Yet they have 
remained virtually unexplored in the Egyptian context. Second, these two
1 Om Muhammed’s case illustrates how the practice of the ayma, discussed in the 
previous chapter, is not always successful for deterring a husband from acts such 
as being drunk or defaulting on his role as economic provider. Om Muhammad 
had written an ayma when she got married ten years ago, but she had sold many 
of it's items over the years to meet household expenses. Her husband, a day 
labourer in the construction trade, has been out of a regular job for many years. 
Moreover, asking for a divorce was not really an option for Om Muhammad. Her 
parents live in one small rented room, and it would be impossible for her and her 
six children to move with them should she get a divorce. The alternative, living on 
her own, would not only be unacceptable by community standards, but would also 
be economically unfeasible given the high cost of housing.
2 This Arabic proverb vividly illustrates the role of gender in defining work patterns. 
Its underlying meaning is that women can endure and tolerate more stressful or 
unfavourable conditions. In Egyptian culture, one's gall bladder is thought to be 
highly affected by stress, anger or sadness, and susceptible to rupture under such 
conditions. Having more than one gall bladder thus denotes that a woman is more 
resilient and can be more tolerant of boring, tedious and frustrating situations. If 
one of her gall bladders is ruptured as a result, she has plenty more.
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forms of work involved women at two different stages of their life cycle; 
married women with children were predominantly engaged in piece-work, and 
unmarried adolescents in wage work. Given my interest in understanding how 
women cope with gender inequalities at work at different stages of life, these 
two patterns thus represented an obvious choice.
My field work shows that women's negotiation options and their 
responses to the conditions of work vary significantly between these two 
types of employment, thus complicating any easy conclusions about women's 
resistance to unfavourable labour relations. As the data will illustrate, piece­
work tends to be generally "euphemized", or "mis-recognized" as charity and 
passing time. The labour relationships underlying piece-work are not 
conceptualized by either the employers (all men) or the sub-contractors (all 
women) as strictly financial transactions, but are presented as a form of 
charity. There is thus little attempt on women's part to challenge the terms or 
conditions of their work.
Women engaged in wage labour, on the other hand, have more 
individual and collective options for both covertly and overtly bargaining for 
better working conditions. As will be discussed below, this is partly due to the 
fact that women are excluded from the male dominated apprenticeship 
systems characteristic of informal sector workshops which provides men with 
avenues of training and promotion. Female wage labour, in contrast, tends to 
be confined to low skilled, high turnover and dead end jobs. Women have 
much less of a vested interest than men in the workplace and little 
anticipation of upward mobility and better conditions. Their protest was thus 
often more open and confrontational than that of male wage workers with a 
stake in the enterprise.
It is widely acknowledged that information about women's labour 
participation in the informal economy is extremely sketchy in Egypt (Hoodfar,
1997)3. Nonetheless, several scholars have contributed to an understanding
3 Based on official statistics, women's labour force participation in the Egyptian 
economy is estimated at between 10-12%. This figure, however, is believed to be 
a gross underestimate as it refers only to the formal labour market. When the 
range of activities in the informal labour market are included, estimates of women's 
labour force participation reach 70% (Nassar, 1996).
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of women's work, both in the formal and informal economy (for example 
B.lbrahim, 1985; Sullivan, 1981; Zaalouk, 1990; Shukry, 1992; Lobban, 1996; 
see also Fergany, 1993 for an extended bibliography). Some more micro­
level studies have also provided important insights into self-employment and 
income generating activities among poor women in the informal sector (See 
for example, Lynch and Fahmy, 1984; and Rugh 1985;). Most of these 
studies, however, have tended to be woman-centered, rather than gender 
focused, without sufficient emphasis on analyzing the differences between 
men and women within the same sector.
Two areas that have not been addressed by any studies of the 
informal economy in Egypt, even those that deal specifically with women's 
work, are the examination of a potentially significant, and expanding female 
labour force in small-scale manufacturing, in both home-based piece-work, 
and wage labour. This labour force is largely invisible. Piece-workers are 
based at home, and thus concealed from public view. Workshops that 
employ women are also often located on the second and third floor of 
buildings, and are not noticeable to casual visitors to these communities. 
Moreover, they often have a male "gate keeper", in the literal sense, which 
makes if difficult for outsiders to even access these workshops, in what 
follows I will discuss both types of employment.
Acquiescence in The Labour Market: The Social organization of Piece- 
Work
Unlike food vendors and grocers, home-based workers are a largely 
invisible labour force. I literally stumbled upon this type of work during my 
early months in the field, and it was only as I built more intimate relationships 
in the community, visited more households, and stayed for longer periods of 
time, that I began to realize how pervasive piece-work, in fact, was. Over a 
year, I carried out in-depth interviews with 25 women engaged in a range of 
sub-contracting activities, as well as with middle women, and male workshop 
owners. Home-based piece-work appeared to be largely dominated by a 
certain category of women at a particular point in their life cycle, namely 
women with younger children. These were both married women as well as
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divorcees, widows, and deserted women. The concentration of this category 
of women in home-based sub-contracting illustrates how a female work force 
with specific age and marital trajectories is created (Heyzer, 1981). As 
Beneria suggests: "women, by means of their work trajectories and 
strategies, supply labour for different processes of capital expansion and 
proletarization according to the family cycle, a conditioning factor that does 
not pertain to men" (Beneria, 1987:103).
The type of subcontracting observed in the communities I studied are 
all of the "vertical" type (Beneria, 1987). These essentially involve assembly 
or production tasks for a certain enterprise following very specific 
instructions, with all raw materials, inputs, and design provided by the sub­
contractor. They included tasks such as polishing metal ornaments, sewing 
leather shoes, a process referred to in Arabic as Shugl suruugi, attaching hair 
pins to carton sheets, tying beads, known locally as ladm, assembling 
children's toys, assembling upholstery tacks, referred to as talbiis shamasi, 
removing extra pieces from plastic hangers and washing pegs, known as 
tafsiis, preparing lemons for pickling, and sewing ornaments on clothes and 
hair accessories.
All the sub-contracting activities I observed, however, are geared to 
the national market rather than export. The sub-contracting firms were 
themselves sometimes sub-contracted by a larger firm, and ranged in size 
from three employees to larger ones of up to ten employees. Some were 
based in the same community, while others were located in different 
neighbourhoods in Cairo, but had access to that specific community through 
the residence of the owner or his employees. I did not come across any sub­
contracting by multinational companies. Since l was primarily interested in 
women's work, I confined myself to the bottom of the sub-contracting chain 
and did not investigate where these linkages would lead4.
4 A study in one of the neighbourhoods, carried out in 1980, indicates that many of 
the small informal enterprises supply finished or semi-finished products to formal 
sector firms (see Landor, 1994).
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Most of the sub-contracting activity takes place inside the house, 
although in the heat of the summer, activities sometimes spill out onto the 
street. Women, usually from the same, or neighbouring, households often 
work collectively. All sub-contracted tasks are repetitive, time-consuming, 
and require no, or very little, skill. Some, like assembling upholstery tacks, 
cause frequent finger injuries, back injuries and put a heavy toll on eyesight.
Moreover, home-based piece-work is extremely low-paying, compared 
to the income levels in the informal sector as a whole. For example, eight 
hours of continuous work on assembling tacks earns a woman two Egyptian 
pounds (about 40 English pence). Attaching one kilo of hairpins to carton 
sheets, which takes about 20 minutes, generates 10 piasters (1 English 
pence); an eight hour day thus generates LE2.40 (a little over 40 English 
pence). Sewing shoes is slightly more lucrative. For one pair, which takes 
about 25 minutes to make, a woman could earn up to 40 piasters; an eight 
hour day, thus earns a woman a little over 5 Egyptian pounds (almost 1 
English pound).
The pay of home-based workers, who are exclusively women, is far 
below the minimum wage in Egypt, and much lower than average earnings in 
the informal sector. This becomes clear when the earnings indicated above 
are compared to the earnings indicated in the CAPMAS study of the informal 
economy in Egypt discussed in chapter two. When inflation and the irregular 
nature of home-based work are factored in, the meagerness of the income 
generated through sub-contracting becomes even more apparent.
My oral histories indicate that piece-work as a form of female 
employment has increased significantly over the past ten years. This 
increase is understandable in view of the increased levels of poverty and 
male unemployment as discussed in chapter two, as well as the casualization 
of employment generally. Given current trends of privatization and structural 
adjustment in Egypt, it is likely that sub-contracting arrangements will be 
intensified even more over the next few years, both for demand and supply 
reasons.
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Women's income is becoming increasingly important for survival in 
low-income households, and at least 18% of households are headed by 
women who are the sole breadwinners for their families (Fergany, 1994b)5. 
In my sample, of the 59 once married women, 12 were de jure heads of 
households (eight were widowed and four were divorced). There were also 
five women who were deserted but not legally divorced. Many others reported 
not being fully supported by their husbands. As more poor women are driven 
into the labour market due to economic need, most have few options other 
than home-based piece-work.
On the supply side, there are indications from many countries that the 
international recession of the 1980's and the adoption of structural 
adjustment and labour deregulation policies, have resulted in a global surge 
of new forms of flexible labour relations, such as subcontracting, partly as a 
way for employers to keep production costs down (Standing, 1989; Baden, 
1993). For employers, sub-contracting ensures a risk free, flexible6 labour 
force that can be expanded or downsized depending on the fluctuations of 
the business (Elson, 1996).
Industrial sub-contracting, geared to both international and domestic 
markets, has recently been recognized as an increasing trend in many parts 
of the world. Products are sub-contracted from larger firms to smaller ones 
and from them to home-based workers. Sub-contracting is therefore not 
subject to regular labour laws or social security provisions. One of the main
5 This is probably a conservative estimate as it does not take into account de facto 
women headed households, that is households where a husband may be 
physically available but where, for a variety of reasons, women may nonetheless 
be the main or only family providers. This estimate also does not take into 
account women who are deserted, but not legally divorced. In-depth community 
studies reveal that households headed by women reach to 30% of all households 
in some urban areas (see EQI, 1987, EL-Kholy, 1990; Fergany, 1994b).
6 Elson provides a useful analysis of how the term flexible is used to refer to three 
dimensions of the economic system: (a) the organization structure of firms, 
whereby large firms sub-contract to other firms and separate their workforce into a 
"core'1 and a more temporary "periphery"; (b) labour market flexibility, referring to 
changes in regulations, contracts, etc, which facilitates employers' ability to hire 
and fire; and (c) flexibility in pattern of production through rendering the division of 
labour less rigid, a process often labeled flexible specialization (see Elson, 1996).
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conclusions of the literature on sub-contracting follows Braverman's 
argument that subcontracting aims at the reduction of labour costs, through 
changes in the division of labour. This is rendered possible by the 
fragmentation of the production process into simple tasks and the 
employment of workers associated with lower skill and lower wages (Beneria, 
1987).
it has been argued that this type of fragmentation of the labour force is 
often associated with "feminization".7 One of the important findings of cross- 
cultural research on subcontracting is the overwhelming concentration of 
female labour in this new pattern of work, particularly at the lowest end of the 
sub-contracting chain, i.e.: as home-based workers. In both developed and 
developing countries, women seem to have been more affected by this trend 
than men (Mies, 1982; Beneria and Roldan 1987; White, 1994; Huws, 1995; 
Standing, 1989).
The association of female labour, in particular, with lower skills and 
wages, is the result of a complex alliance between gender and kinship 
ideologies that determines the terms upon which women enter the labour 
market. Like men, women are bearers of not simply labour power, but also of 
gender attributes grounded in prior division of labour enacted in specific 
family and household arrangements. "The terms upon which women may 
compete in the labour market are thus dictated by the social relations within 
which they operate as daughters, wives, mothers, widows, etc.. and which 
impose ideological sanctions upon their identification as "free labour" 
(Standing, quoted in Westwood, 1988:9). Thus, as Pearson (1994) argues, 
the automatic relationship often assumed between increases in female wage
7 Elson (1996) cautions against an automatic link between feminization and 
flexiblization. She argues, based on a review of international comparative statistics 
on female shares of employment in the textile and electronics industries, that 
flexibility does not necessarily lead to female substitution in traditionally male jobs, 
and that the gender division of labour is often overridden by "flexibility". My data 
supports this cautionary note, as it illustrates how substitution did take place, but 
only in some forms of sub-contracting activities.
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labour and women's empowerment must be substituted for a more careful 
empirical examination of changes in economic systems and their impact on 
women's roles.
In a ground-breaking study on industrial sub-contracting in Mexico city, 
Beneria and Roldan (1987) illustrate how women are not part of an open 
labour market and do not have the same relationships to the means of 
production as men. Gender ideologies which identify women with certain 
characteristics such as docility, being secondary earners, tolerance, and men 
with attributes like restlessness and impatience, mediates production 
relations to create a demand for specifically female or male labour. Along the 
same lines, a study of black and minority women working in family enterprises 
in Britain reveals that labour power is gendered and that this determines the 
conditions under which women and men sell their labour power. "Women's 
domestic roles in reproduction (servicing the household and family) are 
articulated with roles in social production that generates wages" (Westwood, 
1988:4).
The Alliance Between Kinship and Gender Ideology:
Kinship and community relationships and idioms played a significant 
role in accessing sub-contracting work in the study community. Some tasks 
are subcontracted directly from a workshop to women. Many other tasks are 
allocated by a middlewoman, sometimes a relative of the workshop owner, 
who acts as a broker and gets a fee for her services. This reduces women's 
earnings. However, many of the women I interviewed emphasised the 
important role of a middle woman revealing how daily survival requires the 
maintenance of membership in social relations and community networks and 
in continuously nourishing a web of reciprocal arrangements. A form of 
"mutual indebtedness", noted by White (1994) in her study of Turkey, was 
also noticeable in the study community.
Karima, who is engaged in assembling upholstery tacks, comments on 
the important role of middle women. Her comments illustrate the patron-client 
relations operating in access to piece-work:
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"I now know the warsha, workshop, and I can go and get from it 
directly, but it is important to keep good relations with Om 
Hamid, the middle woman. The production pace of this work is 
not regular and during times of scarcity, if I have a good 
relationship with her, I will be sure that she will keep giving me 
as much work as I can take and not reduce my quota, tariiha.
The workshop owner, on the other hand, tries to be fair, and 
when production is slow, he reduces the amount given to 
everybody. You see, his aim is to help as many poor people as 
possible, but with Om Hamid, we have a special relationship, 
she also organises garrfiyya($), rotating saving associations, 
which my mother and I often join."
The owner/manager of one of the larger workshops producing
upholstery tacks explained how and why he sub-contracts to women.8 His
comment illustrates how socially constructed gender attributes are used in
determining employment patterns and how once tasks are labeled feminine,
they reinforce existing labour hierarchies. Piece-work, in this case talbiis
shamaasi, is defined as women's work because of their assumed
characteristics of patience, lack of mobility, ability to sit down on the floor for
long periods of time, endurance, and lack of responsibility for providing for
their families. His comments also illustrate the current dependence of this
type of manufacturing on cheap female labour, although this was apparently
not always the case.9
"We subcontract only to women, not to men. A man would 
suffocate, yitkhinr\  doing this kind of work with no movement, 
haraka. He has no khuP patience. Also, it would be aeeb, 
shameful, for a man to do a job that his wife is already doing or 
is known to be shugl niswsan, women's work. Besides, what is 
25 piasters a kilo. This cannot even pay for a man's cigarettes.
A man works because he has major responsibilities  We
8 See Landor 1994) for a detailed description of nail workshops in 1980 in one of the 
neighbourhoods where I carried out my research. What is striking to note in 
Landor’s account is that the process of talbiis shamaasi was then apparently 
carried out by men in these workshops and was not sub-contracted to women. A 
process of feminization of the task of talbiis shamaasi had obviously taken place 
within the span of a decade.
9 It is critical to note, however, that this dependence on female labour cannot be 
understood only by reference to women's gender attributes, but must also be 
related to an understanding of changes that are occurring to the male labour force.
As discussed earlier, one of the reason women are being driven into sub­
contracting work is due to the increase in male unemployment.
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sub-contract to about 100 women. Most are regulars and all are 
from the hitta, area/community. Women have always been 
engaged in this task, because there are no machines that can 
do it. It is only in the last ten years, that production has 
increased to the point where hundreds of women are working.
There are many workshops like us in the community. We try to 
distribute work fairly to women, to please them, niradeehom.
Each gets about 20 kilos every three days. We subcontract 
women directly for 25 piasters a kilo, without a middle woman.
Some of the sub-contracted tasks have always been defined as 
women's work, such as polishing metal objects. Others, however, such as 
sewing shoes, shughl suruugi, have only recently become feminised. The 
production of shoes has historically been a male task requiring highly skilled 
craftsmen, sanafiyya, who worked by hand. Sewing leather shoes was 
originally called, biyaz wi ibar, a skilled process of piercing the leather on a 
wooden mould and simultaneously sewing it. As leather sewing machines 
were introduced in the 1950's, this hand-made production slowly died out,10 
and was replaced instead by two mechanised procedures. The first is 
piercing the leather, and the other is sewing the shoes. Both tasks were still 
defined as skilled male jobs, a sarfa, and was carried out in workshops by 
men.
Over the past eight years, however, the high wages of skilled male 
workers, and the increasing cost of machines, induced workshop owners to 
cut down on costs by changing the division of labour, and shifting production 
from machine to hand sewn shoes. Shoes began to be sub-contracted out to 
women to be hand-sewn at home, and the task, of shughl suruugi was re­
defined as an exclusively female job. Once this occurred, it became quickly 
naturalised and everyone seemed to forget that in the very recent past, it was 
a skilled male task. The historical development of this task, demonstrates 
how "women's participation in a given labour process is affected not only by 
previously existent gender hierarchies and work histories, but it also
10 I was told that there were only two workshops in the four communities that still 
produce hand made shoes. The one I visited had only two older male craftsmen, 
who confirmed that the old form of producing shoes has practically disappeared.
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reinforces these and creates new labour hierarchies based on gender" 
(Beneria, 1987:14).
The manager of a workshop producing men's shoes explains why he 
subcontracts to women. The power of the ideology of domesticity, and of how 
kinship and charity idioms mediate work relations come through clearly in his 
words:
"There is increasing demand now on hand-sewn shoes, but if 
we continued with the old practice of biyaz and ibar, a shoe 
would cost 200 pounds and no one would buy it. The way we 
do it now, it sells for about 13 pounds. It would be too 
expensive for male workers to hand sew the shoes on the 
machines that imitate hand sewing. A s a n a fi would demand 
150 piasters per pair, whereas a woman will do it for only 50 
piasters. Men have no ruuh, patience/spirit, for these types of 
jobs anyway."
A particularly significant aspect of gender ideology is its power to not
only define certain areas as female as illustrated above, but more
significantly its power to act retrospectively to create amnesia about the
history of certain tasks. This comes through clearly in the following
comments of another workshop manager. His comments also reveal the
increased poverty of the whole urban working class, women and men, again
noting the crucial link between poverty, male under or unemployment and
female sub-contracting.
"You see, Shughl suruugi is not really a skilled job, it is really 
similar to what women do at home. They sew clothes for their 
family don't they? Moreover, life is now very difficult and there 
are many poor women who have no support. This is a way we 
can help them, nisaa^d il ghalaaba. I only give work to women 
in the community, who are like my family."
Research on export based manufacturing in several Third World 
countries suggests similar findings about how gender ideology creates a loss 
of memory that results in rationalising existing divisions of labour. Pearson 
illustrates how the redefinition of certain tasks in "world market" factories as 
women's work operates by likening it to domestic skills that all women are 
presumed to master. This "feminisation" of chores is used to justify the 
preference for female labour in completely "non traditional" tasks, such as
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assembling electronic circuits under microscope magnification, or some forms 
of soldering and welding, which are likened to sewing or embroidery 
(Pearson, 1994). However, as mentioned earlier, "feminisation" may occur in 
certain jobs and under certain conditions, but it is not necessarily an 
inevitable global trend (see Elson, 1996). Apart from hand-sewn shoes and 
upholstery tacks, none of the other sub-contracted activities that I witnessed 
represented a substitution of women for formerly male labour.
Some sub-contracted tasks are purely seasonal such as pickling 
lemon and assembling lanterns for Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting. 
Others are more regular throughout the year. Some women switch from one 
type of sub-contracting to the other, while others remain in the same type of 
work for many years. There are no opportunities for mobility or skill 
acquisition. The most that piece-workers can look forward to is a lateral move 
to a different and slightly more lucrative kind of sub-contracting. Very few 
women are able to make the shift from home-based worker to middlewoman, 
and thus increase their earnings, and possibly also their skills, since being a 
middle woman requires different types of skills and associations. The two 
women in my sample who were able to make this move were both relatives of 
workshop owners. Workshops, and middle women, sometimes keep written 
records of who they subcontract to.
Workshops usually maintain a network of about thirty women, 
depending on the size of the workshop. Individual middle women usually 
have about ten women in their circle. Most women get to know about these 
opportunities by word of mouth, and existing kin and non-kin networks in the 
community. Home-based workers are usually not direct relatives of the 
middle women or the workshop owners. The relationships nonetheless take 
on kinship overtones, as will be discussed below. White suggests the use of 
the term "fictive kin", to denote such relationships (White, 1994). Payment 
arrangements vary, but most women are paid on a weekly basis, either 
directly by the workshop, or through the middle woman.
In the study community, there is more demand by women for piece­
work than the workshops can actually supply, even in the new lines of sub­
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contracting like sewing shoes. This "crowding effect" means that
manipulating social relations to ensure that one gets a steady supply of work
under such conditions is thus an important feature of the organisation of
piece-work. Om Mahmoud, a married woman in her forties, comments on her
work in sewing shoes. Her comments reveal the complex alliances and extra-
economic relations underlying the social organisation of piece-work in
general, as well as the irregular nature of this specific task and its strict rules
of completion given that it is one component of an entire production process:
"I have been doing this for two years only, together with my 
daughter. My husband's income from the water authority is not 
enough to cover our expenses any more and I need to buy the 
trousseau, gihaaz, for my daughter. Attiat, my neighbour who 
works as the kummanda, middlewoman, lives in the same street 
and she gives me work day by day. It is very difficult, because 
we have to finish the work the same day, regardless of when we 
receive them. For example, She gave me eight pairs last night 
at 12 p.m. and wanted them the next morning. I spent all night 
doing them. It takes me about 25 minutes to do one pair. We 
are paid every Saturday, 30 piasters per pair for our labour, 
masna^iyya. But the work is not dependable. One week I make 
seven pounds, and one week I make 20...the work is available 
year round, but the end of the summer is a particularly busy 
season. I first saw women engaged in this work about 7 years 
ago, but there were few. There are so many more women now.
I know personally about 20, but I think more than half the 
women in this street do it. There are two middlewomen in this 
street. But the pay was higher before, women used to get 50 
piasters a pair, now we get only 30 piasters. The middlewoman 
must be making more money, but she is a resourceful, 
milahlaha, woman, a dallala, a door to door sales woman, whom 
we have known for years. She is from Upper Egypt, like us.
Further insights into the influence of middle women can also be 
gleaned from the comments of Om Aziza, the sister in law of a skilled 
shoemaker who owns a small workshop. Her explanation of how she herself 
became a middle woman distributing shoes, illustrates how women view 
piece-work with mixed feelings. The fact that piece-work is carried out at
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home and could be combined with domestic responsibilities11 renders it
attractive for some women. So did the limited range of acceptable job
opportunities for women in the study community, particularly uneducated
ones. Piece-work and self-employment in primarily retail vending and
marketing are the most culturally sanctioned forms of employment for
uneducated women. Waged work is considered degrading and low-status as
will be discussed later. So is domestic work-such as cooks and cleaners, for
richer households. Om Aziza comments:
"When my husband went to prison on charges of drug dealing, I 
found a job as a seamstress in a workshop in Harit il Yahuud, 
but the hours were too long so I left. My sister's husband, who 
has a small shoe-making workshop offered to give me some 
shoes to sew at home. It was a good job, because I could do it 
at home, be close to my kids, and no one can degrade me and 
say that I am a wage labourer in workshops, bita^t wirash (the 
implications of such a label is discussed later in this chapter).
This was three years ago. After a while, the load got too heavy 
so I started distributing to the women I knew and taught them 
how to do it. I take it from the warsha for 50 piasters per pair 
and pay the women 25 piasters per pair. 'I distribute about 300 
pairs a day, to seven women and go down twice a day to the 
workshop to return and get work. It is important that we return 
the work the same day, so that the sana^iyya in the workshop 
can finish the shoe. I distribute to women who I know are in 
need, such as Om Youssef, whose husband does not work, so 
when I have some extra, I give them to her. But the demand 
from women is so great, I have to let many of them down.
When work is slow, I give women who take from me permission 
to go take work from other middlewomen."
Sub-contracted women do not have official leave or holidays and, for 
many of the tasks, are expected to work regularly and continuously as long 
as work is available. In other words the "flexibility" of piece-work is often 
defined by the workshop owners, not by the women themselves. One of the
11 Such comments about women's desire for flexibility brings to the fore the on­
going debate about whether flexible work is inevitably detrimental to women's 
work. Elson makes the important point that flexibility must not be judged on 
previous standards of regular employment, which were more relevant to men 
anyway, but in relations to "the erosion of workers1 rights and their ability to 
organize in defense of those rights" (1996:42).
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criteria for middle women's choice of sub-contractees in some types of tasks 
is thus their "dependability", defined as their ability to keep working on a 
regular basis with no breaks, in practice, this means choosing very poor 
women who are in dire need of cash with little alternative options for 
generating it.
One of the few acceptable reasons for not receiving the finished work
on time is illness or personal circumstances, such as a family death.
Possession by an alien spirit was sometimes mentioned as a type of
"sickness" for which allowances for delays in work, or temporary halts, are
tolerated.12 A middle woman, whose usage of the pronoun, we, reveals that
she identifies more with the male workshop owner, rather than with the
female workers, explains:
"The shoes workshop depends on these women, so I have to 
make sure that they are worthy of their trust. I select women 
who are in need, who are trustworthy, not women who will take 
this lightly, yitdallacu, one day they work, and 10 days not. We 
cannot make allowances for this. Of course if a woman is very 
sick, I understand, and distribute her work to someone else until 
she gets better. Take for example Om Samir, poor thing, she is 
possessed, caleeha riih, who has made her not herself for the 
past two weeks. She cannot eat, cannot even speak, so how 
can I ask her to work? I gave her allocation to someone else, 
until she gets better."
While piece-work is an individual activity and each woman is paid 
individually for her work, it was common to see women working collectively in 
their homes. Often a neighbour would come in and join in the work for an 
hour or so and leave. What is important to note, however, is that not all 
women who are working actually get paid. Some women, are thought of as 
really working, biyishtaghalu, and others as only helping, biysa^du, or as 
passing time, biyitsalu. The women who are working are the only ones who 
get paid for the finished work. Others who are helping them, do so out of 
social obligation and community expectations of co-operation and reciprocity.
Women who are known to have no economic support from husbands such as 
divorcees or widows, or those whose husbands are not providing for them for
12 Spirit possession is discussed in chapter eight.
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a variety of reasons, were often "helped" in their sub-contracting work by 
other women.
Women volunteer their labour and maintain such relations of co­
operation, possibly because the pay for the work is so low and in anticipation 
of receiving the same kind of help from others, should they be in a similar 
situation of need. Given the precarious livelihoods of many of the families I 
studied such anticipation is not unfounded. Om Ashraf, a married woman 
living with her divorced sister in law and mother in law in the same household 
explains:
"The four of us, myself, my daughter, my sister- in-law and my 
mother-in-law work together attaching pins to carton sheets. My 
sister in law is the one who goes and gets her quota from the 
workshop down the street. She gets maybe 15 kilos or so a 
day. We all sit and do it together, but my daughter and I, we do 
not take any money from them. We are only helping them. My 
sister-in-law is unfortunate, her husband divorced her and left 
her with four children and no money. I am lucky, my husband is 
a skilled construction worker and makes good money... So I try 
to help them... Anyway it is tasliya, passing time, for us, it is 
only a few piasters."
Om Ashraf's comments also raise important questions about the extent to 
which women's time and money is more subject to appropriation in response 
to social demands than that of men’s.
“Symbolic Power” in Action”: The Euphemization of Piece-work
Although women saw some positive aspects of piece-work, there was 
a clear sense among all the women I interviewed that piece-work is also low- 
paying and extremely tedious. They used strong terms to describe their work 
such as, irshaha da^ iif, low paying, bitPtum it dahr, breaks the back, rabbina 
yikfiina sharaha, god save us from its evils, ta^ ab, tiring, ghulb, misery, and 
bites the finger. This latter is a complaint I can personally relate to as I spent 
many hours engaged in sub-contracting tasks with the women I interviewed. 
Although they appeared simple, in fact they required dexterity in holding the 
pliers or hammer in the right manner; even when one does, the hammer often 
slips and "bites" one's fingers.
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Most women recognised these negative aspects of the work. 
However, this awareness did not appear to have been translated into a 
feeling of exploitation by either the middle women or the employers. At the 
same time that women sometimes complained about the middle woman 
making too much of a profit off them, they were quick to emphasise how 
helpful and kind they also were, thus casting their relationships with them as 
essentially positive ones. Women's articulated grievances were thus not 
translated into any attempts to negotiate with middle women or organise 
action to change the terms of payment or conditions of work.
On the one hand, as illustrated, there was a high demand for piece­
work by poor community women partly due to the lack of alternative earning 
opportunities. Women thus fear that if they object to the terms of work, there 
will be many others who will take their place. It is noteworthy in this respect 
that the high demand for piece-work by women is also due to the lack of 
financially adequate, accessible, and gender sensitive social welfare policies 
by the government13.
The relative passivity of women vis a vis the middle women and their 
employers can also be explained in terms of the nature and workings of what 
Bourdieu terms symbolic power and symbolic violence, which results in a 
euphemization of social relations (Bourdieu, 1977). In his study of the link 
between power, authority and patterns of reciprocity and exchange among 
the Kabyle peasants in Algeria, Bourdieu illustrates how relations of 
domination are construed as beneficial and constructive social relations. His 
work is an important addition to the discussions on the nature and 
mechanisms of power and hegemony as it highlights how power operates, not
13 The norms that limit women's earning opportunities in the community are 
reinforced by a patriarchal State ideology of the family that regards men as 
economic providers and women as financially dependent on them. For example, 
pensions to women heading their households, such as widows and divorcees, 
many of whom are engaged in home-based piece-work, are extremely low. The 
assumption is that even if a husband is physically absent, a woman will be 
provided for by her male relatives, an assumption resembling that of women as 
secondary income earners and thus justifying lower wages to them. Moreover, 
many women find it difficult to access available social welfare benefits because of 
the complicated and intimidating bureaucratic procedures required (See El-Kholy, 
1996b).
215
only as an external force that must be maintained through coercion and 
repression, but also through more subtle ideological forms. Domination is 
practised and maintained through links and relationships that appear to be 
benign, or sometimes even positive. Bourdieu calls this process symbolic 
violence, "the gentle invisible form of violence which is never recognised and 
is not so much undergone as chosen, the violence of credit, confidence, 
obligation, personal loyalty, gifts, hospitality, piety—in short all the virtues 
honoured by the code of honour" (1977:192).
The relations underlying piece-work in Cairo, which embody a complex 
alliance between gender, kinship and market ideologies, can best be 
understood within this framework14. Although acknowledging many of the 
negative aspects of their jobs, women generally saw this as an unfortunate, 
but inevitable part of their life and fate as poor women. My research 
suggests that the mystification of some aspects of the relationships 
underlying piece-work works both ways, and is shared by both the women 
working as piece-workers as well as those employing them. The workshop 
owners and middle women I interviewed did not appear to perceive 
themselves as being exploitative, but rather as genuinely being charitable, 
helping the poor, musa^dit il ghalaaba, and extending alms to the 
impoverished, sadar’a, as good Muslims are expected to do.
This euphemization of piece-work, by both employers and employees, 
as passing time and helping the poor limits women's ability to contest their 
working conditions. Re-casting piece-work arrangements as benevolent and 
charitable, forging community solidarity, mutual help and reciprocity plays an 
important role in the lack of active protest to such arrangements. Piece­
workers are regarded, and regard themselves, as unemployed women in 
need of charity, not as members of the labour force. The power of gender 
ideology to create a collective loss of memory about the history of the division 
of labour, to naturalise social relations making them appear as what 
Bourdieu's would term "doxa"--that is, common sensical and beyond the
14 Many of the ideas of this section were developed in an earlier paper presented at 
the Regional Arab conference on Population and Development, December, 1996. 
See El-Kholy (1996a).
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realm of the contestable-, or to euphemize exploitative and unequal power 
relations, are vividly illustrated by the case of piece-workers in the community 
studied.
These arguments and findings support one of the few studies on home-based 
piece-work in the Middle East (White, 1994). In her pioneering study of 
ateliers and home-based workers in Istanbul, White finds that women's labour 
is closely linked to social and gender identity and to membership in social 
groups such as the family, and both kin and non kin networks. "In Turkey, 
women's identity is largely expressed through complex sets of relations that 
involve giving and receiving labour. Exchanging labour and services in social 
groups, such as the family and neighbourhood is crucial for women's social 
and economic survival" (White, 1994: 6). Women are under contradictory 
pressures to on the one hand contribute to family income, and on the other 
hand, not to work among strangers. Working as home-based piece-workers 
allows women and men to resolve this contradiction: they can generate 
income for their families, without violating the expectations of the family and 
prevalent codes of "proper" female behaviour.
White, thus similarly concludes that the low wages, lack of security 
and tedious aspects of home-based piece-work are naturalised, and 
"euphemised" as ones of kinship and expressions of community obligation 
and solidarity (White, 1994). in the Egyptian case, however, I would argue 
that piece-work also allows women and men to resolve another contradiction.
It allows the community to fulfil its expectations of assistance to needy 
women by offering them income-generating opportunities while at the same 
time reinforcing gender hierarchies by keeping women out of areas of skilled 
wage work, reserving the latter for men.
Contesting Working Conditions: "Workshop Girls"
The conditions of piece-work illustrates the power of gender and 
kinship ideologies which circumscribe women's ability to contest the terms of 
their employment. It would be premature, however, to draw any blanket 
conclusions on that basis about the strength of gender ideologies or the
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inability of women to bargain in the labour market. Another pattern of female 
employment that I discuss in this section illustrates that certain groups of 
women, at a particular stage of their life cycle, and under certain conditions of 
supply and demand, may deploy a range of public and private, collective and 
individual strategies to maximise their options, voice their discontent, and 
juggle the possible contradictions between marriageability and domesticity on 
the one hand and paid employment on the other.
My main argument in this section is that different forms of female 
employment-which often correspond to different points in their life cycle- 
embody different forms of power relations and thus leads to different patterns 
and forms of resistance. Thus, unlike piece-workers who represent a 
fragmented and docile labour force-despite their expression of discontent 
with piece-work arrangements--, wage labourers respond to their situation in 
a different way. Some appear to be engaged in a subtle process of 
negotiation that I characterise as "strategic trade-offs". Yet others may 
respond to their perceptions of unfair working conditions by an explicit, and 
gender specific form of revolt, termed namrada by workshop owners, which 
often takes collective forms.
My initial attempts to locate and gain access to workshops that employ 
women were frustrating. I was told by two of my key interviewees, that many 
girls were employed in such workshops, but that this would be a difficult area 
to explore in depth until I built stronger relationships in the community. 
Women do not admit to being employed by workshops, because wage labour 
is considered as degrading, low-status work. Wage labourers are referred to 
as banaat il wirash, literally "workshop girls/daughters", which has a 
condescending connotation among community members.
Moreover, many of the workshops employing women are located on 
the upper floors of buildings and are thus difficult to identify. Workshop 
owners later told me that they "hide" their workers partly to "protect the girls" 
given the low-status of such employment in the community. They also needed 
to protect themselves from government officials, particularly labour 
inspectors. Most such workshops are informal in the sense that they are
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unregistered or regulated by forma! laws and do not insure their employees. 
In the few workshops that registered their employees for social insurance, 
women workers, in particular, were not insured as they were considered an 
unstable labour force with a high turnover rate. Workshop owners/managers 
are thus very careful not to reveal their female employees to strangers.
In contrast, although it is also illegal to hire children below the age of 
12, I was struck by the prevalence and visibility of, mainly male, child labour 
and by the lack of attempts to conceal it.15 Women explained that if 
government officials come to check on workshops, it is easy to pretend that 
the boys are sons or relatives of workshop owners, "family" labour, which is 
outside of the domain of government regulation. It would also be easy to ask 
children to run into the streets away from the workshops if word goes around 
that an inspector is in the community. This would be more difficult to do with 
adult female labour.
Given this difficulty of gaining access to workshops, I decided to 
continue my research at the household level, until I was able to identify and 
build strong relations with women who are themselves employed in wage 
work. After several months in the field I was able to start exploring wage 
labour in greater detail. I visited 17 workshops and interviewed 26 women 
wage labourers, and 7 male workshop owners/managers. The workshops I 
observed, ranged from those employing 2 to 12 people and produced diverse 
products: lollipops and candy, make-up, hair accessories, jewellery,
furniture, electronic equipment, elastic bands, chalk, plastic utensils, socks, 
children's toys and ready made clothes.
The women I interviewed ranged in age between 13-23 years, with 
only three older women who were either divorced or widowed. The 
predominance of an age specific group-young, unmarried girls-in this 
particular type of employment contrasts sharply with the characteristics of 
those engaged in piece-work, married women with young children. This
15 For a discussion of child labour in Egypt, See Azer and El-Adawy (1994); Abdalla 
(1988).
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confirms the point made earlier about age and marital trajectories having 
gender specific implications in the labour market.
My interviews with workshop owners revealed a range of other gender 
specific factors that affected female employment. Ragab Samir, who owns a 
workshop which produces fake jewellery, has been in this business for 29 
years, climbing the traditional male apprenticeship ladder from being a sabi, 
unskilled helper, to a musaa i^d, semi-skilled helper, to a sanafi, skilled 
workman to a hirafi, higher level of skilled workman. Ragab’s workshop has 
five men and four girls, between the ages of 16 and 21, none of whom are his 
relatives. This workshop represents an interesting case study of the role of 
gender in structuring several aspects of employment, so I will present it in 
some detail here.
As in many workshops, there is a clear segregation of tasks by gender
in this particular workshop, which is a fairly large one consisting of three
rooms on the third floor of a dilapidated building. The four girls are engaged
in tasks referred to as finishing tasks, tashtiib wi takmiil. These include
attaching the false gems to the metal backing, beading and packaging. The
men, on the other hand, are engaged in the core of the work, namely,
producing the different parts of the accessories and attaching the metal
pieces. Ahmed explains why this gender division of labour is essential:
"The girls are assigned the work which requires a lot of 
patience. If the boys do this kind of work, they would get fidgety 
and the cigarettes they would smoke would cost more than what 
they would make. The men would not be able to sit quietly like 
this. They would start talking and make too much noise. The 
money that the men make for their tasks is much higher 
because men have obligations that are more important, and as 
a result they are naturally more skilled, tabiFt-hum ahraf. Girls 
will always remain the subyan, subyan il hirfa, the boys of the 
boys of the trade" (that is, at the very lowest chain of the skill).
The naturalisation of skills and aptitudes is clear in this comment. 
Ragab's comment below also reveals an interesting similarity between the 
greater value assigned to male labour and the preference and value attached 
to giving birth to sons, who can bear the family name, in this community as 
well as Middle Eastern societies more generally. Ahmed explains:
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"Girls are not as valuable to me as men. When a girl gets 
married, I have to ask her to leave the workshop, so 1 will be 
forgotten after a while. But a boy who is well trained will carry 
my name, as a highly skilled workman, hirafi. It will be known 
that he worked for me and was trained by me. He will always 
say my trainer was so and so, and my name will endure in the 
market, it will not disappear."
All the girls in the workshop are unmarried. This is not a coincidence,
but a condition for the employment of women that does not apply to men.
Ragab explains why he hires only single girls and does not allow them to
continue work after they get married. His arguments present a telling example
of how "truths" are created to effectively check women's labour mobility and
to keep them out of the skilled labour force. These truths become communal
cultural standards to which women also subscribe.
"I started hiring girls only about seven years ago, but only 
unmarried girls. Once they get married, they have to leave.
The boys can stay, but not the girls. You see, I have men and 
boys working here, and with married woman there could be 
greed, tamac, and problems, mashaakil. Once they get married,
1 can give them work to do at home on a sub-contracting basis.
I did that with several women who used to work with me as 
young girls."16
The use of space in Ragab's workshop is also vividly gendered. 
Similar to many other workshops I visited, there are significant variations in 
seating arrangements and space allocation based on gender. This partly 
reflects the low status of banaat el wirash, and is possibly related to the need 
to better control and monitor women's behaviour. The four girls sat side by 
side on a long wooden bench, in the same room as the manager. They were 
all wearing a higaab, a scarf that covers their head and neck, referred to in
16 Within this community and specific work context, workshop owners argued that 
married women pose a greater threat than unmarried virgins. Unlike unmarried 
women, they have already tried sex, so would be more easily tempted by the men 
in the workshops, who would themselves be also more daring in making a pass at 
them. Because married women do not face the same risks of being publicly found 
out it they have sex, as unmarried virgins would, they are thus assumed to be 
more daring and promiscuous. They have less "symbolic capital" to protect (see 
previous chapter).
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the literature as the veil or the new veiling17. There was a cassette player on
the manager's desk, which he switched on and off at will. The girls clearly did
not have the right to do the same.
The male employees, on the other hand, had a separate, larger room
of their own, with individual working tables and chairs and a cassette player
that they had control over. In the hours I spent in the workshop during
several visits, the men ordered tea, were joking and talking loudly, walked
around the workshop and had the cassette on, blasting music. The girls were
not offered, and did not order tea, and did not once get up from their bench. I
was intrigued that although Ragab admitted in his discussions with me that
men talk more and are rowdier than girls, he still felt the need to monitor and
supervise the work of the girls more closely, and as his comments below
reveal, even whip them occasionally. On probing this issue, Ahmed explains:
"These girls have been entrusted to me by their parents, they 
are an amaana, for safekeeping. So I have to make sure that 
they do not do anything improper like talk or joke with the men.
The work of girls is sensitive, you always have to keep an eye 
on them. I insist that they have to cover their heads properly 
and I hit them with a whip lightly on their hands if I see them 
acting in an improper way or if I hear a dirty word. The girls eat 
together during lunch time, and I eat with the men."
The terms and conditions of wage work clearly vary from workshop to 
workshop, but the above case illustrates some of the common features that 
have emerged from my fieldwork. Gender structures the terms and relations 
of employment in a variety of ways. First, there is a clear job segregation, 
with skilled and mechanised tasks offering job mobility being associated with 
men. In all the workshops I observed, certain tasks were clearly defined as 
female jobs and others as male jobs, with little exchange of tasks. A carpentry
17 Naema, a 17 year-old girl who I knew well and whom I accompanied to this 
workshop, wears her scarf only when she goes to work. The rest of the time at 
home and in the community, she does not wear it. Naema regarded the scarf as a 
uniform that she had to don when she goes to work, it was part of the deal, and 
she had not consciously thought about it. Macleod’s suggests that this "new 
veiling" in Cairo may be a form of "accommodating protest", and Hoodfar’s argues 
that veiling in Cairo can be seen as a private strategy to venture into the public 
sphere (see Macleod, 1990).
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workshop manager explains why only men work on machines in his
workshop, whereas women are involved in assembling furniture:
"Men prefer machines, it is much harder work. Men must feel 
they are sweating in their job. That is why they prefer to do the 
difficult jobs, not the light ones, haagat it khafiifa, like assembly.
After all, men have a command over women, it rigaal 
qawamuun cata it nisaaP (this is a verse from the Quran that is 
open to several interpretations, but which is commonly used to 
justify male superiority over women).
Second, there are also marked wage differentials in unskilled jobs. An 
unskilled male worker can make up to 7 Egyptian pounds (1.40 English 
pounds) a day, whereas an unskilled female worker would not make more 
than 3 Egyptian pounds (about 60 English pence) a day for the same job. 
Because female wage labour is so much cheaper, there is a high demand for 
it, which is not matched by existing supply. This situation contrasts with the 
case of piece-workers-where demand far exceeds the supply of work. Partly 
as a result, wage labourers are better able to negotiate their terms of work 
than piece-workers as will be discussed below.
Third, a common issue that emerged from my interviews relates to the 
existence of several forms of "sexual harassment" that both women and 
workshop owners were aware of. This is possibly because this type of 
employment is so looked down upon in the community. Forms of sexual 
harassment included complaints about offensive jokes, making passes, using 
dirty language, as well as actual physical molestation. Sexual harassment 
was one of the important reasons cited by several girls for quitting their jobs.
Zouba, a 45 year- old woman whose husband deserted her 20 years 
ago, has had extensive experience as a wage labourer in a range of 
workshops. She was one of the few once married women working in a 
workshop and had a reputation for being tough and un-intimidated by men. 
This was visibly reflected in what was considered her masculine looking body 
and walk. Zouba currently works in a workshop producing plastic utensils, 
where she is engaged in removing the extra plastic pieces from hangers, a 
process called tafsiis it rayish. She is the only woman in the workshop, which 
has five other men working on machines.
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Zouba works squatting on the floor in one corner of a four by four 
meter room with practically no ventilation. I spent many hours over a period 
of two weeks squatting beside her and helping her with her task. Throughout, 
the smell of the burning plastic fumes was suffocating and by the end of the 
two weeks I had difficulty breathing. The noise of the four machines, which 
worked non-stop from 10 a.m. to 11 p.m. except for a short lunch break, was 
also deafening.
These intolerable conditions, however, did not deter Zouba from 
working at an incredible pace. Because she is paid by her production rate (7 
piasters per kilo), she explained, every second counted, and every piaster 
counted as she was determined to ensure that her children live a decent life 
and get the best education. On a bad day, she makes about 50 kilos (LE3.5 , 
50 pence), and on a good day she can make up to 100 kilos (LE7 , a little 
over 1 sterling). Zouba comments on the issue of sexual harassment in 
workshops.
"Women are tested in workshops, for two things: honesty and 
properness. Money is left lying around on purpose to see if a 
newly recruited woman will steal it. Men make sexual 
advances, in the form of dirty talk and looks, to see how the 
women will respond. The men want to see if the woman is a 
cfa ,  sexually promiscuous/loose. It is up to the woman, 
however, to protect herself and prove to everyone that she is 
untouchable. The main rule is never to joke with the men.
Once you do that you will no longer be able to keep the limits."
After a I got to know her well, Zouba also volunteered information 
about her personal experience with harassment, as we were having lunch 
one day at a local cafeteria. She also explained how, many years ago, she 
decided to purposefully modify her own appearance to make herself look 
more masculine, astargil, in order to avoid harassment. She is not poorly 
groomed, her hands and palms are rough, she does not remove the hair on 
her arms or legs, and her gait is distinctly un-feminine by community 
standards. Zouba recalls:
"I was working in another plastic workshop three years ago. But 
I left because the men were bothering me, they were rude/dirty.
I was once cleaning under one of the machines and one of the
224
men stuck his foot in my ass. I was furious and screamed at 
him, but he laughed and said, did you really feel anything, I 
thought you were cold/frigid. I complained to the workshop 
owner but he did not believe me and said that this is a man who 
prays and cannot do such a thing, so I must be lying to him. I 
asked for my pay and left. Workshop girls witness these kinds 
of problems all the time.
Amal, who is now married to a labourer in an upholstery shop and has
two children, recalled with anger how she was harassed at her job in a
workshop producing elastic bands when she was an adolescent. Her
reactions are an excellent illustration of what Okely terms "moments of
defiance" (Okely, 1991).
"One of the men who works in the workshop used to whistle to 
me all the time. Then one day he grabbed my breasts. I 
screamed at him and when I went back next day, I took a knife 
with me and made sure that I always keep it hidden in my 
sleeve... A week later he grabbed my breasts again and I 
stabbed his hand with the knife. It was bleeding and people 
gathered. I told the usta what happened, and he reprimanded 
the man, but did not fire him. He never came near me again."
Fourth, as mentioned earlier, the utilisation of space in workshops was 
also clearly gendered. Women were assigned less space and were often 
working on the floor, whereas the men would generally have chairs. 
Moreover, women's space was usually much more closely monitored and 
regulated than men's space. These arrangements were most obvious in the 
shoe, socks, electronics and plastic workshops. They were less obvious in 
the carpentry and candy making workshops.
It is noteworthy, however, that only some of these aspects of gender 
discrimination, in particular wage levels and sexual harassment, were 
recognised as unfair and objected to by the women themselves. Others 
issues were identified by me, such as space allocation, regulation, control of 
dress and task segregation. Although I felt strongly about these issues, most 
of the women I talked to did not consider them as significant. This difference 
in perception of gender-based discrimination between myself and my 
interviewees is yet another example in support of one of the main arguments 
running throughout the thesis: prioritising or contesting different parts of one's
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social reality is partly based on one's specific socio-economic location and 
daily realities.
My interviews with workshop managers and my oral histories with older 
women in the community confirmed that female wage work has been 
increasing over the past 5-10 years. A state of poverty and inflation, il ghila, 
on the one hand, and attempts by workshop owners to lower production costs 
on the other were the main reasons given for this increase. One workshop 
owner explains:
"It is poverty that makes girls work in workshops", said one of 
my interviewees, "If a family is not in need why would she let 
her daughter work?. People are squeezed, mat-huuna, and 
tired, ta^baana, it is not like before."
By emphasising that women are working due to economic necessity,
workshop owners, however, are simultaneously reinforcing gendered
differences by confirming that women's work signals distress and is a sign of,
not progress, but community deterioration and decay. In a context where
masculinity, and male worth are so closely linked to being providers, one way
to maintain and reproduce gender hierarchies in a situation where men are
less able to provide for their families is to re-produce such ideals. One
workshop owner comments:
"Workshop work is no good", "would any girl opt to be known as 
bint il wirash, unless she has no choice. The fact that more girls 
are in workshops now is a sign of deterioration, tadahwur, not 
progress, tattawur
The links between waged work and poverty, as well as its low status
are also captured by Layla's shocked response to my question as to whether
she has ever worked before she got married and had her two children.
Looking offended, Laila whose father is a relatively well off, mabsuut,
wholesale fruit merchant says:
"Shame on you.. Work. What work? You think I am one of 
those girls of the workshops! Of course I have never worked 
outside the house, ever. My father never made me want 
anything, and when he died, my brothers continued to provide 
for us. They brought us a full marriage trousseau and married
us off Then, realising that I myself work as I had told her
about my previous work experience, she added: "Of course
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work is not bad. If one works like you with a degree and in a 
respectable place, that is fine. But if an uneducated woman 
works, (Layla left school when she was 12), her eyes are 
opened to a lot of things and she becomes bold, gariPa. If a 
woman is bold but ignorant, not educated, she becomes bad, 
wihsha, and can do wrong/improper things, hagaat ghalat. (She 
was referring to sexual behaviour in this context). No, thank 
god, we are not like other families. My father and brothers 
always provided for us and never made us in need of work."
A context of poverty, male underemployment and unemployment, and 
a rise in female-supported households provides the general framework for 
understanding the increase in female waged employment in this community. 
Within this context, the specific reasons that the working women gave 
themselves varied. An overwhelming number, however, cited preparations 
for marriage, in particular contributing to the costs of the trousseau, gihaaz,
as the main reason. As discussed in the previous chapter, the gihaaz, and
related inventory of furniture and appliances, the ayma, play a critical role in 
enabling women to improve their status and that of their families, to increase 
their marriage options, and to gain leverage vis a vis their husbands and 
mothers-in-law.
Samah is a pretty 17 year-old who works in a carpentry workshop 
assembling washing pegs and furniture. Her parents got divorced when she 
was 9 years old and since then both she and her mother have been working. 
Samah reveals her reasons for working, and her expectations of how working 
before marriage may enable her to make a "better" marriage, meaning 
marriage to someone able to provide for her. She was aware that many 
married women, including her mother who is a divorcee, are working to make 
ends meet, many of them as piece-workers, and she did not want to end up 
like that.
"I have been working in the same workshop for the past 8 years.
Even when I went to school I used to work in the vacations. I
left school in 1st prep, when I was 11 years old, because we
could no longer afford to pay for private lessons18, and I have 
been working full time here ever since, from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m.
18 The costs of education, particularly, as it relates to intra-household decision 
making will be discussed in chapter nine.
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every day. I am paid by my production rate, in a bad week I 
make 20 pounds (under 3 sterling), and in a good week I can 
make 30 pounds (5 sterling). I usually give 15 pounds or so a 
month to my mother to help with household expenses. The rest 
of the money I put in several saving societies, garrfiyya(s) 19, so
I can save for my marriage trousseau, gihaaz  This is the
main reason I am working. So far I have bought some of the 
"light" things, my set of "melamine"(plastic like set of cups and 
plates), and aluminium (washing basins, pots and pans), 
glasses and some sheets. But there are still other things like 
the fridge and gas oven that I want to buy.... Once my gihaaz is 
completed, I will stop working. I do not want to continue 
working after I get married. I want to relax/rest.... I hope that I 
will find a husband who will provide for me, appreciate me, 
yPadarni, and compensate for the hard times I have seen, 
yFawadni" She then adds bitterly: "is it not enough that I have 
worked as a girl, will I also have to work when I get married? "
Aziza, a 20 year-old who works in an electronics workshop echoed the
same sentiments.
"I used to work in a clothes workshop in another community, but 
I quit because I was harassed in the bus. Men used to come 
and stand very close to my back and I would hate that feeling, 
but could not say anything. I thus moved to this workshop 
which is near my house, i make about 20 pounds a week, 
which is less than I used to make at the other workshop, but at 
least I am not bothered in transportation. I give my mother 5 
pounds to help with our expenses at home, and the rest goes 
into two garrfiyya(s), one of which I am organising. I am saving 
for my gihaaz. I bought many things and I will stop when I finish
buying what l need and get married. It was my decision to work.
But it is enough, I want to relax, astirayyah.
Aziza's comments also illustrate a more general finding that 
adolescent wage labourers, particularly older ones, have some control over 
their income, and also often take the decision to work themselves. Like
Samah and others, some of Aziza's wages go to her mother (it is
predominantly the mother who has access to the girls' wages, not the father,
19 c~The role of gam iyya(s) as a socio-economic support network for women is 
discussed in chapter nine.
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even when it is not a female-headed household). Aziza manages, however,
to keep about half of it to herself, to spend according to her own priorities.20
Other reasons that women mentioned for working were paying for the
education of a younger sister or brother, helping out with household
expenses or paying the costs of a major medical operation. In most cases,
however, unlike piece-workers who saw themselves engaged in these tasks
for a long time to make ends meet, banaat el wirash were more goal-oriented
and saw their jobs as terminating once they reached this goal. As mentioned
earlier, the goal in most cases is preparing a marriage trousseau. Like
Samah and Aziza, most of the girls I interviewed did not want to work after
they got married.21 There were very few exceptions. Nasra, a bubbly 19 year
old who works in a socks workshop is one of them. Although she is also
working primarily to complete her trousseau, she stressed that she enjoys her
work and would continue working after marriage if her husband allowed it.
"I like my work. It makes me feel as if I am worthy and doing 
something meaningful, liyya i^ima. I feel that I am alive when I 
go to work and talk to people. I want to keep working after I 
marry. Work is not shameful even if a woman is rich, mabsuuta 
and her husband provides for her, mikafiiha. Nasra then quoted 
a popular Arabic rural proverb: "If your are poor work to help 
yourself, if your are rich work to get more gold (an investment 
for the future), Ya fa^ iira rudiih cala halik, ya ghaniyya teFili biih 
khulkhaalik
20 This type of individual income retention and control is counter intuitive in the 
Egyptian context given the strong suggestions about family income pooling, which 
emerge from the limited number of intra-household studied in Egypt. This finding 
is similar, however, to suggestions from Java, Indonesia, where research on 
female factory daughters showed that they controlled a sizable amount of their 
income, and that much of their wages did not go into general household expenses, 
but was invested in rotating saving associations through which substantial sums of 
capital was accumulated (See Wolf, 1990).
21 This finding contrasts sharply with Ibrahim's study of factory workers in the early 
1980's where she finds that single girls acquired a deep sense of self-identity 
through their jobs and were likely to continue work after they got married 
(B.Ibrahim, 1985). This difference is possibly related to the different nature of work 
conditions, labour relations and status of jobs in the formal and informal sectors.
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The previous section illustrated the role of gender in structuring the
terms and conditions of waged labour and highlighted some of the areas
around which women expressed their discontent. It also illustrated the
contradictions and inter-relations between work and marriage choices.
Female wage labour emerges as a low-status, disreputable job that could risk
a girl's (and her family's) reputation and affect her marriageability, a universal
goal for women in the community and a critical component of their definition
of womanhood. At the same time, accumulating a large gihaaz, one of the
main reasons banaat el wirash work, also increases a girl's marriageability,
and increases her and her family's status. One of the main problems that
banaat el wirash have to continuously confront is gossip in the community,
kalaam il naas. When someone proposes to a wage labourer, there is a lot of
talk, and her reputation may be questioned. What is similarly being
questioned, of course, is the economic standing of her family. Om Sanaa
talks disdainfully about her son's plan to propose to a girl who works with him
in a metal workshop:
"Can you believe it! He wants to get us one of those girls who 
grew up in workshops and who do not know right from wrong.
These girls have poor manners, and who knows what they do 
with men all day long in the workshops. He can do as he 
pleases, but I warned him, she will not make him comfortable, 
mish hatrayyahu. He will not be able to control her, yihkumha" 
(meaning both sexually and otherwise).
Given this common perception of wage work, how do women manage 
the risks involved, given that many have to work in order to acquire a gihaaz2 
How do women manage the risks for them, and their families, of acquiring a 
poor reputation in a context where reputation is a critical resource for 
survival? How do they attempt to ward off the hazardous possibility of not 
being considered "marriageable" in a context where marriage is an 
unquestioned central part of identity? What options do women have for 
carving a space for themselves to work as wage labourers while at the same 
time ensuring their respectability? Given women's awareness of some of the 
unfavourable aspects of wage work, are they able to challenge employment
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terms and conditions, or are they, like piece-workers, so constrained by the 
workings of gender and kinship ideologies that they are unable to protest?
My field work suggests that due to a complex combination of socio­
economic, and personal factors, banaat el wirash are generally able to, and 
often do, contest some aspects of their situation or attempt to expand their 
options. The previous discussion illustrated some of these "moments" of 
defiance, such as temporarily covering one's hair or stabbing an intruder with 
a knife. The discussion that follows elucidates two further practices, which in 
different ways, and at this specific point in time, act to mitigate the perils to 
reputation that waged work entails, or to challenge some of its perceived 
injustices. These are: public defloration ceremonies, laf bil sharaf, which 
literally means public display of a girl's honour, as well as the related hymen 
replacement operations; and a form of female rebellion, termed namrada by 
workshop owners, which connotes unjustified revolt, and is often of a 
collective nature. I discuss each in turn.
Managing the Risks of Wage Labour: "Strategic Trade-offs"
Defloration, or deflowering, refers to the process of rupturing the
hymen of a virgin through intercourse. Because of the importance of virginity
in Egyptian culture, it is customary, particularly, among rural Egyptians to'
deflower brides manually, rather than through regular intercourse. This ritual,
reportedly much less prevalent in urban areas, is performed by either the
husband himself, or a traditional mid-wife, a daaya. There is practically no
research on this topic. Khattab's study of women's perceptions of sexuality,
based on a sample of 42 women in two villages in lower Egypt, provides one
of the few studies which discusses this ritual (Khattab, 1996). She describes
the process as follows:
"The hymen is torn by inserting the forefinger enfolded in a 
white handkerchief into the outer vagina of the bride pushing 
hard until the hymen is ripped off and the blood oozes out on a 
handkerchief... Guests wait quietly outside the house until one 
of the women assisting in the deflowering comes out with the 
handkerchief soaked with the blood evoked by tearing the 
hymen. Once the handkerchief is shown, cries of joy, zaghariit,
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are heard everywhere and the singing and dancing of female 
friends and relatives starts (ibid:23).
What is the relevance of this practice in Cairo and how does it link to 
informal sector employment which is the concern of this section? This link 
was initially far from an obvious one. I only started perceiving a possible 
connection after I was invited to attend the deflowering ceremony of Samira, 
and started discussing this practice, its meaning and temporal development, 
with her and other women in the community. Samira, who has been involved 
in wage work since she was .13, is a 23 year old woman born in Upper Egypt 
but raised in Cairo with whom I became very close.
I was invited as an "honoured guest" to attend Samira's defloration, 
which was carried out by her husband himself, not, by a daaya. However, a 
daaya, Samira's mother, mother-in-law, a maternal aunt and myself were also 
present in the room. Samira's intense fear and embarrassment showed 
through her heavily made up face, but she lay down submissively on the 
gilded bed without uttering a word. Her mother helped push up the rented 
white wedding gown up to her knees and took her underpants off. The daaya 
and her mother-in-law then each held a leg and spread them apart, and her 
husband wrapped a white handkerchief around his forefinger and 
approached her.
I was standing in a corner at one end of the room, and turned around 
so as not to face them. I heard Samira screaming, then her mother-in-law 
shouting to her son: "push harder, and a little lower". More screams from 
Samira, and then quiet sobs. In what seemed like an eternity, but was 
actually only a few minutes, the daaya then shoved us all out of the room, 
except for Samira and her mother. Samira's husband and mother-in-law, 
faces beaming and holding the mahaarim (the white handkerchief soaked 
with fresh blood), and myself, feeling quite sick to my stomach, came out of 
the room to a crowd of people, mainly women, who started crying with joy. 
The crowd of over thirty people then left the house, one of them holding the 
mahaarim up high. They were joined by others, including more men, as they 
started walking in a procession through the streets beating drums and crying
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cries of joy, zaghariit In a daze, I slowly walked back to my car which was
parked at the entrance of the community.
I went to visit Samira a week later and found her with her mother,
grand mother, and a number of other female relatives of different age groups.
I initiated a conversation on defloration practices, asking how Samira was
feeling. A lively discussion ensued. Although I had discussed defloration
with women before, it was only through this encounter that I began to glimpse
how public defloration may act to provide unmarried women more choice in
deciding to work in specific jobs. Samira admitted that it was a very painful
and unpleasant experience, but was emphatic about its importance, even
though her husband did not insist on it.
"I have been working for years, staying out till late and I do not 
want any one to yFaayirny; belittle/humiliate me. My work was 
important to me and I learnt a lot about the market and made 
good money, but I have to prove to everyone that I am a
respectable woman  Going around with my sharaf improves
my family's reputation and affirms their honour and status, 
shuhra lil ah I. I know that Cairenes, il masarwa, do not do this 
like us, but people in this community do not all know each other 
and there is a lot of gossip, so people need to know a good, 
kiwayyisa girl from a bad, wihsha, one.... This is the price, 
taman, for my ability to work all these years before I got 
married."
I was quite struck by Samira's interpretation and the bluntness of her 
argument. I pursued this lead about perceiving public defloration as a price 
for waged work as I continued to acquire more information about defloration 
practices and experiences. Women often used less blunt and explicit terms 
than Samira, but I found that her interpretation, which seemed to imply the 
concept of a trade-off, found resonance and was echoed in different ways by 
many of the women I interviewed.
Defloration practices in the study community are defined as either 
dukhla baladi, inaccurately translated as traditional defloration, or dukhla
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afrangi, western/foreign defloration.22 The main difference between them is
whether or not someone, other than the bride and groom, is present in the
room when the deflowering takes place, and the manner of defloration,
manually or through intercourse. In the baladi style, a daaya or other female
relatives are present, and one of them or the husband deflowers the bride
manually. Both ceremonies, however, are usually followed by a festive,
public ceremony to show off the honour, known as, lafbil sharaf.
According to my oral histories, the public ceremonies to display the
"honour" of a bride takes on a much more elaborate and public form in Cairo,
than used to be the case in rural areas. This more elaborate form, however,
appears to have become entrenched in the community as a new "tradition",
cu/f. Such "re-invention" of tradition can possibly be conceptualised as a
form of urban adaptation by rural migrants to the anonymity and changing
conditions in urban areas which, among other things, requires single girls to
work in waged work alongside unrelated males. In rural Upper Egypt, the
origin of the majority of my respondents, girls do not normally go out after
puberty and it is known who belongs to which family, so there is less concern
for public affirmation of honour, beyond the two immediate extended families.
The comparisons women provided between defloration practices in
rural and urban areas, based on their own personal experiences, lends
strength to this argument. Samira's grandmother recalls her own experience
with defloration, which was a baladi one, but did not involve public display
beyond the household.
"El laf bil sharaf ^eeb fif Saciid, public display of honour is 
shameful in Upper Egypt. People know and trust each other and 
exaggerating the ceremony and importance of a dukhla means 
lack of trust. Also, this public display can cast a spell on the
22 There are many permeations to the actual practice, which makes an easy 
distinction between dukhla baladi and dukhla afrangi difficult. My observations 
and discussions suggest at least four variations: dukhla baladi with public
ceremony, dukhla afrangi with public ceremony, dukhla baladi without public 
ceremony, dukhla afrangi without public ceremony.
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bride, tishahirha23 You see, if an infertile woman sees the 
sharaf of another woman, she can get pregnant, but at the same 
time she casts a spell on the woman whose sharaf was public 
and makes her infertile. This happened to one of our 
neighbours, itkabasit fi dukhiit-ha, became infertile on her 
wedding night, and now will have to see the sharaf of another 
woman in order to become pregnant."
Om Mohammed, a relative of Samira who is in her fifties, reiterated
this reasoning and emphasised how the laf bil sharaf has become much
more elaborate since they migrated to Cairo.
"There was no daaya in my dukhla in Upper Egypt. It was just 
he and I, and then he went and showed the sharaf to our 
families. But when my daughter Magda got married, it was 
different. There were drums and people walked with her sharaf 
until dawn. Her brother even took a picture holding the sharaf 
(referring to the blood stained handkerchief), which I still keep.
Magda used to work in workshops outside this community. We 
have to cut people's tongues (stop gossip), niksar kalaam il 
naas.
Om Mohamed then told me about a woman who was working with her
for six years in paper recycling workshops and who got married last week.
She was 30 years old and still bint binuut, a virgin, when she left work to get
married. Her family had a big dukhla baladi with a public ceremony and they
took her sharaf and made a big celebration, zaffa in the community. A
woman's sharaf is good, hilw, explained Om Mohamed. In response to my
question as to whether this was in anyway considered by community women
an unfair practice or as humiliating to the bride, Om Ahmed replied:
"The most important thing is for a woman to find an opportunity 
to work and make money. This girl, god bless her, when she 
got married, was able to get a full gihaaz and four gold bracelets 
and a fridge. Her husband also got her two bracelets and the 
bedroom, but she got everything else for herself from her work.
She will be like a queen in her house now."
23 Mushaahara is a wide spread indigenous belief involving casting a curse or spell 
which makes women infertile or which reduces the milk of lactating mothers. For 
more on this concept and it's relationships to perceptions of health, see Sholkamy 
(1996).
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Om Ahmed evaded a direct response to my question, but her 
comments are revealing as to what she considers as priorities for a woman, 
having a large gihaaz which plays an important role in increasing one's 
command in marriage as well as one's status and respect in the community. 
Because this can sometimes only be achieved through working, expanding 
one's options for respectable employment prior to marriage was thus critical. 
The status of families in the community and their honour is clearly negotiated 
and displayed by both a girl's virginity, but just as importantly, by the size of 
her gihaaz. Once again, the notion of trade-off between these two status 
conferring practices seems to be implied in Om Ahmed's comments.
Generally the type of ceremony is based on what the bride and her 
family want. The bride’s family usually insists on an elaborate dukhia baladi 
with iaf, if the bride has a history of working as a wage labourer, even if the 
groom does not want one. Attiyat, a 40 year old woman who distributes 
shoes on a sub-contracting basis to women told me that she was married in 
rural lower Egypt and a daaya deflowered her, but the sharaf was taken 
outside of the bedroom and shown only to members of the two families who 
were present outside the door. There was no public procession. Her 
younger sister, who was employed by workshops since they moved to Cairo, 
was also married last year in the village. They did not go around with her 
sharaf in the village but brought the mahaarim back to the neighbourhood in 
Cairo where her sister lives and roamed the streets with it. Attiyat 
emphasised the extent to which workshop girls are criminalized by community 
standards:
"It is in Cairo, in the community where my sister grew up, 
worked and will continue to live that we must prove that she is 
innocent. It is exactly like a criminal who has to prove that he is 
innocent. The dukhla baladi and public ceremonies, 
preserve/protect a girl, bitihfaz il bint If some one talks about 
her you can put your finger in her/his eye."
There are suspicions in the community, however, about the genuine 
nature of the process of defloration. To remove any doubt, some women thus 
insist that they keep the door open when being deflowered. Om Sabah, who 
used to work in a workshop assembling carton boxes comments:
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"My defloration was very painful, it was as if someone pierced 
my eye... But I am the one who insisted. We do not think this is 
against women's rights and things like that24. I am proud that I 
had it done this way and that I kept the door open. You see, we 
hear of people who do it afrangi and then they display blood 
that is not really the blood, you know pigeon blood and things 
like that... So keeping the door open is more proof, and is even 
more honourable for the family, tisharaf wi titawil rabbit il ahf. I 
also had a Christian woman in the room with me, she is a 
neighbour, so no one can say she is a direct relative and will 
cover up. My mother wrapped the sharaf around her head and 
went dancing in the streets with it."
It is worth mentioning at this point that religious discourse, largely
articulated by men in the community, and which is playing an increasingly
important role in Egyptian culture, does not endorse the practice of dukhla
baladi and the public display of sharaf. In fact, the dukhla afrangi, was
sometimes termed dukhla Sunni, meaning religiously sanctioned. The
insistence of many women about performing an elaborate dukhla baladi must
thus be appreciated as a palliative against possible family dishonour even
though they know it is being increasingly condemned by religious authorities
in the community, which many both fear and respect. The continuation of
public defloration in this context shows how economic realities may override
religious sanctions. It also illustrates how women can create, or undermine
family honour and status not just through their sexual behaviour, which has
been the main focus in studies of the Middle East, but also through material
practices such as the gihaaz.
Om Sanna explains how she insisted that her working daughter
undergoes a dukhla baladi with laf, last year although her own experience in
the village was different, and despite the disapproval of her son-in law.
"In my case in the village, the man (read her husband) took my 
card (read deflowered her) himself and there was a pot of water
to wash his hands in and that was that. No laf. But my
daughter's wedding night was different. I insisted that a daaya
24 The reference to women's right is I suspect due to this woman's perception of my 
views on the subject and her depiction of me as an urban "westernized" woman 
who probably viewed this practice as barbaric and against women's rights. I say 
perception, because although I personally felt quite shocked by the practice, 1 
actually did not discuss my feelings.
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go in with them and that we go around with the sharaf in the 
streets.... My daughter worked in a socks factory for many 
years...We were able to provide her with a valuable/proper 
gihaaz mcPtabar, but we have to cut people's tongues... My 
son-in-law is religious, he belongs to a tariPa, a Sufi order, and 
was very angry and said that this is not right and is against 
Islam. He even got me a sheikh to the house to convince me.
But I insisted. This way she brought us honour, tawwilit 
rsPbitna, with both her large gihaaz and her sharaf (i.e.: public 
display of her virginity."
Om Ahmed, a 45 year old widowed Cairene who works in the same
sock factory as Om Sanna's daughter, is one of the few women in my sample
who had a dukhla afrangi with no laf. Om Ahmed started working only eight
years ago, several years before her husband passed away, to help pay for
the education of her children. She had attended Om Sanna's daughter's
wedding, and witnessed her public defloration ceremony. Her comments
highlight the significance of regional origin, the possible role of defloration as
a specific form of urban adaptation by recent rural migrants and the
relationship between Islamic sanctions and defloration.
"Some women in Cairo now have a dukhla afrangf5, even if they 
work before marriage. It is only the Sacayda who live in Cairo 
that still have the dukhla baladi because they are not used to 
women going out.... If they have worked in workshops, this is of 
course worse...But they now say the dukhla baladi is haraam, 
religiously forbidden. My brother-in-law lived in Saudi Arabia for 
7 years and he told us that it is religiously forbidden because it 
is haraam for anyone, even another woman to see any part of a 
woman over her knees."
To guarantee the smooth operation of the public rituals of defloration, 
however, mechanisms are in place to ensure that women who may not be 
virgins are protected in the process. Hymen replacement surgery, known as 
taPiP (literally patching), offers one such mechanism. Hymen replacement 
emerges as a largely urban phenomenon that is catering to the re­
enforcement and entrenchment of public defloration rituals as an important
25 The data does suggest that recent rural migrants from upper Egypt tended to be 
more emphatic about the dukhla baladi and the laf if a girl has worked before 
marriage, than those originally from Cairo. However, most of the latter in my 
sample, had also had public defloration processions.
238
"tradition" largely among recent migrants to the city. None of the older women
recalled that this type of operation existed in their villages, although other
forms of "cheating" were known to exist. Interviewees, however, were quick
to tell me that they knew of several women in their community who underwent
this operation. They generally made excuses for them and did not consider
them as prostitutes, or necessarily disreputable. They had only made a
"mistake", ghalta. What appeared important is not that they were not virgins,
but that this fact, this ghalta, was not publicly recognised.
"They make operations here to repair the hymen, tar'iF, all the 
time. We hear and see a lot... If a doctor is clever, the daaya 
will not find out; but if he is not, it can be easily detected. In the 
village, there are none of these operations. If they hear a girl is 
like that they bury her alive.... Dr. Samir's nurse just told us 
about a woman who had the operation last week. She is getting 
married next month, and no one will find out."
I was directed to Dr. Samir, who performs these operations in one of 
the four neighbourhoods I visited but was unable to identify, and thus 
interview, any of the women who actually underwent the operation. The 
following discussion is thus mainly based on my interviews with Dr.Samir and 
his nurse, Amina. My entry point to Dr.Samir's surgery was through his 
nurse, who one of my interviewees knew well. We first met in Amina's house 
for an informal chat, and then later met her at the clinic where we also had a 
quick discussion with the doctor. Because of the personal introduction, they 
were both quite open and frank with me, despite the obvious culturally illicit 
nature of their activities.
Dr. Samir, a general practitioner, has been operating a polyclinic in 
this neighbourhood since 1985. He personally performs both abortions and 
hymen replacement surgeries. The costs of hymen replacement operations 
vary depending on their nature. The simplest one, which is done to women 
who are getting married within a week or so, costs about 200 Egyptian 
pounds. The more complicated one that can last for months costs about 500 
pounds. Dr. Samir emphasised, however, that both were medically simple 
operations that take no more than half an hour. Women are given a mild 
form of general anethsesia and operated on in the clinic. They leave in a few
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hours. Last week, two operations were performed, one on a woman from 
outside the neighbourhood.
Amina, born and bred in this particular neighbourhood, provides Dr. 
Samir with access to the women who need the surgery. People trust her and 
she is known to be discreet. Amina sees herself as providing a service to 
women, who may have made a mistake, ghalta, or may have been drawn into 
a pre-marital relationship because they were naive and did not know any 
better.
"I am providing a service for women so that they are not found 
out and scandalised, yitfidhu, on their wedding night, if anything 
is wrong. I do not ask any questions. It is not our business.
The public dukhla is a big festival, mahragaan, in this 
community.26
One of the central questions that emerges from the previous 
discussion is why it is that the dukhla baladi remains so entrenched even 
though it is well known that female virginity can be faked. I argue that part of 
the reason is that the rhetoric and rituals of proving virginity are themselves 
gendering processes which reinforce the separateness and differentiation 
between men and women, publicly affirming male superiority and their 
authority and command over women. In the context of the. study community, 
where men's masculinity is clearly threatened due to economic deprivation, 
as discussed earlier, the entrenchment of these rituals may thus also serve 
as "compensatory mechanisms" which reinforce gender hierarchies and male 
dominance.
What I have been suggesting so far is that women's insistence on an 
elaborate public defloration ceremony, despite its trauma, may be possibly 
interpreted as a trade-off, which enables some women greater mobility, more 
lucrative employment, and an ability to generate an income to purchase a 
significant gihaaz. The gihaaz, in turn, and as discussed in the previous 
chapter, is an essential component of women's ability to negotiate in their
26 I did not ask the doctor why and how he chose this particular community to open 
his practice in. I also wanted to find out more about the women who seek his clinic 
and his perception of changes in numbers over time, but was unfortunately not 
able to carry out another interview with him or the nurse.
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future marriages, and to increase the status of their families. Clearly, I am not 
arguing for a direct or mechanical link between the presence of the laf in 
defloration, whether afrangi or baladi, and waged work. The situation is more 
complicated and there are many variables involved. Public defloration 
ceremonies are practices with multiple meanings, meanings which may 
evolve through time, and may be interpreted and appropriated in various 
ways by different women and men, based on individual, familial or regional 
variations.
For example, as discussed earlier some women (only three, and all of 
whom were originally from Cairo) did not practice this ritual even though they 
were employed by workshops prior to marriage. Moreover, waged work is by 
no means the only context in which public defloration ceremonies were 
considered desirable. My research shows that it was practised by other 
women who may not have worked as wage labourers, but who for various 
reasons were perceived to be exposed to possible perils which could 
compromise their reputation. Specifically, there were two other contexts 
where public ceremonies were deemed necessary. The first was in cases 
where a bride's father has been away for a long time and a girl has been 
brought up by her mother, without the continuous guardianship or control of a 
man. The second is when an engagement has been extended for several 
years, during which the groom has been known to frequently visit a bride and 
spend time alone with her.
While recognising the multiple meanings and contexts of public 
defloration rituals, I suggest, nonetheless, that one possible and plausible 
interpretation of public defloration ceremonies is that they act as a type of 
what I have termed "strategic trade-off". As a trade-off, public defloration 
ceremonies allow women to pursue their choice to engage in wage work in 
order to achieve a certain material goal and yet affirm their respectability, 
honour and reputation, by submitting to certain practices that they may 
otherwise find traumatic or painful. Not only did I detect a discernible pattern 
suggestive of this link, but, perhaps more significantly, many women 
themselves explicitly articulated a perceived connection between wage work
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and this type of defloration. Women who did not engage in wage work before 
marriage definitely had more choice as to what type of dukhla they would 
have, whereas for those who did work, an elaborate public defloration 
ceremony was almost always a necessity. The main point to stress here is 
that for a certain group of women in Cairo, this was one way to create some 
areas of latitude to accommodate the contradictory demands of respectability 
on the one hand and more leverage in their marriages on the other, through 
the accumulation of a "proper" gihaaz.
It is possible to venture that the gendering practice of public 
defloration gains a specific meaning as the price for enabling women to work 
in informal sector workshops. It acts as a culturally endorsed, and class 
specific signifier of family "respectability", while addressing women's need to 
earn an income in the context of increasing economic pressures. In her study 
of the new veil among more middle class women in Cairo, Macleod (1992a,b) 
suggests that the women she interviewed resorted to other “traditional” 
signifiers, such as wearing the veil, to demonstrate their worthiness while 
allowing them to work, a process she terms "accommodating protest". The 
elaborate public rituals of displaying a bride's sharaf amongst the women I 
interviewed may not mean the same thing, and unlike veiling, it was 
challenged to some extent by conservative Islamic voices in the study 
community, it is nonetheless interesting to contemplate possible parallels 
between the two practices as responses, at this historical juncture, to the 
societal restrictions on women in a context where the material basis of male 
dominance is disintegrating, and where women's wages are becoming 
increasingly necessary for the survival of households.
While women engaged in wage labour may resort to a practice such 
as public defloration ceremonies as a means to work while maintaining their 
(and their family's) reputation, this tells us little about whether, and how, they 
are able to challenge the unfavourable working conditions in workshops. My 
data illustrates that workshop girls are often vocal about their concerns, and 
many take concrete steps to negotiate better terms, often in a collective
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manner. In what follows, I discuss one form of female protest, termed 
"namrada" by workshop owners, which I came across in my research.
Overt Protest: Namrada
Namrada (which literally means rebellion or revolt, but connotes
unjustified, ungrateful behaviour), was the term used by several workshop
managers to describe forms of female protest. It was clearly a gender
specific term. Men did not yitnamradu, they were considered more loyal to
the workshops than women. Workshop owners often complained that women
were ungrateful and had a higher rate of turnover than men. The areas of
most vocal protest revolved around wage levels. Women overtly, and often
collectively, articulate their desire for higher wages to the workshop owner. If
he does not respond, a common strategy is to quit work in groups of two or
three, without giving notice, so as to cause maximum disruption. This was
contrasted to men's behaviour, who even if dissatisfied, rarely quit en masse.
A workshop manager recounts how three of his "best" women, whom he had
trained for three years, quit without notice last week: Half jokingly he says:
"I had a coup d'etat, inqilaab, in my workshop last week." Then 
more seriously he adds:" One of the girls wanted a higher pay, 
itnamradit. I refused because I feel I am fair to her and what I 
am giving her is more than enough. She left last week, and was 
able to take with her two other girls. They were two of the best 
ones, whom I had trained for years, but they also itnamradu."
I later identified one of the girls and found that the three of them had 
moved to another workshop at the end of the same street where they had 
managed to negotiate slightly higher pay.
Samah, Aziza and Mervat, neighbours, have been working in a 
workshop manufacturing toys for three years, after they left primary school, 
mainly to save for their gihaaz. They voiced their dissatisfaction with pay 
levels, their decision to leave collectively, and their ability to negotiate for 
better terms:
"The owner used to delay payments, and sometimes reduce our 
weekly pay for no reason, kan biyakulna fil abd. He had also 
not given us a raise for three years. We were still paid 15
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piasters for each piece we finish, while other workshops give 20 
and 25 piasters per piece. We asked for a raise, but he refused.
So we agreed amongst ourselves not to go back after the feast 
holiday. We went to another workshop, but the people were 
rude and the usta used to insult us. We stayed there two 
months, and in the meantime, the owner of the old workshop 
convinced us to go back and promised to increase our pay. We 
agreed and we now take 20 piasters per piece."
Nehmedou, 19 years old and her sister of 16, both working in an
electronics workshop (assembling recycled earphones), echoed this theme of
female solidarity in their negotiations, highlighting the trade-off they made
between sexual harassment and wage levels:
"My sister and I worked there for only two months. We were 
paid well, (35 pounds a week, 6 sterling) even after we took out 
the daily transportation expenses. But then we started hearing 
the men in the workshop making dirty jokes and giving us dirty 
looks, and did not feel comfortable. We both complained to the 
manager, but he said they are like your brothers, you are not to 
worry. Then one day, one of them asked me to go out with him,
I told my sister this is it, we must leave the workshop, and we 
convinced another girl with whom we became friends there to 
leave with us. During the week, we went around to other 
workhshops, this time in our own community, and the owner of 
an elastic making workshop said he would hire us next week, 
the three of us. We stayed in the electronics workshop till the 
end of the week, took our pay and left without saying 
anything...The pay is less here, but at least we do not get 
hassled, mahadish biydayPna.
Several interrelated factors can explain why wage workers are more 
able and willing than piece-workers to take concrete action to improve their 
working conditions. One reason is related to the low-status of wage work, 
which means that banaat el wirash have already broken a community norm, 
and so have become both bolder, but also less willing to settle for a wage 
level that does not make this trade-off worthwhile. Because they regard work 
as a way of gaining more security later in life, particularly in marriage, wage 
workers are more goal oriented, and are thus willing and able to manoeuvre 
and persist to ensure that they reach this goal.
Supply and demand factors in the labour market also pay an important 
role in this equation. Unlike piece-workers, there is a much higher demand
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for female wage workers than existing supply which improves women's 
bargaining position. In fact, several of my interviewees emphasised that 
workshop owners now prefer women to men, because they are cheaper, less 
noisy, do not smoke and they clean up the workshop after they finish work.
Recruitment patterns and the role that kinship plays in this process is 
also significant. Although still operative, kinship idioms play a much less 
significant role in the labour relations underlying waged work. Because 
transactions are much more overtly financial, it is more difficult for either the 
women or their employers to "euphemize" such work as "charity", or 
"community solidarity", as is the case with piece-work. Moreover, partly 
because of the danger of sexual harassment at work, and because of the low 
status associated with wage work, workshop girls often seek jobs in groups of 
two or three, and are almost never recruited individually. This creates a form 
of solidarity that does not exist among piece-workers, who constitute a much 
more fragmented labour force, or among men wage labourers, who are less 
in need of the type of protection that group recruitment offers.
Moreover, unlike the girls who are mostly in dead-end jobs and can 
only make lateral moves, boys and men have a much greater chance of 
upward mobility in the skill hierarchy. Because of their anticipation of higher 
wages, status, and power as they move up the ladder, boys and men have a 
greater stake in the system and thus may be less willing to openly defy 
workshop owners. This dynamic resembles the cyclical nature of women's 
power in the family, discussed in chapter one, which also affects women's 
ability and willingness to contest unfavourable relations within the household 
as discussed in earlier chapters.
My findings also suggest that associating covert action with women 
and overt action with men, a common association in the literature, must be 
challenged. Hart (1991) argues along similar lines. Her study shows how 
poor women's protest in a village in Malaysia was more direct than that of the 
men who are co-opted and entrapped into a patron-client relations, the 
advantages of which they did not want to forego. The women, on the other
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hand, being largely excluded from this system, had greater latitude for more 
open confrontation.
This chapter explored how women respond to the conditions and terms 
of work in the informal labour market focusing on two specific forms of 
employment: piece-work and wage labour. The role played by economic 
factors, gender, life cycle, and kinship idioms in structuring terms of work, 
earnings, labour relations and negotiation options within these two forms was 
illustrated. The different ways in which gender was implicated with kinship 
(see Loizos and Papataxiarchis, 1991a) in these two work contexts were 
highlighted. The chapter also contextualized more general statements about 
women's passivity in the face of exploitative working conditions by examining 
how and why different forms of female work may result in different responses.
These ranged from accommodation and acquiescence, to implicit trade-offs 
and re-invention of "traditions", to direct and open protest.
Having examined women's experiences and options as related to pre­
marital negotiations in chapter six and to employment in the informal sector in 
this chapter, the following two chapters will explore gender arrangements and 
relationships within the marital union. Chapter eight will address conjugal 
relations and sexuality, while chapter nine will address intra-household 




CONJUGAL ARRANGEMENTS AND SEXUALITY 
"A man is like a butcher, he likes a healthy cow"
Om Samir is in terrible distress. Her only married daughter, Nasra, 
who fell sick six months ago, is now unable to move. Her left leg is 
paralysed, and she suffers from a debilitating headache. She can no longer 
cook or clean, nor can she earn money as a piece-worker stringing beads 
any more. Although Nasra has been to many doctors as well as specialised 
religious healers who have attempted to cure her by reading verses of the 
Quran,1 her ailments have not gone away. Neighbours have advised Om 
Samir to take Nasra to a hadra, a public spirit possession ceremony, in a 
close-by community to find out whether an alien spirit was the cause of her 
illness. Om Samir is worried that Nasra's husband may get fed up with her 
daughter and demand that she and her two children leave the house and go 
back to her parents’ house.
Om Samir, a widow, lives in two rented rooms with her married son 
and daughter-in-law. She has no other family in Cairo, her brothers and one 
sister still live in a village in Upper Egypt. Om Samir’s son has made it clear 
that there is no place for his sister Nasra in the two rooms they are renting, 
should her husband divorce her. Although Nasra had an ayma when she got 
married, it would not be of much use as a deterrent against divorce, or taking 
on a second wife in this case, Om Samir explained. For one thing, they have 
no strong family support or connections in this community, no c/zwa. All her 
family is in the village. Moreover, Nasra's husband, an electrician from Cairo, 
would fight to ensure that he keeps many of the things on the ayma. He 
would receive support from others in the community, even from Nasra's
1 Quranic healing, ailag bil Quran, is an apparently widely spread alternative medical 
system in Cairo which will be discussed later in the chapter. The healers are 
generally men, and the patients often women. I was told by both healers and 
community members that this was an increasing phenomenon in their 
communities.
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brother, because Nasra is no longer fulfilling her husband’s needs, and she
has not been doing so for a long time. Om Samir explains:
"A tired or sick woman is of no use to her husband, 
matilzamuush, he could throw her out, yirmiiha, and marry 
another wife, for she can neither satisfy his sexual needs, tPdi 
hagtu, nor his household needs, haagit beetu, so what is her 
use. You see, a man is like a butcher, he likes a healthy 
cow, r7/ raagil zay il gazzaar, yihib il bihiima il caffiya.2"
Chapter six illustrated how unmarried women enter into marriage with 
widely shared expectations of their conjugal roles, and aware of at least some 
of the unequal aspects of power relations underlying marriage arrangements. 
It highlighted how men and women's relationships to marriage are evolving 
and analysed some of the means through which women attempt to increase 
their marriage choices and mitigate their relative vulnerability in marriage 
through practices such as the ayma and the gihaaz.
The current chapter moves the discussion of gender relations to power 
relations and contestation within the marital union. It discusses the nature of 
marital conflicts, and highlights attempts by women to voice their discontent. 
Spirit possession is presented as one such avenue. An analysis of women's 
spirit possession narratives leads me to suggest that spirit possession 
represents a cultural idiom which gives women, particularly married ones, 
access to a discursive space in which they can express their daily 
grievances. Spirit possession also sometimes allows women to negotiate 
roles that are at variance with social expectations and prevalent gender 
ideologies, as well as to develop new notions of personhood that go beyond 
those based on kinship. The two-seemingly unrelated-sites of contestation 
that were vividly articulated through spirit possession narratives, are 
responses to sexual demands by their husbands, and responses to the 
"islamization of everyday life".
2 Healthy does not do justice to the word caffiya, which is a more complex word 
implying sexual maturity, radiance and physical strength. It is a gender specific 
term. I have never heard it to describe a man.
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Beyond Public Gender Ideologies: Spirit Possession as a "Subordinate 
Discourse"
As suggested in the theoretical chapter, contestation implies that 
disadvantaged groups have some recognition that they are not getting what 
they want or deserve. Furthering our understanding of women's perceptions 
of their roles and situations, and the extent to which they have internalised 
dominant ideologies that disadvantage them, is thus a critical first step in 
understanding women's varied responses to inequalities. As several writers 
have pointed out, women's compliance with certain practices and the 
ideologies they embody, does not necessarily mean they have internalised 
them, but may be due to lack of perceived alternatives or to fear. In other 
words, "compliance” does not necessarily imply “complicity" (Agarwal, 1994).
Efforts to understand women's perceptions must thus entail, not only 
listening to their formal statements, but also to the specific idioms and 
colloquialisms expressed in their daily Lives. As Comaroff and Comaroff 
argue consciousness is embodied not only in the overt and explicit 
statements of "common predicament on the part of a social group, but also in 
the implicit language of symbolic activity". Researchers interested in 
understanding the perceptions of subordinate groups, will thus have to go 
beyond "formal institutions and statements and into the textures of the 
everyday" (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1987:192).
Several studies have sought to go beyond androcentric public 
ideologies and have focused on the identities, "conceptual systems", and 
narratives of women, expressed through activities such as women's oral 
poetry, carpet weaving, and women's religious rituals (Dwyer, 1978b; Abu- 
Lughod, 1986; Messick, 1987). In her study of domestic weaving in North 
Africa, Messick offers the notion of "subordinate discourse" as a way of 
tapping alternative views of the world that may be articulated by women in 
subtle, non public ways. She gives the example of carpet weaving, an old 
craft of non elite African women, as an example of such a subordinate 
discourse which is "distinguished by its co-existence with the dominant 
ideology of gender relations, and by its non public, silent quality" (1987:211).
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Weaving represents an elaborated body of specialised female knowledge, 
men are excluded from craft processes, and, as a mode of expression, it 
offers alternative gender conceptions to those articulated by the more public 
patriarchal ideology (Messick, 1987).
My forays into the routines of women's everyday life in low-income 
Cairo, has brought spirit possession to my attention, suggesting that it may 
also offer such a "subordinate discourse". I became aware that spirit 
possession is not a marginal, "exotic" ceremony in which a limited number of 
women are engaged, but that it may articulate a fairly pervasive and 
entrenched system of values, beliefs and practices among women in the 
study community. A close analysis of the narratives of 15 possessed women 
in my community (13 of whom were married), in the context of a wider 
analysis of their livelihoods, leads me to suggest that spirit possession serves 
as a "subordinate discourse", or a "hidden transcript" (Scott, 1990)3. It is an 
avenue through which women express discontent, as well as articulate an 
increased awareness of their conflicting roles within their marriages and 
society at large.
Being possessed by a spirit results in multiple disabilities for women, 
in the form of symptoms such as headaches, paralysis, and listlessness. 
Nonetheless, possession also allows women to get entitlement from men, and 
more significantly, gives them new "voices" and identities. These voices 
address, often in contradictory and ambiguous ways, issues of concern to 
women, which may be ignored or avoided by men. Taqqu and March argue, 
based on their review of cross-cultural studies on spirit possession, that 
women's pursuit of "spiritual patrons" is primarily a "defensive" strategy aimed 
at self protection and relief from the constraints placed upon them. However, 
spirit possession also has elements of assertiveness as it enables women to
3 There is a great degree of similarity between Messick's notion of the "subordinate 
discourse", and James Scott's "hidden transcript", which he defines as "a 
"discourse that takes place offstage, beyond the direct observation of the 
dominant groups" (Scott, 1990). The difference is that Scott developed the notion 
in the context of agrarian class relations and was not particularly sensitive to 
gender issues, whereas Messick's term applies specifically to an analysis of 
gender relations and ideologies.
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affirm themselves through articulation of alternative perspectives and notions 
of selfhood (Taqqu and March, 1986).
The two recurring themes voiced through the narratives of spirit 
possession of the women I interviewed were two issues of very different 
orders; sexual relations, and responses to the "islamization" of everyday life. 
These two issues form the basis for the discussion to follow. A brief overview 
of the history and rituals of spirit possession in Egypt may, however, first be 
in order.
Spirit possession in Egypt has always been a predominantly, although 
not solely, female phenomenon. Its exact origin is still open to speculation. 
The belief systems and rituals involved were probably introduced into Upper 
class Egypt by African slaves in the 18th and 19th century (Fakhouri, 1968; 
Nelson, 1971), and gradually diffused to the rest of society where they were 
incorporated into existing beliefs and practices. The increasing revival of 
Islamism in Egypt, on the one hand, and the dismissal and ridicule of spirit 
possession by government officials, the media and professionals on the 
other, makes women's public admission of possession to outsiders rare. 
Nonetheless, my research suggests that the incidence of spirit possession 
and the rituals related to it may be still quite pervasive.
The basic components of spirit possession and rituals as embodied 
particularly in the zaar cult, have been partly described elsewhere (Kennedy, 
1967; Fakhouri, 1968; Nelson, 1971; Morsy, 1978). The description below is 
based largely on my observations as a participant in these ceremonies, 
expanding on the accounts provided by others.
A possessed woman is referred to as milammisa, touched, or caleeha 
riih, gin, or asyaad. The spirits are both male and female and have distinct 
names, personalities, nationalities, and religions. Anyone can get 
possessed, but there are some personal qualities, like vanity, cay°a, and 
certain actions, like throwing hot water down a toilet or going to bed crying, 
that may make one more vulnerable. These qualities and actions are 
associated almost exclusively with women, which is one of the main reasons 
women are believed to be more susceptible to spirit possession than men.
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Possession is manifested through a range of general symptoms. The 
most common of which are debilitating headaches, fatigue, irritability, feelings 
of suffocation, paralysis and obsessions. The spirits, depending on who they 
are, make both material and non-material demands on the afflicted person. 
Once afflicted, women believe it is practically impossible to exorcise the 
spirits; they can only be appeased or placated by giving in to their demands 
and by participation in special spirit appeasing ceremonies.
There are two types of ceremonies, a public one referred to as hadra, 
and a private one referred to as zaar, which is by invitation. The private 
ceremony, commissioned by one woman in her home, seems to be on the 
decline because it is much more costly, and is being replaced instead by 
public hadra(s), which are open to anyone. Both are fully ritualised events, 
but the zaar is much more elaborate, and appears to be less common. While 
I attended 14 hadra(s), I attended only one zaar.
A hadra ceremony is orchestrated by an influential specialised broker 
usually an older woman, called a kudya, and often takes place in her house. 
The public hadra(s) I attended were held on a weekly basis, either on 
Mondays or on Fridays. Some began after the noon call to prayer and others 
after the sunset call to prayer. There were usually 10-40 women at any one 
time, sitting on the floor, exchanging experiences and narratives of 
possession, gossiping and sometimes also smoking cigarettes and drinking 
tea. Most of the women came from different quarters in the city, other than 
the one in which the hadra was taking place.
A band of usually male musicians-drum, flute and tambourine-played 
the different songs/beats, d ^ a ,  associated with the different spirits. The 
beats ranged from sombre ones to very joyful and festive ones. Each woman, 
according to the spirit(s) possessing her, had a special beat(s) at the tune of 
which she got up and danced, t i f ^ r ,  often with some cajoling from the lead 
musician. As the rhythm of the music picked up, some women went into a 
trance, from which they were revived through assistance from one of the 
other women by light hugs and strokes on her leg or back. The main
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objective of the ritual is to appease and satisfy the spirits so that they do not 
cause the symptoms from which possessed women are suffering.
Not all the women who were at the hadra(s) were possessed, however.
I learnt that some women actually go in an attempt to find out if they are 
possessed, which they do if they find themselves unable to resist dancing to 
a certain dar^a; this serves as an initial diagnostic procedure. Other women 
go out of curiosity, or to have fun, farfasha.4
Two general approaches have characterised the anthropological study 
of spirit possession. Although the two approaches are not mutually exclusive 
and both have linked possession to asymmetrical power relations, there are 
important differences between them, both theoretically and methodologically. 
The first and predominant one has adopted a functionalist approach, arguing 
that possession beliefs are a traditional means by which women, and other 
deprived groups, temporarily alleviate the pressures resulting from their 
subordinate status. According to this approach, possession provides a 
culturally sanctioned "niche" enabling women to step out of their prescribed 
roles without facing public censure. The underlying assumption is that 
possession serves therapeutic and cathartic goals (Lewis, 1966; Gomm, 
1975; Kennedy, 1967; Morsy, 1978).
The second approach questions the potential of a functionalist 
framework in fully appreciating a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon 
such as spirit possession. Although not discounting the former approach, 
some scholars have argued for moving the debate beyond the culturally 
sanctioned function of spirit possession rituals, emphasising the need to pay 
closer attention to the subtle messages and views inherent in the narratives 
and episodes of possession themselves (Boddy, 1989). This requires 
developing a highly intimate relationship with possessed women, so as to 
carefully record their possession narratives. Boddy goes so far as to argue 
that possession can best be understood as a "feminist discourse".
4 It is only by appreciating the dreariness and difficulties which characterise some 
aspects of the daily lives of low-income women in Cairo and their limited access to 
"recreational facilities", that one can appreciate the importance of the concept of 
farfasha.
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Possession enables certain groups of women to not only articulate 
discontent, but also to express unconventional views on often taboo subjects, 
and in the process of doing so, to challenge taken for granted gendered 
identities and roles (Boddy, 1989).
The narratives I was able to collect corroborated some of the insights 
of the latter approach. Possession did enable some of the women I 
interviewed to make demands that allowed them to temporarily suspend their 
prescribed roles, as mothers, wives, home-makers, and sexual providers. 
However, my discussions convinced me that possession cannot be explained 
away only as a traditional "outlet" or "catharsis" for deprived and powerless 
groups. By reflecting, sharing and discussing the grievances embodied in 
possession narratives, possessed women and others who are the audiences 
of their narratives, were able to reflect on their identities and social 
expectations in a way that I did not witness in other gatherings and 
discussions among women. This often had direct practical consequences for 
the way in which they negotiated with their husbands over sexual demands or 
in the type of dress they adopted as will be discussed below.
My data suggests that spirit possession provides a meaningful account 
of women's subordinate place in a world of rapid social change. It is a 
dynamic discourse, whose text is closely related to a changing context. It is 
thus difficult to understand the text, the possession narratives, without 
understanding the context that shapes the material relations and daily 
livelihood struggles of the women ! talked to. As will be discussed below, the 
construction of the possession narratives is a complex and contradictory 
process. Broader socio-economic and political concerns find their way into 
the changing imagery and character of the spirits. Like other cultural forms, 
spirit possession episodes and imagery acquires new meanings and 
addresses new experiences as social relations and social boundaries are 
redefined during periods of social change. Women interpret and incorporate 
new circumstances in the wider society into their possession beliefs and 
rituals (Ong, 1987; Nelson, 1971).
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I pursue the argument that spirit possession is a subordinate cultural 
text that gives voice to women and allows them to subtly express a range of 
thoughts about their lives in general, and gender relations in particular, that 
they may not otherwise be able to overtly articulate. During both the hadra, 
and at other times when the spirits are manifest, zahir, women are able to 
make suggestions, challenge role expectations and gendered identities, and 
express daily concerns which in an everyday context may be inadmissible. 
These messages and suggestions are often contradictory. However, it is the 
very multivalence and obscurity of the messages transmitted through this 
idiom that contributes to their strength. Non-possessed women, who are 
important audiences in such settings, can ponder these issues and possibly 
pursue suggested trains of thought and act upon them.
Boddy's work on spirit possession, based on fieldwork in a village in 
the Sudan, is perhaps the best illustration of the "articulatory potential" of 
possession. She argues that signals and messages women pickup from their 
own possession and from observing the episodes of possession in other 
women defy, challenge and rework conventional meanings of gender 
relations, opening up provocative, albeit ambiguous and opaque, directions 
of thought. "Messages communicated by women to both male and female 
villagers via the zaar often have subversive tones as well as supportive ones.
Gender appropriate meanings emerge when individuals read these 
messages in light of their own experiences." Boddy concludes that: 
"possession can thus amplify a woman's double consciousness to the point 
where she is able to see her life, her society, her gender, from an altered 
perspective and a heightened sense of awareness" (1989:5).
In the following section, I attempt to illustrate how possession may 
enable some low-income women in Cairo to comment on and negotiate 
normative expectations of gender roles. I do so by examining the recurring 
"messages" that emerged spontaneously from my interviews and discussions. 
My relationships with possessed women began via an introduction to two 
possessed women in a Cairo neighbourhood by a female street vendor with 
whom I had built a strong relationship early on in my fieldwork. They were her
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neighbours, and it is with them that I initially participated in hadra(s). They 
then introduced me to other possessed women whom they knew, and I got to 
know some others from my frequent visits to the hadra(s).
The spontaneity of the messages that emerged through women's 
narratives is critical to note. Unlike my interviews with other women in the 
community, where I often initiated specific themes to guide the discussions, 
my encounters with possessed women were totally unstructured. They 
focused on listening closely to their possession episodes and experiences. I 
had no clue as to what might emerge. The predominant themes in these 
narratives, perceptions of sexual relations and responses to "islamization" of 
daily life were so compelling, however, that I decided to pursue them in more 
depth with more women in my sample than I had originally planned.
Negotiating Sexual Relations:
Sexuality is a critical component in the construction of gender relations 
in the study community. This is consistent with several other studies on 
gender relations in the Middle East. Al-Messiri, 1978, notes that men's ability 
to keep their wives sexually satisfied, through "frequent and lengthy 
intercourse", is an essential element of both men's and women's notions of 
masculinity in low-income, baladi, Cairo. Moreover, bint El Balad, the 
traditional low-income urban woman, is assumed to be very aware of herself 
as a sexual, feminine being. This self- image is reflected in the seductive 
way she wraps her milaaya laf (traditional loose cover, to be distinguished 
from the current higaab and khimaar) around her hips and in her coquettish 
walk.
Insights into the importance of sexuality in the construction of gender 
identities can also be gleaned from Rosen's (1978) study in the city of Sefrou, 
Morocco. His research revealed that men differentiated themselves from 
women on the basis of fundamental differences in sexual nature. Women are 
viewed by men to possess much more nifs, the thoughts and attributes that 
people have in common with animals such as lust and passion, than cag/, 
reason, rationality. Rosen's male informants argued that women's excessive
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sexual desire is what makes them referred to locally as habl il Shitaan, the 
rope of Satan, and necessitates that men, whom nature has equipped with 
much more cag/, systematically control women. The Moroccan woman, 
described by one of Rosen's male informants, is "like a Turkish bath without 
water, because she is always hot and without a man she has no way to slake 
the fire" (1978:567).
Interestingly, however, women's commentary on their sexual 
relationships, revealed through possession narratives, were not in line with 
some of the above descriptions. The afflicted women I interviewed expressed 
not excessive sexual desire, but a consistent lack of interest in sexual 
encounters, at least in the context of their marital relations. The main issue I 
want to pursue, however, is that the spirit possession narratives on sex and 
sexual relations are not about women's enjoyment of sex or otherwise. They 
are primarily about power, subordination and negotiation within the specific 
rules of the games of their conjugal relationship. Women's narratives seem to 
be about their ability to control the circumstances under which sex is 
demanded of them, and the power, and right to refuse intercourse.
The following excerpts from the narratives of possessed women 
illustrate the opaque and ambiguous commentary of women on their sexual 
lives. Om Youssef is an illiterate woman who works as a piece-worker and is 
married to a construction worker who spent several years in Kuwait in the 
early 1980's. She has three children. The following excerpt from her story is 
revealing:
"I have not been sleeping in the same bed with my husband for 
the past 10 years and we have not had sex for as long as that.
There is nothing I can do about it. The spirits do not allow me.
When he comes near me I start kicking and screaming. One day 
I bit him so hard he bled. At first my husband used to get angry 
and to hit me, but now he understands that it is not up to me, il 
asyaad do not want it. I know it is haraam to deny my husband 
sex, and I have been to many doctors and I even made a zaar 
every year for the past three years, but the spirits still do not 
allow me, it is out of my control. I personally do not mind it 
however, I never enjoyed sex with him, it was always a duty. 
Sometimes he also hurt me."
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Amal is more recently married to a fruit vendor and has two toddlers, a
boy and a six-month old baby girl. Amal was employed by a workshop before
she was married and now assists her husband in his job. AmaPs story is very
similar to Om Youssef's although they do not know each other and actually
reside in different neighbourhoods. Amal recalls:
"Mokhles, the spirit, has been with me for three years, before I 
got married, but I did not know it then. He made me refuse all 
marriage proposals. 1 got married in the end because Mokhles 
succumbed and let me get married. My eldest brother (I am the 
only girl among three bothers) insisted that I marry and beat me 
up for refusing. Mokhles did not want to see me beaten up so in 
the end he agreed and I got married to my current husband.
Since I got married, however, I have had terrible headaches. I 
also hate sleeping with my husband. When he approaches me,
I start screaming and I feel as if someone is strangling me. 
Mokhles, manifested himself to me at a friend’s zaar that I 
attended six months ago. He manifested himself as a tall pink­
skinned giant with dark black hair. He told me he was in love 
with me and explained that he makes sex unbearable with my 
husband because he is jealous. Now I sometimes see Mokhles 
sleeping beside me on the bed, 1 can feel his breath on my 
neck.5
Most of the women related their narratives about what the spirits did or 
said retrospectively. However, I also witnessed two, rather unsettling, 
occasions when the spirit became manifest during the interview itself,6 and 
started talking to me, and other women, directly. One of these spirits is 
Abdalla, a spirit possessing Om Ayman, who became manifest during an 
interview with her, in the presence of some members of her family, and two
5 This reference to pale skin is a euphemism for physical beauty. As was evident 
from women's comments in earlier chapters, shades of skin colour were important 
markers of beauty and identity in the study community. It is also interesting to note 
in Amal's comments how the spirits are viewed not as intruders, but as protectors.
6 This was both an unnerving, and bemusing situation. As discussed in chapter 
four, part of me did not believe what was going on and wanted to dismiss it as a 
charade, a form of female theatre, a show put on for my benefit. It was hard for 
me to come to terms with the fact, as I eventually did, that everyone around me 
seemed to really believe that the spirits can become manifest and can speak to us.
This raises the issue of symptoms as cultural texts and forms of cultural 
communication and expression. I was initially shut off from a linguistic universe, 
knowledge of which is taught and culturally acquired. The women around me were 
reading and decoding signs and symptoms, which I could not access.
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neighbours. Abdaila's manifestation was preceded by a dramatic scene
where Om Ayman started choking, gesturing wildly with her hands, and crying
hysterically. After she calmed down and was offered a glass of water, Abdalla
began to speak to me through her, but in an altered, hoarse, and slightly
foreign voice. He expressed hatred for Om Ayman's husband, a wholesale
grocery vendor, and his excessive and improper sexual demands;
"He is a bull, cigl, and I despise him. He is trying to sleep with 
me and is asking me to do dirty things, hagaat wiskha. I love 
Amal (Om Ayman) and I do not want her to sleep with him, so 
every time he tries to sleep with her, I get in the middle of the 
bed and separate them and kick him. So one day, he said fine, 
if Amal does not want to sleep with me, then you sleep with me.
I am a man, like him, but he is not ashamed to ask me to do 
these things. He is a very bad man."
One of the issues that emerged from many of the discussions, is 
the explicit link that was made between female sexual services and 
male economic provision. This link was later confirmed by other non­
possessed women in my sample and, as will be illustrated later, 
provides a key to understanding gender roles and relations in the 
community. Om Youssef, newly married woman to a wholesale grocer 
and suspected of being possessed, makes this link as follows:
"I get pain, batwigF, when I sleep with my husband. I do not 
enjoy it, mafiih inbisaat I just wait for it to end. I am cold, barda.
Samar told me that she had a similar situation and that 
someone advised her to see her atari She discovered that she 
was possessed by Yawer Bey. He is a very snobbish man and 
he hurts her when she has sex with her husband because he 
does not like her husband. You see her husband is not a 
respectable man. He does not give her enough money to buy 
proper clothes or household items, even though he makes a lot.
Samar suggested that maybe I am also possessed. Maybe the 
spirit is angry with my husband too. He also does not provide 
for me. I will go with her to a hadra this week to find out."
What messages can one derive from the above narratives? What do 
they tell us, and just as importantly tell other women, about how women in the
7 Atar is the term used for a type of diagnosis that is done by a specialised person 
to find out the type of spirit and what his/her demands are.
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study community view their own sexuality, their sexual relations with their 
husbands, their role as sexual partners, and the extent to which they have 
control over their sexual lives, that is, when, with whom, and how to have 
sex? While the message are not clear and can be interpreted differently by 
women, several suggestions can be teased out: women do not enjoy sex with 
their husbands, their husbands make "improper" sexual demands, women's 
sexual submission is conditional on men's ability to provide for them. The list 
could go on.
However, more nuanced answers to these questions are only possible 
through analysing and understanding the broader context which shapes 
these women's lives. This is a context where refusing sex is considered a 
religious sin, haraam, as will be discussed below, and which often results in 
wife beating. In a 1995 national survey that looked at the main reasons for 
wife beating in Egypt, women revealed that the single most important reason 
for being beaten up by their husbands was refusing to have sex (El-Zanaty et 
al, 1996).
To make sense of these findings, one also needs to situate them within 
broader understandings of gendered expectations within marriage.8 As 
discussed in chapter 5, the definition of manhood/masculinity, ruguula in 
relation to a potential groom, generally coincided with the role of husband as 
economic provider, while definitions of womanhood/femininity corresponded 
to that of several specific roles for women: housewife, mother and provider of 
sexual services. A good woman/good bride, il hurma il kiwayyisa, is defined 
by the extent to which she is strong, healthy and can provide labour to the 
household, as well as sexual satisfaction, cafiyya. My own probing into intra- 
marital negotiations, interestingly, revealed that women were not contesting 
these various expectations with equal vigour.
8 As discussed earlier, there are variations in gender role expectations according to 
life cycle and marital status: a good adolescent girl, a good bride, a good wife, a 
divorcee, etc..
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Married women did not typically protest about excessive child-care 
demands or household chores9. In fact many of the women I interviewed took 
great pride in showing off their clean and organised rooms with cooked food 
available, and their children adequately fed, regardless of conflicts with their 
husbands. Women's roles as homemakers and mothers appeared as part 
and parcel of their self-definition as women. These are tasks they have been 
engaged in since they were young girls, caring for siblings and helping out 
with domestic chores. On the other hand, their provision of sexual services 
was not considered an absolute duty or indisputable part of their roles as 
wives, on the same footing as their maternal and housewifery duties. Taking 
my cues from the spirit possession data, I started discussing women's sexual 
expectations and experiences in greater detail.
A word of caution is necessary, however, before presenting my 
analysis of women's narratives on sexuality and conjugal relations. Personal 
narratives as a tool for generating information, while powerful and revealing, 
nonetheless have inherent limitations, already alluded to in the chapter four. 
All narratives are self-serving and inevitably entail elements of self­
justification. Hence they are not to be taken at face value. In discussions of 
marital relationships and conjugal conflicts-relations whose dynamics are 
complex and entangled in both emotions and material exchanges, the 
problems of relying on women’s narratives are compounded. When talking 
about relationships that are not going well, women may naturally want to 
present themselves as wronged, unfailingly blaming and condemning their 
husbands and providing justifications for their own actions. However, this 
does not detract from the importance of such narratives for focusing attention 
on the specific idiom and terms through which women choose to express 
marital discord and discontent. These, in turn, reveal important aspects of 
gendered expectations and gendered bases of power.
9 For houses with no sewerage, disposal of waste- water was pointed out as one of 
the most onerous household chores. While women often complained of it, 
however, they did not contest that it was part of their duty and roles as women, or 
more commonly the role of younger girls in the household. Complaints of certain 
tasks are not necessarily contestation of roles. This of course raises the difficult 
issue of consent discussed in the theoretical chapter.
261
Sex, Power and Economic Provision:
Despite individual variations, four broad orientations and attitudes 
regarding sexual relations were discernible. The first was a general 
consensus among women that sex is a basic need for men, closely tied not 
only to concepts of maleness, but also to fundamental biological needs. 
Some women even emphasised that sex was the main reason why men seek 
marriage.
"If it was not for sex, why would men get married?," one of my 
interviewees reflects. “If it was only for cooking and cleaning, 
their mothers could do that for them. Sex is the most important 
thing for a man."
Second, although in general men were expected to initiate sex, women
could also occasionally take the initiative, but they had to modulate their
demands carefully so as not to risk their reputations. Samira and Soad,
neighbours and close friends in their early 40's voiced similar views in a
group discussion. Soad comments:
"we never initiate sex, we are respectable women, muhtaramiin, 
but of course there are other women who are vulgar/immodest, 
bigha, and they ask for it openly.
Om Sayeda, explains how she manoeuvres when she wants to sleep
with her husband:
"It is ^eeb for a woman to ask her husband for sex, he would 
think her horny, mish 3adra, and would wonder if she was like 
that when he is away, she could sleep with any man. But a 
smart woman if she wants sex, she can ask for it indirectly, 
cajole a man and do things to make him demand it. This is what 
I do."
Third, although women could sometimes initiate sex, they had much 
less control over refusing it. Most of the women I interviewed said that an 
overt refusal of sex results either in coerced sex, verbal abuse, or physical 
violence. Although many unambiguously expressed their lack of interest in 
sex, refusal was generally not tolerated by husbands, so that many women 
reported engaging in sex against their wishes. This is a stark example of
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compliance with a certain type of behaviour out of fear and not out of 
complicity.
A few women emphasised that their own husbands do not force them
to engage in unwanted sex. They nonetheless viewed the provision of sexual
services, essentially, as a duty. One woman explains:
"My husband is understanding, and if I have my period or am 
tired, he does not insist. Most husbands are not so 
understanding and force it on their wives. But it is not always a 
man's fault. A man must feel free at home (free to have sex on 
demand), otherwise he will seek it outside. For women sex is 
a responsibiiity, a duty and a religious obligation, 
masr’uuliyya, w i wagib, wi fard."
Many other women, especially those who reported conflicts with their
husbands over household finances, were particularly negative about their
sexual relations. They also felt they had some legitimate rights to refuse sex.
Om Adel, a piece-worker married to a street sweeper, responded very directly
to my question as to how she views her sexual relationship with her husband:
"I do it against my wishes, d i haaga ghasb can i i  wahid'. It is 
difficult for a woman to get out of this. Everything else can be 
refused except for this. The maximum you can do is say you 
are tired or have your period and hope that your husband will 
not insist. But you can only do this for a day or two, not all the 
time. Sex is the most important thing for a man. He demands it, 
he is the one who comes and asks for it, he sleeps with me 
every other day. If I do not sleep with him, he can go and marry 
someone else."
Stronger expressions of resentment are voiced by the following three
interviewees to describe their feelings towards their sexual obligations:
"Every time we have sex it is a fight. When he asks me, it is like 
I have a terrible job to do. Sex to me is like a sad/sorrowful 
event, karab. If I say no, he hits me and gets angry. Men take 
no excuses when it comes to sex even if a woman is tired.
"I hate/cannot stand, m abafish, having sex with my husband.
He sleeps with me when I am fast asleep, I am a heavy sleeper 
and he takes advantage of that. He is disgusting. I wake up in 
the process and start screaming and slapping my face, altum. 
Sometimes even my period does not deter him, he uses a 
condom, caz//, to sleep with me when I have my period". (I later
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probed whether he also used a condom as a birth control 
method, and Om Aya said no, she uses the pill).
"When my husband wants to have sex, y^idi maslahtu (literally 
satisfy his desire), and I say no, he drags me in front of my 
children as if I am a cow, a bihiima. I have no dignity, 
karaama. These things are supposed to be private, not public in 
front of the kids."
Fourth, and very significantly, women's propensity to reject or resist
sexual demands seems to be directly related to their perception that their
husbands are defaulting on their roles as economic providers. Clearly,
marriage for these women may have been about much more than material
exchanges. However, many inevitably used the maintenance argument when
they wanted to default on sex. They complained that their husbands were not
providing for them adequately,10 and used this as a way of challenging their
obligations as sexual providers. Om Adel explains quite bluntly:
"He does not even approach me for sex anymore. He 
understands that I will not sleep with him. Why should I? Does 
he feed me?"
None of the women made a link between the fact that they are
circumcised and their lack of interest in sexual encounters with their
husbands. Om Yehia, married to a construction worker, emphasises that
female circumcision does not impede a woman's sexual enjoyment. She was
one of the few women who said that she had found sex pleasurable at some
point. She comments:
"I am circumcised and I used to like to sleep with my husband.
He made me comfortable and provided for his household. Five 
years ago, however, he reduced the masruuf he was giving me 
and stopped getting anything for the house... He still 
approaches me for sex, but I no longer want it or enjoy it."
10 Whether this was the case or not, is of course difficult to ascertain, since I did not 
talk to their husbands, and did not get their views on the reasons for marital 
discord, or how the cycle of conflict started. It may be that a woman's initial 
coldness towards a husband and her reluctance to have sex with him has 
produced disinterest or unwillingness on his part to provide for her, which in turn 
increases her resentment towards him and strengthens her unwillingness to 
engage in a sexual relation.
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She then went on to reflect bitterly on the more general plight of
women who can no longer depend financially on their husbands:
"A man is a man by how much he spends on his house, il Raagil 
raagil fi masrufaatu. There are no men any more. Men have 
become irresponsible, il rigaala khaFa. If a man economically 
provides for his wife, misatit miraatu (literally makes her a 
woman, sit), then he has a right to control her, lih ha3 yithakkim,
and sleep with her two or more times a day if he wants But
there are no men these days.
This link between breadwinner status and sexual rights has already 
been alluded to in a few anthropological studies in Egypt. In her study of the 
self-images of bint El Balad, Al-Messiri (1978) shows how women's notions of 
masculinity centre mainly on the ability of the husband to earn an income and 
provide for his family. A man who does not fulfil this expectation is referred to 
as a mara, a degrading slang term meaning woman, but which when used 
only in reference to men, implies a "loss of masculinity". As a mara, a man 
loses culturally sanctioned prerogatives over his wife, and his unrestricted 
accesses to her sexual services. The close link between notions of 
masculinity and provider status has also been noted in other Egyptian 
ethnographies (Rugh, 1984; Hoodfar, 1990). These cultural ideals do not 
necessarily reflect reality as discussed in chapter two, but are further 
reinforced by state laws that define the man as breadwinner and the woman 
as a housewife, or at most a secondary earner.11
The study by Shahla Haeri (1989) of temporary marriage, muFa, in 
Iran, although highly specific to ShiFa doctrine, is nonetheless relevant in this 
regard. Her study brings to light the underlying premises of marriage in Islam 
in general and its associated doctrinal presumptions and conceptualisations 
of men and women. Haeri highlights how, despite their differences, all 
schools of Islamic law consider marriage as a contract, caqd, between two 
transacting parties. Legally, religiously and socially, a contractual transaction 
lies at the core of Muslim marriage, whereby, men gain an exclusive right
11 As discussed briefly in earlier chapters, these gender constructs are clearly 
reflected in government employment policies, and in social security and social 
assistance systems.
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over women's sexual services, in return for payment of money or valuables,
traditionally in the form of a bride price, mahr (Haeri, 1989).
Haeri's interviews with women, men, and religious scholars in Iran in
the 1980's, as well as her historical research, reveals the embededness of
the concept of "contract” in Iranian beliefs and its significance as a discourse
underlying Muslim marriage. Iranian women were in essence either "leasing
the womb", in the case of temporary marriage, or "selling it", in the case of
permanent marriages. Haeri writes:
"as with other forms of social exchange, a contract of marriage 
is at once a legal, religious, economic and symbolic 
transaction....In the context of Iranian society, the all prevailing 
concept of contract functions as a "root paradigm" informing 
people's consciousness and orienting their behaviour in their 
daily interactions and transactions" (Haeri, 1989:29).
The underlying logic of, very crudely put, "sex for maintenance", that 
came through in many of my own interviews can similarly be understood with 
reference to the underlying normative understanding of the terms of the 
Islamic marriage "contract". Such a contract, which governs the majority of 
my interviewees, stipulates that women be available for sex on demand for 
husbands who meet their maintenance obligations.12
The concept of nushuuz, which is derived from Islamic thought and 
denotes female disobedience, is also of relevance on this point. Although not 
mentioned explicitly by my interviewees, the notion may have an implicit 
influence on their perceptions of gendered roles. According to Mernissi 
(1987) the concept of nushuuz, mentioned in a verse in the Quran, is 
interpreted by Muslim commentators to mean a serious offence and rebellion
12 I do not want to imply that women reduce marriage into a simple exchange of sex 
for money devoid of any sentiments or to simplify the complex layers of 
interdependence and emotions inherent in any conjugal arrangement. However, 
this connection is one that did come through clearly in my interviews, and is thus 
difficult to ignore. This prevailing conception of marriage may not be the view of 
the Islamic religious establishment. This is, however, outside the scope of my 
interest as I was concentrating on the perceptions of a specific group of women 
and how these informed their actions and practices. I did not interview any 
religious scholar on that issue. Moreover, it is probable that this normative 
understanding of marriage may not find resonance amongst the upper class 
sections of Egyptian society as was discussed in chapter six.
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by women indicated by their refusal to obey a husband’s requests, 
particularly for sex.
Mernissi argues that the verse on nushuuz, which has been interpreted 
by some as sanctioning the right of men to hit their wives, is taken by 
religious authorities today, as a way of authorising violence against women.13 
This perception that denial of sex was a grave offence, and that fulfilling a 
husband's sexual demands was a religious duty for a woman was clear from 
my interviews. Women did not generally think they had the right to refuse 
sex, except perhaps if their husbands had lost their conjugal entitlements by 
not providing for them. As discussed in chapter three, this may become an 
increasing problem in light of rising poverty and male unemployment. If a 
woman perceived her husband as having defaulted on his material 
obligations, then she was generally less willing to honour her part of the 
bargain or "contract". As the above section illustrates, this unwillingness is 
occasionally voiced overtly, but more often is articulated more covertly, 
sometimes through the idiom of spirit possession.
In addition to sex, the other recurrent theme revealed through the spirit 
possession narratives revolved around women's commentary on religious 
practices and expectations. Clearly this is an issue of a very different order 
than sex and sexuality. The arena of sexuality relates directly to daily 
interactions between men and women, and therefore any grievances in this 
regard are directly felt, and articulating discontent is relatively 
straightforward. However, the influence of religion, and its manifestations at 
the community level, on women's daily lives is much more diffuse and would 
be expected to result in contradictory and dispersed responses. The 
following section explores the theme of religious expectations as they 
emerged in the possession narratives and attempts to analyse them within 
the broader context of the "islamization of everyday life" which is taking place 
in the study community.
13 Mernissi discusses the great difficulties scholars encountered in interpreting this 
verse and the difference of opinion and lack of clarity that surrounded it. She 
notes that one established Muslim scholar devoted 27 pages of his commentary to 
it and provided not less than 200 contradictory opinions on its meaning.
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Responses to the "Islamization" of Everyday Life:
In the four neighbourhoods I visited, there was much evidence of what
may be termed the "islamization'' of everyday life, already noted in previous
chapters. In all four neighbourhoods local mosques and Islamic charitable
associations were playing an active role in providing a range of services,
particularly in health care, cash handouts for orphans and widows, religious
instruction and interest free credit. One of the most visible and popular
services was the orphans support program, kafaalit il yatiim. Regular
handouts of money, clothes and sometimes school uniforms are distributed
under this program which, is administered on a monthly basis by several fully
veiled women, munaqqabaat, from outside the community. There were 400
women, divorcees and widows, registered to receive this service at one of the
mosques in one of the neighbourhoods.
In all four neighbourhoods, local mosques appeared to play an active
role in the articulation of appropriate roles for women. The Friday sermon,
khutba, regularly made reference to family values and the need for women to
demonstrate modesty, hishma, and to fulfil their obligations to their husband
and children. One of the mosques where I attended Friday prayers was
distributing, free of charge, tapes of Quranic recitations and lectures on
Islamic morals. These were circulating widely in the community.14
A recent study of a low-income neighbourhood in the north of Cairo
similarly documents the increasing influence of Islamist discourse on
women's everyday lives, and the role played in particular by local mosques in
this process. Ghanem (1996) argues that the role of the mosque, which is a
highly gendered space,
"seems to reinforce power relationship in the family. Major parts 
of the discourses circulated there call for the total and absolute 
right of men over women, who should always obey their
husbands, fathers and mothers The mosque manifests and
shapes the ways in which gender is constructed. Inside the 
mosque, women are spatially separated from men, their access
14 A content analysis of such tapes would be a fascinating undertaking, but one 
which was unfortunately outside the scope of this study.
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to the mosque is conditional on the absence of the menstrual 
period, and within its confines they are required to wear a long 
and loose dress and to totally cover the hair and 
chest"(1996:194).
Ghanem shows an increasing involvement of religious leaders, both 
male and female, in the arbitration of family conflicts. She also shows 
increasing attempts to open up the mosque for women and increase their 
participation, by investing in setting up separate sections, arguing that this 
represents an attempt to counter other spaces that women have begun to 
have access to, such as the work place. These features were also visible in 
my study community. The point to stress, is that unlike the workshops, which 
as discussed in chapter seven, are a stigmatised public space, or the 
hadra(s), which are tolerated but generally discouraged, the mosque is a 
space which women are consciously encouraged to frequent.
Segregated religious classes were an important feature in several of 
the local mosques in the study community. I attended several sessions, 
which usually followed either the Friday noon prayers or the sunset prayer 
and lasted for about an hour. None of the women in my sample were regular 
attendees, except during the fasting month of Ramadan, but all had attended 
at some point during the past few months. Most classes were led by educated 
women from outside of the communities, all of whom were affiliated with il 
Garrfiyya il ShaFiyya, one of the most prominent Islamic charitable 
organisations in Egypt. At one of the classes I attended, white T-shirts were 
distributed free of charge to the women who were attending the classes. 
These were a present for their children explained the "teacher", and they 
should let other women in the community know that they too could get T- 
shirts if they attended the classes.
The majority of the women in these classes, were wearing a headscarf; 
a few donned a khimaar. There were many more younger, unmarried women, 
some with a degree of formal education, than in the hadra(s). In fact, the 
audience, the formality, dress code and strict atmosphere in the classes 
contrasted sharply with the relaxed and informal atmosphere of the hadra(s) I 
attended. Much of the discussion during those classes revolved around the
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need for women to be more pious, to wear the khimaar, to renounce worldly 
pleasures and anticipate death, and to fear god and their husbands, khushtF.
Informal meetings amongst women, such as those of the hadra(s) were 
denounced as haraam, and a waste of time in gossip, namiima, time that 
should be spent in devotion to one's family and to god. In her study of what 
appears to be similar religious classes in one low income community in the 
1980's Guenena similarly finds that "the discussion of Islam was used to 
encourage behaviour changes such as wearing Islamic dress and to stop 
women from using contraceptives which are considered harmful to the future 
of the nation" (Guenena, 1986).
Local mosques also played an important role in providing health care. 
Clinics attached to two of the mosques in the community provided some of 
the best quality, friendliest and most affordable services in the area according 
to the women I interviewed. I did not spend any time in the various "Islamic 
clinics" in the community, but Hatem (1994) suggests that the many clinics 
which have spread in neighbourhoods in Cairo over the past decade are 
often used as a base for spreading a conservative interpretation of Islam. 
Health care professionals often encourage patients to participate in the 
increasingly common phenomenon of segregated religious study groups for 
both men and women discussed earlier.
A process of "islamization" of everyday life was therefore evident in the 
study community. The following section explores responses by some women 
to this process and to perceived pressures on them to conform to "Islamic" 
modes of behaviour. I only discuss, however, the type of responses to such 
pressures that were revealed through an analysis of women's spirit 
possession narratives. Such pressures must be located within the broader 
context, discussed in chapter two, of a rising Islamist discourse which has 
been gaining momentum since the early 1970's in the country.
These pressures on women do not come directly, or only, from their 
husbands, but also from other members of the family as well as from the 
broader community of neighbours, relatives, and local leaders. The lack of 
conformity to certain types of behaviour affects the reputation of the entire
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family and its status vis a vis others in the community. For example, the 
pressure on one of the possessed women, Om Naema, to cover her hair, tit- 
hagib, came directly from one of her unmarried daughters, who herself had 
donned the higaabf and who feared that her mother's refusal to do so and her 
other "un-lslamic behaviour" could seriously jeopardise her own marriage 
options. Husbands were also under the same kinds of pressure to ensure 
that their wives submitted to interpretations of proper Islamic behaviour, such 
as wearing the higaab and/or khimaar, spending more time listening to the 
Quran and religious tapes than to popular music, and being more obedient 
toward them, including sexually. While clearly the implications of religious 
indoctrination goes beyond the conjugal relationship, it also has a direct 
impact on marital affairs which is why it is discussed in this chapter.
One of the striking features of the spirit possession narratives of the 15 
possessed women I interviewed in depth, was the fact that most of the women 
were possessed by Christian spirits. I had not seen a reference to this in the 
literature and was therefore quite puzzled. The prevalence of Christian 
spirits was confirmed during the hadra(s) I attended. One of the beats 
repeated often and to which people danced was called the Monastery beat, 
DeFit il diir, which is requested by Christian spirits. Christian spirits, made a 
series of demands on the women. These included purchasing silver 
pendants with a cross and Christ on them, going to church, drinking beer, 
refusing to perform Muslim prayers, refusing to wear two types of dress 
interpreted by some as proper Islamic dress, the higaab, scarf that covers 
head and neck, and the khimaar, which covers the face and entire body.
All the Muslim women I interviewed defined themselves as good 
practising Muslims, and being Muslim was an important part of their self- 
identity. Their observances of Islamic practices varied greatly, but most 
generally fasted during Ramadan and some prayed, although not necessarily 
on a regular basis. Some attended prayers and religious classes in local 
Mosques, particularly during Ramadan. The ultimate aspiration of many was 
to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, the hig.
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The women possessed by Christian spirits, however, could not iive-up
to their self-image as "good Muslims". Many could not stand to hear the
Quran, or the call for prayer, or to pray themselves. Om Sarnia, a 40 year old
married woman who sells bread and has two daughters comments:
"I know I am possessed by a Christian spirit because I saw him 
several years ago, I still feel him sleeping beside me, when I go 
to bed. He is a priest and is tall, white and good looking. He 
asked me to buy a silver cross and I got one and have been 
wearing it ever since. I have always prayed regularly and read 
the Quran, but he does not like it. Now, when I pray, I feel like 
someone is choking me and I fall down."
Echoing what appears like a desire to dispense with the imposition of 
certain religious practices, Om Naema, married with two sons and two 
daughters, talks about her experience with possession. Om Naema is married 
to a guard who runs a small grocery shop in the afternoons. She does not 
earn a cash income herself. One of her daughters is married and living in 
Saudi Arabia, and the other is a 17 year old who left school when she was 12 
and voluntarily took up the higaab three years ago. She has been trying to 
convince her mother to do the same. Om Naema’s comments reveal an 
interesting perception of identity and of the Christian as the "other", as she 
conflates Christians and foreigners, referring to both as Khawaaga(s), 
foreigners. This may be a reflection of increasing inter-faith tensions in Egypt.
It is also possibly related to the attempts by a rising Islamist discourse, as
discussed earlier, to cast Copts in Egypt as the "other within" (see Shukralla,
1994). Om Naema talks about her experiences:
"I stopped praying and insisted on getting a dog. People told me 
this was bad because a dog in a house makes the angels go 
away. But I was very attached to this dog. I used to walk like a 
madwoman in the street and then suddenly I would fall down 
unconscious in the form of a cross, atsallib. I went to many 
doctors, but they could not heal me. My neighbour suggested 
that I go and seem my atar, and I did. The kudya told me that I 
am possessed by a Christian spirit who is in love with me, 
caashP, and wants me to make him a zaar. I made him a zaar 
and I got all the things that Christian spirits like, you know they 
are like il Khawagaat, foreigners. I had a large buffet with 
cheese, gibna ruumy, olives, and beer. I invited many friends. I 
felt' much better afterwards, but every now and then the
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symptoms come back... Just last week my daughters found me 
tearing my clothes as a tape reciting the Quran was on.”
Several of Om Naema's neighbours and her daughter confirmed her 
narratives and recalled several instances when she would fall down in the 
street in the form of a cross. Her daughter, also confirmed how hysterical Om 
Naema becomes when she hears Quranic tapes, and confessed that she was 
worried that such behaviour by her mother may affect her own reputation and 
marriageability.
Sannaa is a 19 year-old woman finishing a high school diploma in
nursing. She is one of the highest educated in my sample and is also one of
the two unmarried women among the group of possessed women. She
comments on her possession by Christian spirits:
"I am possessed by two Christian spirits, Girguis and Mary. My 
beat is the monastery beat, Da^/'f il diir. I just find myself pulled 
when I hear it and I keep dancing. But I also like to dance to 
the beat of the Prophet, madiih il Nabi. Mary and Girguis are 
young and they want me to wear shorter skirts and trousers and 
not to pray. When I hear the call to prayer, I keep screaming 
and have to close my ears. I want to wear the higaab, but they 
do not allow me. I tried once and I had a continuous headache 
for two weeks. I had to stay in a dark room and tie my head from 
the pain. My mother took me to many doctors but nothing 
worked."
When I asked women why so many of the spirits were Christian, and 
whether this was a recent phenomenon, one of my interviewees, an older 
woman who has been possessed for many years, explained that there are 
many more Christian spirits nowadays than in the past. "I heard that this is 
because the priest in the nearby community, father Samaan, has asked the 
Christian spirits to spread to our community, sarahhum caleena". Another 
woman ventured a similar conspiracy theory, but at a more global level: "It is 
because the Grand Pope in America, the head of the Christians, has asked 
the spirits to go to the Muslim world and possess Muslim women. They want 
us to be nasaara, Christians, like them."
Amal, a married woman who has been possessed by two Christian 
spirits for the past 5 years had a different interpretation:
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"The spirits are not really Christian. They are all Muslim and 
they are good. We just say they are Christian because 
Christian spirits are stronger, they are more difficult to get out 
when the sheikhs come and read Quran. Muslim spirits may 
respond to the sheikhs' use of Quran, but Christian ones do not 
and so the Quran cannot get them out. The maximum that a 
sheikh can do is to make them become Muslims."
I was told of several cases when a sheikh could not get the spirit out, 
but at least managed to convert him/her to Islam. According to the women I 
interviewed, however, the resort to sheikhs to get the spirits out, and more 
particularly attempts to convert spirits to Islam, has become widespread only 
in the past 10 years.
The above accounts point to the complex ways in which spirit 
possession narratives are constructed by selectively incorporating elements 
of everyday life, resulting in a "bricolage" of themes picked up from daily 
practices as well as from broader commentary on socio-economic and 
political life articulated through the media. The women I interviewed generally 
saw themselves as good Muslims. The fact that so many spirits are 
Christians, and their specific "anti-lslamic" demands could possibly be 
interpreted as a reflection of some sub-conscious resistance to increasing 
attempts to regulate women's lives, justified by Islamic idioms
The Islamic establishment is against zaar15. Possessed women are 
considered to be lacking in faith, imanhum DeFiif. The predominant response 
from local religious leaders, as well husbands, to women's possession is to 
persuade and pressure them to become more pious, to take the higaab or 
khimaar, to pray, to read the Quran regularly, and to join the religious classes 
in the mosques rather than participate in the spirit possession circles. Given 
this broader context, possession, specifically through the manifestation of 
Christian spirits, may be articulating a "counter-hegemonic" cultural text. 
Such a text would allow women to deal with their desires to conform to their
15 The Islamic establishment, as embodied in state institutions and public 
discourses, has always tried, to varying degrees depending on the context, to 
discourage practices considered as "unorthodox", popular, or folk ones. These 
have included, not just spirit possession ceremonies, but also visitation of saints’ 
shrines, muulids, and so forth.
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own self-perceptions as good Muslims, without succumbing to the recent 
pressures on them to display certain behaviour that is being defined by 
others as "proper Islamic behaviour.
Some of the demands of Christian spirits such as wearing short skirts 
and trousers, their assumed link with foreigners and the west (two of my 
interviewees mentioned America specifically), is also of interest. It may reflect 
the mixed signals about "modernity" and the "West" (which is identified with 
America in popular thinking) that are portrayed through the media. This is a 
"West" whose ideas and products are often sought after (see for example the 
gihaaz items discussed in chapter 6), but whose influence is also feared as 
promoting moral decadence. For example, satellite television and western 
cinema and video films were regularly referred to in Friday prayers by one 
religious leader in a local Mosque as "satanic transmissions", beth shaytani, 
that all good Muslims should avoid.
The above interpretations and arguments suggest one plausible 
explanation for the specific imagery of the spirits at this specific point in time 
and allude to the historical specificity of the subordinate discourse of spirit 
possession. They also allude to the ways in which spirit possession 
challenges gender relations and may alter relations in concrete and tangible 
ways in women and men's daily lives.
The Potentials and Limitations of "Subordinate discourses":
I have been arguing that the spirit possession idiom, widely shared by 
women, is a powerful communicative mechanism that enables women to both 
express discontent as well as negotiate gender expectations and identities in 
their daily lives. In the process, everyday assumptions and expectations 
about gender roles and relations may be challenged. The significance of 
spirit possession goes beyond the acts of individual women. It constitutes a 
discursive space as well as a complex and diffuse cultural repertoire, that is 
not based on written text, but on a consensual recognition of signs and 
symptoms of possession.
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An indication of the potential threat represented by this discourse may 
be seen in the relentless, and increasing, attempts by male Sunni healers 16 
to not only discredit it, as may be the case with attempts to discourage other 
forms of vernacular beliefs and practices, such as muulids or visits to saints' 
shrines, but also to specifically target and combat it. Part of the reason 
behind this apparent targeting of spirit possession may be directly related not 
only to its form, but to its content—that is the narratives it generates- 
particularly those regarding sexual relations and religious observance. The 
messages that community members receive from women who actually refuse 
to have sex with their husbands, or who insist on not wearing a certain type of 
dress can be rather unsettling of prevalent gender ideologies. Spirit 
possession could be particularly worrisome for men because of its potential 
as a route to the much debated, and feared, female disobedience of nushuuz 
mentioned earlier.
What gives spirit possession its resilience and the ability to withstand 
such pressures is the degree of overlap that exists between spirit possession 
beliefs expressed by women and "religious" healers alike; both believe that 
humans can be possessed by gin(s). The difference, however, is that 
whereas women believe you can only appease the spirits through traditional 
zaar(s) or hadra(s), Sunni healers attempt to exorcise the spirits. The attempt 
at converting the spirits, however, is suggestive of the failure of exorcising 
them and thus a testimony to the strength of the discourse of spirit 
possession.
Mahmoud, an engineer who has recently become known in the 
community as a religious healer explained to me how he became a healer, 
referred to as either Sunni, or more specifically as a Quranic healer, yFaalig 
bil Quran. Dismissing possession and zaar as heresy and irrational 
behaviour when he was young, Mahmoud was re-introduced to it when he
16 Sunni is a generic term that was used to describe extra religious men who wear 
white galabiyya(s) and grow long beards in the tradition of the prophet. Sunni 
healers are those who attempt to cure illness through "Quranic methods".
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was working in Saudi-Arabia through the complaints of a colleague. The 
nature of those complaints is of interest since they correspond to some of the 
themes appearing in women's possession narratives discussed earlier. 
Mahmoud's colleague was in distress because his wife, who was 
subsequently diagnosed as possessed, used to respond with bouts of 
shrieking whenever he approached her sexually during his vacations in Cairo 
and refused to sleep with him.
Although intrigued, Mahmoud still dismissed the issue of possession 
as trivial until he returned to Cairo a few years ago, after 6 years of work in 
Saudi Arabia,17 and became an active volunteer member on the board of a 
local mosque. In the mosque, stories were circulating about community 
women possessed by Christian spirits. There were other stories about women 
possessed by spirits who were inflicting upon them a range of ailments, 
including the inability to have sex with their husbands. There were also 
reports that these women were resorting to churches and priests to appease 
the spirits. Mahmoud, and a group of young men he got to know through the 
mosque, became quite concerned and decided to do something about this 
phenomenon.
Seeking out a specialised sheikh for advice, Mahmoud and his 
colleagues began learning the "methods" of Quranic healing so as to counter 
what they perceived as the shameful phenomenon of Muslims women (our 
women, sitattna, is how he referred to them) going to church as well as 
resorting to heretical, traditional spirit possession ceremonies. Mahmoud 
read extensively on the topic, and joined the healing sessions of a well-known 
sheikh for a few months, as an apprentice, to gain practical experience. Now
17 The link with Saudi Arabia is noteworthy and indicative of wahabi influence which 
is strictly against all forms of innovations, bida^. This influence, an aspect of 
"globalisation", was infused into Egyptian society partly through the waves of 
regional migration that took place in the 1970's as discussed in chapter three.
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a self proclaimed "religious" healer, Mahmoud emphasised that he cures 
patients from spirit possession afflictions, mostly women, for free.18
Two of the possessed women I interviewed, who were cousins, had 
asked Mahmoud to visit them for a healing session, after reportedly being 
pressured by their husbands. One of the women also said that she felt 
compelled to see a Sunni in response to demands by her 18 year old 
daughter who held a preparatory school degree and was a frequent 
participant in the women's religious classes in a local Mosque. An important 
point to stress at this point is thus that "religious healing" may be invited not 
only by men, but also by a certain group of women, perhaps more educated 
and younger ones.
Over a course of four sessions, Mahmoud was unable to exorcise the 
spirits, but managed to convert one of them. Both women, however, 
continued their visits to the hadra(s) at the same time as they were being 
"treated" by Mahmoud.19 Both said that the involuntary shrieking that came 
upon them whenever their husbands approached them sexually, or when they 
heard the Quranic tapes, did not go away. I later probed into this issue with 
the husband of one of the women, who confirmed that he is still unable to 
approach his wife sexually because of the fits which overtake her when he 
tries to do so.
Thus, despite these alternative efforts to deal with possessed women, 
there appears to be a fair degree of resistance on the part of women to 
counter this encroachment into their space and to hold on to their more 
traditional practices of zaar and hadra(s). Women's attempts to hold on to
18 Mahmoud explained that although he does this task on the side "to serve god", 
some of his other colleagues have left their jobs and have taken up religious 
healing as their main profession. Although Mahmoud stressed that he does not 
get paid for his services, he admitted that professional healers do, which, he 
argued, is legitimate in Islam according to a saying, hadith, by the prophet.
19 Mahmoud's methods, like that of other healers, involves writing certain Quranic 
verses on paper using saffron, za^faraan, which produces an orange/reddish liquid 
when mixed with water. Patients are then asked to dip the paper in a glass or 
basin of water and then either drink it or bathe with it. Other methods included 
reading Quranic verses in the ear of the afflicted patient, and sometimes, slapping 
her/him Or hitting them with a stick. The latter devise is meant to frighten the spirit, 
explained Mahmoud, but the afflicted person does not feel any pain.
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spirit possession is reflected both in their use of an Islamic idiom to justify 
their actions (many stressed that spirits are mentioned in the Quran and that 
their practices are thus religiously sanctioned), but also possibly through the 
unconscious or conscious manipulation of the imagery and demands of the 
spirits. A separate study would be required to establish changes over time. 
However, many of my interviewees stressed that they know more possessed 
women now than in the past, that many more spirits are Christians, and that 
while the incidence of the zaar, the more elaborate private ceremony, has 
decreased, the hadra(s) are still a widespread and important feature in the 
lives of many Iow-income-women in Cairo.
Despite attempts to undermine it, the idiom of possession thus 
appears to have survived as a powerful idiom that enables women to voice 
some of their everyday concerns and "latent grievances", in response to a 
"latent power" (see Lukes, 1986). This covert discourse, however, does not 
completely escape the categories of formal dominant discourses and is thus 
limited by them. As argued in chapter one, in the search for the "infra­
politics" of disadvantaged groups, there is a danger of over estimating the 
potential of every day forms of resistance to radically change power relations.
In this instance, the danger of exaggerating the ability of possession to 
challenge power relations is illustrated graphically by an inadequately 
publicised murder case. This was published in Egypt's foremost Arabic 
newspaper, Ai Ahram, in June, 1995, under the title: "Possessed girl beaten 
to death by her father to get the spirits out of her body". The reported story 
goes as follows. On June 3rd, 1995, Sahar Emad El Din Youssef, a 13 year- 
old girl who lives in the lower Egyptian town of Mansura, was found dead in 
her room. The death was due to repeated beatings with a plastic hose.
Investigations revealed that the girl’s parents, both engineers had 
taken up what was termed "Islamic dress", il ziy il Islami, the previous year, 
meaning the khimaar for the wife and an ankle length white galabiyya for the 
husband. They quit their work and started pressuring their daughter to also 
take up the khimaar. She refused, apparently because she was possessed
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by spirits who forbade her to do so. After several months of pressure, her 
parents kept her from school, locked her in a room and started beating her 
with a plastic hose to get the spirits out. Sahar's spirits of resistance were 
defeated. She died. What messages or conclusions members of her 
community, including her schoolmates, derived from this episode is difficult to 
judge.
The previous sections have attempted to shed light on some aspects 
of power relations within the conjugal union and ways in which women may 
voice their discontent through "subordinate discourses". Spirit possession 
was presented as one such avenue. Spirit possession, a complex 
phenomena with multiple referents, appears to play an important role as a 
cultural idiom which gives women, particularly married ones, access to a 
discursive space in which they can express ideas, and sometimes actually 
negotiate relations at variance with social expectations and prevalent gender 
identities. The two recurring themes which emerged most vividly through the 
spirit possession narratives relate to women's responses to sexual demands 
from their husbands and to the "islamization" of their everyday life. The 
following chapter will discuss other areas, such as the education of daughters 
and budgetary allocations, which also emerged as the subject of contestation 
between men and women within the household.
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CHAPTER NINE
INTRA-HOUSEHOLD DECISIONS AND EXTRA-HOUSEHOLD NETWORKS 
“I would sell my clothes to keep my daughter in school”1
This chapter focuses on intra-household decision making and 
relations. The chapter elaborates some key areas of disagreements and 
conflicts between husbands and wives and discusses how they are resolved.
Decisions regarding the education of daughters emerged as a particularly 
important issue over which women and men's priorities, aspirations and 
strategies diverged. A significant part of the chapter is thus devoted to a 
discussion of this issue.
Women's resources, and hence their relative bargaining power, are 
not solely determined by their familial context, but are also influenced by their 
access to extra-household options (Harris, 1981; Agarwal, 1997). Thus the 
chapter also discusses the role of women's informal networks, highlighting in 
particular how they may serve to enhance women's choices and latitude of 
decision making within their households. Several studies have highlighted the 
crucial role of informal networks in Cairo’s neighbourhoods (Rugh, 1979; 
Wikan, 1980; Nadim, 1985; Singerman, 1995; Hoodfar, 1997). My own 
discussion will focus more specifically on three types of female networks 
which are instrumental in supporting women's attempts to gain an advantage 
in their marriages. These are: spirits possession ceremonies, hadra(s), 
female run grocery shops, bPaafa(s), and rotating credit associations, 
garrfiyya(s).
Early scholarship on families and household arrangements has 
emphasised the existence of "household strategies" (Bruce and Dwyer, 1988;
1 This is a quote from one of my respondents.
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Guyer and Peters, 1987; Hart, 1995). The household was conceptualised as 
an income-pooling unit, with an assumption of harmony and consensus 
between household members. Studies in third world settings have further 
stressed the centrality of the family unit as a resource for the survival of the 
poor, ethnic minorities and rural-to-urban migrants (Glenn, 1987). Early 
research on family dynamics in Egypt was heavily influenced by this 
approach. "Adaptive family strategies", and decision making as a "family 
calculus" were highlighted as explanations for the behaviour of individuals 
within the household (Rugh, 1984; B. Ibrahim, 1985).
Feminist critiques since the early 1980's, however, have challenged 
the idealised, normative view of households as necessarily harmonious, 
undifferentiated units whose members pursue common strategies. Such 
strategies, it was argued, are often assumed, rather than historically and 
empirically investigated. More recent research has led to an increasing 
recognition of divergences of interests within households, thus paving the 
way for a more nuanced understanding of household dynamics. This 
alternative approach to the household recognises power differentials between 
genders and generations, and possible conflicts over interests, needs and 
priorities (Harris, 1981; Whitehead, 1981; Bruce and Dwyer, 1988; Hart, 
1995; Sen 1990; Guyer and Peters, 1987; Folbre, 1986,1988; Wolf, 1990).
Within this context, several studies have highlighted how power and 
conflict within households are most clearly manifested in the area of 
budgetary allocations and decisions regarding spending, savings and 
investments (Pahl, 1989; Bruce and Dwyer, 1988). Based on her work with 
female piece-workers in Mexico city, Roldan (1988) found that "money 
constitutes an important base of power". She thus argues that "the analysis of 
allocationai forms should contribute substantially to our understanding of how 
gender hierarchies are imposed and reproduced within households, as well 
as to the existence of points of resistance to such inequality" (1988:229).
These findings are similar to suggestions from research in Egypt. Al- 
Messiri’s study of intra-household relations in Cairo reveals several types of 
financial arrangements and different levels of economic complementarity
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between husband and wife that are based on both regional origin and men's 
occupation. She concludes that there is "a close association between money 
and power in the husband-wife relationship. The partner who has access to 
financial resources of the family, has more to say in terms of decision making 
and is more dominant" (1985:219). In her study of low-income households in 
Cairo, Hoodfar (1988, 1997) similarly found that men and women had 
divergent priorities in cash disposal and expenditures, and recognised that 
control of cash flow is closely related to power relations between husbands 
and wives.
By the early 1990, more recent conceptualisations of the household, 
without denying the importance of economic factors, also emphasised the 
role of ideology in decision making. The outcome of negotiation between 
household members was seen to be determined not only by economic factors 
such as access to material resources, but also by how "social identities", are 
defined, that is, by the specific views about the rights, responsibilities and 
needs of different household members (Folbre, 1992; Moore, 1994; Hart,
1995). As Moore argues: "Bargaining is about definitions and interpretations, 
it is both symbolic and material. What is needed is a clear understanding of 
how gendered identities are implicated in the determination of discourses 
about the rights and needs of specific sorts of individuals" (Moore, 94:10). 
My own data supports this view. Budgetary issues were a major area of 
conflict between married couples whose expenditure priorities often diverged.
"All our problems are over money/expenses, il masariif", was a phrase I 
heard often in my discussions. Nonetheless, conflicts also revolved around 
interpretations of rights and needs, such as whether a girl needs to be 
educated, for example.
Understanding the nature of decision making within households was a 
challenge, given that I spent much of my time exclusively with women. My 
data thus depends on women’s accounts, as well as on the fights and 
disagreements between married couples that I witnessed first hand. 
Unravelling the intricate processes of decision making was further 
complicated by the fact that it was not always easy to achieve a
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straightforward and clear cut understanding of who took decisions-husband, 
wife, or other family members- patterns of decision making and negotiations 
did not emerge easily. These patterns were also not set, but changed 
according to the nature of the decision, men's and women's stage in the life 
cycle, their earning capacity and the specific budgetary arrangements2.
Some areas of decision making nonetheless appeared to be gendered 
in a fairly straightforward manner. For instance, decisions regarding 
daughter's circumcision and defloration ceremonies were largely recognised 
as female prerogatives with decisions taken openly without consultation with 
men, and sometimes despite male disapproval. Other decisions, such as 
decisions to have an abortion or a hymen repair operation were similarly 
taken by women, without prior consultation. Unlike defloration and 
circumcision, however, these were decisions taken secretly.3
Men generally had greater latitude in decisions concerning issues of 
physical mobility, such as in visiting parents or friends or spending the 
night/week out of the house. Taking on a co-wife was clearly also a male 
decision, although as discussed earlier one which women attempted to 
actively influence through practices such as the ayma. Other areas like birth 
control or choice of a spouse, allowed more room for negotiation and a 
consultative decision making process between husband and wife. Male 
opinion was often formally deferred to in case of disagreement, though 
sometimes secretly defied.
One important area of disagreement between men and women, which 
emerged early on in my fieldwork, relates to decisions regarding the
2 I did not investigate budget arrangements in any depth. For more on this area, 
see Hoodfar (1988) and Nadim (1985).
3 Abortion is illegal in Egypt. Women nonetheless talked to me openly about their 
decision to abort as a way of avoiding another child. Women commonly used 
traditional, and often unsafe, methods such as drinking loads of boiled onion peel, 
or inserting sticks of Mulukhiyya (a traditional green vegetable with a long stem) in 
their wombs. Less commonly, if they could amass the 150LE pounds required, 
some women resorted to a private clinic. Men were never consulted in such 
decisions, and women made every effort to ensure that they do not find out.
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education of daughters. This was an issue where disagreements between 
spouses was often evident and an area where women's resourceful attempts 
to circumvent their husband's authority was most manifest. Wives were 
generally more adamant about educating their daughters than their husbands 
and they actively sought ways to achieve this objective.
The discovery that women struggled to educate their daughters caught 
my attention as a counter intuitive finding in the Egyptian context. The 
common assumption, based on observations and studies in rural areas, 
suggested that it is women who pull their children out of school to receive 
help in domestic chores. I thus decided to investigate this issue in greater 
depth.
The issue of girls’ education is also of particular interest because as 
will be shown below, it has a direct bearing upon women's aspirations and 
ability to avoid abuse both in the marital union and in the labour market. It is 
also of interest because it may constitute an example of a longer term and 
more proactive strategy by women for enhancing their options and improving 
their livelihoods, one that could result in an inter-generational change in the 
favour of women. In this sense, it contrasts to some of the other short and 
medium term protective practices such as driving a prospective spouse away, 
tatfiish, the marriage inventory, ayma, the marriage trousseau, gihaaz, and 
public defloration ceremonies, laf bil sharaf, which were discussed in earlier 
chapters.
"I would Sell My Clothes To Keep My Daughter in School”:" Investing in 
The Future:
The education of girls was often a subject of disagreement between 
husband and wife. Disagreements revolved around both initial decisions 
regarding a daughter's enrolment as well as continuing her schooling. The 
high costs of education, largely because of having to invest in informal
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private lessons4, increases markedly after the first five years of schooling. 
According to estimates by various people in the study community, private 
lessons cost a total of 25-35LE a month for all subjects during the first five 
years of elementary schooling. Once in preparatory school, however, the 
cost of each subject is 10LE per month. Assuming that a child takes private 
lessons in an average of five subjects, this means a fixed cost of LE50 a 
month. In addition to the costs of private lessons, other significant costs of 
schooling include uniforms, books, and snacks during the school day. Thus, 
for poor households, education, especially beyond elementary school, 
becomes a significant financial burden that must be balanced against other 
family needs (For an excellent and extensive survey of these costs, see 
Fergany, 1994a; El- Baradei, 1996).
While the education of daughters was one of the sources of conflicts 
between husband and wife, sometimes resulting in beating by the husband, 
the education of sons appeared to be less contested. Husbands and wives 
generally felt equally ambivalent about the education of a son beyond 
elementary school. On the one hand they viewed a boy's education as a 
source of social mobility for the family. On the other hand, it reduced the 
possibility of getting a steady apprenticeship in a small-scale workshop that 
could both earn the family an immediate income, as well as secure him a 
skilled job in the same trade in the future. With girls, however, there was a 
clearer difference of opinion.
The reasons for men's ambivalence, and sometimes reluctance to 
educate their daughters appears to be partly related to poverty and the need
4 The very low salaries of school teachers in Egypt has resulted in the emergence of 
the "private lesson" phenomenon as a strategy for teachers to supplement their 
salaries. Although officially discouraged by the Ministry of Education, it is currently 
a common reality, and a real cost of a theoretically free educational system. It is 
expected practice in all schools that teachers organise off school hours private 
lessons for groups of students. This phenomenon, which increased markedly 
since the mid 1980's, is so ingrained in the current educational system that 
students who refuse to take private lessons, run the serious risk of being failed in 
their exams, regardless of their performance. Because of its illegal and informal 
nature, it has been difficult to capture the national scale of this trend. One 
estimate, however, is that private tutors in Egypt earned around 2 billion U.S $ 
during the school year 1994/95 (Kossaifi, 1996).
286
to balance limited income with a range of household expenses. Part of the
reason, however, is also related to different interpretations of the value of
educating girls. Female education appears to be towards the bottom of men's
expenditure priority list, whereas for women it is a crucial item.5
Women's defiance sometimes took the traditional form of getting angry
and leaving the house to go stay with their parents, ghadbana, discussed in
chapter five. Fatma, a 30 year-old woman with one daughter in 4th grade of
primary school says:
"I wanted to give my daughter private lessons immediately after 
school started, but my husband wanted to delay them for a few 
months. 1 knew if my daughter does not start lessons at the 
beginning of the year, the teachers will persecute her, 
yistar'saduuha, and will fail her even if she does well. I insisted 
and we had a big fight. I left the house, ghidibt, and stayed in 
my mother's room next door for a week. Then he came and 
made up with me and said he will pay for the lessons. He has 
paid for this month, but I know this will be a continuous fight 
every month."
Another woman also ghidbit like Fatma, but she stayed in her parents' 
house for two months to pressure her husband into continuing to pay for the 
private lessons of his two eldest daughters. This strategy worked partly, and 
a compromise was reached whereby the husband agreed to pay half the 
costs. The woman agreed to pay the other half, which she managed to save 
from both her income as a home-based sub-contractor, and from the daily 
food allowance, masruuf, that her husband gives her.
I also observed more subtle responses to men's reluctance to invest in 
educating their daughters. Three women I interviewed kept their daughters in 
school for several months without the knowledge of their husbands. Om
5 While the gihaaz, discussed in chapter 6 appeared more of a priority for wives 
than husbands, the differences were not of the same magnitude as with decisions 
about education of daughters. It is also noteworthy that while women gave a high 
priority to both the gihaaz and education, they often have to make "trade-offs" as 
to whether they should allocate more of their limited resources for one or the other.
These decisions are shaped by many factors including the number of wage 
earners in the family, the number of daughters, and how well a daughter performs 
at school.
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Ahmed, a frail 34 year-old woman married to day labourer in a carton 
recycling workshop is one of them:
"My husband thinks it is unimportant to educate a girl, but I told 
him she must not grow up to be ignorant, gahla, like me, He still 
refused, so I sent her anyway without telling him. He found out 
by chance 6 months later, when he met her in her uniform 
coming back home... He beat me up and swore to divorce me if 
I do not take her out, hilif aalaya bil tala3. My brother and my 
neighbours intervened, calmed him down, and gradually 
convinced him that he should let her continue, that education is 
a good thing and that I will contribute towards the costs from the 
money I make selling bread... He finally agreed, and my 
daughter now is in 6th primary. My dream is that my daughter 
can continue to secondary school."
Samiha, a feisty woman aged 26 who has been engaged in sewing on
a sub-contracting basis for the past 8 years (two years after she got married),
comments bitterly that if it was not for the money she earns from her work, her
children would not be in school.
"I pay for most of their expenses. My husband would rather put 
his money in a video. I am the one who took a decision to 
educate them, took them to get photographed, I applied, I 
arranged for lessons with their teachers, and paid for 
everything. If the school asks for a parent, I am the one who 
goes. He does not even know where the school is. If I cannot 
educate all of them, then Aya, my daughter, is my priority. If a 
girl is educated, she has dignity/pride, karaama, her husband 
cannot control her, ylsaytarcalleeha. She would also be able to 
marry an educated man. I cannot subject my daughter to the 
hard work and humiliation, bahdala, marmata, that I saw as an 
ignorant woman. I cannot let my girl grow up like that. If I do 
not educate all my children, at least I have to educate my 
daughter Aya."
When a husband refuses to meet education costs, some women use 
escalating tactics. Initial tussles often result in arguments, getting angry, 
seeking family and community support, refusing to have sex, or leaving the 
house. If all this fails, it is common for a woman to try to pay for the costs 
herself. Seeking paid employment, usually in menial and low-paying jobs, 
saving from housekeeping allocation, the masruuf, and joining rotating credit
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societies, garrFiyya(s) (which will be discussed below) are three of the most
common methods that women deploy to keep their daughters in school.
Om Yehia, a co-wife in her fourties who runs a grocery has put five of
her six girls and one boy through school. Her husband, a semi-skilled worker
in the construction trade, used to give her a weekly allowance, but has
stopped doing so for the past few years. She thinks he is having an affair
with a woman from a neighbouring community, and is visibly upset about both
his affair and the fact that he no longer gives her an additional allowance.
Om Yehia comments:
"My husband thinks educating the girls is useless.. They will 
marry someone and go away, he would say. I ignored him, 
however, and I sent them all, but he did not pay a piaster for it. 
Through the profit from the bPaala, and through saving from the 
masruuf, I am able to make ends meet, but it is so
expensive God willing I will continue their education.
Education is critical for a girl so that if her husband dies, if she 
gets divorced, or if he stops providing for her, she can 
respectably support herself, not become miserable, titwikis, like 
what happened to me. She can also get a respectable job, 
wazeefa muhtarama. An educated woman will also not take an 
ignorant man, gahil. With an education she will marry better."
Amina, an uneducated woman in her early thirties with a son and a
daughter, assembles upholstery pins on a sub-contracting basis. Her
husband is a driver, but does not have a regular job. Her comments reveal
that boys have better access than girls to income earning opportunities
through learning a skill as an apprenticeship in a workshop, an option that is
not available for girls. This is why she prefers to use the earnings from her
work to pay for her daughter’s education.
"I am engaged in this job that breaks the back, mainly to keep 
my children in school, particularly my daughter. My son can 
work in a workshop in the afternoons and make some money 
towards his school expenses, but my daughter cannot. I do not 
want anyone to say that she is a workshop girl, bint wirash.6 
Their father does not have a regular job. He will not pay for 
education and after many fights he said he will pay only for the
6 Banaat el wirash, as discussed in the previous chapter, is a term with degrading 
connotations used for girls who work in wage labour in informal sector workshops, 
either in the community or outside it.
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private lessons of the boy, not the girl. If I wanted to keep the 
girl in school also, I would have to pay for it myself."
Om Ahmed, a 48 year-old woman, took up a job as a wage labourer in
an informal factory producing socks, so as to support the education of her
children beyond the preparatory stage. Her comments point to a critical
issue, raised by other women, regarding the conditions of employment which
women aspire for:
"I was adamant/insistent, musirra, that they finish their 
education. It is particularly important for me to educate my 
daughter, because I was not educated, an education enables 
one to work, il ta^aleem calleeh camal. There is work and work.
The work of educated people is different. Am I like a 
muwazafa? If I were educated would 1 work in a job like this 
one? Yes I may earn more here, but the minute the owner tells 
me I do not want you, it is finished, I have to leave. If I work for 
20 years, I will also never get a pension. Education for a girl is 
also important nowadays because when a good man proposes, 
he would always asks: What degree does the girl have?."
An interesting issue that emerged from my data is the link that some
women made between education and the goal of minimising household
violence against women. Om Sahar is an uneducated woman with two
daughters and one son. Her husband told her last year that he cannot afford
to continue paying for school expenses, particularly the regular monthly costs
of private lessons. Om Sahar comments:
"1 told him that my children must get an education, my son can 
quit school, but not my daughter. I would sell my clothes to 
educate my daughter. If my daughter has a degree, her 
husband would not dare beat her up the way you beat me. If I 
was educated, you would not be able to lay a hand on me. I 
would be a respectable muwazafa, and I would have married 
someone who appreciates me, b iy ’addarni, and has a clean 
tongue, lisaano nidiif.
Other women also made this link between domestic violence and girls’
education. Attiyat, a 30 year-old middle woman who distributes shoes to
community women to sew at home and has 4 children, comments:
"The education of a girl is a treasure, aalaam il bint kinz. An 
educated girl would be able to marry a decent/respectable man, 
who will treat her well, yFamilha kowayes, and would not 
scream at her or hit her for no reason. An ignorant woman has
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no, dignity, and is powerless, malhaash hiila, but an educated 
woman would not tolerate what we tolerate from our husbands. 
Education is more important for a girl than for a boy. A boy has 
many job options when he grows up, even if he is not educated.
But for a girl, education will assure her the best job. It is better 
than putting money aside for her. What would she do with the 
money? Open a workshop?
Such comments suggest that the often cited proverb indicating that 
women do not mind being beaten, "being beaten by a lover is like eating 
raisins, darb il habiib zay akl il zibiib, must not be taken at face value as a 
portrayal of all women's world views on this issue. In fact, women's views on 
violence were quite complex and sometimes ambiguous, representing an 
excellent example of how the consciousness of subordinate groups in 
"hegemonic relationships" is a mix of contradictory views and values. Some 
of these views reflect the values of the dominant groups, and some emerge 
more directly from practical experience (Eagleton, 1991).
In my discussions, two categories of violence which I term "justified 
violence" and "unjustified violence" were evoked by women at different times, 
referring to both the reasons sparking the violence and the degree of abuse. 
Women sometimes regarded violence- wife beating and verbal abuse- as a 
non- desirable practice-unjust, wrong, and generally "unjustified". In some 
cases, however, violence, was also regarded as "justified". These were 
cases where a woman was believed to have breached deeply ingrained 
expectations, such as flirting publicly with another man. As discussed earlier, 
refusal to have sex was sometimes considered an offence deserving of 
beating and at other times was not. In the long term, women appear to be 
addressing violence through educating their daughters.7
7 In the more immediate and short term, women addressed marital abuse through 
resorting to community pressure. One common way was for the woman who has 
been subjected to violence to complain, dramatically and in a voice loud enough 
for her neighbours to hear, about her husband's actions. These monologues were 
a common, culturally endorsed form of communication, that aims at what I would 
term "publicising the private". By doing so a woman ensures that domestic 
violence, and the behaviour of her husband, is somewhat checked as it becomes a 
community affair subject to public arbitration and judgement.
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in contrast to the many women I interviewed for whom a girls’ 
education was high on their priority list, I only encountered one case when a 
woman said that her husband wanted their daughters to stay in school, but 
she disagreed and felt it would be a waste of money. There were many more 
cases, on the other hand, where the wife would insist that her daughter stay 
in school but her husband would not agree, would not take the required 
bureaucratic steps to register his daughter, or would be unwilling to pay for it.
I also encountered several cases when a woman decided, on her own, to take 
her daughter out of school. Om Tamer explains why she took her daughter 
out:
"I took her out when she was 14 because she was very pretty 
and I wanted to protect her, I was afraid that she would be
harassed by the male youth in the streets and by her male
teachers."
Om Tamer's husband did not go against her decision nor argue about it. It
was clearly his wife's decision.
Of course, women's aspirations and attempts to keep their daughters
in school do not always work. There were many cases when women had to
take their daughters out of school when, despite all their efforts, they could
still not find the necessary resources, were unable to find paid employment,
had to make trade-offs between education costs and other important costs
such as that of the gihaaz, or could not convince their daughters to remain in
school. Of the 59 once married women in my sample, 10 reported that they
were unable to pursue their struggles to educate their daughters. One of
these women is Om Zeinab. In resignation she recalls:
"My husband, who works in a coffee shop, refused to buy 
Magda a new uniform at the beginning of the school year. She 
had to wear the old one and she was ashamed and said that 
people made fun of her, so she decided not to go anymore.
What could I have done, I am helpless and have no money, 
mabil yad hiila. If I had money, it may have been different."
Neama, a 15 year-old girl, talks about her reasons for quitting school, 
despite her mother's initial insistence. The trade-offs between investing in
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education or accumulating a gihaaz (discussed in chapter six) as two status
enhancing mechanisms for girls is evident in her remarks;
"If my mother keeps working to pay for the costs of my 
education, she will not be able to start saving for my gihaaz. So 
I decided to leave school and start working to help complete my 
gihaaz. My mother was upset and said what about your future, 
but I told her that this'(meaning ensuring a good marriage 
through a proper gihaaz), is my future too. She agreed and I 
have been working now for three years and have already 
bought an aluminium set, sheets, and a fridge".
The suggestions emerging from my data that there may be a difference 
between men and women in the value put on girls’ education and in the 
efforts pursued to secure schooling is noteworthy in view of the demonstrated 
link between female education and "empowerment" world-wide (See for 
example Jejeebhoy, 1996; El-Hamamsy, 1994). The mothers who insist on 
educating their daughters, may neither be feminists nor possess a 
consciousness of their oppression as women in the way it is commonly 
understood. These are the same mothers who insisted on circumcising their 
daughters or on public displays of their virginity, as discussed in chapters five 
and seven. Nonetheless, the reasons women offered for keeping their 
daughters in school also indicate an awareness of women’s vulnerability to 
injustice and abuse in both their marital relations and in their working 
environment.
The two reasons most often cited for insisting that daughters complete 
their education are: finding a respectable job, waziifa muhtarama, and, finding 
a muhtaram, respectful, and educated husband with assurance of a regular 
income, thus avoiding abuse both at work and at home. What is striking is 
that both reasons centre on a search for respect, and are closely related to 
some aspects of these women's own self identity and unpleasant memories 
and demeaning practical life experiences in both marriage and employment.
Bourdieu's notion of the habitus is illuminating in this respect. The habitus 
argues Bourdieu, "as a product of history, produces individual and collective 
practices, ensures the active presence of past experiences deposited in the 
form of schemes of perception, thought and action." Women's aspirations and
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behaviour can be considered "anticipations of the habitus"... those practical 
hypotheses based on past experiences and which give disproportionate 
weight to early experiences" (Bourdieu, 1990:55).
An educated woman could, in the eyes of the women I interviewed, 
avoid the menial and low paying jobs that many of them are now engaged in, 
such as piece-work or waged work in workshops, discussed previously. Such 
work is considered both degrading and low paying. Anxious that their 
daughters may need to seek paid employment in the future, and aware of 
links between securing financial independence and increasing their leverage 
for decision making within their household, mothers attempt to enhance their 
daughters future opportunities for finding "respectable" jobs. These would be 
jobs with better work conditions, regular working hours which can 
accommodate their domestic roles, social security benefits, and a decent and 
assured income at the end of the month-, unlike the jobs they themselves are 
currently engaged in.
Given the high level of graduate unemployment in Egypt (see Fergany, 
1995), it is difficult to judge how realistic these dreams are. Nonetheless, 
there were several "models" of upward mobility, success stories pointed out 
to me and circulating in the community of certain women who through their 
education were able to find jobs, with local offices of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs, with local NGOs, and, in two cases, with private sector firms outside 
of the community.
Education was also seen as a way to expand marriage options and to 
reduce the possibility of marital violence. Women reasoned that education 
elevated a woman's (and her family's) status and prestige in the community 
and enabled her to better contest and defy domestic violence. This may 
partly be because investing in a daughter’s education suggests to members 
of the community that she is valued by her family. Some women argued, 
again sometimes through specific examples, that an educated woman is likely 
to have more choices of who she would marry. She is also more likely to 
marry an educated man who they believed would be more inclined to treat 
her well. What all of this suggests is that at least some women appear to be
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actively seeking ways of addressing the issue of marital abuse, including 
violence.8 Women's insistence on educating their daughters thus appears to 
be fulfilling both practical gender interests, interests derived from the 
practical daily needs and realities of women and which may imply a complicity 
with existing gender hierarchies, as well as strategic gender interests, those 
which consciously challenge the premises underlying current gender relations 
and thus have transformatory potential (Molyneux, 1985; 1998).9
The suggestion that women in low-income areas of Cairo are 
particularly eager to educate their daughters is at variance with most studies 
and observations regarding girls’ education in rural Egypt. Existing studies 
refer to general "family" pressures and objections, arguing that parents are 
more reluctant to invest in their daughters because they eventually "marry 
out" (see for example El-Baradei, 1996). I was able to identify only one 
recent study in rural Egypt that has hinted, albeit in passing, to a gender 
difference in decisions regarding education, in the other direction. In her field 
study of the socio-cultural context of early marriage in two villages in Egypt, 
El-Hamamsy (1994) addresses the reasons why many of the women married 
over the past 10 years did not get a formal education. Her study shows that 
"some 49% of the women reported that they did not attend school because 
parents, particularly the father, did not believe in girls’ education and 
thought it was useless or socially shameful" (El-Hamamsy, 1994:22, my 
emphasis). Other studies, observations, and conventional wisdom, however, 
has it that one of the main obstacles for girls’ education relates to women's 
burdensome household chores in rural areas, thus suggesting that it is 
primarily mothers who pull their daughters out of school so that they can help 
out with domestic chores, such as cooking, fetching water and caring for
8 Domestic violence from the perspective of women I interviewed, and that which 
they contest, is defined narrowly to include beating and insults. It did not include 
circumcision, which are included in the broader definitions of domestic violence by 
some feminist organisations in Egypt and abroad.
9 See the theoretical chapter for a more detailed discussion of gender interests, 
rights and needs.
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younger siblings, as well as assist in agriculture related activities, animal 
husbandry and dairy production.10
Rural Urban Differences: Some Hypothesis
A number of hypotheses regarding urban-rural differences11 in 
attitudes and practices regarding girls’ education may be entertained. The 
first hypothesis is related to the different nature of domestic chores and 
unpaid family labour in urban and rural areas. Women's household chores in 
urban areas are generally less time consuming. For example, two of the most 
time consuming activities in rural areas which require the assistance of girls, 
baking bread and fetching water, are much less relevant in urban areas 
where many women buy ready made bread and have easier access to tap 
water, inside or outside the house. Other time consuming activities, like food 
processing and dairy production are also largely replaced in urban areas by 
cash purchases. Child-care responsibilities may also be less demanding in 
urban areas due to a smaller family size. Women I interviewed were very 
aware of these differences in domestic chores, as compared to rural areas, 
and expressed them in their reluctance to let their daughters marry into rural 
households.
The second hypothesis is related to urban women's personal 
experience of paid employment. Unlike rural women, many poor urban 
women have first hand experience in paid employment in the informal sector.
Not all informal sector work is necessarily low paying. However, as 
mentioned earlier, many women in the community studied were engaged in 
two forms of informal sector employment: home-based piece-work, which is 
irregular, tedious and poorly paid, and wage labour, which pays better, but
101 am grateful to Dr. Malak Zaalouk for drawing my attention to this point. As an 
expert working on girls’ education programs with UNICEF in rural Egypt for many 
years, her initial reaction to my findings were those of extreme surprise.
11 I do not want to imply that rural and urban are homogenous categories, and I 
appreciate the differentiation within both categories. Fergany (1994a) presents 
important differentiation in attitudes and services within urban communities. 
Nonetheless, I think for the purposes of the specific hypothesis I am developing, 
one can still talk broadly about differences between rural and urban settings.
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offers no security, provides limited opportunities for job mobility, entails the 
risk of sexual harassment, and is considered a highly "un respectable" job for 
girls.
With male unemployment steadily rising over the past decade, and 
being more deeply tied into an inflationary cash economy, poor urban women 
also recognise, more than their counterparts in rural areas, that their 
daughters may need to seek paid employment in the future. Education 
becomes not just an avenue for social mobility and respect, but also a hedge 
against future insecurities. By educating their daughters, urban mothers 
believe they can secure them more "respectable"--not necessarily higher 
paying-jobs, jobs with better terms and conditions than the ones they have 
themselves experienced.
Finally, I venture a hypothesis about the changing nature of family 
structures in urban areas that affect residence patterns, household dynamics, 
inter-generational flows and support systems, as well as normative 
expectations from female kin. The centrality of women in urban kinship 
systems, a phenomena termed interchangeably "matrifocality", "matrilateral 
asymmetry", "matrilateral bias", "gynefocality" has been suggested by several 
studies in western industrialised countries (Yanagisako, 1978). This 
phenomenon characterises both intra and inter-generational relationships, 
and has been observed in residence patterns, flows of mutual aid and 
exchange, frequency of visitation, and in sentiments of closeness (Vatuk, 
1971).
One explanation for this phenomenon is related to the differentiation in 
male occupational roles accompanying industrialisation, which has meant 
that the household is no longer a central economic production unit and thus 
that relations between men lose some of their strength. Other explanations 
have centred on families' desire to cope with the conflicting pressures of a 
commitment to an independent nuclear family and conjugal unit, on the one 
hand, and the need to maintain mutual dependence and extra-household ties 
and solidarity, on the other. Yanagisako (1977) argues, based on her 
research among Japanese American families in Seattle city in the U.S.A., that
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because female ties were viewed by her interviewees as less economically 
and politically demanding, and more based on sentiment than on 
"instrumentality", female interpersonal networks were less threatening to 
ideologies of conjugal independence .
One of the few attempts to test the "matrilateral hypothesis" is provided 
by Vatuk's study of first generation urban migrants in two neighbourhoods in 
North India. She finds that while kinship systems were still predominantly 
patrilineal both structurally and normatively, there was an increasing trend 
towards matrilateral kin. This was reflected in more visits and interaction 
between a married woman and her sisters in the urban setting and the 
acceptance of a broader range of roles for a wife’s relatives as opposed to 
those formerly deemed appropriate only for the relatives of the husband 
(Vatuk, 1971).
In my study community, there were similarly some indications of strong 
relations between female kin, particularly between mother and daughter. As 
mentioned in chapter seven, working adolescent daughters normally gave a 
portion of their wages to their mothers, not their fathers. Older unmarried 
sons, on the other hand, generally retained most of their income. Moreover, 
there was a strong preference for women to live close to their own mothers 
when married, and as discussed earlier, one of the issues prospective brides 
actively negotiated is choice of residence. Once married, visits between 
mother and daughter were undoubtedly much more frequent than those 
between a son and his mother. Of the few extended households in the 
community, three were based on a groom living in his wife's parent's 
household, an unconventional residential structure in the Egyptian context. 
Community members did not express any negative sentiments regarding this 
residential pattern.
It is plausible to argue that at a more general level in the Egyptian 
urban context, a trend towards matrifocality may be in the making. Mothers' 
expectations from daughters may be changing with respect to old age 
security and support. In an urban nuclear family context, daughters may 
acquire more importance as a source of future support. Whereas in a rural
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family, an older woman could count on the services of her co-resident 
daughter-in-law, this is less likely in urban areas where most families are 
nuclear. In such a context, it may be that mothers increasingly rely on their 
daughter(s) to support them in their old age, and well as to help them in 
coping with the complexities of urban life-such as dealings with the 
bureaucracy.12 Women know from practical experience, that literacy 
assumes a particular advantage for survival in the urban context, and thus 
arguably resolve to invest in their daughter's education.
Several women recalled their experiences of having to go to a doctor, 
or a government office, and their frustrations at not knowing how to read the 
bus numbers, directions, or instructions. "I always take my (educated) 
daughter with me when I go to get my pension", ventured one woman. My 
observations suggest that it was daughters, more often than sons, who were 
called upon in such situations. These observations and tentative hypothesis 
clearly require further investigation of how family relationships may be 
changing due to the demands put on women and men by urban life.
The implications of the above suggestions are multiple, both at the 
theoretical and policy levels. One implication is that attempts to close the 
gender gap in education in Egypt, will not simply be realised through the 
efforts of governments and donors to build more "girl friendly" schools and 
the laudable activities of the government and NGOs to introduce literacy 
classes. Perhaps just as importantly these goals will be realised through the 
daily struggles and aspirations of thousands of illiterate women to enrol, and 
keep, their daughters in school. These struggles are both material, 
necessitating efforts to find the necessary means to cover education costs, 
but also symbolic and ideological in that they may defy male authority with 
respect to decisions in this area. Of course, women's efforts do not always
12 The bureaucracy in Egypt is notorious for it's complexity. Even simple dealings, 
such as issuing a birth certificate or accessing a pension, take time, effort and 
connections.
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achieve their intended consequences.13 What is critical to note here, 
however, is that failure, in this specific instance, is often due to women's 
inability to generate the necessary financial resources to pursue their aim. 
Household poverty in general, and women's lack of an independent and 
adequate income, in particular, emerge as important reasons why women's 
attempts in this arena are sometimes met with failure. This supports 
Agarwal's argument, in her critique of Sen's (1990) overemphasis on 
women's lack of perception of their self interest, that the issue at stake is 
often not sharpening women's perceptions of their self-interest, but improving 
their ability to overcome the external constraints that prevent them from 
pursuing these interests (Agarwal, 1994). In the Egyptian context, policies 
that can assist with the financial costs of the education of girls in poor urban 
areas, either directly in the form of scholarships, or indirectly through 
providing women with access to more lucrative income earning opportunities, 
can significantly improve women's "fall back" positions, and are clearly called 
for.
Theoretically, my data challenges some of the still pervasive notions of 
women's false consciousness pervading much feminist writing, which casts 
women as passive beings who internalise their subordination and perpetuate 
their own oppression. Despite increasing data that questions these notions, 
and although several scholars are moving away from this simplistic, and 
ahistorical approach, as Agarwal points out in a recent book, it is still: "a long 
standing view which continues to hold sway" (Agarwal, 1994:422). The 
comments by Sahar EI-Mogy, an Egyptian feminist and writer, in her review of 
a recent study on reproductive health in rural Egypt in an important Arabic- 
language Journal on Women's studies, are an excellent example of this 
prevalent view in Egypt. Emphasising how the study reveals various forms of
13 A recent study of primary enrolment, based on World Bank estimates, indicates 
that in Egypt in 1960, enrolment rates in primary education were higher than the 
average for middle income countries. After 25 years, this rate is lower than the 
average of low-income countries. The main difference relates to female 
education. The same study estimates that female enrolment rates have 
decreased in poor urban communities (Fergany, 1994a).
300
oppression from which rural women suffer she argues that the main problem 
is as follows:
"they (meaning poor rural women) are not able to alleviate their 
oppression or challenge it, because they are not aware that 
they are being oppressed in the first place. Society has 
made women into spokes in a wheel, into dolis that have 
learnt how to perform certain roles and who have neither the 
consciousness nor education that can enable them to begin to 
question and challenge their surroundings. The first question 
that must be tackled before improvements in women's position 
can be made is: How can we make women realise the nature 
and severity of their oppression." (Hagar, 1994: 226, translated 
from Arabic).
Focusing on decisions regarding the education of girls, this section 
has illustrated that women and men in the same household may have 
divergent interests and priorities. These are often reflected in conflicts over 
budgetary allocations and serve to complicate decision- making processes 
within households. The above discussion has illustrated that an examination 
of intra-household relations is thus critical for understanding power in gender 
relations and the ways in which women may seek to gain leverage to pursue 
their own priorities. However, women's resources, and hence their relative 
power, are not solely determined by their familial context but are also 
influenced by their access to extra-household options. An analysis of 
relations, strategies and networks that go beyond the household is thus also 
crucial. This forms the focus of the following section.
Beyond the Household: Extra-familial Networks
A number of feminist writers have argued that the household is an 
inadequate unit of analysis, as intra-household power relations and 
hierarchies are shaped not only by household dynamics, but by socio­
economic and ideological forces beyond it (Harris, 1981, Moore, 1988). 
Others have cautioned that an overemphasis on the household also leads to 
misleading conceptualisations of the household as an autonomous unit where 
marital arrangements are given priority over other types of social
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arrangements in defining relations between men and women (Whitehead, 
1984, quoted in Moore, 1988).
Women's multiple roles in extra-household kin and non kin networks 
have long been ignored in the analysis of kinship and power structures in 
anthropology. This "invisibility" of women has, however, been challenged by 
several feminist anthropologists who have pointed to the diverse forms of co­
operation between women, and their relevance to women's ability to improve 
their bargaining positions. Several writers have suggested that women who 
are not well integrated into durable and lasting support networks often have 
less independent decision making powers and are more subject to male 
authority within households (Chaplain and Bujra, 1982; Moore, 1988; March 
and Taqqu, 1986).
Women's networks have, as a result, received increasing attention in 
cross-cultural research over the past ten years. Using ethnographic data, 
from diverse societies in the developing world, March and Taqqu, 1986, 
argue that some women's informal networks have transformatory potential, 
and can be effective "catalysts for change". They show how extra-household 
social networks, mostly informal loosely structured groupings, play a critical 
role in mediating women's access to many kinds of material and emotional 
resources, services, and information. These networks can have considerable 
legitimacy and power, often enabling women to better voice their concerns 
and perspectives, widen their options, and enhance their solidarity and 
spheres of influence (March and Taqqu, 1986).
Many studies of Middle Eastern societies similarly stress the 
importance of women's networks. Joseph's study of an urban working class 
community in Lebanon demonstrates the vitality and intensity of street based 
networks, which are primarily the domain of women. Her study highlights the 
role of the neighbourhood street, Zaruub, as a boundary marker of a social 
unit, and as the site of intricate and deep relations of reciprocity and sharing 
that transcend family and kinship (Joseph, 1978). In the Sudan, the cult of 
zaar, has been pinpointed as a specifically female extra-familial network that 
enables new migrants to adapt to urban life (Constantinides, 1978). Hale
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(1993) also drawing on research in the Sudan, goes further in emphasising 
the potentially political nature of zaar gatherings and networks and interprets 
them as "protest ceremonies", during which issues of concern to women, 
ignored or avoided by other groups, are raised (my emphasis).
Although I started out with an awareness of such networks and was 
prepared to explore linkages and forms of co-operation between households, 
my early discussions with women on these topics were frustrating, as was 
mentioned in chapter four. As I spent more time in the community, however, I 
began to observe the range of networks of mutual help that did exist. For 
example, washing clothes involved a common form of co-operation between 
women in different households. Women with access to a roof usually offered 
others use of roof space, washing pegs and washing ropes. Since four or 
five families could need to use the roof of the same house, a system of 
rotation was usually agreed upon in advance to avoid problems and to 
accommodate everyone's needs. The timing of the weekly wash was based 
on the husband's day off, and thus on his occupation. For a government 
employee it was Fridays, and thus a family who had men working in the 
government would normally do the weekly wash on Thursday. The day off for 
workers in the informal sector was Sundays, and such families would thus 
wash on Saturdays.14
I observed and participated in several networks. These served as 
important avenues for providing women with access to financial resources 
and information, emotional support, recreation, and space for the articulation 
of discontent. In this section, I analyse three such networks: spirit 
possession circles, female-run grocery shops, and rotating credit
14 Another form of extra-household co-operation was organising community
decorations during the fasting month of Ramadan Women collect payments from 
households, usually on a street by street basis, and children gather to cut small 
coloured pieces of paper and tie them to string. These, together with plastic and 
paper lanterns are hung up from balcony to balcony. The result is a beautiful array 
of decorations that give a festive and colourful touch to what was otherwise a 
dusty and dreary looking community. The decorations are not taken down at the 
end of the month, but are left to be blown away by the wind over the months.
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associations. There are important difference in their bases for membership, 
their structures and their purposes. However, all three networks can be 
described as leader centred-, that is, revolving around a single female 
leader-, incorporate both "active" and "defensive" strategies15, and have a 
predominantly, but not exclusively, female membership.
Women-centred Networks: Hadra(s), Braala(s) and Garri iyya{s)
Spirit possession as a communicative mechanism has been discussed 
extensively in chapter eight. Spirit possession circles, hadra(s), however, not 
only provide a discursive space for the emergence of an alternate "language" 
to express discontent and negotiate social expectations, but, as in the Sudan, 
they also provide an important physical space for some low-income Cairene 
women to socialise freely. The hadra(s) ceremonies provide one of the few 
non-kin, non-neighbourhood based female networks in low-income Cairo, 
thus carving out an important and separate physical and social space for 
women, where they can forge new relationships outside the confines of their 
daily lives, relationships which supplement kinship relations. During the 
breaks between the dancing, women often discussed common problems, and 
exchanged advice about marriage, health, children, employment and other 
areas of concern. Hadra{s) thus provide a context for the emergence of new 
notions of personhood, notions based on same sex friendships, but not on 
the dominant principles of domestic kinship, such as mothers, daughters, 
wives, aunts and so forth, which play a central role in defining female identity. 
The hadra(s) thus provides an interesting example of how, as Loizos and 
Papataxiarchis argue, in specific contexts, kinship may be “implicated in the
16 March and Taqqu distinguish conceptually between "defensive" associations 
which are based on women's exclusion from male society, and where women thus 
unite due to "shared adversity" or in response to a crisis or constraint beyond their 
control, and "active" associations, which not only provide emergency support and 
protection, but may also amass significant resources, enabling women to expand 
their choices. These are not mutually exclusive categories (March and Taqqu, 
1986).
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construction of gender identity” in a manner that is quite different than the 
way it is in the dominant conjugal model of gender, which informs much of 
ethnographic analysis (1991a).
The hadra(s) is female dominated and is led and managed to a large 
extent, by women.16 The role of the kudya, on which a hadra(s) is dependent, 
is an exclusively female occupation with considerable prestige, status and 
influence. It is an achieved role that does not derive from association with 
men (as husbands, brothers, or fathers), but is earned through successfully 
orchestrating spirit possession ceremonies over many years. It is noteworthy, 
that only a woman who has been previously possessed, or is currently 
afflicted, can become a kudya. The role of the kudya is often passed on from 
mother to possessed daughter.
As I learnt when I asked the kudya at one of the ceremonies to make a 
diagnosis, atar, for me, matriarchal concepts are central to the diagnostic 
procedures related to spirit possession. To find out their atar, a woman (or 
man) has to provide the kudya with a piece of personal clothing, (I provided a 
T-shirt, although the kudya had insisted that I provide a more personal item), 
and write their first name, and that of their mother only on a piece of paper. 
When the kudya asked me to write my mother's name,. I could not help 
contrast this with the request for my father's name on all official papers and 
documents in Egypt, and I must admit to a certain sense of pleasure. "In our 
world", explained the kudya, "mothers are more important than fathers". 
Several studies have similarly highlighted how women's rituals often honour 
specifically female roles. As Tapper (1983) and Sorabji, (1994) show, a 
significant part of women's gatherings around muulids, celebrations of the
16 I say large extent, because as mentioned earlier some of the lead people in the 
ceremony, the musicians, are men. Moreover, in seeking a "voice", it is interesting 
to note that women may be appropriating male images of power, since many of 
the spirits possessing women, and who give them a voice and sometimes protect 
them as well, are in fact men. Although certainly not a rule, my impressions is that 
women are usually possessed by male spirits, and men, by female spirits.
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birth of the prophet, in both Turkish towns and Sarajevo city, revolves around 
the celebration of the nativity and motherhood of the prophet's mother.17
What strengthens the potential power of a hadra(s) as independent 
female space is that it is not an exclusive women's network. Afflicted men 
sometimes participate, but they are usually very limited in number. This is 
probably one of the few instances where women mix with men in the same 
confined space, but where men represent a minority. At the hadra(s) I 
attended, the number of women at any one time ranged from 10 to 40; the 
number of men never exceeded three, who looked terribly intimidated and 
uncomfortable. In most of the hadra(s) I attended, there were no men at all.18
Some women go to the hadra(s) on a regular basis and a familiarity 
quickly develops amongst the "regulars", which a kudya assured me does not 
happen with the men. After I had been to the same hadra(s) for several 
consecutive times, I started recognising faces and felt much more relaxed, 
familiar, and as belonging to a group. From the way some women greeted
17 In her excellent analysis of muulids in a politically turbulent Sarajevo in 1990, 
Sorabji, provides an important contrast to the prevalent view of women's rituals as 
specifically female, "counter hegemonic" models to dominant male ideologies 
which thus enable women to contest their gender roles. Unlike the situation in the 
1980's, muulid participants in Sarajevo in 1990 actually had "mixed motives"; 
Muulids had become a forum for expressing both solidarity, and conflicting views 
between different groups of women over the nature and basis of that solidarity. 
While muulid goers viewed themselves as religiously motivated, their perceptions 
of Islam’s implications and it's relationship to Muslim and national identity vis a vis 
the Serbs and Croats varied. "At the muulids of 1990, open disagreements 
between Muslims lay only millimetres beneath the skin of ritual unity and was 
perceived as a threat both to personal integrity and to Muslim unity" (1994:113). 
Sorabiji's observations emphasise the point made earlier about the historical 
specificity of spirit possession narratives.
18 I did not interview or talk to any of the possessed men in hadra (s). Several 
women, and one kudya, however, told me that men who attend are often 
homosexuals-which they referred to interestingly, not in the degrading terms of 
khawal, nor that of mara mentioned earlier, but in the more neutral one of 
mukhanas. Some of the men were also newly married men who are impotent, 
referred to as tied, marbuut, (meaning the penis is tied). The hadra{s) thus provide 
a context for the emergence of forms of "subordinate masculinities" that challenge 
"hegemonic" notions of masculinity (See Lindisfarne and Cornwall, 1994), and 
enable the articulation of “de-sexed forms of personhood” (see Loizos and 
Papataxiarchis, 1991b).
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me, I also suspect that they had started to recognise me as a "regular". 
Women of all ages participate in spirit possession networks, even those who 
are not necessarily possessed as mentioned earlier. In the ones I attended, 
however, there was a predominance of married women in their middle years. 
Some relationships established during a hadra(s), may be followed up and 
developed outside its physical confines. I was unfortunately unable to probe 
into this aspect as much as I would have liked, however, partly because of 
time constraints, and partly because there seemed to be reluctance among 
the women to admit to keeping in touch with those they met in hadra(s). This 
reluctance indicates that hadra(s), while tolerated, do not have full public 
legitimacy and sanction.
Another common network in the study community is focused around 
small female managed grocery stores, bPaala(s), which are often home- 
based. These serve as a place for meetings and exchanges between 
women. Running a grocery, is not an exclusively female role as is the case of 
the kudya mentioned above, or the ganfiyya leader, which will be discussed 
below. Many are run by women, but there are also bPaala(s) run by men. 
However the latter tend to be larger, better stocked, and, at least as far as the 
women are concerned, they do not provide the same support network.19
Most of these bPaala(s) have a relatively steady clientele20 of about 20 
to 50 women who, over time, develop intimate relations with each other and 
use the grocery shop as a locale for sharing a wide range of information 
regarding jobs, health, marriage opportunities, marital problems, and the like.
The relationships between the grocer and other women are based on more 
than mere financial transactions, but also incorporate many elements of 
patron-client ties, partly because of the control that the grocer has over much
19 I say female run, not owned because female run bPaala{s) are sometimes co­
financed or owned by a husband, who may also sell himself in the evenings, as an 
additional job. This does not reduce the importance of bPaala(s) as support 
networks, however, as women adjust their shopping times to fit those of the wife's 
availability.
20 Grocers explained that there are two types of clientele: steady, zubuuna dayma, 
and one off, zubuuna tayyaary. The bPaala serves as a network only for the 
steady clients.
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valued, and often scarce, subsidised goods, such as rice and sugar. The 
relationship is further complicated because many bfaala(s) are illegal and 
unregulated. Thus when word goes around that a government official is 
checking the area, word is quickly sent to the grocer, often by one of her 
regular clients, and the shop is promptly closed. A grocer thus conducts her 
relationships with clients carefully, since there is always the threat that an 
angry client could expose her to government officials.
The profitability, size and sphere of influence of a bfaaia  varies, 
growing or decreasing, partly depending on the charisma and 
resourcefulness of its manager. Some of the women running these 
bfaaia(s), also manage to become organisers of saving associations, 
garrfiyya(s), which will be discussed below. This constitutes an example of 
how starting a micro-enterprise such as a bfaaia  can grow from merely a way 
of increasing one's income to make ends meet, to a strategy for exerting 
substantial influence in the distribution of resources and gaining prestige in 
the community. Clients are tied to these groceries by a daily or weekly credit 
system of shukuk, buying on credit, and it is through checking out a woman's 
"credit history", that a grocery owner can determine who is trustworthy and 
reliable enough to incorporate into a ganfiyya. This minimises repayment 
problems and secures her own reputation in the community as a successful 
ganfiyya leader.
My observations support findings in one low-income community in 
Cairo which suggests that women value these interactions around bfaaia(s) 
so much that they purposefully spread their purchases throughout the day 
(Shorter et al, 1994). It is important to note, however, that bfaala(s), are 
more valuable in this respect for women at a certain point in their life cycle. 
These are unmarried older adolescents, or recently married women whose 
mobility is usually more restricted than older women and younger girls. While 
the latter group also uses the bfaala(s), they also have more access to retail 
or wholesale markets outside their neighbourhoods.
A third, pervasive type of network in the community, is the ganfiyya, 
an informal rotating credit and saving association. The importance of rotating
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credit associations as both a financial and social support system has been 
highlighted by several researchers and in societies as diverse as India, 
Mexico, Malaysia, China, Barbados, Jamaica, Nigeria, and the Cameroon 
(March and Taqqu, 1986). Despite cross-cultural variations, a feature they 
share in common is their disproportionate representation of women.
Several studies in Egypt have highlighted the role of garrfiyya(s) 
(Wikan, 1980, Nadim, 1985; Singerman, 1995; Hoodfar, 1997). Garrfiyya(s) 
are formed by a group of people who are interested in saving money for a 
specific purpose. Each member contributes a similar and agreed upon sum 
of money into a common fund on a regular basis, weekly, monthly or daily. 
Each member, is then given the whole amount of money in the fund based on 
the agreed upon system of rotation.
Singerman's study in Cairo neighbourhoods is perhaps the most 
detailed one highlighting the prevalence of ganfiyya(s). She shows how they 
provide a critical informal mechanism for financing marriage expenses in 
particular, in a context where marriage expenses are extremely high and 
where people have no access to the formal banking system. Singerman 
estimates that a large portion of national gross domestic savings may in fact 
be circulating in informal savings, and argues that the "sayings ethic" in the 
country is no doubt much stronger than official estimates would lead one to 
expect. Since garrfiyya(s) are predominantly organised by women, she 
further argues that women are the real "bankers" in Egypt (Singerman, 1995).
Ganrfiyyafs) were common in the community studied. The 
ganfiyya(s) I observed and participated in were based on either residence or 
place of employment, were all managed by women, and had a 
disproportionate female membership. A ganfiyya is initiated by one person, 
who gathers a group of 10 to 30 people, mainly women, who may be 
interested in joining. The members of the group may not themselves know 
each other, but are linked through the person who initiated the ganfiyya and 
who becomes its leader and manages the common fund. Some members 
contribute more than one share. Personal circumstances of the different 
members are taken into account when deciding on collection rotations, and
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the ganfiyya leaders play a crucial role in this process of decision making. 
Rotation periods varied, but most were on a weekly basis, with a single 
payment ranging from 3 pounds to 15 pounds a week.
While many women were involved in ganfiyya(s), it is important to 
note that they were not an option for all women. Very poor women were often 
excluded from these networks. Some told me that they have never joined a 
saving society, because they had neither the luxury of a steady income 
themselves, however meagre, nor a husband with a steady income that would 
ensure the regular repayments. In fact not joining a ganfiyya  is often a good 
indication of the level of poverty of a woman and her household.
As I found out when I was asked to join a ganfiyya  myself, its 
organisers welcome new members, even if they are from outside the 
community. In fact, ganfiyya(s) often act as a way of integrating a newcomer 
into community networks. New members, however, are checked out as 
carefully as possible, but more importantly, they get their payment at the end 
of the cycle. After demonstrating their trustworthiness, they can then be 
allocated progressively earlier rotations. In the four ganfiyya(s) I 
participated in during my fieldwork, I was always allocated the last rotation or 
the one before last. I think in my case, however, it had less to do with trust, 
and more to do with my being perceived as a resource, someone who could 
afford to add to the capital without benefiting from early returns. Being paid 
last, however, was not necessarily perceived as a disadvantage. Some 
women said they like to be paid at the end of a cycle as they did not want to 
be in debt. In their case, their motives for joining a ganfiyya  was not getting 
an advance payment, but was more related to ensuring that the money they 
are able to save every month is not spent and is protected from possible 
diversion into household expenses.
Unlike the grocer and the kudya, the role of a ganfiyya  leader is not 
as specialised as a profession or activity, but is usually combined with other 
roles. Grocers, as mentioned earlier, and door to door saleswomen, daliala, 
often organise ganfiyya(s) capitalising on their extensive networks of clients.
Although theoretically anybody can start a ganfiyya, some women in the
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community had a particular fame as ganfiyya  organisers and others had bad 
reputations and were to be avoided.
Conflicts often occurred in ganfiyya(s), due to a member defaulting on 
a rotation, or another demanding an earlier turn in the midst of rotation due to 
an emergency situation. Reallocating turns and making allowances for these 
kinds of emergencies, without alienating other members, as well deciding 
when to put pressure on defaulting members to honour their agreement, 
requires skill and intimate knowledge of the circumstances and character of 
each member. A good ganfiyya leader was thus considered one who 
ensures that members get their turns on time, resolves conflicts in a fair 
manner, taking peoples' personal circumstances into account (such as a 
sudden death or illness), being flexible about turns if necessary, and ensuring 
the privacy of the individual women involved in the ganfiyya(s).
Usually, but not necessarily, the organiser of a ganfiyya  takes the first 
turn. Other turns rotate subject to negotiation with the organiser and tailored 
to the demands and circumstances of individual women, such as an 
impending birth, marriage, or the beginning of the school year. Once a 
woman has committed herself to a ganfiyya, she must honour it to the end. 
It is highly frowned upon if she quits in mid-cycle. Unless-there is a 'cas de 
force majeure1, she is not entitled to take back the money she has deposited 
into the ganfiyya until the very end of the cycle. Exceptions are made, 
however, as in the case of a widow whose room caught fire destroying most 
of her meagre belongings. She had already been allocated the total amount 
of the ganfiyya, but had three instalments with a total of 15 pounds left. The 
ganfiyya  leader paid them herself.
Unlike the hadra(s), and bfaala(s), where some women know each 
other and often meet, ganfiyya(s) are not networks in the physical or 
personal sense. Ganfiyya(s) are more "anonymous" networks, where 
members may not know each other, or may only know some of the other 
members Sometimes, the only direct link between the members is the 
organiser herself, who usually knows the members on a personal basis. In 
fact, it is important that people do not know who else is in a ganfiyya, Om
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Nagi, the leader of one of the ganfiyya(s) I joined, explained to me, because 
a garrfiyya could be cursed by the evil eye, titnizer.
Another garrfiyya organiser said that this secrecy is necessary 
because sometimes women, particularly those who have an independent 
source of income, join a garrfiyya without the knowledge of their husbands as 
they may want to spend the money on something the husband disapproves of 
(such as educating a daughter or having an abortion for example), or may 
want to protect their incomes from possible demands by a husband. My 
observations and discussions actually confirmed that some women are quite 
careful not to tell their husbands when they have joined a ganfiyya. A good 
ganfiyya leader thus does not leak out information out about who is in her 
network so that these women do not get into trouble with their husbands.
As with the two networks discussed above, ganfiyya(s) are a 
predominantly, but not exclusively female network. Some garrfiyya(s) are all 
female, some are all male, and some are mixed. The majority would seem to 
fall in the first and third category. It is interesting to note, however, that even 
the all male ganfiyya(s) are organised by women. As mentioned earlier, not 
every woman can become a successful ganfiyya organiser. A gamfiyya 
leader must possess a diversity of skills to manage these networks well and 
successful organisers acquire significant influence and status in the 
community. However, the reasons given as to why ganfiyya  leadership is a 
specifically female role, did not always reflect an awareness of the 
considerable skills required by this job. "Women organise gamfiyya(s) not 
men," one woman told me, "because they are the ones who are staying at 
home and have empty heads, mukhkhuhum faadi". Other community
members were more cognisant that women possess special qualities which 
enable them to mobilise people, in a way that men cannot: "Men cannot 
organise garrfiyya{s)," ventured Sayeda, "because they cannot gather 
people together around them, yillimu ii naas, like women can."
Ganfiyya(s) play an important role in enabling individual women to 
gain more control and decision making power within their marriage, partly by 
providing them with an avenue for financial assistance, and relative financial
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independence. By getting advance payments or saving money through 
joining a garrfiyya, a woman may be able to start small income generating 
ventures--such as vending, or recycling activities™, to put a daughter through 
school, or to buy items for her gihaaz. Many women are able to join 
garrfiyya(s) through shrewd savings from the daily or weekly housekeeping 
allocation that their husbands provide, taking particular care to cut down on 
expenses in a manner that cannot be detected by their husbands.
One of the particularly interesting findings that emerged from my 
observations of garrfiyya(s)} but which so far has not been noted in the 
literature, is that some women use the garrfiyya as a way of diverting mate 
income, which they believe rightfully belongs to them. This was particularly 
the case in better off households where a husband was making a reasonable 
income but may not be spending it according to the priorities of his wife. Om 
Muhammed, who generates an income of about 3LE a day, through selling 
belila (popular desert dish made from wheat, milk and sugar) and sweets at 
the corner of her street, and is married to a semi-skilled worker in an 
electrical workshop, explains her reasons for joining garrfiyya(s). I quote her 
extensively below, because the use of garrfiyya(s) as a way of re-routing 
male earnings, invoked by a few other women, comes through very clearly in 
her comments.
Garrfiyya(s) are complex social arrangements with multiple facets and
purposes that clearly cannot be reduced to a single purpose. Not all women
viewed garrfiyya(s) in the same light as Om Muhammed. Nonetheless, I
highlight Om Muhammed's reasoning because it adds an interesting nuance
to our understanding of how some women may deploy garrfiyya(s) as
strategies to gain what they perceived to be their rightful entitlement from
their husbands. Om Muhammed comments:
"I found that joining a ganfiyya  is the best way to get 
money out of my husband." You see, he makes a lot of 
money, but his hand is loose, 3idu sayba, and he has bad 
habits. He spends most of it on cigarettes and even hash.... He 
wants a son, and when he gets angry with me, he threatens to 
marry another woman who can bear him a son.... I do not care if 
he takes another wife as long as he does not reduce the little
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that he is already paying for us; at least if he has another wife, 
he may be less willing to keep on asking me for money. You 
see, he is also always asking me for more money, all the time, 
and twice he hit me for not giving him any. Would god approve 
of this? It is a good thing he does not know how much money I 
make. I never leave my money in the house. I put as much as I 
can in the garrfiyya every week. Not only that, but I also use 
the ganfiyya as a way of aasuru (squeeze) i.e.: squeeze 
money from him. I demand 2 or 3 pounds from him every now 
and then and say that it is for my share in the ganfiyya. Not 
paying your turn in is very shameful around here and would 
jeopardise our relationships and reputation in the community.
What else do poor people have but their reputation, surrfa? So 
he always, although reluctantly, gives me the money for the 
ganfiyya. I have to be clever, however and not demand it too 
often. It was my neighbour who gave me this clever idea. She 
is a really nas-ha, sawy/smart woman. I think I have taken 
more money from my husband since I started joining 
garrfiyya(s) this year than I have ever before. Mind you, this 
is money rightfully owed to me and my children, it is our 
right, ha3! wi haf ciyaaii.
This chapter has focused on intra-household decisions and extra­
household relations and discussed possible links between the two. In 
particular, the role of extra-household networks in increasing women's 
leverage and bargaining power vis a vis their husband's was emphasised. 
The education of daughters was presented as one site of contestation 
between husbands and wives and an area where women deployed a range of 
tactics to pursue their priorities and aspirations. Some of the resources they 
drew on in this process lay outside their immediate household. The chapter 
has thus also discussed the role of extra-household informal networks. The 
focus has been on three specific networks which emerged as crucial in 
supporting women's attempts to improve their lives. These are: spirits 
possession ceremonies, hadra(s), female run grocery shops, bfaala(s), and 
rotating credit associations, ganfiyya(s).
314
CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS AN ’ORGANIC FEMINISM'
This thesis began with a seemingly straightforward question: how do a 
particular group of women in low-income neighbourhoods in Cairo perceive 
and respond to gender relations and hierarchies, both in their households 
and in their workplace? Almost 300 pages later, the answers seem anything 
but straightforward. If one can draw any tentative conclusions, it is that 
women's perceptions and responses are complex, contradictory, and in 
continuous flux as they interact with broader socio-economic conjunctures. 
Whether in their families or in the labour force, women's perceptions of 
inequity, and their responses to their conditions varied significantly. These 
variations partly depended on the type of employment they were engaged in, 
the phase of their life cycles, and the availability (or perception of the 
availability) of alternative options. Thus any single conclusion about women's 
willingness and ability to challenge existing gender arrangements and any 
assumptions of homogeneity of motives, perceptions and strategies would be 
erroneous. It also follows that any attempts by activists and policy makers to 
advance women's interests are bound to be varied and complex.
The thesis demonstrates, with certainty, however, that neither narrow 
Marxist approaches to resistance and consciousness, nor the a-historical, 
universal usage of the notion of patriarchy, both of which imply a sense of 
fixity and emphasise the "false consciousness" of subordinate groups, are 
adequate frameworks for understanding women's options and responses to 
gender hierarchies in their daily lives. At the other extreme, my data 
suggests that an approach that almost glorifies and romanticises poor 
women's strategies, by depicting low-income women as strong, resourceful, 
and knowing actors, able to successfully manipulate custom and conventional 
gender arrangements to their advantage, is also far too simplistic.
Women in my study displayed both defiance and compliance, both 
lack of articulated awareness of their self-interest and positions of relative 
subordination, and high levels of awareness of some of the injustices against 
them as women. Sometimes, their actions were pragmatic, seeking
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immediate relief. At other times, they sought more medium-term or longer- 
term gains. Both a "culture of silent endurance"1 and a culture of what I 
would term "silent defiance" existed simultaneously.
My data demonstrates that in some contexts, women are both willing, 
and able to dispute existing gender arrangements, and to successfully 
influence the outcome of negotiations to their advantage. For example, as 
shown in chapter seven, workshop girls, banaat il wirash, who were mainly 
unmarried, were often able to negotiate for better wages. Moreover, as 
discussed in chapter nine, many women, through deploying a range of tactics 
such as temporarily deserting the marital home, ghadbana, joining 
ganfiyya(s) and engaging in paid employment, were also able to pursue their 
aspirations to educate their daughters, often against the wishes of their 
husbands.
In other instances, women articulated discontent and resentment in 
strong terms, but sought damage limitation, rather than radical change. 
These attempts were clear in the practice of the ayma, the marriage 
inventory, discussed in chapter six. An examination of women’s views on the 
ayma reveals a local, class-bound discourse about women’s rights and 
interests which demonstrates a striking awareness amongst women of their 
relative disadvantage in marriage. The ayma, whose stipulations are 
enforced both legally and through informal mechanisms, taradii, was used by 
women as a means to settle marital conflict in their favour, ward off the 
looming threat of a divorce or having a co-wife imposed, and to provide them 
with some degree of financial stability. Although aware of their vulnerability 
in marriage, by insisting on a large ayma, women were not directly attempting 
to challenge their subordinate position within marriage, but rather, to limit the 
damage that could result from such a position.
In other contexts, women were both aware of injustices, willing to 
challenge them, but unable to pursue their aspirations due to external 
constraints, such as fear of physical violence, the inability to generate an
1 This term comes of Khattab's study (1992) on reproductive health in two villages in 
Egypt.
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income, or the difficulty of accessing social security benefits. For example, as 
discussed in chapter eight, some women expressed sexual disinterest, and, 
sometimes, outright revulsion towards their husbands. Yet many reported 
submitting unwillingly to their husbands’ demands for sex, partly due to fear 
of being beaten up, being thrown out of the house, or being divorced.
Other women, as seen in chapter nine, were unable to pursue their 
priority of keeping their daughters in school due to their inability to harness 
the necessary resources. Yet they clearly valued girls’ education, more so 
than their husbands, as an avenue for ensuring a respectable job for women, 
wazeefa muhtarama, and reducing the possibilities of physical and verbal 
abuse by a future husband. These are good examples of instances where 
women's responses are not necessarily related to their lack of perception of 
self-interest, but rather, are due to external circumstances which constrain 
their ability to pursue these interests. The women in the above examples 
demonstrated compliance, but not complicity (See Agarwal, 1994).
Yet in other contexts, women were both compliant and complicit with 
certain practices, which ostensibly seemed to perpetuate their positions of 
disadvantage, but which they did not perceive, or articulate as such. These 
were cases where women appeared to have themselves internalised existing 
gender norms and ideologies. The case of female circumcision discussed in 
chapter five, is a case in point. Circumcision was not viewed as a form of 
genital mutilation, as it is viewed by middle class feminists, but as a form of 
bodily purification that makes a woman more feminine and sexually appealing 
to a husband. It is both a 'rite of passage’ for women, and a gendering 
practice closely tied to constructions of men and women's worth and roles in 
the community, as well as constructions of male and female bodies.
By a gendering practice, I mean one that serves as a public reminder 
of the power differentials between men and women and of women’s 
subordinate position in society. Decisions regarding circumcision were 
primarily women's decisions, in which men were generally not consulted. 
Although many women recalled how painful their circumcision was, they were 
also emphatic about its importance. I did not encounter any questioning of
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the practice at all. This was a case of apparent complicity with the gender 
order, which may indicate women’s unquestioning acceptance of certain 
aspects of their lives.
My data further illustrates that some women accepted certain 
practices, partly due to their internalisation of gender norms as is the case 
with circumcision, but they responded in a manner that cannot be neatly 
described as either complicity or compliance (which connotes some degree of 
force, physical or moral). Their response can more aptly be described as a 
form of acquiescence. This form of acquiescence was particularly evident 
among piece-workers, discussed in chapter seven.
Piece-workers acknowledged the low-paying, tedious, and hazardous 
working conditions under which they labour using strong words such as back 
breaking, bitMum II dahr, low-paying, irshaha deFiif, and god save us from its 
evils, rabinna yikfina sharaha. However, they did not view it as reflecting any 
injustice against them as women or as workers, but rather as part of their fate 
as poor women. The labour relations underlying piece-work were not 
conceptualised, by either workshop owners (all men) or piece-workers (ail 
women), as strictly financial transactions. Rather they were presented as a 
form of charity and extending alms to the poor, sadaqa. Women thus took no 
steps to try and challenge the conditions of piece-work or bargain for better 
terms.
However, in other forms of work, such as wage labour, in which single 
adolescents predominated, women were much more aware of several 
aspects of gender discrimination, particularly unequal pay and sexual 
harassment. Unlike, piece-workers, workshop girls, banaat il wirash, were 
both willing, and sometimes able, to contest some of the unfavourable 
aspects of their work. Some engaged in practices directly aimed at deterring 
sexual harassment, through individual and momentary protest, such as 
stabbing an intruding male co-worker with a knife, or manipulating their 
bodies to look more masculine. Others engaged in more collective attempts 
to negotiate for better wages, often successfully, through namrada, a gender 
specific term that implies unjustified rebellion. As shown in chapter seven,
318
women often collectively (in groups of two or three) quit their work, without 
notice so as to cause maximum disruption, in search of better wages or terms 
of work.
The different responses by banaat il wirash and piece-workers to their 
working conditions are due to a different conjuncture of a number of 
economic, personal and cultural factors. These include market factors of 
supply and demand (unlike piece-workers, there was much more demand 
than supply for women’s wage work, partly due to the community’s negative 
view towards this form of work), the different role played by kinship idioms, 
and the marital trajectory and phase of women’s life cycles. These contingent 
responses confirm the difficulties of making any blanket statements about 
women’s ability to negotiate in the workplace.
By exposing the various ways in which women respond to gender 
hierarchies, the thesis has shed light on the mechanisms and modalities of 
power, and how it may operate at the micro-level, both in the home and in the 
labour market. One mechanism was that of “euphemization”, that is, recasting 
exploitative relationships as positive ones, as Bourdieu (1977; 1980) 
suggests (see Chapter seven). The power of euphemization was very clear 
in the case of sub-contracting. Both piece-workers and middlewomen 
"misrecognized" or obfuscated the relations underlying piece-work as passing 
time, tasiia, and forms of charity and community solidarity. The example of 
piece-workers further highlights an important aspect of power, that is, the 
power of gender ideologies to create a collective loss of memory about the 
history of certain labour processes. As the example of hand-sewn shoes, 
illustrated, gender ideologies acted retrospectively to naturalise certain 
tasks as women's work, even though they were exclusively male tasks, only a 
few years earlier.
Drawing on Foucault's analysis of power (see chapter one), the thesis 
also illustrated how unequal gender relations are maintained and reproduced 
by creating and sustaining certain common sensical or self-evident "truths" 
about men and women's roles. In a context where families are increasingly 
dependent on female wages, female employment has become inevitable.
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However, by constructing the meaning and implications of female 
employment in certain ways (for example, "proper girls do not work", "the 
work of women is a sign of deterioration not progress", "only the desperate 
would allow their girls to be called "banaat wirash", "married women in 
workshops promote male greed"), women are simultaneously able to enter 
into wage labour, and yet are kept out of its more lucrative and skilled areas, 
reserving the latter for men.
Moreover, my data illustrates how myths with religious references are 
creatively invented, to legitimate gender hierarchies. For example the 
anecdote regarding the assumed excessive sexual demands of the daughter 
of the prophet, recounted in chapter five and which has no factual historical 
basis, was nonetheless widely circulating and believed. This myth serves to 
reinforce certain understandings about how a female body should look like 
and appropriate behaviour towards husband, and thus sanction circumcision.
As suggested in chapter five, the universality of female circumcision in the 
community, and women’s strong adherence to the practice, is occurring in the 
context of reluctance by official religious institutions, such as il Azhar, to 
unequivocally endorse it as religiously sanctioned. Religious myths are 
nonetheless created to legitimate it.
One of the findings that emerged from the data, relates to the inter­
linkage between women's household and workplace options, confirming 
similar conclusions from other studies (see for example, Rugh, 1985; Afshar, 
1993). As discussed in chapter seven, banaat il wirash were essentially 
participating in the labour force in order to gain more leverage and widen 
their options in their future marriages, by accumulating a large gihaaz. The 
triangular relationship between the gihaaz (which links directly with the 
ayma), public defloration ceremonies, and women's waged work is of 
particular interest. It is not only testimony to the complex relationships 
between work and family options, but also illustrates how women's choices 
are affected by broader socio-economic changes, and how women attempt to 
manipulate conventional arrangements in order to expand their choices. The
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ayma and the gihaaz as items of marriage negotiations, appear to have 
gained a particular importance over the past 20 years.
The conditions and consequences of women's employment in the 
informal economy revealed by this thesis make any simple link between 
women's ability to participate in the labour market and their empowerment 
questionable. Piece-workers were integrated into the labour market, albeit 
intermittently and under precarious working conditions. Given current 
economic recession, labour deregulation and the effects of structural 
adjustment in (see chapter two), casual work in general and home-based 
piece-work in the informal sector, in particular, is likely to increase. At the 
same time, policy and research interest in the resilience and growth potential 
of the informal sector in Egypt for creating jobs is mounting.
The crucial question that still remains to be answered however, is, to 
what extent will this growth incorporate women? To what extent will the 
success of the informal sector be based upon the existence of a pool of 
cheap female labour with no prospects for mobility or job security? Given 
projections for the growth of the informal sector and its increasing role in 
export-oriented industrialisation, will the gender composition of skilled waged 
employment change, will women become skilled workers, sanafiyya?  Or will 
they simply increase the ranks of unskilled home-based workers doing 
industrial piece-work and accepting unfavourable working conditions, low pay 
and lack of social security and mobility, as in the case of Turkey (see Berik 
and Cagatay, 1994)) and Mexico (see Beneria and Roldan, 1987)?
Women working for wages in small informal workshops, were better 
paid than piece-workers, although they also had limited avenues for mobility 
and skill acquisition. Banaat il wirash have managed to creatively resolve 
some of the immediate contradictions posed by working outside the home, by 
manipulating and recrafting traditional practices, such as public defloration 
ceremonies, laf bit sharaf, discussed in chapter seven. By saving and 
accumulating a large gihaaz, they are also able to gain leverage in their 
future marriage, mitigate their vulnerability against divorce and maltreatment, 
and secure themselves financially.
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So, in many respects, it can be argued that wage work in the informal 
sector enhances women's bargaining power in their households. Again, 
however, the question is, at what cost? While venturing into a new "public 
space" and gaining leverage in their marriages, banaat il wirash may 
simultaneously be reinforcing normative gender expectations, through public 
defloration ceremonies, and the self-confessedly traumatic experience of the 
dukhla baladi. In addition to the emotional cost to the individual women 
involved, these practices also serve to perpetuate the ideal of female 
chastity, and sanction gender inequalities and the pressures put upon 
women.
Certainly access to cash generated through employment was an 
important bargaining tool for women. For example, it enabled some women 
to pursue their long-term aspirations, such as educating their daughters, 
which may result in inter-generational mobility for women. It allowed others to 
realise their medium term priorities of accumulating a gihaaz and thus 
expanding their choices of who to marry, where to live, and strengthening 
their bargaining positions vis a vis both their future husbands and mother-in- 
laws. However, the conditions of women's paid work described in the thesis, 
and the trade-offs that women make in the process of juggling such work in 
the context of a certain gender ideology, also emerge as important 
considerations when making connections between women's labour force 
participation and their empowerment.
My data also suggests that the neat distinctions between overt and 
covert practices and actions, which permeates most of the literature on 
resistance, is inadequate to describe the range of practices that women 
engage in. The assumption that women's protest tends to be covert, 
uncoordinated, and individual, whereas men's protest is more open and 
collective needs further examination. For example, women employed in wage 
work, engaged in a gender specific form of collective, open revolt, namrada. 
Workshop girls were often even more vocal and open about their discontent 
than male workers. Because they are excluded from the male dominated 
apprenticeship system characteristic of informal sector workshops, which
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provides men with avenues for training and promotion, women could afford to 
be more confrontational than male workers with a stake in the enterprise.
Moreover, my data shows that, contrary to prevalent assumptions in 
the literature, covert action is not necessarily individual, and collective action 
is not synonymous with open protest. Sometimes women acted individually, 
attempting to resolve conflicts to their advantage or defy current 
expectations. Attempts at tatfiish, discussed in chapter five, used by 
unmarried women to discourage uninteresting marriage suitors by leading 
them to refuse the match, is an example of a covert, non-confrontational, 
individual attempt to pursue one's options. Temporarily deserting the marital 
home, ghadbana, or stabbing a rude co-worker with a knife are other 
examples of individual attempts at resolving a disagreement, but which are 
both confrontational ones and represent more open statements of discontent.
Other coping responses and practices observed in the course of my 
fieldwork were both collective and overt, such as garrfiyyas, rotating credit 
and saving societies. While they played an important role in enabling 
individual women to widen their choices in their households, they do not 
represent forms of collective protest. As discussed in chapter nine, however, 
these networks enabled women to increase their material resources and thus 
pursue certain priorities, such as accumulating a large gihaaz, having an 
abortion or hymen repair surgery. Moreover, garrfiyya(s) also supported 
some women in engaging in individual subversive actions, such as diverting a 
husband’s income.
Spirit possession circles, hadra(s), are another collective, informal 
network which offers women a social and discursive space to indirectly 
express their grievances and defy some of the restrictions on their behaviour, 
mobility and dress. As argued in chapter eight, spirit possession is a widely 
shared cultural idiom, a form of “subordinate discourse”, through which 
women seek to express discontent, negotiate gender expectations and 
develop new notions of self-hood that are not based on kinship. An 
exploration of women's spirit possession narratives suggested two recurring 
themes of discontent, the lack of control over their sexuality, and the current
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pressures concerning their dress and mobility in the name of Islamic 
modesty.
A process of “islamization of every day life” was evident in the study 
community (see chapters two, three and eight). Spirit possession may be 
partly interpreted as a response to such a process. Many women reported 
being possessed by Christian spirits, who demanded that they refuse to wear 
the higaab or khimaar, stop praying, attending religious classes or listening to 
the Quran and religious tapes. Possessed women often yielded to these 
demands, and their behaviour was tolerated to a certain extent. As seen in 
chapter eight, the apparently increasing attempts to undermine spirit 
possession rituals through recourse to an alternative, male dominated, 
“religious” curing system, Hag bil Quran, is testimony to the strength of spirit 
possession practices.
“Veiling” or donning the higaab, has been widely discussed as one 
visible response by middle class women to the increasing islamization of 
everyday life in Egypt (see for example Macleod (1992a,b). As suggested in 
chapter eight, however, refusal to take up the higaab by some women 
because they are possessed, may be another response, but one that is 
articulated and enacted much more covertly and subtly and amongst women 
of a different socio-economic location. However, responses articulated 
through the idiom of spirit possession have their limitations in terms of 
challenging power relations, and may come at a tremendous personal cost. 
The case of the 14 year-old possessed girl who was beaten to death by her 
parents because she refused to wear the khimaar in response to the 
demands made by the spirits, is a sad, but vivid, illustration of these 
limitations.
My data also reveals a response by women to the contradictions in 
their daily lives that does not fit neatly in the over/covert dichotomy. I have 
termed this response “strategic trade-offs". This is a response which enabled 
women to deal with the contradictory demands on them to both generate an 
income, lucrative enough to cover the costs of their gihaaz, and yet retain 
their respectability and central identity as wives and mothers. Women's
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insistence on a traumatic dukhla baladi and public defloration ceremony, 
sometimes despite the disapproval of their husbands and with the knowledge 
that it is not religiously sanctioned, in order to venture into waged work, is an 
excellent example of such a strategic trade-off. Another example of a 
strategic trade-off is that which mothers sometimes had to make between 
investing in a daughter's gihaaz versus investing in her education as 
discussed in chapter nine.
Given these findings and observations about the varied and complex 
negotiations surrounding gendered roles, what conclusions may be drawn for 
future agendas of research and policy? Clearly, this thesis has barely 
scratched the surface on many issues, about which our stock of knowledge is 
still very limited; much more needs to be done. One of the aims of this thesis 
was to offer new insights, which can form the basis for informed hypothesis 
that merit further research.
A central perspective, largely absent from this thesis, is that of men 
and how they perceive the gender order of which they are a part. How do 
they view sex and sexuality? What are their responses to circumcision? 
What are their perspectives on women's education and employment? How do 
they define masculinity and femininity? How are they coping with their 
increasing inability to fulfil their central role as breadwinners and to what 
extent is this tied to their perceptions of masculinity?
However, as explained in chapter four, I have made a 'strategic trade­
off myself, which enabled me to access women's worlds in an intimate way 
that I am convinced would not have been possible had I attempted to spend 
as much time with men. I am also doubtful that men would have been willing 
to openly share with me their views on some of these questions. My focus on 
women enabled me to provide a rich perspective on their experiences in 
negotiating gender hierarchies and on their views on important, sensitive, 
and not easily observable issues, such as the conditions and consequences 
of sub-contracting and wage work, the ayma, defloration and sexual attitudes.
None of these issues have been studied to any satisfactory extent in the 
Egyptian context.
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One of the central themes revealed by the thesis and meriting further 
attention is the existence of major discrepancies between the approaches 
and agendas of middle-class feminist activists in Egypt, and the practices, 
priorities and perceptions of the low-income women I studied, yet also points 
of overlap and communality. This was illustrated in some detail in chapter 
six, by juxtaposing the ayma against the "new marriage contract" campaign, 
which was initiated by Egyptian feminists in 1994. Both the ayma and the 
proposed contract were viewed by different groups of women as critical 
vehicles for increasing women’s leverage in marriage and furthering women’s 
interests. Although the definition of these rights and interests varied, there 
were also obvious links and points of overlap. For example, both the ayma 
and the new contract attempt, in different ways, to address the risks and 
injustices of unilateral divorce and polygyny.
However, despite these connections, there was no reference to, or 
discussion of, the ayma at all during the campaign for a new marriage 
contract. A survey was conducted among low-income women to elicit their 
responses to the suggested contract hoping to increase the campaign’s base 
of support. However none of the survey questions addressed low-income 
women’s actual marriage negotiations or probed into their strategies for 
dealing with their perceived interests. The campaign had laudable aims and 
was a worthwhile effort, but it was a top down and myopic one, which may 
have been one of the reasons why the new marriage contract was eventually 
rejected by both the government and the public.
A main question that emerges is thus: how can we bridge the gaps 
between diverse, often class-bound, gender interests and priorities? Is it 
possible to find common ground and thus move beyond limited "gender 
activisms" and towards slowly building a process that would result in a broad 
based and sustainable social movement? I have been trying to argue, that 
the largely "top down" approach, which has characterised Egyptian feminist 
activism over the past decade, clearly has limitations, and may even result in 
backlashes. Moreover, as argued in chapter six, in the name of gender 
equality, such an approach may actually result in perpetuating inequalities
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amongst women. By controlling the agenda and deciding on the key issues, 
are more privileged women not in fact exercising a form of power over other 
women? This is power in the sense that it results in marginalizing the voices 
and priorities of certain categories of women, deterring them from entering 
into the dialogue, as equal partners, and reinforcing the hegemony of middle 
class priorities and discourses.
The existence of such discrepancies clearly has implications for 
development and feminist activism, not just in terms of pointing out past 
mistakes, but also by suggesting possibilities for alliances. For example, 
current attempts to change personal status laws in Egypt could be 
strengthened significantly by mobilising women around issues of concern to 
them such as the ayma, which links easily with broader demands for changes 
in laws affecting marriage, divorce and domestic violence. The possible 
erosion of the legal basis of the ayma, due to pressures from conservative 
forces, as discussed in chapter six, also emerges as an important priority for 
feminist activism. Moreover, the lack of women’s control over their sexual 
lives and their financial vulnerability, were concerns strongly voiced by many 
of the women in my sample. These issues need to be further pursued, and 
could serve as key concerns around which mobilisation of a broader 
constituency of women could occur.
Women's daily struggles may not result in radical outcomes or in 
altering power relations between men and women in and of themselves. 
Nonetheless they provide a store of issues, ideas and priorities to better 
inform feminist debates and agendas, as well as development policies. 
Perhaps more importantly, an understanding of women's daily concerns and 
struggles is a first step towards paving the way for dialogue amongst women 
of different classes, which may suggest areas around which broader 
constituencies of women could be mobilised and politicised. Such dialogue, 
also offers a chance for the emergence of local leadership around issues of 
direct relevance to a larger number of women, who can themselves begin to 
intervene at the level of setting the feminist agenda and discourse.
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My data also suggests that the prevalent state of male unemployment, 
the increasing number of female-headed households, and women’s 
perspectives on this state of affairs poses an important "contradiction" in 
prevailing gender ideologies which could serve as a "branching point" or 
"lever of change" (see Lukes, 1986). The socio-economic context discussed 
in chapter two, while constraining for women in many ways, may also offer an 
excellent opportunity to begin articulating “counter truths” which could serve 
to unsettle current gender arrangements. These are only some possible 
avenues of further inquiry and action suggested by my exploratory study 
amongst a limited number of women in several communities in Cairo. Further 
micro-level research on women's daily struggles and practices in different 
settings in Egypt is clearly needed.
Theoretically, the approach suggested in this thesis can further our 
understanding of how certain aspects of social reality are more contestable 
than others, and how women in different socio-economic and historical 
contexts have different layers of apprehension of social reality. Such 
apprehension is not static, but changes with changing circumstances. Some 
of the important questions thus become when and at what point are different 
aspects of social reality perceived as unjust? When and at what points do 
aspects of social reality appear as natural, as what Bourdieu would term 
"doxa", and thus are incontestable (See also Kandiyoti, 1998). What makes 
the accessible so inaccessible? Finally, what does this tell us about how 
power relations operate, the ways in they are perpetuated, and the ways in 
which they could be transformed?
In an attempt to combine my theoretical concerns with my more 
practical activist goals, I want to offer a new concept which may provide a 
way forward to thinking about, and challenging gender inequalities. This is 
the concept of "organic feminism", a concept that I have coined, borrowing
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from Gramsci. Although Gramsci developed the concept of the “organic 
intellectual" in a different context2, I think it may, nonetheless, be interesting 
to think of a parallel concept with regards to feminist activism. I do not 
propose to use it in exactly the same way, as I am not talking about "organic 
feminists" (focusing on the actors), rather I aim to pursue the articulation of 
an "organic feminism", or "organic feminist agendas", i.e., focusing on the 
issues.
The term “organic feminism” seems to me a much better one than that 
of the class and context free term of "indigenous" feminism, which is used to 
denote activism and scholarship in third world countries. For example, as 
seen in chapter six, there is not one ‘indigenous ‘ view of women’s interests 
within marriage in Egypt, but several; not one response to cope with women’s 
subordinate positions and vulnerability in marriage, but many. The public 
discussion regarding the new marriage contract referred to in chapter six, and 
the findings regarding the ayma put into question the homogenising term of 
“indigenous”, as they reveal that the meaning of marriage itself varies 
significantly between women of different classes, and even amongst the 
middle classes themselves. A concept such as organic feminism also allows 
us to get away from the dichotomies and essentialism of concepts such as 
"western" versus "indigenous", which have plagued feminist scholarship for 
so long. Organic feminism suggests that in within any context, a sustainable 
and effective way to mobilise a broad constituency of women and thus to 
advance the goals of challenging gender inequalities and socio-economic
2 Gramsci developed the concept in the context of his thinking about the relationship 
between civil society and the state. He argued that the transformation of civil 
society must precede a socialist seizure of state power. Gramsci argued that it 
would be erroneous to set up hierarchical, centralised structures that are not in 
touch with the everyday realities of the masses and that are alienated from 
historically evolving grassroots organisations. While the popular classes may not 
espouse a pure revolutionary consciousness, they could be transformed though 
the organic dialectical interaction with “organic” intellectuals. For Gramsci, the 
concept of the organic intellectual thus linked the intellectual sphere with popular 
consciousness. He argued that it is only through the mediating role of organic 
intellectuals, intellectuals who are an organic part the daily realities of a 
community, and who are able to articulate new visions within the shared symbols 
of a larger culture, that Marxism could be truly become a “counter hegemonic” 
force (See Boggs, 1976).
329
injustices may be to invest more time and effort in making agendas of social 
change more "organic".
By “organic”, I mean more than “bottom up”, as it is now used in 
development discourse. Rather, I use the term in the Gramscian sense to 
refer to a dialectical and evolving process of dialogue and interaction 
amongst different groups of women in different locations, all of whom may 
have legitimate priorities and concerns. This is not a linear process, as the 
term “bottom up” implies, but rather a self-questioning, contradictory and 
dialectical one that acknowledges the inherent power inequalities amongst 
the different actors, is open to learning about their different perspectives, and 
is committed to seeking possible common grounds for action. Such a 
process would eventually result in the articulation of an agenda that is 
shaped by a more diverse set of concerns which reflect the shifting realities 
of women’s daily lives in different socio-economic contexts; an agenda which 
does not, apriori, disregard or marginalize the concerns of any group. As 
the data shows, women's priorities agendas and strategies for change in 
Egypt may vary significantly on some issues and may overlap on others. An 
“organic feminism” does not dismiss the important role of intellectual 
feminists, nor disregards their ideas, but argues that their roles needs to shift 
to that of learners, catalysts and mobilizers, rather than agenda setters.
My preference for a concept such as organic feminism, rather than that 
of "participatory" or ’bottom up" feminism, is thus partly because the latter 
concepts do not adequately capture the dialogue and dialectic process 
implied in the concept of “organic feminism”. Moreover, because a concept 
such as “organic feminism” is a more overtly political one, it may not be as 
easily appropriated by institutions across the political spectrum (as is 
currently the case with the concept of “participatory development”, for 
example), and thus become abused or devoid of its content. Rather, the 
concept of “organic feminism” can remain one that is espoused by 
organisations which have an explicit interest in addressing gender 
inequalities, and unequal power structures more generally.
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Moreover, such a concept can reach out to a broader segment of 
feminist intellectuals, whose professional background is not in development 
work, and who are thus often unaware of, or sceptical about, concepts such 
as "bottom up or "participatory" emerging from development discourse. This 
is certainly the case with many of the key actors in the "women's movement" 
in Egypt—who, despite their common middle class affiliation--, come from 
diverse educational and political backgrounds, such as social development 
work, law, and human rights activism. In some ways, the concept of organic 
feminism is a more inclusive one, which could facilitate the forging of both 
horizontal and vertical alliances amongst women.
Promoting such a concept, however, will be no easy task. Developing 
anything organic implies first a total decomposition3, it requires that as 
middle and upper class, intellectual feminists, we are ready to completely 
‘decompose’, that is, to take apart and radically rethink our current ideas and 
approaches to addressing gender inequalities, to be open to experimentation 
and conscious social learning, and to allow new visions to start evolving 
based on a much stronger dialogue with women in diverse social locations4' 
A further challenge is that there maybe few popular organisations 
representative of different groups of women, through which such a 
transformatory dialogue can begin to take place. Nonetheless, women’s 
formal and informal institutions and networks do exist, and while many may 
be neither be representative or strong, some may nonetheless present 
possible platforms for engagement.
Clearly I offer this concept in a speculative, probing and searching 
mode. I realise that it will require more theoretical work to develop it further.
3 I am grateful to my Ph.D. colleague from the Philippines, Albert Alejo for making 
this point when I was trying out the concept on him many months ago.
4 Although arguing for respecting diversity amongst women, 1 am clearly taking a 
position that departs from that adopted by both so called “cultural feminists” or 
“deconstructionists”, for whom the issue of “difference” is also of paramount 
importance. Rather, I agree with Goetz who has argued that despite the diversity 
of women’s interests, accounts and identities, “some accounts are vitally more true 
than others”, and, that as feminists, we must strive for establishing “some 
minimalist, but objective, grounds on which to distinguish between the truth and 
falsity of divergent interpretations of the world” (Goetz, 1991:149).
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Perhaps "organic feminism" may not be a workable concept. Perhaps it is 
impossible to develop a feminist agenda broad enough to accommodate 
diversity without losing its basic principles of human rights and justice, an 
agenda that is “diverse”, but not so “fragmented” that it loses any possibilities 
for action, or lends itself to easy manipulation by those in power. As Goetz 
argues:
“there is a fine divide between diversity and fragmentation, and 
it is a divide that can be widened by development planners who 
feel unwilling to accommodate women’s concerns The 
apparatus of domination has always been able to benefit from 
maximum differentiation. It can accommodate—and has done, 
as the history of WID has show—separate spaces for 
potentially divisive differences much more easily than it can 
stomach a genuine inclusion of difference” (1991:146).
Aware of these difficulties, an approach that furthers the concept of 
"organic feminism”, may nonetheless be worth a chance. The data presented 
in this thesis lends some reason for optimism as it demonstrates that despite 
differences amongst women in Egypt, there were also important areas of 
possible overlap. These could provide a practical springboard towards the 




Population of Egypt*, 1937-1995
Population of Egypt and the percentage living 








1937 15,921 28.2 71.8
1947 18,967 33.5 66.5
1960 26,085 38.2 61.8
1966 30,076 40.0 58.8
1976 36,626 43.8 56.2
1986 48,254 44.0 56.0
1995 58,978 U U
U = Unknown
* Source: CAPMAS, 1995, table 1.7
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Table (2)
An Example of an Ayma
Amal's ayma (Married in 1995 and divorced in 1996)
Serial Number Description of item Value (LE)
1 5 2 bracelets 21 K gold, 40grms 1 gold 
wedding band, 2grms
2 1 Bedroom with cupboard, 8 pieces 
made of wood
4,500
3 1 "modern" parlor, 3 pieces 1,000
4 1 Wooden cupboard 350
5 1 Set of plastic plates and tea cups, il- 
Sherif brand
140
6 1 Set of Aluminum pots and pans, 14 
pieces
80
7 1 Small electric heater, Olympic brand 50
8 1 Small electric mixer Molynex make* 150
9 1 6 foot refrigerator, ideal brand** 650
10 1 Oven with four torches, "United 
Manufacturers” brand**
750
11 1 Washing machine, ideal brand** 450
Total 16 16 Items that cost LE 8,470, 
exclusive of the gold items
8470
★ This is an imported item







URBAN GOVERNORATES LOWER EGYPT UPPER EGYPT FRONTIER GOVEI
1 Cairo 5 Damietta 14 Giza 22 New Valley
2 Alexandria 6 Dakahlia 15 Beni Suef 23 Matrouh
3 Port Said 7 Sharkia 16 Fayoum 24 North Sinai
4 Suez 8 Kalyubia 17 Menya 25 South Sinai
9 Kafr El-Sheikh 18 Assiut 26 Red Sea
10 Gharbia 19 Souhag
11 Menoufia 20 Qena











Description of Study Population
Number of households visited: 46
Number of women interviewed: 88
Number of men interviewed: 12
Number of workshop visited: 17






Abandoned (not legally divorced) 5
Divorced 4
Total 88
All the men in my sample were married 
** This figure includes those who are informally engaged, as well as those 
who have read the fat-ha, but who have not yet had a formal 
engagement party, shabka
Occupational Status of female Population
Occupational Category Frequency
Piece-worker 25
Middle woman (for piece-work) 5
Wage labourer 26
Self Employed (vendors, grocers, recycling) 14
Student 2
Not Working for an income 9
Government employees 2
Local clerical jobs (with local clinics, Pharmacy, 
Mosque and NGOs) 5
Total 88
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Occupational Status of male Population
Occupational category Frequency





Educational Status of female Population
Educational category Frequency
Illiterate 63
Completed 6th grade* 12
Completed preparatory school 6
Completed secondary school 7
Total 88
Either through the formal school system or through certified literacy 
classes.
Educational status of male Population
Educational category Frequency
Illiterate 5
Primary School degree 2




Sample Population by type of Household







Three sets of issues guided my discussions and in-depth interviews. 
First, there was a set of issues related to women and men's roles and 
behaviour. This included questions such as: what are the distinct roles and 
responsibilities of women and men, at different phases in their life cycle, both 
in the household and in the workplace? How are different household 
responsibilities divided and negotiated? how does women's roles as paid 
workers, interact with, and affect, their roles as mothers, wives and 
daughters?
Second, there was a set of issues related to beliefs and expectations. 
Some of the questions included: What does the widely quoted Arabic idiom: 
II sit wa il raagil raagil (a man is a man and a woman is a woman) currently 
men to both men and women? What are the prevailing beliefs and norms 
about maleness and femaieness and to what extent are these shared by both 
men and women? How does this vary by age? How are these beliefs related 
to actual behaviour? How are discrepancies between commonly held beliefs 
and observed/actual behaviour explained?
Third, there was a set of questions related to patterns of negotiation 
and bargaining. Some of the questions included: What kinds of constraints 
are currently operating on women? How do different women perceive those 
constraints? how does this differ according to age, life cycle and pattern of 
employment? To what extent and in what ways are women attempting to 
shape, create, negotiate, accommodate, resist or challenge the current 
gender arrangements? What are the specific symbols and contents of 
women's and men's power? What are the various bases, sources and usage 
of this power? What are the symbols and contents of women and men's 
subordination? how do women seek to influence or control men, or other 
women in the process of negotiating relations? What types of community 
networks for women currently exist? What role do they play in mediating and
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negotiating gender relations and expectations? Are new possibilities for 
resistance opening up for women? Who are the women who are more likely 
to engage in such resistance? Who are the men who are likely to be sought 
out as allies?
For each set of arrangements that I proposed to investigate, I also 
formulated some more specific guiding questions. With regards to marriage 
and the conjugal contract, questions were sub-divided into three components; 
questions related to pre-marital standards and expectations, marital conflicts, 
and resource allocation. With regards to the first component, pre-marital 
standards and expectations, questions included: How are decisions about 
marriage taken? To what extent are women involved in the choice of 
spouse? Why do women get married? What are the implications of not 
getting married? Who is involved in negotiating marriages? What are the 
terms of the marriage contract? Do defloration ceremonies take place? 
What are their implications? Are women circumcised? Why? Why not? How 
are decisions regarding circumcision negotiated?
With regards to the second component, marital conflicts and sexuality, 
questions included; What are the expectations of men and women regarding 
the initiation and frequency of sexual relations? How common are extra­
marital relations and how are these perceived by men and women? How is 
polygamy viewed? To what extent do women perceive it as a threat? Is wife 
beating prevalent? accepted? Under what conditions is it justified? Under 
what conditions is it not accepted? How is it resisted? What are the main 
causes of marital conflicts? How does the construction of femininity and 
masculinity mediate the way in which such conflicts are perceived, negotiated 
and resolved?
With regards to the third component, resource allocation and 
budgetary control, questions included: Who pays for what and how is this 
determined or negotiated? What happens when household expenses cannot 
be met? What is the extent of intra-household cooperation or conflicts 
regarding resource allocation? How are items, and individuals prioritized? 
How are decisions regarding savings, investments and expenditures taken? 
To what extent is masculinity related to the concept of breadwinner and
341
provider? What are the implications of men not being able to provide for their 
families? What are the implications of women being the main breadwinners? 
What forms of extra-household forms of financial cooperation and support 
that exist? What roles do women and men play in such networks and how 
does their participation affect their ability to negotiate within the household?
With regards to the second set of arrangements that I proposed to 
investigate, that is, gender relations in the informal labour market, questions 
included: Why are women working? Who took the decision to work? How 
do women find out about job opportunities? Through their husbands? Other 
women? What is considered proper women’s work and why? What are the 
conditions of work and what is the role of gender in defining pay levels and 
terms of employment? How are wages negotiated? How are earnings spent 
and invested? What problems are women currently facing as paid workers? 
How are they trying to address these problems? If they had a choice, would 
women still be working? Would they want their daughters to work? In the 
same type of job as themselves? Why? Why not?
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